APPENDIX A
XVII. Testing And Use Of Chemical And Biological Agents By The Intelligence Community
-94-
http://www.druglibrary.org/Schaffer/history/e1950/mkultra/AppendixA.htm
general lack of interagency communication on drug related research. As the October 1959 study noted, "there has been no coordination with other intelligence agencies up to the present." [106]
On December 7, 1959, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI, apparently a General Willems) was briefed on the proposed operational use of LSD by USAINTC Project Officer Jacobson, in preparation for Project THIRD CHANCE. General Willems expressed concern that the project had not been coordinated with the FBI and the CIA. He is quoted as saying "that if this project is going to be worth anything, it [LSD] should be used on higher types of non-U.S. subjects" in other words "staffers." He indicated this could be accomplished if the CIA were brought in. The summary of the briefing prepared by Major Mehovsky continues: "Of particular note is that ACSI did not direct coordination with CIA and the FBI but only mentioned it for consideration by the planners." [107]
After the briefing, four colonels, two lieutenant colonels and Major Mehovsky met to discuss interagency cooperation with CIA and FBI. The group consensus was to postpone efforts toward coordination:
Lt. Col. Jacobson commented that before we coordinate with CIA we should have more factual findings from field experimentation with counterintelligence cases that will strengthen our position and proposal for cooperation. This approach read to by the conferees. [108]
Had such coordination been achieved, the safety of these experiments might have been viewed differently and the tests themselves might have been seen as unnecessary.
XVII. Testing And Use Of Chemical And Biological Agents By The Intelligence Community
-94-
http://www.druglibrary.org/Schaffer/history/e1950/mkultra/AppendixA.htm
general lack of interagency communication on drug related research. As the October 1959 study noted, "there has been no coordination with other intelligence agencies up to the present." [106]
On December 7, 1959, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI, apparently a General Willems) was briefed on the proposed operational use of LSD by USAINTC Project Officer Jacobson, in preparation for Project THIRD CHANCE. General Willems expressed concern that the project had not been coordinated with the FBI and the CIA. He is quoted as saying "that if this project is going to be worth anything, it [LSD] should be used on higher types of non-U.S. subjects" in other words "staffers." He indicated this could be accomplished if the CIA were brought in. The summary of the briefing prepared by Major Mehovsky continues: "Of particular note is that ACSI did not direct coordination with CIA and the FBI but only mentioned it for consideration by the planners." [107]
After the briefing, four colonels, two lieutenant colonels and Major Mehovsky met to discuss interagency cooperation with CIA and FBI. The group consensus was to postpone efforts toward coordination:
Lt. Col. Jacobson commented that before we coordinate with CIA we should have more factual findings from field experimentation with counterintelligence cases that will strengthen our position and proposal for cooperation. This approach read to by the conferees. [108]
Had such coordination been achieved, the safety of these experiments might have been viewed differently and the tests themselves might have been seen as unnecessary.
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