Before trying to understand the failed deception operation to blame the assassination of President Kennedy on Lee Harvey Oswald, Fidel Castro and Communists, it is necessary, as linguist David Mauer has shown, and Peter Dale Scott, John Newman and Dan Hardway have elaborated on in detail, you should become familiar with how that game is played.
Here's the first chapter of today's Army Field Manual on Military Deception that you can apply to the Dealey Plaza Operation, as we come to know it. - BK
Army Manual FM 3-13.4
Army Support to Military Deception
ARMY SUPPORT TO MILITARY DECEPTION
Contents Page
PREFACE...
iii INTRODUCTION
..........................................................................................................
v Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS
.....................................................................................................
1-1 Overview
of Army Military Deception Planning
.........................................................
1-2 1-1
Functions of Military Deception
.................................................................................
1-3 1-1
Categories of Deception ............................................................................................
1-4 1-1
Key Terms of Military Deception
...............................................................................
1-5 1-3
Principles of Deception ..............................................................................................
1-6 1-5
Types of Military Deception
.......................................................................................
1-7 1-6
Tactics .......................................................................................................................
1-8 1-7 Techniques
................................................................................................................
1-9 1-8 Deception Maxims
.....................................................................................................
1-10
1-8 Deception Means
.....................................................................................................
1-11
1-11 Information Quality
..................................................................................................
1-12
1-13 Roles and Responsibilities
......................................................................................
1-13
1-13 Chapter 2 PLANNING
1-14
2-1 Preplanning
...............................................................................................................
1-15
2-1 The Army Tactical Deception Planning
Process .......................................................
1-16
2-4 Deception Plan Approval
.........................................................................................
1-17
2-14 Intelligence Support to Deception
Planning ............................................................
1-18
2-14 Legal Considerations
...............................................................................................
1-19
2-17 Operations Security and Deception
.........................................................................
1-20
2-19 Military Deception as an
Information-Related Capability ........................................
1-21
2-20 Integration with Other
Information-Related Capabilities ..........................................
1-22
2-21 Coordination Requirements
.....................................................................................
1-23
2-23 Risk Assessment
.....................................................................................................
1-24
2-23 Chapter 3
1-25
PREPARATION AND EXECUTION
.........................................................................
1-26
3-1 Preparation
................................................................................................................
1-27
3-1 Execution
...................................................................................................................
1-28
3-1 Managing the Execution of the Deception
Plan ........................................................
1-29
3-3 Terminating Military Deception
Operations ...............................................................
1-30
3-5 Chapter 4 ASSESSMENT
1-31
4-1 Assessment Responsibilities
.....................................................................................
1-32
4-1 Assessment Plan .......................................................................................................
1-33
4-2 Measures of Effectiveness and
Measures of Performance Development ................
1-34
4-2 Appendix A
1-35
COUNTERDECEPTION
...........................................................................................
1-36
A-1 Contents ii FM 3-13.4 26 February
2019
1-37
Appendix B INPUT TO OPERATION PLANS AND
ORDERS
1-38
B-1 Appendix C DECEPTION EVALUATION
CHECKLIST
1-39
C-1 SOURCE NOTES
...............................................................................
1-40
Source Notes-1 GLOSSARY
................................................................................................
1-41
Glossary-1 REFERENCES
........................................................................................
1-42
References-1 INDEX
1-43
Index-1 Figures Figure 2-1. Planning
steps
1-44
2-12 Figure 3-1. Monitoring activities .
1-45
3-4 Figure B-1. Sample Appendix 14 (Military
Deception) to Annex C (Operations) ..............
1-46
B-1 Tables Table 1-1. Deception differences
1-47
1-2 Table 1-2. Sample deception
techniques
.....................................................................
1-48
1-8 Table 2-1. The Army tactical deception
planning process in the military decision making process
1-49
2-4 Table 2-2. Sample terminations
Introduction
When properly resourced and integrated, deception
has the potential to deter or induce actions that are favorable to the force
and can increase the success of friendly activity. In the same way that
operations transition from one phase to the next, deception plans integrated
into each phase and through each transition will strengthen the ability of
commanders to retain initiative throughout the operation. Successfully planned
deceptions give commanders the ability to act faster than the enemy can make
decisions, creating positions of relative advantage. Deception, as part of a
broader strategy, is present in military case studies. While deception has its
roots in the earliest military strategies, the modern day practical study of
deception relies largely on case studies from World War I to present day. The
availability of actual participants for interviews combined with detailed after
action review reporting provides an in-depth understanding of deception tactics
and techniques. Deception can play a pivotal role in achieving the commander’s
objectives and significantly reduce risk. Deception can conceal, protect,
reinforce, amplify, minimize, distort, or otherwise misrepresent friendly
technical and operational capabilities, intentions, operations, and associated
activities. Deception can be a critical enabler to achieving operational
surprise and maintaining the initiative during large-scale combat operations in
highly contested, lethal environments. This publication is the proponent for
the new Army term, tactical deception.
Chapter 1 Fundamentals OVERVIEW OF ARMY MILITARY
DECEPTION PLANNING
1-1. Military deception is actions executed to
deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist
organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific
actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the
friendly mission (JP 3-13.4).
Deception applies to all levels of warfare,
across the range of military operations, and is conducted during all phases of
military operations. When properly integrated with operations security (OPSEC)
and other information-related capabilities (IRCs), deception can be a decisive
tool in altering how the enemy views, analyzes, decides, and acts in response
to friendly military operations.
1-2. Deception is a commander-driven activity that
seeks to establish conditions favorable for the commander to achieve
objectives. It is both a process and a capability. As a process, deception
employs an analytic method to systematically, deliberately, and cognitively
target individual decision makers. The objective is to elicit specific action
(or inaction) from the enemy. As a capability, deception is useful to a
commander when integrated early in the planning process as a component of an
operation focused on causing an enemy to act or react in a desired manner.
Deception greatly enhances the element of surprise.
Deception aligns with
surprise and the displacement of critical threat capabilities away from the
friendly point of action. Due to the potentially sensitive nature of deception
activities and selected means, planners must implement appropriate security and
classification measures to properly safeguard deception tactics, techniques,
and procedures.
FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY DECEPTION
1-3. Planners must have a thorough understanding of
the functions and the scope of what deception can and cannot accomplish. A deception
plan serves as a part of the overall mission. Every deception plan must clearly
indicate how it supports the commander’s objectives. The functions of deception
include, but are not limited to— Causing
delay and surprise through ambiguity, confusion, or misunderstanding.l
Causing the enemy to misallocate
personnel, fiscal, and materiel resources.l Causing the enemy to reveal strengths,
weaknesses, dispositions, and intentions.l Causing the enemy to waste combat power and
resources with inappropriate or delayed actions.l
CATEGORIES OF
DECEPTION
1-4. Deception activities support objectives
detailed in concept plans, operation plans (OPLANs), and operation orders
(OPORDs) associated with approved military operations or activities. Deception
applies during any phase of military operations to establish conditions to
accomplish the commander’s intent. The Army echelon that plans a deception
activity often determines its type. The levels of war define and clarify the
relationship between strategic and tactical actions. The levels have no finite
limits or boundaries. They correlate to specific authorities, levels of
responsibility, and planning. The levels help organize thought and approaches
to a problem. Decisions at one level always affect other levels. Table 1-1
shows the three types of deception. Chapter 1 1-2 FM 3-13.4 26 February 2019
Table 1-1.
Deception differences Military deception Tactical deception
Deception in support of operations security Focus Influence the action or
inaction of enemy decision makers Gain a tactical advantage over an enemy Make
friendly force intentions harder to interpret Level Strategic or operational
Tactical Any Support to Military campaigns and major operations Army commanders
All in support of an approved operations security plan Headquarters Combatant
command and joint task forces Joint task forces, Army Service component
command, division, and below All Approval from In accordance with CJCSI 3211.01
or DODI 3604.01 Two levels higher (as per combatant command instruction) Two
levels higher (as per combatant command instruction) Target Adversary or enemy
Enemy Foreign intelligence entity CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
instruction DODI Department of Defense instruction
MILITARY DECEPTION
1-5. Military deception (MILDEC) is planned,
trained, and conducted to support military campaigns and major operations.
MILDEC activities are planned and executed to cause adversaries to take actions
or inactions that are favorable to the commander’s objectives. The majority of
MILDEC planned for and executed by the combatant command (CCMD) to create
operational-level effects. MILDEC is normally planned before, and conducted
during, combat operations. CCMD instructions add guidelines, policies, and
processes that must be adhered to in their respective commands. MILDEC is a
joint activity to which the Army, as the primary joint land component,
contributes. Army forces do not unilaterally conduct MILDEC. MILDEC must adhere
to the regulatory requirements found in Army policy and regulations, CJCSI
3211.01 series, and applicable CCMD instructions.
TACTICAL DECEPTION
1-6. Tactical deception is an activity planned and
executed by, and in support of, tactical-level commanders to cause enemy
decision makers to take actions or inactions prejudicial to themselves and
favorable to the achievement of tactical commanders’ objectives. Commanders
conduct tactical deception (TAC-D) to influence military operations to gain a
relative, tactical advantage over the enemy, obscure vulnerabilities in
friendly forces, and enhance the defensive capabilities of friendly forces. In
general, TAC-D is a related subset of deception that is not subject to the full
set of MILDEC program requirements and authorities. In most circumstances, Army
commanders can employ TAC-D unilaterally if certain criteria are met. In
description, TAC-D differs from MILDEC in four key ways: MILDEC is centrally planned and controlled
through CCMD-derived authorities, but TAC-D isl Fundamentals 26
February 2019 FM 3-13.4 1-3
DECEPTION IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS SECURITY
1-7. Deception in support of operations security
(DISO) is a deception activity that conveys or denies selected information or
signatures to a foreign intelligence entity (FIE) and limits the FIE’s overall
ability to collect or accurately analyze critical information about friendly
operations, personnel, programs, equipment, and other assets. The intent of
DISO is to create multiple false, confusing, or misleading indicators to make
friendly force intentions harder to interpret by FIE. DISO makes it difficult
for FIEs to identify or accurately derive the critical information and
indicators protected by OPSEC. Deception and OPSEC are mutually supporting
activities. DISO prevents potential enemies from accurately profiling friendly
activities that would provide an indication of a specific course of action
(COA) or operational activity. DISO differs from joint MILDEC and TAC-D plans
in that it only targets FIEs and is not focused on generating a specific enemy
action or inaction. Because a DISO does not target a specific enemy decision
maker, the DISO approval process differs from the MILDEC approval process. A
DISO can be approved at two levels higher, provided that it adheres to the
joint policy for MILDEC in CJCSI 3211.01 series and is developed in support of
an approved OPSEC plan. CCMD instructions add guidelines, policies, and
processes that must be adhered to in their respective commands.
KEY TERMS OF MILITARY DECEPTION
1-8. Military deception officers (MDOs) must have a
comprehensive understanding of deception terms and definitions. Deception
refers to those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation,
distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a
manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests. The following are terms and
definitions associated with deception that deception will use throughout the
planning process— Deception goal.l
Deception objective.l
Deception target.l
Desired perceptions.l
Conduits.l Indicator.l Filter.l Node.l Link.l Deception event.l Observable.l Competing observable.l
Patterns.l Deception story.l
1-9. The deception goal is the commander’s statement
of the purpose of military deception as it contributes to the successful
accomplishment of the assigned mission (JP 3-13.4). It is always written from
the perspective of the friendly force commander. In initial planning guidance,
a deception goal may be general in nature, requiring refinement during the development
of the deception estimate. The deception goal is usually stated as a positive
friendly advantage or condition such as: “Deception will create a decisive
combat power advantage for the coalition main effort attack along AXIS
MONTANA.”
Like any other form of military operation, the measure of success for
deception is its direct contribution to the accomplishment of the mission.
Deception plans often require investments in effort and resources that would
otherwise be applied against the enemy in a more direct fashion. Consequently,
it is important for the commander to first envision the deception goal in terms
of its specific contribution to accomplishing the designated mission. Some
additional examples include— “I want to
use deception to improve the friendly force advantage.”l
“I want to use deception to increase
freedom of maneuver.”l Chapter 1 1-4 FM 3-13.4 26 February
2019
1-10. The deception objective is the desired result
of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or
not to do at the critical time and/or location (JP 3-13.4). It is the action or
inaction that directly leads to the advantage or condition stated in the
deception goal. For example, “Cause the enemy to hold its armored reserve in a
position or status unable to impact friendly forces along AXIS MONTANA through
H+36 hours.”
1-11. The deception target is the adversary decision
maker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception
objective (JP 3-13.4). The target thus directs the action or inaction of the
military capability described in the deception objective. The deception target
or target set is key individuals on whom planners focus the deception plan.
Understanding the target’s process for receiving and processing information,
assessing a situation, and deciding a COA is critical to a successful deception
plan. For more information on deception targets, see chapter 2.
1-12. In military deception, desired perception is
what the deception target must believe for it to make the decision that will
achieve the deception objective (JP 3-13.4). They are personal conclusions,
official estimates, and assumptions that the deception target must believe in
order to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. These
enemy perceptions will form from both objective (observation and analysis) and
subjective (intuition and experience) analysis. They are also heavily impacted
by biases, preconceptions, predispositions, and filters applied in the
collection, analysis, delivery, and reception of information.
1-13. Within military deception, conduits are
information or intelligence gateways to the deception target, such as foreign
intelligence entities, intelligence collection platforms, open-source
intelligence, and foreign and domestic news media (JP 3-13.4). They are the
pathways to the deception target. Collectively, they define how the enemy will
observe activity in the information environment and how those observations are
transmitted, processed, and ultimately delivered to the decision maker. For
more discussion on conduits and conduit analysis, see discussion beginning in
paragraph 2-33.
1-14. In operations security usage, an indicator is
data derived from friendly detectable actions and opensource information that
an adversary can interpret and piece together to reach conclusions or estimates
of friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities (JP 3-13.3).
1-15. A filter is any node within a conduit that
aggregates, synthesizes, or applies bias information on its path to the deception
target. A node is an element of a system that represents a person, place, or
physical thing (JP 3-0). Planners understand that filters make every conduit
unique, affecting the way information is transmitted through them. To create
the most effective portrayal of the deception story, planners assess each
conduit and the filters involved, ensure redundancy with other conduits, and
appreciate the relative value of each conduit as perceived by the target.
1-16. A link is a behavioral, physical, or functional
relationship between nodes (JP 3-0). The key link between selected indicators
and the deception story is the tentative identification of one or more enemy
conduits to which the plan exposes the indicator. Observable activities and the
threat conduits combine to produce indicators that can be seen or perceived to
aid in collection and decision-making processes. Unless exposed to one or more
active conduits, an indicator is ineffective in conveying the observable or
indicator: the enemy cannot register or respond to what it cannot see.
Executions are the tasks or activities that the friendly unit conducts to put
an observable into action.
1-17. A
deception event is a deception means executed at a specific time and location
in support of a deception operation (JP 3-13.4). A deception event aims to
portray an observable that contributes to desired perceptions in the deception
target.
1-18. In military deception, an observable is the
detectable result of the combination of an indicator within an adversary’s conduit
intended to cause action or inaction by the deception target (JP 3-13.4).
Observables are often made up of executions, which can include events,
activities, or elements of information that must be seen or sensed by the
target to form the desired perceptions. Observables may gain credibility
through the use of supporting observables. To enhance the probability that the
target will receive or accept one or more of the required observables.
1-19. MDOs may need to develop supporting
observables. Supporting observables enhance the deception story and help create
a believable context for the required observables. Planners identify all the
activities Fundamentals 26 February 2019 FM 3-13.4 1-5 normally associated with
a specific activity or event (the required observable). From those activities,
the planner analyzes which of those associated activities the target would
normally collect against and use as a significant indicator of usual or
consistent friendly behavior. The activities must be fully compatible with all
elements of the deception story and carefully sequenced with other observables
to have their desired effects.
1-20. Within military deception, a competing
observable is any observable that contradicts the deception story, casts doubt
on, or diminishes the impact of one or more required or supporting observables
(JP 3-13.4). To minimize the impact of competing observables on enemy analysis,
they must be mitigated as part of the deception plan. Examples of mitigation
for competing observables include protection with OPSEC, including DISO;
neutralization of the enemy conduit to which competing observables are likely
to be exposed; or assumption of risk based on detailed analysis of minimal
impact to the operation. The availability of resources and time are often
limiting factors in preparing such supporting measures, but they can be
extremely valuable in raising the credibility and verifiability of the
deception story and the probability of deception success.
1-21. Patterns are multiple-repetitive indicators
that give the enemy an operational profile. Enemies use their intelligence
collection assets to analyze patterns to identify the unit and predict its
mission. Changes in pattern can affect how an enemy perceives friendly actions.
1-22. The
deception story is a scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be
portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception (JP
3-13.4). It is a succinct statement or narrative of exactly what the MDO wants
the target to believe to be the true situation, then decide and act on that
basis. It is usually made up of the deception observables and the deception
desired perceptions in a specific sequence to create deception events. MDOs
write the deception story from the perspective of the enemy so it reads like
the enemy’s intelligence estimate about friendly forces’ actions and
intentions.
PRINCIPLES OF DECEPTION
1-23. Just as the principles of war provide general
guidance for the conduct of military operations, the six principles of
deception provide guidance to plan deception. The principles of deception are— Focus.l Objective.l Centralized planning and control.l
Security.l Timing.l Integration.l
FOCUS
1-24. The deception plan should focus on the thought
process of the threat decision maker who has the authority and capability of
causing the desired actions. The enemy’s intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance is normally not the target; rather, it is a primary conduit used
in the deception plan to convey selected information to the decision maker.
Planners must clearly understand the difference between intermediate conduits
and the intended target. Focused deception must cause an action or inaction of
the enemy force. In order to do this, there must be existing conduits to the
deception target or a reasonable expectation that conduits can establish.
OBJECTIVE
1-25. Deception plans focus actions and resources
that motivate an enemy to decide to take (or not to take) specific desired
actions. The plan cannot focus solely on motivating the target to believe
certain things; it must lead to the target making a specific decision to act or
not act.
CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND CONTROL
1-26. A centralized approach is necessary to avoid
confusion and to ensure various elements portray the same story and do not
conflict with other operational objectives or evolving conditions in an
operational environment. Execution of the deception may, however, be
decentralized as long as all participating Chapter 1 1-6 FM 3-13.4 26 February
2019 organizations adhere to a single plan. Once the commander approves the
deception plan, the designated operational element monitors the situation and
its effects on the target, as well as friendly and partnered forces. The MDO,
working with the deception working group (DWG), ensures synchronization,
deconfliction, and OPSEC.
SECURITY
1-27. Successful deception requires strict security
that begins before execution with measures to deny the enemy knowledge of the
friendly force’s intent to deceive. Successful planners apply strict need to
know criteria to each aspect of the deception plan. Maintaining the security of
the deception means limiting the number of informed planners and participants
to those needed. The MDO must develop and maintain access rosters and other
security controls to limit exposure of operational deception activities.
TIMING
1-28. The most critical aspects of deception
planning are beginning proper synchronization with the commander’s intent and
maintaining synchronization during execution. Timing in deception operations is
crucial. The challenge is to get the deception target to act in accordance with
the deception objective within the timelines required by the friendly
operation. Planners must conduct a thorough conduit analysis to understand the
amount of time required for an observable to pass through filters and nodes
before reaching an enemy decision maker. This means that friendly deception
executions must be completed in a manner that accounts for the time consumed by
the enemy’s intelligence collection and analysis process, the enemy’s
decision-making process, and the enemy’s activity that is to be exploited by
friendly forces. Timing must be synchronous among friendly deception actions
taken, the assimilation and reaction processes of the enemy, and dependent
friendly operations.
INTEGRATION
1-29. Deception is an integral part of an operation
that planners must integrate, at all levels, throughout the planning process.
This integration includes developing a concept for deception that supports the
overall mission as part of COA development. Planners must also integrate
deception plans with higher headquarters plans. Deceptions must be consistent
with Army doctrinal norms. The MDO assists the staff in integrating the
deception operation throughout all phases of the operation. This begins with
planning, continues through execution, and concludes with the termination of
the deception.
TYPES OF MILITARY DECEPTION
1-30. Any deception aims to either increase or
decrease the level of uncertainty, or ambiguity, in the mind of the deception
target. This ambiguity has the potential to compel the target to mistakenly
perceive friendly motives, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities
thereby altering the target’s assessment. Two generally recognized types of MILDEC
exist: Ambiguity-increasing.l
Ambiguity-decreasing.l
AMBIGUITY-INCREASING DECEPTION
1-31. Ambiguity-increasing deception provides the
enemy with multiple plausible friendly COAs. Ambiguity-increasing deception is
designed to generate confusion and cause mental conflict in the enemy decision
maker. Anticipated effects of ambiguity-increasing deception can include a
delay to making a specific decision, operational paralysis, or the distribution
of enemy forces to locations far away from the intended location of the
friendly efforts. Ambiguity-increasing deception is often directed against
decision makers known to be indecisive or risk-adverse.
1-32. These
deceptions draw attention from one set of activities to another. They can
create the illusion of strength where weakness exists, or create the illusion
of weakness where strength exists. They can also acclimate the enemy to
particular patterns of activity that are exploitable later. For example,
ambiguity increasing deceptions can cause the target to delay a decision until
it is too late to prevent friendly mission Fundamentals 26 February 2019 FM
3-13.4 1-7 success. They can place the target in a dilemma for which no
acceptable solution exists. They may even prevent the target from taking any
action at all. This type of deception is typically successful with an
indecisive decision maker who is known to avoid risk.
AMBIGUITY-DECREASING DECEPTION
1-33. Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions manipulate and
exploit an enemy decision maker’s pre-existing beliefs and bias through the
intentional display of observables that reinforce and convince that decision
maker that such pre-held beliefs are true. Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions
cause the enemy decision maker to be especially certain and very wrong.
Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions aim to direct the enemy to be at the wrong
place, at the wrong time, with the wrong equipment, and with fewer
capabilities. Ambiguity decreasing deceptions are more challenging to plan
because they require comprehensive information on the enemy’s processes and
intelligence systems. Planners often have success using these deceptions with
strong minded decision makers who are willing to accept a higher level of risk.......
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