The Nuclear Football

The Real Story of the “Football” That Follows the President Everywhere

Take a peek at the mysterious black briefcase that has accompanied every U.S. president since John F. Kennedy

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/real-story-football-follows-president-everywhere-180952779/

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From the Smithsonian National Museum of American History, the nuclear "Football." (Jamie Chung)

By Michael Dobbs

SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE | 

OCTOBER 2014

It is the closest modern-day equivalent of the medieval crown and scepter—a symbol of supreme authority. Accompanying the commander in chief wherever he goes, the innocuous-looking briefcase is touted in movies and spy novels as the ultimate power accessory, a doomsday machine that could destroy the entire world.

Officially known as the “president’s emergency satchel,” the so-called nuclear “Football”—portable and hand-carried—is built around a sturdy aluminum frame, encased in black leather. A retired Football, emptied of its top-secret inner contents, is currently on display at the Smithsonian National Museum of American History. “We were looking for something that would demonstrate the incredible military power and responsibilities of the president, and we struck upon this iconic object,” says curator Harry Rubenstein.

Contrary to popular belief, the Football does not actually contain a big red button for launching a nuclear war. Its primary purpose is to confirm the president’s identity, and it allows him to communicate with the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon, which monitors worldwide nuclear threats and can order an instant response. The Football also provides the commander in chief with a simplified menu of nuclear strike options—allowing him to decide, for example, whether to destroy all of America’s enemies in one fell swoop or to limit himself to obliterating only Moscow or Pyongyang or Beijing.

Although its origins remain highly classified, the Football can be traced back to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Privately, John F. Kennedy believed that nuclear weapons were, as he put it, “only good for deterring.” He also felt it was “insane that two men, sitting on opposite sides of the world, should be able to decide to bring an end to civilization.” Horrified by the doctrine known as MAD (mutually assured destruction), JFK ordered locks to be placed on nuclear weapons and demanded alternatives to the “all or nothing” nuclear war plan.

A declassified Kennedy memo documents the concerns that led to the invention of the Football as a system for verifying the identity of the commander in chief. The president posed the following chilling, but commonsense, questions:

“What would I say to the Joint War Room to launch an immediate nuclear strike?”

“How would the person who received my instructions verify them?”

According to former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the Football acquired its name from an early nuclear war plan code-named “Dropkick.” (“Dropkick” needed a “football” in order to be put into effect.) The earliest known photograph of a military aide trailing the president with the telltale black briefcase (a modified version of a standard Zero-Halliburton model) was taken on May 10, 1963, at the Kennedy family compound in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts. Since 1963, the Football has become a staple of presidential trips, and was even photographed in Red Square in May 1988, accompanying President Ronald Reagan on a state visit to the Soviet Union. (Reagan’s Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, was accompanied by a military aide who was clutching a very similar device, known in Russian as the chemodanchik, or “little briefcase.”)

A recurring complaint of presidents and military aides alike has been that the Football, which currently weighs around 45 pounds, contains too much documentation. President Jimmy Carter, who had qualified as a nuclear submarine commander, was aware that he would have only a few minutes to decide how to respond to a nuclear strike against the United States. Carter ordered that the war plans be drastically simplified. A former military aide to President Bill Clinton, Col. Buzz Patterson, would later describe the resulting pared-down set of choices as akin to a “Denny’s breakfast menu.” “It’s like picking one out of Column A and two out of Column B,” he told the History Channel.

The first unclassified reference to the existence of the Football is contained in a formerly top-secret memorandum from 1965 obtained by the National Security Archive of George Washington University. Tasked with reducing the weight of the Football, a senior defense official agreed this was a worthy goal, but added, “I am sure we can find strong couriers who are capable of carrying an additional pound or two of paper.”

For the Football to function as designed, the military aide must be nearby the commander in chief at all times and the president must be in possession of his authentication codes. Both elements of the system have failed on occasion. According to the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Hugh Shelton, Clinton mislaid his laminated code card, nicknamed the “Biscuit,” for several months in 2000. “This is a big deal, a gargantuan deal,” the general complained in his 2010 autobiography, Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior.

An even closer brush with disaster came during the attempted assassination of Reagan in March 1981. During the chaos that followed the shooting, the military aide was separated from the president, and did not accompany him to the George Washington University hospital. In the moments before Reagan was wheeled into the operating theater, he was stripped of his clothes and other possessions. The Biscuit was later found abandoned, unceremoniously dumped in a hospital plastic bag. It seems unlikely that a crown or scepter would have been treated so cavalierly.

About Michael Dobbs

Michael Dobbs is a former Washington Post reporter and foreign correspondent in Italy and the former Yugoslavia, best known for his Cold War coverage. Dobbs is the author of the Cold War Trilogy, which includes Six Months in 1945, One Minute to Midnight and Down with Big Brother.

LeMay's Ghostwriter MacKinlay Kantor

MacKinlay Kantor – “…He ghostwrote Geneeral Curtis LeMay’s memoirs, penning the famous words ‘We’re going to bomb them back into theStone Age….”

This Book: https://www.amazon.com/Mission-LeMay-My-Story-Curtis/dp/B0006BN17W

Mission With Lemay: My Story by Curtis E. Lemay and MacKinlay Kantor is the personal and outspoken story of a history making General Curtis E. Lemay. His military contributions were enormous. His firebombing campaign against Janpan between March 1945 and the Japanese surrender in August 1945 may have killed more than 500,000 Japanese civilians. He said, "if the US lost the war he fully expected to be tried for war crimes". After the war, he unintentionally iniated the Berlin Airlift, then reorganized the Strategic Air Command (SAC) into an effective instrument of nuclear war.

[LeMay spoke at Ohio State graduation in 1962. Can anyone get a copy of his speech?]

 Review:

LeMay is the most important figure in 20th Century warfare. He transformed warfare from a surface conflict between armies and navies slugging it out toe to toe into a three-dimensional conflict in which air forces of incredible power could appear anywhere on the face of the earth and determine the fate of nations, ideologies, and millions of people.

This is a surprisingly well written book, considering it is a military memoir. The brilliant McKinley Kantor was the ghost writer, and you can tell when Kantor takes the typewriter to himself as the story smooths out and becomes hypnotic. But the majority of the work is in LeMay's voice, and it is raw and gripping as you come to terms with firebombing cities and killing millions. At times, the book dries out as LeMay gets into the minutia of building a modern Air Force during the 1950s and early 1960s. But everything in this book builds upon the theme of the work, something that could be call the "LeMay Doctrine" - that when it comes time to fight, hit them with everything you've got and get the damned thing over with. Even the tediousness of Wherry and Capehart Housing Bills in congress suddenly become important to the story, and seem to fit somehow.

This is a memoir, but at the time it was written it proved the saying "history is written by the winners". In just 20 years, LeMay had taken a good air force and made it invincible. Like it or not, in the days before ICBMs, the ability of the USAF to penetrate any defence and nuke any opponent back to the stone age (something LeMay claims he never said) was the only thing that kept America from being attacked. LeMay's book explains the ruthlessness required to make not just that transformation, but instill that willingness to kill millions without remorse. Anyone who is interested in understanding that transformation and mindset must read this book. Likewise, anyone who looks at Iraq and Afghanistan in 2008 and wonders "WTF, over?" must read this book - it provides a currently politically unacceptable explanation of why we are failing today.

Of course the book also describes the birth of air power, the trials and tribulations of WWII, and has enough politics to challenge conventional thinking on the Truman and Johnson administrations' decisions leading to the debacles of Korea and Vietnam. Of course, as a memoir, it must be read with skepticism as well. For example, LeMay was USAFE when the Soviets blockaded Berlin, and in the beginning of the Airlift applied procedures suitable for bombing operations, which did not work very well. He was quickly replaced with a transportation expert, and of course glosses over that significant failure of his command.

As I re-read this book almost four decades after I first read it, I found it to be as pertinent today as I found it then. I first read this book in 1970 as an Air Force ROTC cadet, during the Vietnam conflict, and it made a permanent impression on my thinking about what would become my profession. LeMay wrote this book just after he was fired as CSAF, making him the only true hero among Flag Officers in the Vietnam Conflict. He stood up to Lyndon Johnson and told him to apply overwhelming force and end the war, and he would not stop saying it. As a result Johnson fired him in 1964. For the next 8 years, every other Flag Officer remembered the lesson of LeMay's dismissal, saluted smartly, and sent tens of thousands of Americans to die needlessly in that war, along with hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Asians.

Personally, I waited four years for Nixon to implement his "secret plan" to end the war, and when it failed to materialize, I decided in 1972 to vote for another bomber pilot, George McGovern, for President. Despite their political differences, LeMay and McGovern thought alike about that war, and undoubtably any war. Either win it as quickly as possible with overwhelming force, or get out of it. I think LeMay would have understood my vote.

Why is that important? Because ever since this book was published in 1964, when LeMay's advice was acted upon, that particular war was ended quickly with the least amount of death. When he was ignored, the war went on and on and on and on, with endless casualty lists.

This book explains in detail what could be called the "LeMay Doctrine". Unlike the "Powell Doctrine", LeMay did not dabble in the political realm until after he retired (after this book was published) and his place on George Wallace's 1968 ticket effectively polluted his legacy. However, if one can read this book without constantly asking "What were you thinking, Curtis?" I think it will reveal some lasting truths about power, organization, and military operations that are as true today as they were in the days of iron men in aluminum airplanes over Hitler's Fortress Europe or Hiroshima.

The Most Famous Writer Who Ever Lived: A True Story of My Family (Hardcover)

By Tom Shroder

“A grandson of writer MacKinlay Kantor unravels the tangles of his grandfather's life and finds many of those same threads (the good, the bad, the ugly) in his own…A compelling account, suffused with both sympathy and sharpness, of a writer who's mostly forgotten and of a grandson who's grateful.”—Kirkus Reviews

An award-winning veteran of The Washington Post and The Miami Herald, Tom Shroder has made a career of investigative journalism and human-interest stories, from those of children who claim to have memories of past lives, in his book Old Souls, to that of a former Marine suffering from debilitating PTSD and his doctor pioneering a successful psychedelic drug treat­ment in Acid Test. Shroder’s most fascinating subject, however, comes from within his own family: his grandfather MacKinlay Kantor was the world-famous author of Andersonville, the seminal novel about the Civil War. As a child, Shroder was in awe of his grandfather’s larger-than-life character. Kantor’s friends included Ernest Hemingway, Carl Sandburg, Gregory Peck, and James Cagney. He was an early mentor to the novelist John D. MacDonald and is cred­ited with discovering the singer Burl Ives. Kantor wrote the novel Glory for Me, which became the multi-Oscar-winning film The Best Years of Our Lives. He ghostwrote General Curtis LeMay’s memoirs, penning the infamous words “We’re going to bomb them back into the Stone Age,” referring to North Vietnam. Kantor also suffered from alcoholism, an outsize ego, and an abusive and publicly embarrassing personality where his family was concerned; he blew through several small fortunes in his lifetime, and died nearly destitute. In The Most Famous Writer Who Ever Lived, Shroder revisits the past—Kantor’s upbringing, his early life, his career trajectory— and writes not just the life story of one man but a meditation on fame, family secrets and legacies, and what is remembered after we are gone.

About the Author

---

Tom Shroder is an award-winning journalist, editor, and author of Old Souls and Acid Test, a transformative look at the therapeutic powers of psychedelic drugs in the treatment of PTSD. As editor of The Washington Post Magazine, he conceived and edited two Pulitzer Prize–winning feature stories. His most recent editing project, Overwhelmed: Work, Love, and Play When No One Has the Time, by Brigid Schulte, was a New York Times best seller.

1956 Milsco M13 Aircrewman Holster/Sling

Sling on the rifle found in the TSBD Nov. 22, 1963

WTS Rare 1956 NOS Milsco M13 Aircrewman Holster/Sling & Original Box - Oswald JFK

I have a rare NOS (new old stock) 1956 Milsco (Milwaukee Saddlery Company) USAF M13 Aircrewman revolver holster/sling (produced in 1956 for the United States Air Force Smith & Wesson .38 Aircrewman revolvers).

Also included is the original 1956 Milsco box and the original string that was tied around the assembly when I removed it from the box.

Lee Harvey Oswald used a sling exactly like this on his 6.5 Carcano rifle that he allegedly used to assassinate President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963 in Dallas, Texas.

As the K-38 Combat Masterpiece, this revolver was first purchased in 1956 for the Strategic Air Command Elite Guard of the United States Air Force (USAF). From 1960 - 1969 the Air Force bought large numbers of Model 15-1, 15-2, and 15-3 revolvers with a 4" barrel. The only distinctiving markings are "U.S.A.F" on the left side of the frame. Originally all were blued, though some were reparkerized (see parkerizing) while in Air Force Service.The Model 15 was the standard issue sidearm of the U.S. Air Force Air/Security Police from 1962 until 1992. It was also issued to security personnel in other branches of the U.S. armed forces, including the Naval Security Forces (NSF).

You have an example of one of the variations of the holster designed by Norris Murray. A US patent on this design was granted in January, 1958. Murray was from Dayton, OH and is believed to have been employed by the USAF at Wright Patterson AFB.

The two inch version of this holster is usually encountered in black leather and is marked on the flap USAF. It was intended to carry the Colt and Smith & Wesson .38 Special Aircrewman revolvers. The four inch version was intended for the S&W .38 Special revolvers with fixed sights. These holsters were manufactured by MILSCO, formerly known as Milwaukee Saddlery. The brown variation is encountered much less frequently than the black.

I have examples of the two inch and four inch holsters in black and brown in my collection. All are marked USAF on the flap, and I have a couple of others that are not marked at all, similar to your example. The attached pic of one of mine shows a brown two inch version marked USAF.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v146/Ordnanceguy/Holsters/ACholster004.jpg

Your example is particularly nice because it is complete by having the shoulder strap. Quite often these are found with the shoulder strap missing.

Again, while I can't be certain I would say that without the USAF marking your example is probably a civilian version rather than military. Either way it is a beautiful holster.

Charlie Flick

THE COLT AIRCREWMAN SPECIAL: THE ALL ALUMINUM .38 CALIBER

by Chris Eger   

https://www.guns.com/news/2013/02/06/the-colt-aircrewman-special-the-all-aluminum-38-caliber

In the early 1950s, the newly born US Air Force needed a brave new handgun for its atomic cowboys. The main thing, for better or worse, was that the gun be lightweight. The solution, in classic 1950s style, was aluminum Aircrewman revolver, which, much like a lot of 1950s style was both a success and a failure at the same time.

US Air Force Pilot with Aircrewman revolver.

In World War 1, pilots and aircrew often found themselves lost, crashed, or shot down in areas that were less than friendly. This led to those daring young aviators to begin carrying handguns and in some cases rifles with them for those unexpected stops. Throughout World War 2, US Army Air corps, personnel and glider pilots often carried full sized .38 revolvers of various manufacturers supported by the occasional M-1 carbine.

In 1947, the US Air Force was carved off from the Army and the new brass realized the need for a modern space age handgun for the occasional aircrew emergency, survival situations, and nuclear weapon’s security breach. In a time where every ounce of weight was sliced from huge bombers like the Convair B-36 “Peacemaker” to allow them to carry atomic weapons to the Soviet Union, the watch word was ‘lightweight.’

Design of the Aircrewman

Colt answered this call for a small and effective, but super lightweight handgun, with a modified version of their then-new Cobra line of snub-nosed revolvers.  It was named the Aircrewman.

Colt Aircrewman.

The Cobra itself was a revamp of the company’s earlier 1927-era Detective Special. Both were ‘D-frame’ six shot .38-specials with small profile rounded butts and 2-inch barrels. To carve weight away from the Cobra, Colt used space age aluminum for the frame and cylinder instead of the normal ordanance grade steel.

The Cobra already used an aluminum side plate, but to throw out all of the steel except in the barrel and replace it with the wondermetal was a bold step forward. To be safe, the Air Force used low-pressure rounds instead of commercial .38 SPL loads.

Whereas the Detective Special was 21-ounces and the Cobra was 16-ounces, the superlight Aircrewman tipped the scales at just 11-ounces with six rounds of 38-Special loaded. In comparison with the snubs of today, the 5-shot, S&W 637 Airweight comes in at 13.5. So yeah, the Aircrewman was about as light as you could get.

Colt made just 1189 of these guns in 1950-51. Records from Colt show that some 1,123 were shipped to the US Air Force from 12/21/1950- 4/23/1952. The largest lot of these, some 255 revolvers, was sent to Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska in 1951. This is not unexpected as at the time Offutt was home to the bombers of the US Strategic Air Command, whose crews sat on constant ramp alert to scramble towards the Soviet Union with a cargo of atomic weapons.

Recall and destruction

Besides the Colts, between 1953-54, Smith and Wesson produced about 40,000 aluminum framed M-13 snub-nosed pistols to augment the small numbers of Aircrewmen in circulation. 

Colt Aircrewman at Springfield Armory Museum.

130-grain jacketed round nosed bullet grew scarce, users loaded their aluminum guns with full power stuff. This turned a couple of them into small hand grenades and kabooms were quickly reported.  In October 1959, both the Colts and the Smiths were recalled to their depots and crushed, their frames deemed unsafe.

To quote the USAF order at the time, “Because of the peculiarities of the M13 revolver, i.e., requirement for special ammunition, limited use and potential danger if used for other than the purpose for which it was designed, all M13 revolvers excess to Air Force requirements will be mutilated to prevent further use as a weapon. Residue will be disposed of as scrap.”

Though most ended up demolished, a few guns, already in the hands of retired flight officers escaped the wholesale slaughter.  Steel framed S&W 10s, 12s and 15s replaced them and kept aircrews company until as late as the 1990s.

Collectability Today

Today it is thought that less than fifty surviving Colt Aircrewmen exist. Many of these are in museums such as the Autry, and the Springfield Armory Museum but a few are in private circulation. To say they are counted as one of the most collectable of all Colt revolvers is something of an understatement.

One Colt Aircrewman recently sold for over $25,000 at auction. Of course, it was serial

On authentic Aircrewman pistols, “Property of US Air Force” is marked along the backstrap.

numbered AF-1 and had been presented to General Vandenberg, but still it shows that the market is there for these once derided guns. Even unexceptional guns bring $3000-4000 due to their sheer rarity.

With prices such as these, it’s not hard to see why a few bad eggs try to fake them.  Always be wary when trying to buy the real deal. Sometimes Colt Cobras or Detective Special, worth about $300, are converted with fake serial numbers in the proper range and markings and given real or reproduced Aircrewman grips (stripped off many models before melting) to be passed off on unsuspecting buyers.

So, how do you spot a fake?  First, the frames and cylinders has to be aluminum, not steel. If either attracts a magnet, watch out as this Aircrewman is anything but. The barrel will be steel and marked as such. . 

Aircrewman fell in the Colt serial number range between.

On the buttstrap of real Aircrewmen here will be a USAF-issued serial number between AF-1 and AF-1189.

2901LW and 7775LW. All authentic models will fall in this range. ‘Property of US Air Force” is marked along the backstrap and on the buttstrap is a second, USAF-issued serial number between “AF-1” and “AF-1189.” The original grips had silver buttons with the USAF crest inlaid in them. Remember, this was the big blue wonder of Curtis Lemay, and he expected his new service to have a little panache.

The original craft paper box, cleaning rod, and desiccant pack, all add to the value as does any documentation that supports how it escaped the great alumi-gun melt down of the Kennedy era.

Occasionally one will show up without the Air Force markings, which isn’t unusual if a new owner feared its legality and ground them off. In these cases, have the gun checked by an expert knowledgeable in Colts and always get a letter from Colt themselves vouching for the gun’s serial number.

Sgt Neutron

The Air Force also issued the S&W model 56. Disappointed with the Lightweight aluminum cylinder/frames of the light weight revolvers, the Air force contracted with S&W to produce a small revolver that was more durable. The Model 56 was an adjustable sight 2" barrel K-Frame revolver with a 6 shot cylinder. Normally adjustable sight S&W revolvers have a grooved back strap & barrel rib. The only exceptions to this rule are the Model 28 Highway Patrolman & the Model 56. The model 56 was only produced for the USAF, and were marked with "US" on the back strap. Today they are extremely rare on the civilian market, and when encountered for sale, are usually in the $5,000 range. I was stationed on Titan 2 crew in the early 80's, and each silo had 4 Model 56's in the weapons cabinet (one for each crewmember). They were worn by the two officer crewmembers when anyone other than the crew was on site (i.e. maintenance). The two enlisted rarely wore sidearms.

We qualified on the 4" Model 15 revolvers, and as such the Model 56's remained in good shape, having rarely (if ever) been shot. As aircrew in the late 1980's, on alert aircraft, S&W Model 15's were issued with the gunbox staying on the aircraft (we never wore them on alert). During the Gulf War, many personal sidearms were carried, as some units did not have enough to issue (this was about the time that the USAF was transitioning from the various revolvers to the M-9 Beretta, so there may have been a situation where the old ones were returned to depot, but new ones hadn't arrived). So, if the unit didn't issue, guys simply grabbed their personal pistol and a shoulder holster and off they went. There was a rumor that a F-16 unit at Shaw AFB was about to deploy in to the Gulf, but didn't have ANY sidearms for the pilots, so the Squadron Commander went to a local gun store, and used the Squadron Gov't. purchase card to equip his pilots with Glock 19's.

Some years ago when in competitive shooting I recall talking in the pits to an older guy who had served in the Pre 1968 Air Force when Curtis Lemay's influence was at its peak.

Curtis Lemay was an advocate of Air Force personnel being very well trained in small arms, and as such was a driving force in the AR15 design, survival arms and Air force competition. I recall the guys saying if you were in completion you got a standard competition kit from the Air Force with a M1 APG, 30-06 M70 target rifle .22 cal M52 rifle and various pistols for NRA 3 gun (.45. center-fire and .22)2700 course.

I seem to recall this fellow saying, (though I am at the age my memory is not always 100% reliable) that the Air Force use of revolvers in this period was because Lemay liked revolvers and believed they could be shot much more accurately than the rebuilt model 1911 pistols that the Air force could get from the department of the Army.

I also seem to recall that at least officers and possibly airmen on the big bombers (B36, B52) could carry their own pistols as long as they were 38 special or .45ACP. That might be wrong, he might have said they could use their own pistols in competition, but the reason I think I was amazed is that this was after the first gulf war, and at that time (1991) no arm was allowed for use by soldiers that was not government property. So I am pretty sure he said personal owned arms were allowed by crewmen in the Air Force in the 1950s/60s, but I am not sure.

I did know a Navy helicopter pilot who in the 1980s while in Honduras keep a personnel owned stainless S&W as his side arm, though the mode I do not recall. So the practice may have been larger than just the Air Force, I do not know.

I do have an Air Force completion arm manual form 1959 and it lists the following arms as Air Force competitive issue:

.22 cal High Standard Supermatic
.22 cal Ruger MK I (target model, barrel 6-7/8")
.38 SP S&W masterpiece (model 14, I think)

From an October 1971 manual:

Colt Gold cup (.45ACP)
Colt Gold cup (.38 Automatic)
.22 cal High standard Supermatic tournament
.22 Cal S&W model 41
.22 Cal S&W model 46
.38 Cal Automatic Model 52

In the early days following WWII when the Army Air Corps became the USAF, they used the .45 auto, S&W Model 12 and S&W Model 15. The Model 15 became the preferred standard issue and was used by both air crews and the USAF Security force that guarded SAC bases and nuclear storage bunkers.

In later years the Beretta M9 became standard, with probably some other weapon, probably a Sig model used by intelligence people.

Over the years, you can bet that any American made .38 revolver was used in some quantity by some users with special needs.

Following post-war military practice, when a smaller or special unit needed a special gun, the government just bought them commercially with no attempt to make them an "issue" gun.

As example, I've seen video of SAC missile bunker crews wearing S&W Model 36, Model 60 stainless, Colt Detective Specials, and in one video a silo member wearing a 2 1/2 inch S&W Model 66 revolver.

General Lemay ordered special S&W and Colt aluminum frame and cylinder short barrel revolvers for use by SAC bomber crews. It's thought that there was a need for an especially light, small revolver because early ejection seats could throw the crewman around so violently he could be injured by a steel gun.

The Colt model was the Colt Aircrewman. S&W apparently made a "J" frame and possibly "K" frame version.

When it was discovered that the aluminum cylinders didn't stand up, all of these were recalled for destruction.

It's believed that only about 25 Colt Aircrewman revolvers escaped destruction.

So, there was a rather fine line between an official issue pistol and a limited issue gun that was just purchased as needed.

Eric Schlosser’s book “Command and Control” – “the commander and deputy commander at every Titan II site were issued .38 caliber revolvers in case an intruder penetrated the underground comlex or a crew member disobeyed orders.”

That was the holster rig we had in SAC alert aircraft. They were locked in the combat mission boxes with the mission data. You normally only saw them if you were involved in the box inventory. Otherwise the box was locked and boxcar sealed.

The holsters for the Model 13 Aircrew snubs were definitely unique.

There are a few original S&W Mod. 15 USAF revolvers out there, but not many. The originals have USAF stamped below the cylinder on the left side of the frame. They had target triggers and hammers, but the small wood grips, anyway the ones that I carried through two tours in Vietnam did have. These pistols were issused to aircrews, and some were carried in hip holsters, and some in shoulder rigs. They had commerical blue(beautiful) finishes.

When the Air Force became the Air Force after WWII they used WWII era S&W Victory Model .38 Specials and commercial Model 10's.

General Curtis LeMay wanted a light weight revolver to arm SAC crews so the Air Force had both Colt and S&W develop special aluminum framed and cylindered snubby revolvers.

All were called the "Aircrewman".

The Colt version was based on the aluminum Cobra, the S&W Model 13 Aircrewman was a "K" frame 6 shot, the so called "Baby Aircrewman" was a 5 shot aluminum "J" frame.

These aluminum cylinder guns failed to stand up to standard .38 Special ammo, so they were recalled and destroyed.
It's suspected that no more than 25 Colt Aircrewman revolvers survived destruction with no more than that of the two S&W models.

These are very valuable collectors guns so, they've been faked and counterfeited.

In the 50's the Air Force began buying the S&W Model 15 revolver to arm Air Police and air crews and these were "more or less" the standard through the Vietnam War and later.

SAC missile crews were armed with 2" barreled revolvers, some Colt's but most S&W Model 36's and later Model 60 stainless.

As the K-38 Combat Masterpiece, this revolver was first purchased in 1956 for the Strategic Air Command Elite Guard of the United States Air Force (USAF). From 1960 - 1969 the Air Force bought large numbers of Model 15-1, 15-2, and 15-3 revolvers with a 4" barrel. The only distinctiving markings are "U.S.A.F" on the left side of the frame. Originally all were blued, though some were reparkerized (see parkerizing) while in Air Force Service.[8] The Model 15 was the standard issue sidearm of the U.S. Air Force Air/Security Police from 1962 until 1992. It was also issued to security personnel in other branches of the U.S. armed forces, including the Naval Security Forces (NSF).wiki

The FBI and Treasury also issued large numbers of Model 15s back in the day.

The "Aircrewman" was a failed experiment, a K frame with an aluminum cylinder, most were destroyed and remaining examples are unsafe to shoot.

Model 15, also known as the "Combat Masterpiece":

LeMay and the CIA @ the Bay of Pigs

LEMAY AND CIA at the Bay of Pigs

BILL SIMPICH Asks: In regards to this document:

On the far right of Item #7 - Is "C Le M" - Curtis LeMay? 

Was Curtis LeMay cross-designated with the CIA, working counterintelligence?

During February 1961, Curtis LeMay had considerable time on his hands.  From 1957-1961, LeMay was the Vice Chief of Staff - he wouldn't be elevated until Thomas White retired in June 1961.   Was he cross-designated with the CIA, helping out with Air Force issues?

Look at the man I believe is Curtis Le May (C Le M) as WH/4/CI on both "line 7" and the lower right hand corner of this routing sheet.

As of Feb. 61 - Le May was a deputy - not yet on the Chiefs of Staff - I think he was itching for something to do - based on this signature, I propose that he was "cross-designated" to do Air Force counterintelligence on Cuba, and asked to weigh in on whether this airman from an air force base in Panama was a Cuban spy.

"To (WH/4/PM/REDACTED).  (Note:  We don't know the recipient, due to the redaction. Lou Napoli was a WH/4/PM, it could have been him or someone of similar rank.)

"Please file in Artime's 201.  FYI.  Letter was obtained by illegal entry and was examined by TSD/SAB; evidence of previous surreptitious entry was found.  Original letter was returned by Mr. Droller to Subject for reference while he was in DC 13 Feb 1961.  File card on author of letter in WH/4/FI/Reports. C Le M."

The man handling the letter before LeMay got it was described as "Chief of Base" in late January 1961 - I'm not sure - but it might have been David Morales. Morales signed for "Chief of Base" in May 1961.

Three observations about this letter.

1.  If you play "hangman" on the next page after the signature of "C Le M", at both of the references for the WH/4/CI officer, you have a space for twelve letters - "Curtis LeMay" fits perfectly.

2.  The L is a looped L.  Sometimes Curtis Le May signs with a looped L.   The M also looks similar.

  .  

3.  Whether or not Morales was Chief of Base in January 1961, it is uncontested that Morales was the head of CI at JMWAVE in early 1961.  The chances are high that Morales worked directly with Curtis LeMay.

Note that it appears Curtis LeMay was working WH/4/CI at extension 4448 - that number was used three months earlier by WH/4/CI Jean Pierson while working on June Cobb's file. Pierson was working with the nut from TSD - Herman Kimsey, a dangerous man.   By 2/14/61, TSD/SAB is now inspired to try to fake the letterhead and envelope for Castro himself!  

The airman LeMay was investigating during Feb. 1961 was "Jose Sarria", stationed at Albrook Air Force Base in the Canal Zone.  Can't find the document right now, but I recall that Sarria was trying to penetrate Castro's inner circle.   Sarria wrote this letter directly to Manuel Artime.   

This puts Le May directly in the path of tracking Sarria and Artime, and maybe even guiding Sarria in his penetration efforts.

The Sarria story goes up to at least 3/9/61, when C/WH/4 Jake Esterline says he has more info from Bill Pawley/QDDALE on Sarria, including a memo (possibly from Sarria) and Sarria's bio.  Sarria's bio is here - written in the handwriting of Pawley's aide "the Alligator".

The memo is of much greater import.   The memo discusses the anti-Castro forces trapped in the Escambray, fighting against 60,000 pro-Castro forces, and then has this highly provocative language:

"The situation of the combatants of the Escambray is critical, as never it has been up to now.  They are surrounded by a human wall of about 60,000 militiamen, armed to the teeth, with all kinds of equipment in excessive abundance...

"...Getting supplies by land is almost impossible as there is only one safe route and it does not lend itself to transporting equipment, only men on foot with light arms.  The supplies carried by air are insufficient and parts of the last three or four flights have come into the hands of the Government...

"...The Headquarters and the officers are desperately asking for equipment in massive doses quickly; it is estimated that they can continue to keep fighting some 20 days in the aggressive way they are doing now to great success.  After that it will be on defensive and losing ground and positions until complete annihilation occurs.  Morale is high, combative, and disciplined, for the present, but will change quickly if they cannot maintain the offensive as it is to date.  

"The time has come to carry out a great landing of men and armaments, establishing a beachhead and maintaining it by continuing to land armaments, as close as possible to Escambray.  Some place on the South Coast of the province of Santa Clara, to the south of Trinidad, is suggested, as the ideal point, or almost the only one.  

"In Trinidad there is a good runway for planes.  All that zone is sympathetic with the combatants of Escambray and any movement of this nature would be well received and would have much cooperation.  

A note says "important":  "To the east of Trinidad is a swampy zone and is difficult to maneuver a large military body; toward the west it is dangerous because of the facilities for transporting great military forces.  Places by way of assault at the coast are numerous and relatively lacking of surveillance; there are small rivers and navigable streams for two or three kilometers.  

What is particularly strange about all this is that Trinidad was rejected just days after this letter based on the absurd claim that there was no usable airfield at Trinidad - the person who wrote that was Jack Hawkins:

"We thought of another plan for Trinidad involving landing troops who would go directly into the mountains - but there was no airfield.  

"Finally, through photography, we found what we thought was a usable airfield - this was in the Zapata area - and this is what led us to this area."

The Official History of the Bay of Pigs states:  "At no time was Hawkins questioned as to why the B-26s could not have operated  from the Trinidad airfield.  In fact, there was a 4000 foot, hard surfaced runway at Trinidad from as early as 1957, and in 1960 it was listed as one of the seven major civilian airfields of Cuba.  Even more damning is the fact that both Col. Stanley Beerli and Jake Esterline were present during Hawkins' testimony, but neither remembered that 4000 landings were practiced by the Cuban pilots during their training at Retalhuleu, Guatemala."

JFK did not put major stock on the airfields because he did not believe that the airstrikes were important - because neither the Joint Chiefs or the CIA put the argument to him in a coherent fashion.  Believe it or not, Curtis Le May - the Air Chief of Staff - was reported that he was less than fully convinced that airstrikes were important at the Bay of PIgs!  (Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs, p. 200).

General David Gray told DPD Richard Bissell about "a discussion that had taken place the previous day in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs.  Curtis Le May (who was sitting in for the absent commandant of the Marines) and several of the Chiefs admitted their doubt about the absolute essentiality of air cover.  (Bissell, Reflections of a Cold Warrior, p. 175).

John Newman recounts this episode, adding: "Bissell was shocked - as he should have been.  There was no virtuous explanation for what General Gray heard the chiefs say.  'We all knew only too well." Bissell recalled, "that without air support the project would fail."  (Newman, Countdown to Darkness, p. 401).

And who did both Morales and LeMay work with?  

While serving as JMWAVE/CI, Morales had a close relationship with Clark W. Simmons, the C/WH/4/CI (chief of Western Hemisphere counterintelligence, Cuba) in 1961.   

Similarly, WH/4/CI Curtis Le May's boss would have been C/WH/4/CI Clark SImmons.  

As discussed at length in the last chapter of my book State Secret, I consider Clark Simmons a "person of interest" in the death of JFK.

Simmons worked with CIA security official Joseph Langan in the outrageous attempt to cover up the American origin of the planes that conducted the surprise attack on Castro’s planes right before the Bay of Pigs.[ 38 ] Ambassador Adlai Stevenson publicly claimed that this surprise attack was the work of internal Cuban defectors, and was furious to find out that he had been lied to by his own people.

We also know that Simmons and Harvey’s people had access to highly sensitive information in 1962 – the deficiencies of the Secret Service. Simmons joined Richard Helms, Ghosn Zogby (Bill Harvey’s predecessor at the Cuba desk), and Victor Wallen (Harvey’s CI chief) for a scathing review of the Secret Service by one of its prominent agents, Ernest Ignacio Aragon.[ 39 ] Aragon had a lot of inside knowledge, which can be seen in his reports as an emissary on Cuban affairs for Bobby Kennedy.[ 40 ] 

If LeMay was working with Simmons and Morales during the build-up to the Bay of Pigs, that is cause for concern.  Just a few reasons why, above and beyond his repeated hostile comments to JFK during the Cuban missile crisis.

1.  The claim by autopsy team member Paul O'Connor that LeMay was at the JFK autopsy, as well as background on how LeMay arrived in Washington DC that day...you may have seen this?  (Search for LeMay to find it quickly)

http://www.whokilledjfk.net/LEMAY%20WAS%20AT%20AUTOPSY.htm

2.  Gen. LeMay's aide Colonel Dorman's wife was in White House at the time of assassination.

3.  There is one weapon above all, which can be suspected as that which might have been used, based on wound analysis which points to one rifle may have been the culprit.   David Knight portrays this image of an AR-5 Hornet high powered rifle which belonged to, of all people, General Curtis Lemay!  (The Air Force was very drawn to the AR-5 as early as 1956.)

David analyzed that the size of the hole of entry reported by the Parkland doctors for the bullet wound at JFK's throat was only 3-5mm in diameter. For example:

Dr. Charles Rufus Baxter, general surgeon:

“The wound on the neck was approximately an inch and a haft above the manubrium of the sternum, the sternal notch. This wound was in my estimation, 4 to 5 mm. in widest diameter and was a spherical wound. The edges of it–the size of the wound is measured by the hole plus the damaged skin around the area, so that it was a very small wound.”

David ran a complete inventory of rifles mentioned on 22 November 1963, and determined that all of them were of a greater bore than that which caused this “4-5 mm wound”, with the exception of LeMay's AR-5 Hornet.

The tie between the Bay of PIgs and 11/22/63 has never seemed stronger for me - whether or not this signature pans out as belonging to Curtis LeMay.

Bill Simpich - and see the chrono below - 

1/9/61 - False documentation - Artime:  Memo from Wh/4/PA Lou Napoli to Chief of Base:  "Attached under separate cover is being forwarded the documentation reported by you for use by AMBIDDY-1"

1/9/61 - Memo re "Performance of Surreptitious entry of mail" - from TSD/SAB to WH/4/CI - "To WH/4/CI ATTN:  (REDACTED with room for 11 letters and 1 space - Curtis LeMay would fit) the following item was submitted for surreptitious entry - letter from Jose Sarria to Manuel Artime...this letter bore evidence of a previous surreptitious opening"

It then says:  "the letter and copies of contents are returned herewith to WH/4/CI.  Attn:   (room for 11 letters and one space) x4448."

What is weird is that the routing slip for an event on 2/1/61 that has LeMay's initials on it in two different places is attached to this 1/9/61 memo!!

1/13/64 Letter to C/WH/4/CI re Pedro Diaz Lanz, head of the Cuban Air Force and his concern that Artime may be a Communist

1/24/61 - Droller writes Chief CI/OA re doubts about Artime, young Cuban exile (probably Pedro Diaz Lanz) is claiming both that Artime's parents were Communists and that Artime was a penetration agent for Castro

1/27/61 - letter from Sarria to Artime - read the typed version, Sarria claims to have been in the Air Force for the last three years, and wants to meet with Artime in early Feb in Miami and join him.  A gushing letter, carrying on how "Radio Swan" gets him all fired up.

1/30/61 - On Green List search on Artime's parents, traces came up negative

2/1/61 - Long review on Artime's parents and their history w/communism.  His father was expelled from the party in 1939.

2/1/61 Letter for Artime is ready to be delivered to him - this appears to be the letter referenced by C L M in the routing slip

On 2/14/61, TSD/SAB is now inspired to try to fake the letterhead and envelope for Castro himself!   They send the proposal to June Cobb's handler Jean Pierson.)

3/6/61 QDDALE/Pawley is now providing info on Jose Sarria to Esterline.

Here is some of Pawley's handwritten material on Jose Sarria.

By the way, if this is Pawley's handwriting, he disliked Artime and considered him "a Catholic Fidel".

3/9/61 - Esterline sends to C/WH/4/PM the 3/6/61 unsigned letter to "Dr. Cuervo" and the 3/9/61 bio of Sarria written by Alligator.

Here's the English version of the letter - and the note saying "important"

Here's the Sarria bio

2/2/64 Henrietta Lorie - identified as a "CIA covert", vouched for Sarria as a source of intelligence information from Cuba.  Why is Sarria being vouched for shortly after 11/22/63?

LARRY HANCOCK Responds:

I'm afraid I just can't follow though what you list out here as pointing to LeMay.

First off, the Air Force has its own investigative service which includes CI.  If there was an issue with an airman on a base you would certainly see forwarding and involvement but AFOSI would be the unit involved, and that would bring in commanders within the section of the service involved.

Which might mean SAC if it was a SAC base like say Ramey in Puerto Rico.

The chain of command there would have come though SAC OSI - the toughest and most paranoid group of any air command at Ramey:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramey_Air_Force_Base

SAC was not in the Canal Zone.

That would have been southern command:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Air_Forces_Southern_Command

But there would also be no need to play games with crypts, we frequently see documented copied to various agencies as well as the Air Force and they are spelled out openly.

And in 1961 LeMay moved to a staff positon with the Joint Chiefs, which totally takes him out of line of command for the Air Force.  Chiefs and their staffs serve primarily as advisors and perform a communications role for the CIC, they are not in direct chain of command for any service and
the only folks reporting to them are their personal staff and various staff groups assigned under JCS - like SACSA.

Not that there were not Air Force units detailed for clandestine support for the CIA - primarily for transport, logistics and supply.  I write about the origin and evolution of those units in Shadow Warfare.

As to the Bay of Pigs, all I can do is encourage you to read In Denial when it becomes available - which it will shortly, for a full understanding of the interaction between the Joint Chiefs, the CIA and
both Eisenhower and JFK.

If you want to look for somebody going rogue there, you won't find LeMay, you will find the Navy and Burke on the JCS and Dennison as CINCATLANTIC - both doing things with Bissell that JFK was not told about.

BILL SIMPICH:  The LeMay story is useless without context. For me, the center of it is the possibility that LeMay and friends egged on JFK into the swamps of the Bay of Pigs, hoping it would fail in order to justify a land invasion. My questions boil down to two - don’t you agree that c le m looks like LeMay?

And why in the world would be arguing against air operations at the Bay of Pigs?

Larry basically agrees, he just wants to limit it to the signature because as he said in his initial post he blames it all on Bissell.

LARRY: I do Bill, I just can't think of any good reason to for that to be abbreviated in an official document like that...and I have never seen that used for him anywhere else.

As to the other, he certainly was AF Chief on the Joint Chiefs and it certainly was the JCS who assigned their staff to review what was essentially a verbal description of the Trinidad plan (they got even less
to review for Zapata).  And there was specifically an air staff review which addressed logistics issues - that is where the comments that the effort would be doomed if a single Cuban aircraft was left to operate over the beach since it would likely take out the supply ships and the plans for resupply were minimal at best.

However as far as I can tell LeMay himself did not participate in the process and he does not even show up in the follow up inquires...its the Navy Chief and JCS Chair who represent the JCS.

So...does it refer to LeMay, it certainly might since the JCS staff was involved and the Air staff offered an assessment that was an attachment to their evaluations. But I see no sign that LeMay was personally involved in that, in the discussions etc...the Chiefs made it clear that they were not invited and the most they had done was to do a quick and limited review after JFK asked for it. When you read their remarks you can tell the CIA, in particular Bissell, had wanted it as their turf and deserved what they got...sad, but true.

If anything LeMay had been far more involved with the CIA (and battled them) when he was in charge of SAC and SAC was running U-2 missions and its own air recon missions on top of that.

The problem is that to fully appreciate my assessment you have to spend the months inside the Cuba
Project documents and inquiries I did..or read "In Denial" where I spell it all out.

Checkout Larry’s book SHADOW WARFARE

Larry’s new book IN DENIAL will be out in both Kindle and Print in March:

https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B082MTQS2G/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_hsch_vapi_taft_p1_i7