Secrecy News
National Federation of Scientists
Military Deception: A Handbook
FM 3-13.4 Army Support to Military Deception
Posted on Feb.27, 2019 in Military Doctrine by Steven Aftergood
Military tacticians use deception to induce an
opponent to act against his own interests, or to refrain from acting when it
would be advantageous. The theory and techniques of military deception were
detailed this week in a new Army
publication for military planners that also implicitly illuminates the
role of deception in other contexts.
In one form, deception may increase an adversary’s
uncertainty so as to hinder decision-making. In another form, it may decrease uncertainty
to encourage the adversary to make a decision that is mistaken.
“Ambiguity-increasing deception is designed to
generate confusion and cause mental conflict in the enemy decision maker.
Anticipated effects of ambiguity-increasing deception can include a delay to
making a specific decision, operational paralysis, or the distribution of enemy
forces to locations far away from the intended location of the friendly
efforts,” the Army manual said.
Deceptive actions “can cause the target to delay a
decision until it is too late to prevent friendly mission success. They can
place the target in a dilemma for which no acceptable solution exists. They may
even prevent the target from taking any action at all. This type of deception
is typically successful with an indecisive decision maker who is known to avoid
risk.”
On the other hand, “Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions
manipulate and exploit an enemy decision maker’s pre-existing beliefs and bias
through the intentional display of observables that reinforce and convince that
decision maker that such pre-held beliefs are true. Ambiguity-decreasing
deceptions cause the enemy decision maker to be especially certain and very
wrong… Planners often have success using these deceptions with strong-minded
decision makers who are willing to accept a higher level of risk.”
Even deception has limits and rules, according
to the
Army. For one thing, the U.S. military is not supposed to deliberately
practice deception against the U.S. government or the public.
“Deception activities, including planning efforts,
are prohibited from explicitly or implicitly targeting, misleading, or
attempting to influence the U.S. Government, U.S. Congress, the U.S. public, or
the U.S. news media. Legal staff review all deception activities to eliminate,
minimize, or mitigate the possibility that such influence might occur.”
Nor, according to international convention, should
instruments of negotiation be abused as tools of deception.
“Flags of truce must not be used surreptitiously to
obtain military information or merely to obtain time to affect a retreat or
secure reinforcements, or to feign a surrender in order to surprise an enemy.”
See Army
Support to Military Deception, Field Manual 3-13.4, 26 February 2019.
By its nature, the effectiveness of military
deception depends on secrecy. Specific applications of military deception are
addressed in classified publications such as DoD Instruction S-3604.01. The
latest (2017) version of Joint Publication 3-13.4 on Military Deception is
restricted in distribution.
But the new Army manual is unclassified and was
published without restriction.
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