"In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity”
― Sun-Tzu
The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats
without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do
good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.
Sun Tzu
Sun Tzu
THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD
Translated from the Chinese
By LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910)
[This is the basic text of Sun Tzu on the Art of War. It was
extracted from Mr. Giles' complete work as titled above. The commentary itself,
which, of course includes this work embedded within it, has been released as
suntzu10.txt (or suntzu10.zip). This is being released only as an adjunct to
that work, which contains a wealth of commentary upon this text.]
The Art of War has 13 chapters. You can click on
the Chapter Number to go to that chapter directly.
Each chapter is hyper-linked to its corresponding Chinese
text. You may switch back and forth between the English and the original
Chinese text, by clicking on the link at the end of each chapter.
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I. LAYING PLANS
1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance
to the State.
2. It is a matter of life and death, a road
either
to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry
which can on no account be neglected.
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five
constant
factors, to be taken into account in one's
deliberations,
when seeking to determine the conditions
obtaining in the field.
4. These are:
(1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth;
(4) The Commander; (5) Method and
discipline.
5,6. The Moral Law causes the
people to be in complete
accord with their ruler, so that they will
follow him
regardless of their lives, undismayed by any
danger.
7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and
heat,
times and seasons.
8. Earth comprises distances, great and small;
danger and security; open ground and narrow
passes;
the chances of life and death.
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of
wisdom,
sincerely, benevolence, courage and
strictness.
10. By method and discipline
are to be understood
the marshaling of the army in its proper
subdivisions,
the graduations of rank among the officers,
the maintenance
of roads by which supplies may reach the
army, and the
control of military expenditure.
11. These five heads should be
familiar to every general:
he who knows them will be victorious; he
who knows them
not will fail.
12. Therefore, in your deliberations,
when seeking
to determine the military conditions, let
them be made
the basis of a comparison, in this wise:--
13. (1) Which of the two
sovereigns is imbued
with the Moral law?
(2) Which of the two generals has most
ability?
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived
from Heaven
and Earth?
(4) On which side is discipline most
rigorously enforced?
(5) Which army is stronger?
(6) On which side are officers and men more
highly trained?
(7) In which army is there the greater
constancy
both in reward and punishment?
14. By means of these seven
considerations I can
forecast victory or defeat.
15. The general that hearkens
to my counsel and acts
upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command!
The general that hearkens not to my counsel
nor acts upon it,
will suffer defeat:--let such a one be
dismissed!
16. While heading the profit
of my counsel,
avail yourself also of any helpful
circumstances
over and beyond the ordinary rules.
17. According as circumstances
are favorable,
one should modify one's plans.
18. All warfare is based on
deception.
19. Hence, when able to
attack, we must seem unable;
when using our forces, we must seem
inactive; when we
are
near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away;
when far away, we must make him believe we
are near.
20. Hold out baits to entice
the enemy. Feign disorder,
and crush him.
21. If he is secure at all
points, be prepared for him.
If he is in superior strength, evade him.
22. If your opponent is of
choleric temper, seek to
irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow
arrogant.
23. If he is taking his ease,
give him no rest.
If his forces are united, separate them.
24. Attack him where he is
unprepared, appear where
you are not expected.
25. These military devices,
leading to victory,
must not be divulged beforehand.
26. Now the general who wins a
battle makes many
calculations in his temple ere the battle
is fought.
The general who loses a battle makes but
few
calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations
lead to victory, and few calculations to
defeat:
how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention
to this point that I can foresee who is
likely to win or lose.
II. WAGING WAR
1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war,
where there are in the field a thousand
swift chariots,
as many heavy chariots, and a hundred
thousand
mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough
to carry them
a thousand li, the expenditure at home and
at the front,
including entertainment of guests, small
items such as
glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots
and armor,
will reach the total of a thousand ounces
of silver per day.
Such is the cost of raising an army of
100,000 men.
2. When you engage in actual fighting, if
victory
is long in coming, then men's weapons will
grow dull and
their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town,
you will exhaust your strength.
3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the
resources
of the State will not be equal to the
strain.
4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your
ardor damped,
your strength exhausted and your treasure
spent,
other chieftains will spring up to take
advantage
of your extremity. Then no man, however wise,
will be able to avert the consequences that
must ensue.
5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste
in war,
cleverness has never been seen associated
with long delays.
6. There is no instance of a country having
benefited
from prolonged warfare.
7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted
with the evils of war that can thoroughly
understand
the profitable way of carrying it on.
8. The skillful soldier does not raise a
second levy,
neither are his supply-wagons loaded more
than twice.
9. Bring war material with you from home, but
forage
on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough
for its needs.
10. Poverty of the State
exchequer causes an army
to be maintained by contributions from a
distance.
Contributing to maintain an army at a
distance causes
the people to be impoverished.
11. On the other hand, the
proximity of an army causes
prices to go up; and high prices cause the
people's
substance to be drained away.
12. When their substance is
drained away, the peasantry
will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
13,14. With this loss of
substance and exhaustion
of strength, the homes of the people will
be stripped bare,
and three-tenths of their income will be
dissipated;
while government expenses for broken
chariots, worn-out horses,
breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows,
spears and shields,
protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy
wagons,
will amount to four-tenths of its total
revenue.
15. Hence a wise general makes
a point of foraging
on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions
is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and
likewise
a single picul of his provender is
equivalent to twenty
from one's own store.
16. Now in order to kill the
enemy, our men must
be roused to anger; that there may be
advantage from
defeating the enemy, they must have their
rewards.
17. Therefore in chariot
fighting, when ten or more chariots
have been taken, those should be rewarded
who took the first.
Our
own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy,
and the chariots mingled and used in
conjunction with ours.
The captured soldiers should be kindly
treated and kept.
18. This is called, using the
conquered foe to augment
one's own strength.
19. In war, then, let your
great object be victory,
not lengthy campaigns.
20. Thus it may be known that
the leader of armies
is the arbiter of the people's fate, the
man on whom it
depends whether the nation shall be in
peace or in peril.
1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best
thing of all is to take the enemy's country
whole and intact;
to shatter and destroy it is not so
good. So, too, it is
better to recapture an army entire than to
destroy it,
to capture a regiment, a detachment or a
company entire
than to destroy them.
2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your
battles
is not supreme excellence; supreme
excellence consists
in breaking the enemy's resistance without
fighting.
3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to
balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to
prevent
the junction of the enemy's forces; the
next in
order is to attack the enemy's army in the
field;
and the worst policy of all is to besiege
walled cities.
4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities
if it
can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets,
movable shelters, and various implements of
war, will take
up three whole months; and the piling up of
mounds over
against the walls will take three months
more.
5. The general, unable to control his
irritation,
will launch his men to the assault like
swarming ants,
with the result that one-third of his men
are slain,
while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous
effects of a siege.
6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the
enemy's
troops without any fighting; he captures
their cities
without laying siege to them; he overthrows
their kingdom
without lengthy operations in the field.
7. With his forces intact he will dispute the
mastery
of the Empire, and thus, without losing a
man, his triumph
will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are
ten
to the enemy's one, to surround him; if
five to one,
to attack him; if twice as numerous, to
divide our army
into two.
9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;
if slightly inferior in numbers, we can
avoid the enemy;
if quite unequal in every way, we can flee
from him.
10. Hence, though an obstinate
fight may be made
by a small force, in the end it must be
captured
by the larger force.
11. Now the general is the
bulwark of the State;
if the bulwark is complete at all points;
the State will
be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the
State will
be weak.
12. There are three ways in
which a ruler can bring
misfortune upon his army:--
13. (1) By commanding the army
to advance or to retreat,
being ignorant of the fact that it cannot
obey.
This is called hobbling the army.
14. (2) By attempting to
govern an army in the
same way as he administers a kingdom, being
ignorant
of the conditions which obtain in an
army. This causes
restlessness in the soldier's minds.
15. (3) By employing the
officers of his army
without discrimination, through ignorance
of the
military principle of adaptation to
circumstances.
This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
16. But when the army is
restless and distrustful,
trouble is sure to come from the other
feudal princes.
This is simply bringing anarchy into the
army, and flinging
victory away.
17. Thus we may know that
there are five essentials
for victory:
(1) He will win who knows when to fight and
when
not to fight.
(2) He will win who knows how to handle
both superior
and inferior forces.
(3) He will win whose army is animated by
the same
spirit throughout all its ranks.
(4) He will win who, prepared himself,
waits to take
the enemy unprepared.
(5) He will win who has military capacity
and is
not interfered with by the sovereign.
18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy
and know yourself, you need not fear the
result of a
hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,
for every victory gained you will also
suffer a defeat.
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself,
you will
succumb in every battle.
IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS
1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put
themselves beyond the possibility of
defeat, and then
waited for an opportunity of defeating the
enemy.
2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in
our
own hands, but the opportunity of defeating
the enemy
is provided by the enemy himself.
3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure
himself against defeat,
but cannot make certain of defeating the
enemy.
4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer
without being able to do it.
5. Security against defeat implies defensive
tactics;
ability to defeat the enemy means taking
the offensive.
6. Standing on the defensive indicates
insufficient
strength; attacking, a superabundance of
strength.
7. The general who is skilled in defense hides
in the
most secret recesses of the earth; he who
is skilled in
attack flashes forth from the topmost
heights of heaven.
Thus on the one hand we have ability to
protect ourselves;
on the other, a victory that is complete.
8. To see victory only when it is within the
ken
of the common herd is not the acme of
excellence.
9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you
fight
and conquer and the whole Empire says,
"Well done!"
10. To lift an autumn hair is
no sign of great strength;
to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp
sight;
to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of
a quick ear.
11. What the ancients called a
clever fighter is
one who not only wins, but excels in
winning with ease.
12. Hence his victories bring
him neither reputation
for wisdom nor credit for courage.
13. He wins his battles by
making no mistakes.
Making no mistakes is what establishes the
certainty
of
victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is
already defeated.
14. Hence the skillful fighter
puts himself into
a position which makes defeat impossible,
and does
not miss the moment for defeating the
enemy.
15. Thus it is that in war the
victorious strategist
only seeks battle after the victory has
been won,
whereas he who is destined to defeat first
fights
and afterwards looks for victory.
16. The consummate leader
cultivates the moral law,
and strictly adheres to method and
discipline; thus it is
in his power to control success.
17. In respect of military
method, we have,
firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation
of quantity;
thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing
of chances;
fifthly, Victory.
18. Measurement owes its
existence to Earth;
Estimation of quantity to Measurement;
Calculation to
Estimation of quantity; Balancing of
chances to Calculation;
and Victory to Balancing of chances.
19. A victorious army opposed
to a routed one, is as
a pound's weight placed in the scale
against a single grain.
20. The onrush of a conquering
force is like the bursting
of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand
fathoms deep.
V. ENERGY
1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force
is the same principle as the control of a
few men:
it is merely a question of dividing up
their numbers.
2. Fighting with a large army under your
command
is nowise different from fighting with a
small one:
it is merely a question of instituting
signs and signals.
3. To ensure that your whole host may
withstand
the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain
unshaken--
this is effected by maneuvers direct and
indirect.
4. That the impact of your army may be like a
grindstone
dashed against an egg--this is effected by
the science
of weak points and strong.
5. In all fighting, the direct method may be
used
for joining battle, but indirect methods
will be needed
in order to secure victory.
6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are
inexhaustible
as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow
of rivers and streams;
like
the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew;
like the four seasons, they pass away to
return once more.
7. There are not more than five musical notes,
yet the combinations of these five give
rise to more
melodies than can ever be heard.
8. There are not more than five primary colors
(blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet
in combination
they produce more hues than can ever been
seen.
9. There are not more than five cardinal
tastes
(sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet
combinations
of them yield more flavors than can ever be
tasted.
10. In battle, there are not
more than two methods
of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet
these two
in combination give rise to an endless
series of maneuvers.
11. The direct and the
indirect lead on to each other in turn.
It is like moving in a circle--you never
come to an end.
Who can exhaust the possibilities of their
combination?
12. The onset of troops is
like the rush of a torrent
which will even roll stones along in its
course.
13. The quality of decision is
like the well-timed
swoop of a falcon which enables it to
strike and destroy
its victim.
14. Therefore the good fighter
will be terrible
in his onset, and prompt in his decision.
15. Energy may be likened to
the bending of a crossbow;
decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
16. Amid the turmoil and
tumult of battle, there may
be seeming disorder and yet no real
disorder at all;
amid confusion and chaos, your array may be
without head
or tail, yet it will be proof against
defeat.
17. Simulated disorder
postulates perfect discipline,
simulated fear postulates courage;
simulated weakness
postulates strength.
18. Hiding order beneath the
cloak of disorder is
simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under
a show of timidity presupposes a fund of
latent energy;
masking strength with weakness is to be
effected
by tactical dispositions.
19. Thus one who is skillful
at keeping the enemy
on the move maintains deceitful
appearances, according to
which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something,
that the enemy may snatch at it.
20. By holding out baits, he
keeps him on the march;
then with a body of picked men he lies in wait
for him.
21. The clever combatant looks
to the effect of combined
energy, and does not require too much from
individuals.
Hence his ability to pick out the right men
and utilize
combined energy.
22. When he utilizes combined
energy, his fighting
men become as it were like unto rolling
logs or stones.
For it is the nature of a log or stone to
remain
motionless on level ground, and to move
when on a slope;
if four-cornered, to come to a standstill,
but if
round-shaped, to go rolling down.
23. Thus the energy developed
by good fighting men
is as the momentum of a round stone rolled
down a mountain
thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject
of energy.
VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG
1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and
awaits the coming of the enemy, will be
fresh for the fight;
whoever is second in the field and has to
hasten to battle
will arrive exhausted.
2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his
will on
the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's
will to be imposed on him.
3. By holding out advantages to him, he can
cause the enemy
to approach of his own accord; or, by
inflicting damage,
he can make it impossible for the enemy to
draw near.
4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can
harass him;
if well supplied with food, he can starve
him out;
if quietly encamped, he can force him to
move.
5. Appear at points which the enemy must
hasten to defend;
march swiftly to places where you are not
expected.
6. An army may march great distances without
distress,
if it marches through country where the
enemy is not.
7. You can be sure of succeeding in your
attacks
if you only attack places which are
undefended.You can
ensure the safety of your defense if you
only hold
positions that cannot be attacked.
8. Hence that general is skillful in attack
whose
opponent does not know what to defend; and
he is skillful
in defense whose opponent does not know
what to attack.
9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you
we learn to be invisible, through you
inaudible;
and
hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
10. You may advance and be
absolutely irresistible,
if you make for the enemy's weak points;
you may retire
and be safe from pursuit if your movements
are more rapid
than those of the enemy.
11. If we wish to fight, the
enemy can be forced
to an engagement even though he be
sheltered behind a high
rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack
some other place that he will be obliged to
relieve.
12. If we do not wish to fight,
we can prevent
the enemy from engaging us even though the
lines
of our encampment be merely traced out on
the ground.
All we need do is to throw something odd
and unaccountable
in his way.
13. By discovering the enemy's
dispositions and remaining
invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces
concentrated,
while the enemy's must be divided.
14. We can form a single
united body, while the
enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will
be a whole pitted against separate parts of
a whole,
which means that we shall be many to the
enemy's few.
15. And if we are able thus to
attack an inferior force
with a superior one, our opponents will be
in dire straits.
16. The spot where we intend
to fight must not be
made
known; for then the enemy will have to prepare
against a possible attack at several
different points;
and his forces being thus distributed in
many directions,
the numbers we shall have to face at any
given point will
be proportionately few.
17. For should the enemy
strengthen his van,
he will weaken his rear; should he
strengthen his rear,
he will weaken his van; should he
strengthen his left,
he will weaken his right; should he
strengthen his right,
he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere,
he will everywhere be weak.
18. Numerical weakness comes
from having to prepare
against possible attacks; numerical
strength, from compelling
our adversary to make these preparations
against us.
19. Knowing the place and the
time of the coming battle,
we may concentrate from the greatest
distances in order
to fight.
20. But if neither time nor
place be known,
then the left wing will be impotent to
succor the right,
the right equally impotent to succor the
left, the van
unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to
support the van.
How much more so if the furthest portions
of the army are
anything under a hundred LI apart, and even
the nearest
are separated by several LI!
21. Though according to my
estimate the soldiers
of Yueh exceed our own in number, that
shall advantage
them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then
that victory can be achieved.
22. Though the enemy be
stronger in numbers, we may
prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover
his plans and the likelihood of their
success.
23. Rouse him, and learn the
principle of his
activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself,
so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
24. Carefully compare the
opposing army with your own,
so that you may know where strength is
superabundant
and where it is deficient.
25. In making tactical
dispositions, the highest pitch
you can attain is to conceal them; conceal
your dispositions,
and you will be safe from the prying of the
subtlest spies,
from the machinations of the wisest brains.
26. How victory may be
produced for them out of the enemy's
own tactics--that is what the multitude
cannot comprehend.
27. All men can see the
tactics whereby I conquer,
but what none can see is the strategy out
of which victory
is evolved.
28. Do not repeat the tactics
which have gained
you one victory, but let your methods be
regulated
by the infinite variety of circumstances.
29. Military tactics are like
unto water; for water in its
natural course runs away from high places
and hastens downwards.
30. So in war, the way is to
avoid what is strong
and to strike at what is weak.
31. Water shapes its course
according to the nature
of the ground over which it flows; the
soldier works
out his victory in relation to the foe whom
he is facing.
32. Therefore, just as water
retains no constant shape,
so in warfare there are no constant
conditions.
33. He who can modify his
tactics in relation to his
opponent and thereby succeed in winning,
may be called
a heaven-born captain.
34. The five elements (water,
fire, wood, metal, earth)
are not always equally predominant; the
four seasons make
way for each other in turn. There are short days and long;
the moon has its periods of waning and
waxing.
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his
commands from the sovereign.
2. Having collected an army and concentrated
his forces,
he must blend and harmonize the different
elements thereof
before pitching his camp.
3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering,
than which there is nothing more difficult.
The difficulty of tactical maneuvering
consists
in turning the devious into the direct, and
misfortune into gain.
4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route,
after enticing the enemy out of the way,
and though starting
after him, to contrive to reach the goal
before him,
shows knowledge of the artifice of
DEVIATION.
5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous;
with an undisciplined multitude, most
dangerous.
6. If you set a fully equipped army in march
in order
to snatch an advantage, the chances are
that you will be
too late.
On the other hand, to detach a flying column
for the purpose involves the sacrifice of
its baggage
and stores.
7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up
their
buff-coats, and make forced marches without
halting day
or night, covering double the usual
distance at a stretch,
doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an
advantage,
the leaders of all your three divisions
will fall into
the hands of the enemy.
8. The stronger men will be in front, the
jaded
ones will fall behind, and on this plan
only one-tenth
of your army will reach its destination.
9. If you march fifty LI in order to
outmaneuver
the enemy, you will lose the leader of your
first division,
and only half your force will reach the
goal.
10. If you march thirty LI
with the same object,
two-thirds of your army will arrive.
11. We may take it then that
an army without its
baggage-train is lost; without provisions
it is lost;
without bases of supply it is lost.
12. We cannot enter into
alliances until we are
acquainted with the designs of our
neighbors.
13. We are not fit to lead an
army on the march
unless we are familiar with the face of the
country--its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and
precipices,
its marshes and swamps.
14. We shall be unable to turn
natural advantage
to account unless we make use of local
guides.
15. In war, practice
dissimulation, and you will succeed.
16. Whether to concentrate or
to divide your troops,
must be decided by circumstances.
17. Let your rapidity be that
of the wind,
your compactness that of the forest.
18. In raiding and plundering
be like fire,
is immovability like a mountain.
19. Let your plans be dark and
impenetrable as night,
and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
20. When you plunder a
countryside, let the spoil be
divided amongst your men; when you capture
new territory,
cut it up into allotments for the benefit
of the soldiery.
21. Ponder and deliberate
before you make a move.
22. He will conquer who has
learnt the artifice
of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.
23. The Book of Army
Management says: On the field
of battle, the spoken word does not carry
far enough:
hence the institution of gongs and
drums. Nor can ordinary
objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution
of banners and flags.
24. Gongs and drums, banners
and flags, are means
whereby the ears and eyes of the host may
be focused
on one particular point.
25. The host thus forming a
single united body,
is it impossible either for the brave to
advance alone,
or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art
of handling large masses of men.
26. In night-fighting, then,
make much use of signal-fires
and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags
and banners,
as a means of influencing the ears and eyes
of your army.
27. A whole army may be robbed
of its spirit;
a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his
presence of mind.
28. Now a soldier's spirit is
keenest in the morning;
by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the
evening,
his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
29. A clever general,
therefore, avoids an army when
its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it
is sluggish
and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.
30. Disciplined and calm, to
await the appearance
of disorder and hubbub amongst the
enemy:--this is the art
of retaining self-possession.
31. To be near the goal while
the enemy is still
far from it, to wait at ease while the
enemy is
toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while
the enemy
is famished:--this is the art of husbanding
one's strength.
32. To refrain from
intercepting an enemy whose
banners are in perfect order, to refrain
from attacking
an army drawn up in calm and confident
array:--this
is the art of studying circumstances.
33. It is a military axiom not
to advance uphill
against the enemy, nor to oppose him when
he comes downhill.
34. Do not pursue an enemy who
simulates flight;
do not attack soldiers whose temper is
keen.
35. Do not swallow bait
offered by the enemy.
Do not interfere with an army that is
returning home.
36. When you surround an army,
leave an outlet free.
Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
37. Such is the art of
warfare.
VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives
his commands from the sovereign, collects
his army
and concentrates his forces
2. When in difficult country, do not
encamp. In country
where high roads intersect, join hands with
your allies.
Do not linger in dangerously isolated
positions.
In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to
stratagem.
In desperate position, you must fight.
3. There are roads which must not be followed,
armies which must be not attacked, towns
which must
be besieged, positions which must not be
contested,
commands of the sovereign which must not be
obeyed.
4. The general who thoroughly understands the
advantages
that accompany variation of tactics knows
how to handle
his troops.
5. The general who does not understand these,
may be well
acquainted with the configuration of the
country, yet he
will not be able to turn his knowledge to
practical account.
6. So, the student of war who is unversed in
the art
of war of varying his plans, even though he
be acquainted
with the Five Advantages, will fail to make
the best use
of his men.
7. Hence in the wise leader's plans,
considerations of
advantage and of disadvantage will be
blended together.
8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered
in
this way, we may succeed in accomplishing
the essential
part of our schemes.
9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of
difficulties
we are always ready to seize an advantage,
we may extricate
ourselves from misfortune.
10. Reduce the hostile chiefs
by inflicting damage
on them; and make trouble for them, and
keep them
constantly engaged; hold out specious
allurements,
and make them rush to any given point.
11. The art of war teaches us
to rely not on the
likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but
on our own readiness
to receive him; not on the chance of his
not attacking,
but rather on the fact that we have made
our position unassailable.
12. There are five dangerous
faults which may affect
a general:
(1) Recklessness, which leads to
destruction;
(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked
by insults;
(4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive
to shame;
(5) over-solicitude for his men, which
exposes him
to worry and trouble.
13. These are the five
besetting sins of a general,
ruinous to the conduct of war.
14. When an army is overthrown
and its leader slain,
the cause will surely be found among these
five
dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.
IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH
1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of
encamping the army, and observing signs of
the enemy.
Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in
the neighborhood
of valleys.
2. Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb
heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.
3. After crossing a river, you should get far
away
from it.
4. When an invading force crosses a river in
its
onward march, do not advance to meet it in
mid-stream.
It will be best to let half the army get
across,
and then deliver your attack.
5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not
go
to meet the invader near a river which he
has to cross.
6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy,
and facing
the sun.
Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.
So much for river warfare.
7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern
should be to get over them quickly, without
any delay.
8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you
should
have water and grass near you, and get your
back
to a clump of trees. So much for operations in salt-marches.
9. In dry, level country, take up an easily
accessible
position with rising ground to your right
and on your rear,
so that the danger may be in front, and
safety lie behind.
So much for campaigning in flat country.
10. These are the four useful
branches of military
knowledge which enabled the Yellow Emperor
to vanquish
four several sovereigns.
11. All armies prefer high
ground to low and sunny
places to dark.
12. If you are careful of your
men, and camp on hard
ground, the army will be free from disease
of every kind,
and this will spell victory.
13. When you come to a hill or
a bank, occupy the
sunny side, with the slope on your right
rear.
Thus you will at once act for the benefit
of your soldiers
and utilize the natural advantages of the
ground.
14. When, in consequence of
heavy rains up-country,
a river which you wish to ford is swollen
and flecked
with foam, you must wait until it subsides.
15. Country in which there are
precipitous cliffs
with torrents running between, deep natural
hollows,
confined places, tangled thickets,
quagmires and crevasses,
should be left with all possible speed and
not approached.
16. While we keep away from
such places, we should
get the enemy to approach them; while we
face them,
we should let the enemy have them on his
rear.
17. If in the neighborhood of
your camp there should
be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by
aquatic grass,
hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods
with thick
undergrowth, they must be carefully routed
out and searched;
for these are places where men in ambush or
insidious
spies are likely to be lurking.
18. When the enemy is close at
hand and remains quiet,
he is relying on the natural strength of
his position.
19. When he keeps aloof and
tries to provoke a battle,
he is anxious for the other side to
advance.
20. If his place of encampment
is easy of access,
he is tendering a bait.
21. Movement amongst the trees
of a forest shows that the
enemy is advancing. The appearance of a number of screens
in the midst of thick grass means that the
enemy wants to make us suspicious.
22. The rising of birds in
their flight is the sign
of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden
attack is coming.
23. When there is dust rising
in a high column,
it is the sign of chariots advancing; when
the dust is low,
but spread over a wide area, it betokens
the approach
of infantry. When it branches out in different directions,
it shows that parties have been sent to
collect firewood.
A few clouds of dust moving to and fro
signify that the army
is encamping.
24. Humble words and increased
preparations are signs
that the enemy is about to advance. Violent language
and driving forward as if to the attack are
signs that he
will retreat.
25. When the light chariots
come out first and take
up a position on the wings, it is a sign
that the enemy
is forming for battle.
26. Peace proposals
unaccompanied by a sworn covenant
indicate a plot.
27. When there is much running
about and the soldiers
fall into rank, it means that the critical
moment has come.
28. When some are seen
advancing and some retreating,
it is a lure.
29. When the soldiers stand
leaning on their spears,
they
are faint from want of food.
30. If those who are sent to
draw water begin
by drinking themselves, the army is
suffering from thirst.
31. If the enemy sees an
advantage to be gained and
makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers
are exhausted.
32. If birds gather on any
spot, it is unoccupied.
Clamor by night betokens nervousness.
33. If there is disturbance in
the camp, the general's
authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted
about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry,
it means that the men are weary.
34. When an army feeds its
horses with grain and kills
its cattle for food, and when the men do
not hang their
cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing
that they
will not return to their tents, you may
know that they
are determined to fight to the death.
35. The sight of men
whispering together in small
knots or speaking in subdued tones points
to disaffection
amongst the rank and file.
36. Too frequent rewards
signify that the enemy is
at the end of his resources; too many
punishments betray
a condition of dire distress.
37. To begin by bluster, but
afterwards to take fright
at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme
lack of intelligence.
38. When envoys are sent with
compliments in their mouths,
it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a
truce.
39. If the enemy's troops
march up angrily and remain
facing ours for a long time without either
joining
battle or taking themselves off again, the
situation
is
one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.
40. If our troops are no more
in number than the enemy,
that is amply sufficient; it only means
that no direct attack
can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all
our available strength, keep a close watch
on the enemy,
and obtain reinforcements.
41. He who exercises no
forethought but makes light
of his opponents is sure to be captured by
them.
42. If soldiers are punished
before they have grown
attached to you, they will not prove
submissive; and,
unless submissive, then will be practically
useless.
If, when the soldiers have become attached
to you,
punishments are not enforced, they will
still be unless.
43. Therefore soldiers must be
treated in the first
instance with humanity, but kept under
control by means
of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory.
44. If in training soldiers
commands are habitually
enforced, the army will be
well-disciplined; if not,
its discipline will be bad.
45. If a general shows
confidence in his men but always
insists on his orders being obeyed, the
gain will be mutual.
X. TERRAIN
1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain,
to wit:
(1) Accessible ground; (2) entangling ground;
(3) temporizing ground; (4) narrow passes;
(5) precipitous
heights; (6) positions at a great distance
from the enemy.
2. Ground which can be freely traversed by
both sides
is called accessible.
3. With regard to ground of this nature, be
before
the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny
spots,
and carefully guard your line of
supplies. Then you
will be able to fight with advantage.
4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard
to re-occupy is called entangling.
5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy
is unprepared, you may sally forth and
defeat him.
But if the enemy is prepared for your
coming, and you
fail to defeat him, then, return being
impossible,
disaster will ensue.
6. When the position is such that neither side
will gain
by making the first move, it is called
temporizing ground.
7. In a position of this sort, even though the
enemy
should offer us an attractive bait, it will
be advisable
not to stir forth, but rather to retreat,
thus enticing
the enemy in his turn; then, when part of
his army has
come out, we may deliver our attack with
advantage.
8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can
occupy
them first, let them be strongly garrisoned
and await
the advent of the enemy.
9. Should the army forestall you in occupying
a pass,
do not go after him if the pass is fully
garrisoned,
but only if it is weakly garrisoned.
10. With regard to precipitous
heights, if you are
beforehand with your adversary, you should
occupy the
raised and sunny spots, and there wait for
him to come up.
11. If the enemy has occupied
them before you,
do not follow him, but retreat and try to
entice him away.
12. If you are situated at a
great distance from
the enemy, and the strength of the two
armies is equal,
it is not easy to provoke a battle, and
fighting will be
to your disadvantage.
13. These six are the
principles connected with Earth.
The general who has attained a responsible
post must be
careful to study them.
14. Now an army is exposed to
six several calamities,
not arising from natural causes, but from
faults
for which the general is responsible. These are:
(1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3)
collapse; (4) ruin;
(5) disorganization; (6) rout.
15. Other conditions being
equal, if one force is
hurled against another ten times its size,
the result
will be the flight of the former.
16. When the common soldiers
are too strong and
their officers too weak, the result is
insubordination.
When the officers are too strong and the
common soldiers
too weak, the result is collapse.
17. When the higher officers
are angry and insubordinate,
and on meeting the enemy give battle on
their own account
from a feeling of resentment, before the
commander-in-chief
can tell whether or no he is in a position
to fight,
the result is ruin.
18. When the general is weak
and without authority;
when his orders are not clear and distinct;
when there
are no fixes duties assigned to officers
and men,
and the ranks are formed in a slovenly
haphazard manner,
the result is utter disorganization.
19. When a general, unable to
estimate the enemy's
strength, allows an inferior force to
engage a larger one,
or hurls a weak detachment against a
powerful one,
and neglects to place picked soldiers in
the front rank,
the result must be rout.
20. These are six ways of
courting defeat, which must
be carefully noted by the general who has
attained
a responsible post.
21. The natural formation of
the country is the soldier's
best ally; but a power of estimating the
adversary,
of controlling the forces of victory, and
of shrewdly
calculating difficulties, dangers and
distances,
constitutes the test of a great general.
22. He who knows these things,
and in fighting puts
his knowledge into practice, will win his
battles.
He who knows them not, nor practices them,
will surely
be defeated.
23. If fighting is sure to
result in victory,
then you must fight, even though the ruler
forbid it;
if fighting will not result in victory,
then you must not
fight even at the ruler's bidding.
24. The general who advances
without coveting fame
and retreats without fearing disgrace,
whose only
thought is to protect his country and do
good service
for his sovereign, is the jewel of the
kingdom.
25. Regard your soldiers as
your children, and they
will follow you into the deepest valleys;
look upon them
as your own beloved sons, and they will
stand by you
even unto death.
26. If, however, you are
indulgent, but unable to make
your authority felt; kind-hearted, but
unable to enforce
your commands; and incapable, moreover, of
quelling disorder:
then your soldiers must be likened to
spoilt children;
they are useless for any practical purpose.
27. If we know that our own
men are in a condition
to attack, but are unaware that the enemy
is not open
to attack, we have gone only halfway
towards victory.
28. If we know that the enemy
is open to attack,
but are unaware that our own men are not in
a condition
to attack, we have gone only halfway
towards victory.
29. If we know that the enemy
is open to attack,
and also know that our men are in a
condition to attack,
but are unaware that the nature of the
ground makes
fighting impracticable, we have still gone
only halfway
towards victory.
30. Hence the experienced
soldier, once in motion,
is never bewildered; once he has broken
camp, he is never
at a loss.
31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and
know yourself, your victory will not stand
in doubt;
if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may
make your
victory complete.
XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS
1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of
ground:
(1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground;
(3) contentious ground;
(4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting
highways;
(6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground;
(8) hemmed-in ground;
(9) desperate ground.
2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own
territory,
it is dispersive ground.
3. When he has penetrated into hostile
territory,
but
to no great distance, it is facile ground.
4. Ground the possession of which imports
great
advantage to either side, is contentious
ground.
5. Ground on which each side has liberty of
movement
is open ground.
6. Ground which forms the key to three
contiguous states,
so that he who occupies it first has most
of the Empire
at his command, is a ground of intersecting
highways.
7. When an army has penetrated into the heart
of a
hostile country, leaving a number of
fortified cities
in its rear, it is serious ground.
8. Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes
and fens--all
country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
9. Ground which is reached through narrow
gorges,
and from which we can only retire by
tortuous paths,
so that a small number of the enemy would
suffice to crush
a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground.
10. Ground on which we can
only be saved from
destruction by fighting without delay, is
desperate ground.
11. On dispersive ground,
therefore, fight not.
On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground,
attack not.
12. On open ground, do not try
to block the enemy's way.
On the ground of intersecting highways,
join hands
with your allies.
13. On serious ground, gather
in plunder.
In difficult ground, keep steadily on the
march.
14. On hemmed-in ground,
resort to stratagem.
On desperate ground, fight.
15. Those who were called
skillful leaders of old knew
how to drive a wedge between the enemy's
front and rear;
to prevent co-operation between his large
and small divisions;
to hinder the good troops from rescuing the
bad,
the officers from rallying their men.
16. When the enemy's men were
united, they managed
to keep them in disorder.
17. When it was to their
advantage, they made
a forward move; when otherwise, they
stopped still.
18. If asked how to cope with
a great host of the enemy
in orderly array and on the point of
marching to the attack,
I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your
opponent holds dear; then he will be
amenable to your will."
19. Rapidity is the essence of
war: take advantage of
the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by
unexpected routes,
and attack unguarded spots.
20. The following are the
principles to be observed
by an invading force: The further you penetrate into
a country, the greater will be the
solidarity of your troops,
and thus the defenders will not prevail
against you.
21. Make forays in fertile
country in order to supply
your army with food.
22. Carefully study the
well-being of your men,
and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard
your strength. Keep your army continually on the move,
and devise unfathomable plans.
23. Throw your soldiers into
positions whence there
is no escape, and they will prefer death to
flight.
If they will face death, there is nothing
they may
not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth
their uttermost strength.
24. Soldiers when in desperate
straits lose
the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge,
they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country,
they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help
for it, they will fight hard.
25. Thus, without waiting to
be marshaled, the soldiers
will be constantly on the qui vive; without
waiting to
be asked, they will do your will; without
restrictions,
they will be faithful; without giving
orders, they can
be trusted.
26. Prohibit the taking of
omens, and do away with
superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes,
no calamity need be feared.
27. If our soldiers are not
overburdened with money,
it is not because they have a distaste for
riches;
if their lives are not unduly long, it is
not because they
are disinclined to longevity.
28. On the day they are
ordered out to battle,
your soldiers may weep, those sitting up
bedewing
their garments, and those lying down
letting the tears run
down their cheeks. But let them once be brought to bay,
and they will display the courage of a Chu
or a Kuei.
29. The skillful tactician may
be likened to the
shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake
that is found
in the ChUng mountains. Strike at its head, and you
will be attacked by its tail; strike at its
tail, and you
will be attacked by its head; strike at its
middle,
and you will be attacked by head and tail
both.
30. Asked if an army can be
made to imitate the shuai-jan,
I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men
of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are
crossing a river
in the same boat and are caught by a storm,
they will come
to each other's assistance just as the left
hand helps the right.
31. Hence it is not enough to
put one's trust
in the tethering of horses, and the burying
of chariot
wheels in the ground
32. The principle on which to
manage an army is to set
up one standard of courage which all must
reach.
33. How to make the best of
both strong and weak--that
is a question involving the proper use of
ground.
34. Thus the skillful general
conducts his army just
as though he were leading a single man,
willy-nilly, by
the hand.
35. It is the business of a general
to be quiet and thus
ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus
maintain order.
36. He must be able to mystify
his officers and men
by false reports and appearances, and thus
keep them
in total ignorance.
37. By altering his
arrangements and changing
his plans, he keeps the enemy without
definite knowledge.
By shifting his camp and taking circuitous
routes,
he prevents the enemy from anticipating his
purpose.
38. At the critical moment,
the leader of an army
acts like one who has climbed up a height
and then kicks
away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep
into hostile territory before he shows his
hand.
39. He burns his boats and
breaks his cooking-pots;
like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he
drives
his men this way and that, and nothing
knows whither he
is going.
40. To muster his host and
bring it into danger:--this
may be termed the business of the general.
41. The different measures
suited to the nine
varieties of ground; the expediency of
aggressive or
defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws
of human nature:
these are things that must most certainly
be studied.
42. When invading hostile
territory, the general
principle is, that penetrating deeply
brings cohesion;
penetrating but a short way means
dispersion.
43. When you leave your own
country behind, and take
your army across neighborhood territory,
you find yourself
on critical ground. When there are means of communication
on all four sides, the ground is one of
intersecting highways.
44. When you penetrate deeply
into a country, it is
serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way,
it is facile ground.
45. When you have the enemy's
strongholds on your rear,
and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in
ground.
When there is no place of refuge at all, it
is desperate ground.
46. Therefore, on dispersive
ground, I would inspire
my men with unity of purpose. On facile ground, I would
see that there is close connection between
all parts
of my army.
47. On contentious ground, I
would hurry up my rear.
48. On open ground, I would
keep a vigilant eye
on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways,
I would consolidate my alliances.
49. On serious ground, I would
try to ensure
a continuous stream of supplies. On difficult ground,
I would keep pushing on along the road.
50. On hemmed-in ground, I
would block any way
of retreat.
On desperate ground, I would proclaim
to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving
their lives.
51. For it is the soldier's
disposition to offer
an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to
fight hard
when he cannot help himself, and to obey
promptly when he
has fallen into danger.
52. We cannot enter into
alliance with neighboring
princes until we are acquainted with their
designs. We are
not fit to lead an army on the march unless
we are familiar
with the face of the country--its mountains
and forests,
its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes
and swamps.
We shall be unable to turn natural
advantages to account
unless we make use of local guides.
53. To be ignored of any one
of the following four
or five principles does not befit a warlike
prince.
54. When a warlike prince
attacks a powerful state,
his generalship shows itself in preventing
the concentration
of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents,
and their allies are prevented from joining
against him.
55. Hence he does not strive
to ally himself with all
and sundry, nor does he foster the power of
other states.
He carries out his own secret designs,
keeping his
antagonists in awe. Thus he is able to capture their
cities and overthrow their kingdoms.
56. Bestow rewards without
regard to rule,
issue orders without regard to previous
arrangements;
and you will be able to handle a whole army
as though
you had to do with but a single man.
57. Confront your soldiers
with the deed itself;
never let them know your design. When the outlook is bright,
bring it before their eyes; but tell them
nothing when
the situation is gloomy.
58. Place your army in deadly
peril, and it will survive;
plunge it into desperate straits, and it
will come off
in safety.
59. For it is precisely when a
force has fallen into
harm's way that is capable of striking a
blow for victory.
60. Success in warfare is
gained by carefully
accommodating ourselves to the enemy's
purpose.
61. By persistently hanging on
the enemy's flank, we shall
succeed in the long run in killing the
commander-in-chief.
62. This is called ability to
accomplish a thing
by sheer cunning.
63. On the day that you take
up your command,
block the frontier passes, destroy the
official tallies,
and stop the passage of all emissaries.
64. Be stern in the
council-chamber, so that you
may control the situation.
65. If the enemy leaves a door
open, you must rush in.
66. Forestall your opponent by
seizing what he holds dear,
and subtly contrive to time his arrival on
the ground.
67. Walk in the path defined
by rule, and accommodate
yourself to the enemy until you can fight a
decisive battle.
68. At first, then, exhibit
the coyness of a maiden,
until the enemy gives you an opening;
afterwards emulate
the rapidity of a running hare, and it will
be too late
for the enemy to oppose you.
XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE
1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking
with fire.
The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;
the second is to burn stores; the third is
to burn
baggage trains; the fourth is to burn
arsenals and magazines;
the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst
the enemy.
2. In order to carry out an attack, we must
have
means available. The material for raising fire should
always be kept in readiness.
3. There is a proper season for making attacks
with fire,
and special days for starting a
conflagration.
4. The proper season is when the weather is
very dry;
the special days are those when the moon is
in the
constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the
Wing
or the Cross-bar; for these four are all
days of rising wind.
5. In attacking with fire, one should be
prepared
to meet five possible developments:
6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's
camp,
respond at once with an attack from
without.
7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but
the enemy's
soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and
do not attack.
8. (3) When the force of the flames has
reached its height,
follow it up with an attack, if that is
practicable;
if not, stay where you are.
9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault
with fire
from without, do not wait for it to break
out within,
but deliver your attack at a favorable
moment.
10. (5) When you start a fire,
be to windward of it.
Do not attack from the leeward.
11. A wind that rises in the
daytime lasts long,
but a night breeze soon falls.
12. In every army, the five
developments connected with
fire must be known, the movements of the
stars calculated,
and a watch kept for the proper days.
13. Hence those who use fire
as an aid to the attack show intelligence;
those who use water as an aid to the attack
gain an accession of strength.
14. By means of water, an
enemy may be intercepted,
but not robbed of all his belongings.
15. Unhappy is the fate of one
who tries to win his
battles and succeed in his attacks without
cultivating
the spirit of enterprise; for the result is
waste of time
and general stagnation.
16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his
plans well ahead; the good general
cultivates his resources.
17. Move not unless you see an
advantage; use not
your troops unless there is something to be
gained;
fight not unless the position is critical.
18. No ruler should put troops
into the field merely
to gratify his own spleen; no general
should fight
a battle simply out of pique.
19. If it is to your
advantage, make a forward move;
if not, stay where you are.
20. Anger may in time change
to gladness; vexation may
be succeeded by content.
21. But a kingdom that has
once been destroyed can
never come again into being; nor can the
dead ever
be brought back to life.
22. Hence the enlightened
ruler is heedful,
and the good general full of caution. This is the way
to keep a country at peace and an army
intact.
XIII. THE USE OF SPIES
1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand
men and marching them great distances
entails heavy loss
on the people and a drain on the resources
of the State.
The daily expenditure will amount to a
thousand ounces
of silver.
There will be commotion at home and abroad,
and men will drop down exhausted on the
highways.
As many as seven hundred thousand families
will be impeded
in their labor.
2. Hostile armies may face each other for
years,
striving for the victory which is decided
in a single day.
This being so, to remain in ignorance of
the enemy's
condition simply because one grudges the
outlay of a hundred
ounces of silver in honors and emoluments,
is the height
of inhumanity.
3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present
help to his sovereign, no master of
victory.
4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and
the good
general to strike and conquer, and achieve
things beyond
the reach of ordinary men, is
foreknowledge.
5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited
from spirits;
it cannot be obtained inductively from
experience,
nor by any deductive calculation.
6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can
only
be obtained from other men.
7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are
five classes:
(1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3)
converted spies;
(4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.
8. When these five kinds of spy are all at
work,
none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine
manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's
most precious faculty.
9. Having local spies means employing the
services
of the inhabitants of a district.
10. Having inward spies,
making use of officials
of the enemy.
11. Having converted spies,
getting hold of the enemy's
spies and using them for our own purposes.
12. Having doomed spies, doing
certain things openly
for purposes of deception, and allowing our
spies to know
of them and report them to the enemy.
13. Surviving spies, finally,
are those who bring
back news from the enemy's camp.
14. Hence it is that which
none in the whole army are
more intimate relations to be maintained
than with spies.
None should be more liberally
rewarded. In no other
business should greater secrecy be
preserved.
15. Spies cannot be usefully
employed without a certain
intuitive sagacity.
16. They cannot be properly
managed without benevolence
and straightforwardness.
17. Without subtle ingenuity
of mind, one cannot make
certain of the truth of their reports.
18. Be subtle! be subtle! and
use your spies for every
kind of business.
19. If a secret piece of news
is divulged by a spy
before the time is ripe, he must be put to
death together
with the man to whom the secret was told.
20. Whether the object be to
crush an army, to storm
a city, or to assassinate an individual, it
is always
necessary to begin by finding out the names
of the attendants,
the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and
sentries of the general
in command.
Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.
21. The enemy's spies who have
come to spy on us
must be sought out, tempted with bribes,
led away and
comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted
spies and available for our service.
22. It is through the
information brought by the
converted spy that we are able to acquire
and employ
local and inward spies.
23. It is owing to his
information, again, that we can
cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings
to the enemy.
24. Lastly, it is by his
information that the surviving
spy can be used on appointed occasions.
25. The end and aim of spying
in all its five varieties
is knowledge of the enemy; and this
knowledge can only
be derived, in the first instance, from the
converted spy.
Hence it is essential that the converted
spy be treated
with the utmost liberality.
26. Of old, the rise of the
Yin dynasty was due to I
Chih who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise
of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who
had served
under the Yin.
27. Hence it is only the
enlightened ruler and the
wise general who will use the highest
intelligence of
the army for purposes of spying and thereby
they achieve
great results. Spies are a most important element in water,
because on them depends an army's ability
to move.
[END - Sun Tzu on the Art of War, text-only]
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