Sunday, April 13, 2014

James Mastrovito - Destroyed USSS Records and JFK Evidence

Assassination Records Review Board 

The Players
Who called whom? Joan Zimmerman called James M. Mastrovito of Witnesses/Consultants

Description of the Call
Date: 04/01/97
Subject: USSS Records

Summary of the Call:

James Mastrovito called Dave Montague in response to information about ARRB that dave had sent at the beginning of March 1997. I wanted to speak to James Mastrovito because he was in charge of the JFK assassination file at the Secret Service in 1975. Mastrovito said he started working at the Secret Service in 1959 and retired in 1979. From 1960 to 1962, Mastrovito was on the White House Detail. In the summer of 1962, Mastrovito was in the USSS field office in Charleston, West Virginia. After the assassination, he was called to headquarters. He became a Deputy in the Intelligence Division (formerly Protective Research Section PRS) for 10 years before becoming the director of the Intelligence Division a few years before he retired. He worked with Walter Young, who replaced Robert Bouck. According to Mastrovito, Bouck moved out of PRS in the reorganization of the Intelligence Division after 1963.

When Mastrovito took charge of the JFK Assassination file, it consisted of 5 or 6 file cabinets of material. After Mastrovito finished “culling” irrelevant material, the collection was down to one five-draw file cabinet. Mastrovito guessed that his purging of extraneous material took place around 1970. He said that the extraneous material consisted of records of 2000-3000 “mental cases” who called the Secret Service after the Kennedy assassination to claim responsibility for the shooting. Mastrovito offered that Robert Blakey questioned him about this destruction of documents and threatened legal action. Mastrovito pointed out that Chief Rowley’s August 1965 memo directed him to remove irrelevant material. Blakey had obtained index cards from the Secret Service for what were then called “White House cases” and/or CO2 cases. These cares had been sent to the Warren Commission in a card index file. From these cares, Warren Commission members had requested specific Secret Service reports. Blakey had also sought specific files based on his examination of these index cards. Apparently, Mastrovito had destroyed some files that Blakey had wanted to see. Mastrovito decided which files to keep and which files to destroy.

Mastrovito said no one had access to the assassination file except people in the Secret Service. Some reports were copied for the FBI and the Warren Commission. Mastrovito said protective surveys were not in the assassination file but were kept in the operations division.

Mastrovito said that a “CO2” number referred to Intelligence Division or PRS numbering. He speculated that a “CO-S” would go directly to the Chief’s office. CO2 cases did not go to the Chief’s office unless there was a particular or special reason for the Chief’s attention.

Mastrovito mentioned that Thomas Kelley was an Assistant Director of the Secret Service when Mastrovito knew him. Kelley interviewed Oswald in the DPD jail. Mastrovito used to kid Kelly because he never wrote a final report on the case.

I asked Mastrovito if he had viewed or obtained any artifacts while he was in charge of the assassination file. Mastrovito replied that he had received a piece of President Kennedy’s brain. Mastrovito offered that this item was contained in a vial with a label on it identifying its contents. The vial was the size of a prescription bottle. Mostrovito did not remember if it was glass or plastic. The vial was from the Air Force (sic) Institute of Pathology. (Armed Forces Institute of Pathology) Mastrovito said this vial from the AFIP lab came into his possession “about 3 or 4 years later.” i.e. after the assassination.

(Then Mastrovito said it was about “1969 or 1970”) The label said the vial had been sent from the autopsy at Bethesda; there was no other explanation with it. Mastrovito said he could not see what was special about the portion in the vial. I asked Mastrovito who gave him the vial, and he replied that his supervisor, Walter Young (first Chief of the Intelligence Division), gave it to him when he (Young) resigned from the Secret Service. Young had apparently received it from someone at AFIP. Mastrovito offered that Walter Young died last year. Mastrovito said he destroyed the vial and its contents in a machine that destroys food.

Mastrovito offered more information about Secret Service records as follows: He said that after the assassination, the Secret Service change its policy regarding its records in presidential libraries. Before November 1963, the Service had sent its records to the federal records centers and to presidential libraries. That is, Secret Service criminal files were available to the public, for example, in the FDR library and the Truman library. After the assassination, the Secret Service recalled its criminal files from the Truman library saying that the agency wished to review them in light of the assassination. Instead of returning these files to the Truman library as promised, as Mastrovito put it, “the Secret Service kept the files, and we destroyed them.” In those days, according to Mastrovito, the feeling at the Secret Service was that people’s criminal files should not be available to the public. The Secret Service also recalled selected files from the FDR library.

Mastrovito was quite agreeable to the suggestion of future contacts from me, and he provided his travel itinerary and telephone numbers for the next several months.

Lamar Waldron and Thom Hartmann in “Legacy of Secrecy” (p. 766, Counterpoint Press, 2008) wrote, “In November 1994, the authors informed the Review Board very generally about JFK’s 1963 plans for a coup in Cuba,…and about the attempt to kill JFK in Tampa four days before Dallas. Six weeks later, the Review Board learned that – in violation of the JFK Act – the Secret Service had just destroyed files covering JFK’s Tampa trip, and other important files. That destruction would not become public knowledge until 1998, and even today, most members of Congress remain unaware of it.”

Doug Horne, the chief analyst for military records for the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) wrote more extensively about the deliberate destruction of Secret Service records in his book, “Inside the ARRB” (2009, Volume V, p. 1451)

DOUG HORNE:

THE DESTRUCTION OF KEY DOCUMENTS BY THE SECRET SERVICE IN 1995 SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRET SERVICE COVER-UP OF ITS OWN MALFEASANCE CONTINUED, MORE THAN 30 YEARS AFTER THE ASSASSINATION  

In 1995, the Review Board Staff became aware that the U.S. Secret Service had destroyed protective survey reports related to John F. Kennedy’s Presidency, and that they had done so well after the passage of the JFK Records Act, and well after having been briefed by the National Archives (NARA) on the Act’s requirements to preserve all Assassination Records from destruction until the ARRB had made a determination that any such proposed destruction was acceptable

I reported to work at the ARRB on August 7, 1995, and I still distinctly recall that this controversy was raging full force during the first two weeks I was on the job. I recall both General Counsel Jeremy Gunn and Executive Director David Marwell being particularly upset; they were seriously considering holding public hearings in which the Secret Service officials responsible for said destruction would be called to account and castigated, in an open forum, with the media present. The thinking at the time was that doing so would: (a) cause the Secret Service to take the Review Board and the JFK Act seriously; and (b) send a warning to other government agencies, such as the FBI and CIA, to also take the Review Board and the JFK Act seriously, lest they, too be dragged into public hearings that would cause great discomfiture and professional embarrassment.

Eventually – and unfortunately – tempers cooled and no public hearings were held. I suspect that Board Chair Jack Tunheim played a major role in finessing the matter;presumably, the Board Members believed that since the ARRB was still in its first year of its three-year effort to locate and review assassination records, that we would get more out of the Secret Service in the future with honey, than with vinegar.

Stern official letters levying charges and counter-charges were exchanged; a face-to-face meeting between high-level officials of the ARRB and Secret Service was held; tempers cooled; and no public hearings were ever held. Relations with the Secret Service remained testy throughout the remainder of the ARRB’s lifespan. It was my impression, during my ongoing discussions with my fellow analysts on the Secret Service Records team for the next three years (from September 1995 to September 1998), that the Secret Service never “loosened up” and reached a comfortable working accommodation with the ARRB like the FBI, the CIA, and the Pentagon (or, at least the Joint Staff Secretariat) did. The Secret Service and the ARRB remained wary adversaries for four years.

The Review Board itself consciously soft-pedaled the dispute in its Final Report, devoting only one paragraph (and virtually no details whatsoever) to the incident, on page 149:

Congress passed the JFK Act in 1992. One month later, the Secret Service began its compliance efforts. However, in January 1995, the Secret Service destroyed Presidential protection survey reports for some of President Kennedy’s trips in the fall of 1963. The Review Board learned of the destruction approximately one week after the Secret Service destroyed them, when the Board was drafting its request for additional information. The Board believed that the Secret Service files on the President’s travel in the weeks preceding this murder would be relevant.

And that was it – that was the only mention of the entire imbroglio in the Final Report of the Assassinations Records Review Board. My intention here is to give the reader as much additional and relevant, information as I can at this writing, 14 years later. I was never “on the inside” of this problem, but I do have a correspondence file of letters exchanged, and will quote from them liberally to give the reader a sense of what it feels and sounds like when two bureaucracies go to war inside the Beltway. This is of more than mere academic interest, since the evidence presented in this chapter has shown that several Secret Service officials on the White House Detail were complicit in both the President’s death – due to willful actions that greatly lessened the physical security around President Kennedy during the Dallas motorcade – and in the coverup of the damage to the limousine, which if left in its original damaged condition, would have proved JFK was caught in a crossfire, and therefore killed by a conspiracy.

A Summary of the Records Destroyed by the Secret Service in January of 1995.

The Protective Survey Reports destroyed by the Secret Service in January 1995 were part of a group of records transferred by the Secret Service to the General Services Administration’s Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland on August 7, 1974 under accession number 87-75-4. The instructions on the SF-135 (“Records Transmittal and Receipt” form) were: “Retain permanently for eventual transfer to the National Archives or a Presidential Library.” There were six boxes transferred under the accession number, and the two that were destroyed in January of 1995 contained the following files:

Box 1 Protection of the President (John F. Kennedy)

-         Andrews Air Force Base 1961 (Arrivals and Departures)
-         Andrews Air Force Base 1962 (Arrivals and Departures)
-         Andrews Air Force Base 1963 (Arrivals and Departures)
-         Arlington National Cemetery
-         Camp David
-         The Capitol
-         Churches
-         D.C. National Guard Armory
-         D.C. Stadium
-         Departures from South Grounds
-         Dulles International Airport
-         Embassies
-         Executive Office Building
-         Golf Clubs
-         Griffith Stadium
-         Homes of Friends
-         International Inn
-         Mayflower Hotel (three folders, for 1961-63)
-         National Press Club
-         Other Places Folders (#s 1-4, from January 1961-December of 1962)

Box 6 Protective Survey Reports for the following trips:

-         Duluth, Minnesota (9-24-63)
-         Ashland, Wisconsin (9-24-63)
-         Billings, Montana (9-25-63)
-         Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming (9-25-63)
-         Cheyenne, Wyoming (9-25-63)
-         Grand Forks, North Dakota (9-25-63)
-         Laramie, Wyoming (9-25-63)
-         Salt Lake City, Utah (9-26-63)
-         Great Falls, Montana (9-26-63)
-         Hanford, Washington (9-26-63)
-         Tongue Point, Oregon (9-27-63)
-         Redding, California (9-27-63)
-         Tacoma, Washington (9-27-63)
-         Palm Springs, California (9-28-63)
-         Las Vegas, Nevada (9-28-63)
-         Heber Springs, Arkansas (10-3-63)
-         Little Rock, Arkansas (10-3-63)
-         University of Maine (10-19-63)
-         Boston, Massachusetts (10-26-63)
-         Amherst, Massachusetts (10-26-63)
-         Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (10-30-63)
-         Chicago, Illinois (11-2-63): Three Folders [TRIP CANCELLED]
-         New York City (11-8-63)

In addition, one folder of vital records was missing from Box 2 in this accession, titled: “Other Places Folder #6” (for the period July-November 1963)

Clearly, withholding these two boxes of materials from any investigator would have kept that investigator from learning about normal protective procedures and concerns related to everyday activities throughout the Kennedy Presidency, and would furthermore have denied the investigator comparative knowledge regarding how JFK was protected in numerous venues just prior to the trip to Texas. Perhaps the reader can better understand now why Jeremy Gunn and David Marwell were so upset with the Secret Service. The records were destroyed in the fourth month following the establishment of the ARRB, and furthermore had originally been tagged: “Retain permanently for eventual transfer to the National Archives or a Presidential Library.”

Their destruction occurred long after the Secret Service was initially briefed on the requirements of the JFK Records Act in December of 1992 by the NARA staff, and required willful action by officials within that agency; it was hardly an accident. The Secret Service clearly didn’t want the ARRB poking into its past procedures and practices; the agency had been the recipient of severe criticism in the HSCA’s 1979 Report, and apparently did not wish to repeat that experience, or to have its sealed records released to the Archives for placement in the JFK Records Collection, for all JFK researchers to peruse in the future.

Chronology of Letters Exchanged Between the ARRB and the U.S. Secret Service Over the Destruction of Protective Survey Reports

On July 25, 1995 Review Board Chairman John R. Tunheim sent a powerfully worded letter to the Director of the Secret Service registering the Review Board’s displeasure about its recent discovery that the two boxes in question had been destroyed over a half a year previously. A letter from Board Chair Jack Tunheim (rather than David Marwell or Jeremy Gunn) addressed directly to the Head of the Secret Service (instead of to the administrative officials with whom the ARRB staff had been dealing) was a powerful signal that the Review Board was immensely displeased and took the matter very seriously. Some key passages in Jack Tunheim’s letter are quoted below:

            In January of this year, Dr. Jeremy Gunnn of the Review Board staff requested of John Machado and Ann Parker of the Secret Service that the six boxes in the accession be made available for his review to evaluate the importance of the material for the JFK Collection in the Archives. Although four of the boxes were made available, we were not provided with boxes (1)and (6), the two most important boxes. On February 7, 1995 – and several times thereafter – Mr. Machado and Ms. Parker informed us that theFederal Records Center “could not locate” the two missing boxes….Although we repeatedly were told that special requests for these records had been made at the Federal Records Center, Ms. Ann Parker of the Secret Service finally informed Dr. Joan Zimmeman of the Review Board staff, on July 19, 1995 – six months after we had first requested the boxes – that the records had in fact been destroyed in January of this year at approximately the same time that we had requested them.

Tunheim’s letter requested full accounting of what had happened to the two boxes; a listing of all other Secret Service records pertaining to President Kennedy that had ever been destroyed; and instructed the Secret Service not to destroy any records of any kind relating to President Kennedy or his assassination without first allowing the Review Board and its staff to review them for relevance. For added emphasis a copy of the letter was sent to the Chief Counsel of the U.S. Secret Service, as well as to John Machado, the apparent culprit who presumably gave the orders to destroy the records.

The Secret Service made an immediate attempt to de-escalate the matter by assigning an official named W. Ralph Basham, its Administrative Director of Administration, to reply. Basham’s reply, dated July 31, 1995, was a five-and-one-half page single spaced attempt at obfuscation, the administrative equivalent of a Senate filibuster, to use a legislative analogy. In addition to saying, in some many words, ‘Hey, we didn’t do anything wrong, we were following routine destruction procedures established years ago,’ the Secret Service attempted to wiggle out of its predicament by simultaneously suggesting that perhaps the destruction was really the Review Board’s fault because it was not in receipt of the ARRB’s expanded definition of what constituted an “assassination record” until February 1995, after the records were destroyed. Perhaps most disturbing of all was the narrow definition that the Secret Service had used commencing in December 1992 (following its NARAbeefing on the JFK Records Act) to define what constituted an assassination record:namely, White House detail shift reports only for the period November 18, 1963 to November 24, 1963. Mr. Basham also tried to downplay the significance of the missingChicago protective survey reports for the cancelled November 2, 1963 trip (during which conspirators had planned to assassinate President Kennedy) by writing:

The folder concerning the canceled trip to Chicago would only have contained a preliminary survey report, if any document at all, since final reports are not conducted when a trip is cancelled. This report, if in fact it was even in the prepared folder, would have been of limited scope. [Author’s comments: there were 3 folders on the cancelled Chicago trip, not one, and this attempt to portray the Chicago file as one folder was duplicitous; furthermore, how did Basham presume to know that any reports written about the cancellation of the Chicago trip would have been “of limited scope?” It is easy to make such  claim after evidence is destroyed, because there is no way you can be challenged.]

The ARRB’s response to this “in your face” piece of administrative obfuscation was signed out by Executive Director David G. Marwell on August 7, 1995, and showed no mercy. Rather than simply allow the matter to “go away” or “die,” as the Secret Service had hoped, Marwell’s leter (co-drafted by him and Gunn) resurrected the seriousness of the matter in no uncertain terms. I quote below, in part:

Although you concluded your letter by stating that you “trust this explanation will clarify any misunderstandings that may have arisen,” I regret to say that not only does your letter not allay our concerns, it compounds them.

The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Act) forbids the destruction of any documents “created or made available for use by, obtained by, or [that] otherwise came into the possession of …. The Select Committee on Asssassinations…of the House of Representatives.” It is our understanding that the records in Accession 87-75-0004 that the Secret Service destroyed were examined by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and thus were “assassination records” under the JFK Act and they apparently were destroyed in violation of law. [emphasis in original, which is most unusual in official government correspondence – it is the equivalent of shouting at someone during a conversation]

We see the destruction of these assassination records as particularly ominous in light of the fact that the Secret Service revised its destruction schedule after passage of the JFK Act and that it targeted for destruction records that, at the time the law was passed, were slated to be held “permanently.” [emphasis in the original]

Rather than refereeing to and applying the standards of the JFK Act, your letter suggests that the responsibilities of the Secret Service extend no further than complying with standard records disposal schedules. After acknowledging that the Secret Service in fact destroyed records in 1995 from Accession 87-75-0004 (related to the protection of President Kennedy), you state that they were “processed in accordance with National Archives and Records (NARA) procedures, and in full compliance with approved records disposition schedules.” The JFK Act, it should be clear, supercedes any law or any disposition schedule related to “assassination records.”

This was a “right back in your face” response that told masters of obfuscation at the Secret Service that the ARRB wasn’t going to be rolled, and wasn’t going to go away. Marwell’s letter then upped the ante by requesting a ton of information which any Federal agency would have had a difficult time finding the resources to accomplish. Marwell’s letter ended with these words:

…we specifically request that you assure us that no Secret Service records related to Presidential protection between 1958 and 1969 or to the assassination of President Kennedy be destroyed untilthe Review Board has received prior written notice and has had an opportunity to inspect the records [emphasis in original] 

Sensing that the ARRB was flexing its muscles and was about to “go nuclear” [which was true – public hearings were being considered], Mr. Basham replied on August 15, 1995 with a calming one-page letter and requesting a meeting to discuss the “additional issues” which he said were raised by Marwell’s letter. That meeting was held the very next day (August 16, 1995) on ARRB turf, in our offices at 600 E Street, in Northwest WashingtonD.C.

Following the meeting, which lasted several hours, Jeremy Gunn (our General Counsel and Head of Research and Analysis) signed out a letter on August 21, 1995 to Mr. Basham and Mr. Personnette (Deputy Chief Counsel) of the Secret Service. Gunn recognized for the record that the Secret Service now had a much better understanding of what constituted an assassination record – the ARRB set the definition for this, not the agencies holding records, who all wished to minimize their work – and noted for the record that the Secret Service had agreed that no records related to Presidential protection for years 1958-1969 would be destroyed until after the ARRB had a chance to review them to verify that no assassination records were included. Gunn also recorded the agreement reached on August 16, 1995, that Dr. Joan Zimmerman of our staff would henceforth have full access to all Secret Service records upon demand, not just partial and limied access, as previously. The ARRB threw a face-saving bone to the Secret Service in Gunn’s letter, as well:

As acknowledged in the meeting, we fully understand and accept your interest in ensuring that no documents are released that would compromise Presidential protection. As we have mentioned before, our professional staff is in possession of current security clearances and we will take all appropriate measures to safeguard the records and ensure full compliance with the law.

On the same date, August 21, 1995, Gunn signed out a letter to the miscreant John Machado (who had ordered the two boxes destroyed), which was much less friendly in tone and which bored in on him with a number of questions about dubious statements previously made by Machado, and made additional requests for information and records.

The crisis had abated, and the Secret Service had avoided embarrassing public hearings which would have exposed their perfidy. The public was not to learn of this business until that one cryptic paragraph was published in the ARRB Final Report in late September of 1998, three years later. Unlike poor JFK, whom corrupt individuals in the Secret Service had helped set up in Dallas in 1963, the Secret Service in 1995, had ‘dodged a bullet.’

END HORNE                                                   

THE BLAINE DOCUMENTS 

The Gerald Blaine documents consist of 28 pages – mostly duty assignments and travel vouchers, but there is a brief statement, a denial of having consumed any alcoholic beverages at the Press Club or the Cellar in Ft. Worth, and two survey reports – one for Tampa and the one for a post assassination State Department reception between foreign dignitaries and LBJ.

All of these documents will be posted at JFKCountercoup.blogspot.com and given to Rex Bradford for posting at Mary Ferrell.

There are also three pages of handwritten notes, two pages written over an assignment schedule dated from Nov. 8 to November 30 that reads in full:

Blaime’s Statement regarding drinking at the Ft. Worth Press Club and Cellar reads:

December 6, 1963

I Gerald S. Blaine do make the following statement:

         In Fort Worth, Texas, I worked the 12:00PM – 8:00AM shift at the Hotel Texas onNovember 22, 1963.
        During my stay in Fort Worth, Texas, I consumed no Alcoholic beverages at either the Press Club or at the Cellar Inn.
         Before my tour of duty started I had stopped by the Press Club for about 10 minues. This was prior to the 11:00PM on the 21st of November.
          At 5:00AM to 5:10AM I was at the Cellar Inn for a coffee break, but had no beverage at all, coffee or otherwise.

Respectfully Submitted,

(UNSIGNED)

These 28 pages of documents the NARA recently released as those recovered from Blaine and previously thought destroyed, consists of assignments, travel vouchers, a Ft. Worth drinking statement and two survey reports, one for Tampa and one for LBJ’s visit to the State Department.

These 28 pages just don’t jive with what Blaine says in his book – “he had kept all of his personal reports for all these years…..the boxes were important, he found the box from 1963 and…it was all there, pages and pages of information that refuted all the claims this guy was making” (that they had been destroyed).

In “The Kennedy Detail” (p.357) Blaine, via McCubbin wrote: “It had been a long time, butBlaine was compelled to pull out his files to make sure his memory was serving him correctly. Like any good investigator, he had kept all his personal reports for all these years. Every time they moved to a new house, with his various jobs, (his wife) Joyce had asked him why couldn’t he throw all that stuff out, but he’d insisted the boxes were important. He found the box from 1963 and started going through it. It was all there. Pages and pages of information that refuted all the claims this guy (Abraham Bolden) was making. He was holding in his hands the Tampa advance report that had supposedly been destroyed.”

Where are the “boxes” of his personal reports he had kept for all these years?

Did the NARA only ask him for the documents related to Tampa and Dallas?

Did Blaine turn over all of his records to the Secret Service who in turn culled from them the 28 pages that were turned over to the NARA, or did the NARA receive more records and only released these 28 pages?

Or was Blaine exaggerating and these 28 pages are really the only official records he kept in the boxes for so many years?




Posted on January 7, 2014 by Vince Palamara

Secret Service destroys JFK assassination related documents: what was destroyed and what Gerald Blaine “donated”

Gerald Blaine turned over to the National Archives documents ALREADY MADE AVAILABLE- the Final Survey Report for the Tampa, FL trip of 11/18/63. Blaine mistakenly thought THESE were the documents “conspiracy theorists” thought were destroyed…as usual, he is wrong.

THESE were the ONLY records released by the Secret Service, all in the late 1990′s. I have them all, as 
any citizen with the money can order copies via the collection at the National Archives:

The November 1963 Secret Service shift reports;
RIF #154-10002-10417:
Final Survey Report Philadelphia, PA trip 10/30/63;
RIF#154-10002-10418 :
Final Survey Report Elkton, MD trip 11/14/63;
RIF#154-10002-10419 :
Final Survey Report SECOND New York City trip 11/14-11/15/63;
RIF#154-10002-10420:
Final Survey Report Palm Beach, FL trip 11/18/63;
RIF#154-10002-10421:
Final Survey Report Cape Canaveral, FL 11/18/63;
RIF#154-10002-10423:
Final Survey Report Tampa, FL 11/18/63;
RIF#154-10002-10422:
Final Survey Report Miami, FL 11/18/63;
RIF#154-10002-10424:
Final Survey report San Antonio, TX, 11/21/63;

Here is what was destroyed, Gerald:

A Summary of the Records Destroyed by the Secret Service in January of 1995.
[special thanks to Bill Kelly and the ARRB's Doug Horne]

The Protective Survey Reports destroyed by the Secret Service in January 1995 were part of a group of records transferred by the Secret Service to the General Services Administration’s Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland on August 7, 1974 under accession number 87-75-4. The instructions on the SF-135 (“Records Transmittal and Receipt” form) were: “Retain permanently for eventual transfer to the National Archives or a Presidential Library.” There were six boxes transferred under the accession number, and the two that were destroyed in January of 1995 contained the following files:

Box 1 Protection of the President (John F. Kennedy)
- Andrews Air Force Base 1961 (Arrivals and Departures)
- Andrews Air Force Base 1962 (Arrivals and Departures)
- Andrews Air Force Base 1963 (Arrivals and Departures)
- Arlington National Cemetery
- Camp David
- The Capitol
- Churches
- D.C. National Guard Armory
- D.C. Stadium
- Departures from South Grounds
- Dulles International Airport
- Embassies
- Executive Office Building
- Golf Clubs
- Griffith Stadium
- Homes of Friends
- International Inn
- Mayflower Hotel (three folders, for 1961-63)
- National Press Club
- Other Places Folders (#s 1-4, from January 1961-December of 1962)

Box 6 Protective Survey Reports for the following trips:
- Duluth, Minnesota (9-24-63)
- Ashland, Wisconsin (9-24-63)
- Billings, Montana (9-25-63)
- Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming (9-25-63)
- Cheyenne, Wyoming (9-25-63)
- Grand Forks, North Dakota (9-25-63)
- Laramie, Wyoming (9-25-63)
- Salt Lake City, Utah (9-26-63)
- Great Falls, Montana (9-26-63)
- Hanford, Washington (9-26-63)
- Tongue Point, Oregon (9-27-63)
- Redding, California (9-27-63)
- Tacoma, Washington (9-27-63)
- Palm Springs, California (9-28-63)
- Las Vegas, Nevada (9-28-63)
- Heber Springs, Arkansas (10-3-63)
- Little Rock, Arkansas (10-3-63)
- University of Maine (10-19-63)
- Boston, Massachusetts (10-26-63)
- Amherst, Massachusetts (10-26-63)
- Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (10-30-63)
- Chicago, Illinois (11-2-63): Three Folders [TRIP CANCELLED]
- New York City (11-8-63)

In addition, one folder of vital records was missing from Box 2 in this accession, titled: “Other Places Folder #6” (for the period July-November 1963)

Why Convressional Oversight is Needed: Secret Service Records Destroyed

A Cautionary Tale - Why Congressional Oversight of JFK Act  Is Needed

By Doug Horne, former chief-analyst for Military Records of the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB)

• In January of 1995, the U. S. Secret Service destroyed two boxes of JFK
assassination records willfully, in violation of the law (specifically, in violation of the
JFK Records Act). The records had been labeled for permanent retention, and the
National Archives staff had briefed the Secret Service (and all other key Executive
Branch agencies) after passage of the JFK Records Act that no records were to be
destroyed.

• The records destroyed were protective survey reports on visits President Kennedy
made, or planned to make, to twenty-three (23) different locations between September 24, 1963 to November 8, 1963, inclusive—as well as the normal protective procedures
employed whenever President Kennedy visited 19 various locations throughout
Washington, D.C.

• Among the records destroyed were three folders pertaining to President Kennedy’s
cancelled trip to Chicago, which was to have taken place on November 2, 1963—but
which was apparently cancelled at the last minute due to an assassination attempt.
(See JFK and the Unspeakable, by Jim Douglass, for details.)

• The Secret Service withheld the fact that the records had actually been destroyed for
about six months; instead, in response to repeated requests for the records from the
ARRB staff, they dissembled and told the ARRB staff that the records “could not be
located.” Only when the Secret Service realized that the Review Board was not going to
stop asking for the records, did it admit that the records had been destroyed.

• Initially, there was great rage and consternation within the Review Board about the
destruction of these potentially vital records. That action ran contrary to the very
purposes of the JFK Records Act, which was to make all assassination records possible
available for direct inspection by the American people, and thereby not only help us
understand our own history better, but increase trust in government.

• The Review Board and the Senior Staff of the ARRB considered holding public hearings to castigate and censure the Secret Service officials responsible, but after an unusually frank and tense exchange of correspondence between the ARRB and the Secret Service, nothing happened. Private meetings were held between senior officials on both sides, but no public hearings were held; no one was admonished or punished; and the problem was barely acknowledged— Indeed, was under-reported— in the ARRB’s Final Report. (See Volume V of Inside the Assassination Records Review Board, by Douglas Horne, pp. 1451-1458, for more details about this incident.)


Prepared by: Douglas P. Horne, Former Chief Analyst for Military Records, ARRB

Defense Sec McNamara and Joint Chiefs Chair Taylor to Vietnam



      JFK Library Oval Office Desk Diary - September 25, 1963: "Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Saigon to investigate what effect the political problems in South Vietnam have had on the military situation. They are expected to visit the-country's four military regions. (3:1)" 

Bundy Security Memo re: Covert Operations Against Cuba

1)      Bundy Memo – Sept. 23 Bundy, Security Memo on Covert Cuban Operations



September 23, 1963 

SECRET EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP
SUBJECT: Covert Operations Against Cuba – Security Within the Government

As you know, in August the U.S. Government directed two “exile” raids against targets in Cuba. From the evidence now available, it appears that our security, with respect to U.S. participation in these operations, was excellent.

While there will always be public speculation as to the extent of U.S. involvement in raids of this type, I think we would all agree readily that it is important that there be only speculation and no direct knowledge. Unfortunately, the maintenance of a high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the numbers of people within the Government who have to know a little or much about a U.S. – directed raid against Cuba.

For example, without counting CIA personnel and secretarial and staff personnel of other agencies, there were probably over 20 people in the Executive Branch who knew details of the August raids while many other people were generally acquainted with the U.S. involvement. Among others, the Navy knew where the attack boats were going; the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS knew about the “comings and goings” of the raiders; a few DOD people, who had to procure special equipment for the raids, could presumably surmise that something was going on somewhere and a few intelligence watch officers and press officers were told for their background, that the U.S. Government as aware of the raids.

I think there are two important, if obvious, security lessons we have learned from the August raids - - one, that it is in the nature of the problem that many people probably have to know something about such raids; and two, that these people apparently can maintain adequate security. At the same time, in view of the truth that security leaks were more likely to occur when substantial numbers of persons are involved, it seems essential to me that we constantly convey the high importance of security to others who are privy to information about our covert activities against Cuba. May I ask that members of the Special Group take such steps within their areas of authority as they think appropriate, and may I in particular urge that the Central Intelligence Agency, as executive agent for these enterprises, emphasize the importance of security to all those with whom it has necessary business on these matters, so that we can maintain the high level of security set in these recent operations.

Signed
McGeorge Bundy 

National Security Action Memo 261 - September 23, 1963

1)      NSAM 261 – “THE WHITE HOUSE DIARY SEPTEMBER 23 1963 : “President Kennedy assigns the highest national priority to Project FOUR LEAVES to develop and produce a military communications system. Project Four Leaves – SUBJECT: Assignment of Highest National Security Priority to Project FOUR LEAVES In response to a recommendation by the Secretary of Defense, the president, under the authority granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950, today established the program listed below as being in the highest national security priority category for development and production. FOUR LEAVES.” 
   
      Signed:  McGeorge Bundy 


[See Attachment: Defense Production Act of 1950 posted below]

defense Production Act of 1950

Defense Production Act of 1950  

Wikipedia: Defense Production Act

The Defense Production Act (Pub.L. 81-774) is a United States law enacted on September 8, 1950, in response to the start of the Korean War, part of a broad civil defense and war mobilization effort in the context of the Cold War. Its implementing regulations, the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS), are located at 15 CFR §§700 to 700.93. The Act has been periodically reauthorized and amended, and remains in force as of 2007.

The Act contains three major sections. The first authorizes the President to require businesses to sign contracts or fulfill orders deemed necessary for national defense. The second authorizes the President to establish mechanisms (such as regulations, orders or agencies) to allocate materials, services and facilities to promote national defense. The third section authorizes the President to control the civilian economy so that scarce and/or critical materials necessary to the national defense effort are available for defense needs.[1]

The Act also authorizes the President to requisition property, force industry to expand production and the supply of basic resources, impose wage and price controls, settle labor disputes, control consumer and real estate credit, establish contractual priorities, and allocate raw materials to aid the national defense.[1]

The President's authority to place contracts under the DPA is the part of the Act most often used by the Department of Defense (DOD) since the 1970s. Most of the other functions of the Act are administered by the Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security (SIES) in the Bureau of Industry and Security in the Department of Commerce.[2]

Korean War-era usage
The DPA was used during the Korean War to establish a large defense mobilization infrastructure and bureacracy. Under the authority of the Act, President Harry S. Truman established the Office of Defense Mobilization, instituted wage and price controls, strictly regulated production in heavy industries such as steel and mining, and ordered the disperal of wartime manufacturing plans across the nation.[3]

The Act also played a vital role in the establishment of the domestic aluminum and titanium industries in the 1950s. Using the Act, DOD provided capital and interest-free loans, and directed mining and manufacturing resources as well as skilled laborers to these two processing industries.[4]

Use as innovation tool
Beginning in the 1980s, DOD began using the contracting and spending provisions of the DPA to provide seed money to develop new technologies.[5] Using the Act, DOD has helped to develop a number of new technologies and materials, including silicon carbide ceramics, indium phosphide and gallium arsenide semiconductors, microwave power tubes, radiation-hardened microelectronics, superconducting wire, and metal composites.[4]

Defense Production Act of 1950
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Defense_Production_Act_of_1950

The Defense Production Act of 1950 (Public Law 81-774) was enacted due to "Rising wages and prices during the Korean War [which] caused serious economic difficulties within the United States. In an effort to expand production and insure economic stability, the Defense Production Act of 1950 (Public Law 81-774) authorized Governmental activities in various areas, including requisition of property for national defense, expansion of productive capacity and supply, wage and price stabilization, settlement of labor disputes, control of consumer and real estate credit, and establishment of contract priorities and materials allocation designed to aid the national defense. Under section 712, the Joint Committee on Defense Production was established to serve as a 'watchdog' over Federal agencies administering the various programs authorized by the act. The members of the committee were drawn from the Senate and House Committees on Banking and Currency."[1]

The Defense Production Act Title III Program "authorities were first used extensively during the early 1950s to expedite expansion of industrial capacity for many strategic and critical materials, machine tools, and a number of other critical items needed to satisfy evolving defense requirements. Despite (or, perhaps, partially because of) enormous successes in expanding needed domestic production capabilities, use of Title III declined markedly during the late 1950s and early 1960s and eventually ended altogether by the end of the 1960s. Congress revived and modernized the Title III authorities in the mid 1980s, and these authorities have been used since that time to promote improvement and expansion of industrial capabilities needed for national defense purposes."[2]

"Today's Title III Program differs in fundamental ways from the original program established in 1950. First, the original program was created in response to the national emergency resulting from the Korean conflict and Cold War tensions. Today's program focuses primarily on promoting the transition of new technologies from research and development to efficient and affordable production and the rapid insertion of these new technologies in defense systems."[3]

"Second, the original program was based on virtually unlimited authorities to encourage private investment in materials production and supply. Today's program is subject to a number of restrictions to ensure that Government action is needed and that Title III authorities are the best means to meet the national defense need. Moreover, proposed Title III actions are subject to prior review by Congress and are funded with moneys appropriated for Title III purposes."[4]

"Third, the original program was supported by a funding ceiling of $2.1 billion (in 1950s dollars) and was permitted to obligate these funds based on probable ultimate net cost to the Government rather than total contract liability. Today's program has been funded at an average annual rate of $20-$25 million and has been required to obligate funds at 100 percent of contract liability."[5]

"Despite the significant differences between the original program and today's, the basic purpose of the Title III authorities has not changed - to expand domestic production capabilities to meet defense needs."[6] And, some would argue, to specialize these domestic production capabilities only towards defense needs, assuming that control of global finance, trade and port facilities will continue to feed the civilian sector, and that there is no need, e.g. for US self-sufficiency in oil.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 3, 1994

NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES PREPAREDNESS

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (64 Stat. 798; 50 U.S.C. App. 2061, et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

PART I - PURPOSE, POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION

Section 101. Purpose. This order delegates authorities and addresses national defense industrial resource policies and programs under the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended ("the Act"), except for the amendments to Title III of the Act in the Energy Security Act of 1980 and telecommunication authorities under Executive Order No. 12472.

Sec. 102. Policy. The United States must have an industrial and technology base capable of meeting national defense requirements, and capable of contributing to the technological superiority of its defense equipment in peacetime and in times of national emergency. The domestic industrial and technological base is the foundation for national defense preparedness. The authorities provided in the Act shall be used to strengthen this base and to ensure it is capable of responding to all threats to the national security of the United States.

Sec. 103. General Functions. Federal departments and agencies responsible for defense acquisition (or for industrial resources needed to support defense acquisition) shall:

(a) Identify requirements for the full spectrum of national security emergencies, including military, industrial, and essential civilian demand;

(b) Assess continually the capability of the domestic industrial and technological base to satisfy requirements in peacetime and times of national emergency, specifically evaluating the availability of adequate industrial resource and production sources, including subcontractors and suppliers, materials, skilled labor, and professional and technical personnel;

(c) Be prepared, in the event of a potential threat to the security of the United States, to take actions necessary to ensure the availability of adequate industrial resources and production capability, including services and critical technology for national defense requirements;

(d) Improve the efficiency and responsiveness, to defense requirements, of the domestic industrial base; and

(e) Foster cooperation between the defense and commercial sectors for research and development and for acquisition of materials, components, and equipment to enhance industrial base efficiency and responsiveness.

Sec. 104. Implementation.

(a) The National Security Council is the principal forum for consideration and resolution of national security resource preparedness policy.

(b) The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency ("Director, FEMA") shall:

(1) Serve as an advisor to the National Security Council on issues of national security resource preparedness and on the use of the authorities and functions delegated by this order;

(2) Provide for the central coordination of the plans and programs incident to authorities and functions delegated under this order, and provide guidance and procedures approved by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the Federal departments and agencies under this order;

(3) Establish procedures, in consultation with Federal departments and agencies assigned functions under this order, to resolve in a timely and effective manner conflicts and issues that may arise in implementing the authorities and functions delegated under this order; and

(4) Report to the President periodically concerning all program activities conducted pursuant to this order.

(c) The head of every Federal department and agency assigned functions under this order shall ensure that the performance of these functions is consistent with National Security Council policy and guidelines.

PART II - PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS

Sec. 201. Delegations of Priorities and Allocations.

(a) The authority of the President conferred by section 101 of the Act to require acceptance and priority performance of contracts or orders (other than contracts of employment) to promote the national defense over performance of any other contracts or orders, and to allocate materials, services, and facilities as deemed necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense, is delegated to the following agency heads:

(1) The Secretary of Agriculture with respect to food resources, food resource facilities, and the domestic distribution of farm equipment and commercial fertilizer;

(2) The Secretary of Energy with respect to all forms of energy;

(3) The Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to health resources;

(4) The Secretary of Transportation with respect to all forms of civil transportation;

(5) The Secretary of Defense with respect to water resources; and

(6) The Secretary of Commerce for all other materials, services, and facilities, including construction materials.

(b) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the heads of those departments and agencies specified in subsection 201(a) of this order, shall administer the Defense Priorities and Allocations System ("DPA") regulations that will be used to implement the authority of the President conferred by section 101 of the Act as delegated to the Secretary of Commerce in subsection 201(a)(6) of this order. The Secretary of Commerce will re-delegate to the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other departments and agencies as appropriate, authority for the priority rating of contracts and orders for all materials, services, and facilities needed in support of programs approved under section 202 of this order. The Secretary of Commerce shall act as appropriate upon Special Priorities Assistance requests in a time frame consistent with the urgency of the need at hand.

(c) The Director, FEMA, shall attempt to resolve issues or disagreements on priorities or allocations between Federal departments or agencies in a time frame consistent with the urgency of the issue at hand and, if not resolved, such issues will be referred to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for final determination.

(d) The head of each Federal department or agency assigned functions under subsection 201(a) of this order, when necessary, shall make the finding required under subsection 101(b) of the Act. This finding shall be submitted for the President's approval through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Upon such approval the head of the Federal department or agency that made the finding may use the authority of subsection 101(a) of the Act to control the general distribution of any material (including applicable services) in the civilian market.

(e) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is hereby delegated the authority under subsection 101(c)(3) of the Act, and will be assisted by the Director, FEMA, in ensuring the coordinated administration of the Act.

Sec. 202. Determinations. The authority delegated by section 201 of this order may be used only to support programs that have been determined in writing as necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense:

(a) By the Secretary of Defense with respect to military production and construction, military assistance to foreign nations, stockpiling, outer space, and directly related activities;

(b) By the Secretary of Energy with respect to energy production and construction, distribution and use, and directly related activities; and

(c) By the Director, FEMA, with respect to essential civilian needs supporting national defense, including civil defense and continuity of government and directly related activities.

Sec. 203. Maximizing Domestic Energy Supplies. The authority of the President to perform the functions provided by subsection 101(c) of the Act is delegated to the Secretary of Commerce, who shall redelegate to the Secretary of Energy the authority to make the findings described in subsection 101(c)(2)(A) that the materials (including equipment), services, and facilities are critical and essential. The Secretary of Commerce shall make the finding described in subsection 101(c)(2)(A) of the Act that the materials (including equipment), services, or facilities are scarce, and the finding described in subsection 101(c)(2)(B) that it is necessary to use the authority provided by subsection 101(c)(1).

Sec. 204. Chemical and Biological Warfare. The authority of the President conferred by subsection 104(b) of the Act is delegated to the Secretary of Defense. This authority may not be further delegated by the Secretary.

PART III - EXPANSION OF PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY AND SUPPLY

Sec. 301.

(a) Financing Institution Guarantees. To expedite or expand production and deliveries or services under government contracts for the procurement of industrial resources or critical technology items essential to the national defense, the head of each Federal department or agency engaged in procurement for the national defense (referred to as "agency head" in this part) and the President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (in cases involving capacity expansion, technological development, or production in foreign countries) are authorized to guarantee in whole or in part any public or private financing institution, subject to provisions of section 301 of the Act. Guarantees shall be made in consultation with the Department of the Treasury as to the terms and conditions thereof. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") shall be informed when such guarantees are to be made.

(b) Direct Loan Guarantees. To expedite or expand production and deliveries or services under government contracts for the procurement of industrial resources or critical technology items essential to the national defense, each agency head is authorized to make direct loan guarantees from funds appropriated to their agency for Title III.

(c) Fiscal Agent. Each Federal Reserve Bank is designated and authorized to act, on behalf of any guaranteeing agency, as fiscal agent in the making of guarantee contracts and in otherwise carrying out the purposes of section 301 of the Act.

(d) Regulations. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is authorized, after consultation with heads of guaranteeing departments and agencies, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director, OMB, to prescribe regulations governing procedures, forms, rates of interest, and fees for such guarantee contracts.

Sec. 302. Loans.

(a) To expedite production and deliveries or services to aid in carrying out government contracts for the procurement of industrial resources or a critical technology item for the national defense, an agency head is authorized, subject to the provisions of section 302 of the Act, to submit to the Secretary of the Treasury or the President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (in cases involving capacity expansion, technological development, or production in foreign countries) applications for loans.

(b) To expedite or expand production and deliveries or services under government contracts for the procurement of industrial resources or critical technology items essential to the national defense, each agency head may make direct loans from funds appropriated to their agency for Title III.

(c) After receiving a loan application and determining that financial assistance is not otherwise available on reasonable terms, the Secretary of the Treasury or the President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (in cases involving capacity expansion, technological development, or production in foreign countries) may make loans, subject to provisions of section 302 of the Act.

Sec. 303. Purchase Commitments.

(a) In order to carry out the objectives of the Act, and subject to the provisions of section 303 thereof, an agency head is authorized to make provision for purchases of, or commitments to purchase, an industrial resource or a critical technology item for government use or resale.

(b) Materials acquired under section 303 of the Act that exceed the needs of the programs under the Act may be transferred to the National Defense Stockpile, if such transfer is determined by the Secretary of Defense as the National Defense Stockpile Manager to be in the public interest.

Sec. 304. Subsidy Payments. In order to ensure the supply of raw or non-processed materials from high-cost sources, an agency head is authorized to make subsidy payments, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, OMB, and subject to the provisions of section 303(c) of the Act.

Sec. 305. Determinations and Findings. When carrying out the authorities in sections 301 through 303 of this order, an agency head is authorized to make the required determinations, judgments, statements, certifications, and findings, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy or Director, FEMA, as appropriate. The agency head shall provide a copy of the determination, judgment, statement, certification, or finding to the Director, OMB, to the Director, FEMA, and, when appropriate, to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Sec. 306. Strategic and Critical Materials.

(a) The Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense as the National Defense Stockpile Manager and subject to the provisions of section 303 of the Act, is authorized to encourage the exploration, development, and mining of critical and strategic materials and other materials.

(b) An agency head is authorized, pursuant to section 303(g) of the Act, to make provision for the development of substitutes for strategic and critical materials, critical components, critical technology items, and other industrial resources to aid the national defense.

(c) An agency head is authorized, pursuant to section 303(a)(1)(B) of the Act, to make provisions to encourage the exploration, development, and mining of critical and strategic materials and other materials.

Sec. 307. Government-owned Equipment. An agency head is authorized, pursuant to section 303(e) of the Act, to install additional equipment, facilities, processes, or improvements to facilities owned by the government and to install government-owned equipment in industrial facilities owned by private persons.

Sec. 308. Identification of Shortfalls. Except during periods of national emergency or after a Presidential determination in accordance with sections 301(e)(1)(D)(ii), 302(c)(4)(B), or 303(a)(7)(B) of the Act, no guarantee, loan or other action pursuant to sections 301, 302, and 303 of the Act to correct an industrial shortfall shall be taken unless the shortfall has been identified in the Budget of the United States or amendments thereto.

Sec. 309. Defense Production Act Fund Manager. The Secretary of Defense is designated the Defense Production Act Fund Manager, in accordance with section 304(f) of the Act, and shall carry out the duties specified in that section, in consultation with the agency heads having approved Title III projects and appropriated Title III funds.

Sec. 310. Critical Items List.

(a) Pursuant to section 107(b)(1)(A) of the Act, the Secretary of Defense shall identify critical components and critical technology items for each item on the Critical Items List of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands and other items within the inventory of weapon systems and defense equipment.

(b) Each agency head shall take appropriate action to ensure that critical components or critical technology items are available from reliable sources when needed to meet defense requirements during peacetime, graduated mobilization, and national emergency. "Appropriate action" may include restricting contract solicitations to reliable sources, restricting contract solicitations to domestic sources (pursuant to statutory authority), stockpiling critical components, and developing substitutes for critical components or critical technology items.

Sec. 311. Strengthening Domestic Capability. An agency head, in accordance with section 107(a) of the Act, may utilize the authority of Title III of the Act or any other provision of law, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to provide appropriate incentives to develop, maintain, modernize, and expand the productive capacities of domestic sources for critical components, critical technology items, and industrial resources essential for the execution of the national security strategy of the United States.

Sec. 312. Modernization of Equipment. An agency head, in accordance with section 108(b) of the Act, may utilize the authority of Title III of the Act to guarantee the purchase or lease of advance manufacturing equipment and any related services with respect to any such equipment for purposes of the Act.

PART IV - IMPACT OF OFFSETS


Sec. 401. Offsets.

(a) The responsibilities and authority conferred upon the President by section 309 of the Act with respect to offsets are delegated to the Secretary of Commerce, who shall function as the President's Executive Agent for carrying out this authority.

(b) The Secretary of Commerce shall prepare the annual report required by section 309(a) of the Act in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, Labor, State, the United States Trade Representative, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of other departments and agencies as required. The heads of Federal departments and agencies shall provide the Secretary of Commerce with such information as may be necessary for the effective performance of this function.

(c) The offset report shall be subject to the normal interagency clearance process conducted by the Director, OMB, prior to the report's submission by the President to Congress.

PART V - VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS AND ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Sec. 501. Appointments. The authority of the President under sections 708(c) and (d) of the Act is delegated to the heads of each Federal department or agency, except that, insofar as that authority relates to section 101 of the Act, it is delegated only to the heads of each Federal department or agency assigned functions under section 201(a) of this order. The authority delegated under this section shall be exercised pursuant to the provisions of section 708 of the Act, and copies and the status of the use of such delegations shall be furnished to the Director, FEMA.

Sec. 502. Advisory Committees. The authority of the President under section 708(d) of the Act and delegated in section 501 of this order (relating to establishment of advisory committees) shall be exercised only after consultation with, and in accordance with, guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services.

PART VI - EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL

Sec. 601. National Defense Executive Reserve.

(a) In accordance with section 710(e) of the Act, there is established in the Executive Branch a National Defense Executive Reserve ("NDER") composed of persons of recognized expertise from various segments of the private sector and from government (except full-time federal employees) for training for employment in executive positions in the Federal Government in the event of an emergency that requires such employment.

(b) The head of any department or agency may establish a unit of the NDER in the department or agency and train members of that unit.

(c) The head of each department or agency with an NDER unit is authorized to exercise the President's authority to employ civilian personnel in accordance with section 703(a) of the Act when activating all or a part of its NDER unit. The exercise of this authority shall be subject to the provisions of subsections 601(d) and (e) of this order and shall not be re-delegated.

(d) The head of a department or agency may activate an NDER unit, in whole or in part, upon the written determination that an emergency affecting the national security or defense preparedness of the United States exists and that the activation of the unit is necessary to carry out the emergency program functions of the department or agency.

(e) At least 72 hours prior to activating the NDER unit, the head of the department or agency shall notify, in writing, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of the impending activation and provide a copy of the determination required under subsection 601(d) of this order.

(f) The Director, FEMA, shall coordinate the NDER program activities of departments and agencies in establishing units of the Reserve; provide for appropriate guidance for recruitment, training, and activation; and issue necessary rules and guidance in connection with the program.

(g) This order suspends any delegated authority, regulation, or other requirement or condition with respect to the activation of any NDER unit, in whole or in part, or appointment of any NDER member that is inconsistent with the authorities delegated herein, provided that the aforesaid suspension applies only as long as sections 703(a) and 710(e) of the Act are in effect.

Sec. 602. Consultants. The head of each department or agency assigned functions under this order is delegated authority under sections 710(b) and (c) of the Act to employ persons of outstanding experience and ability without compensation and to employ experts, consultants, or organizations. The authority delegated by this section shall not be re-delegated.

PART VII - LABOR SUPPLY
Sec. 701. Secretary of Labor. The Secretary of Labor, identified in this section as the Secretary, shall:

(a) Collect, analyze, and maintain data needed to make a continuing appraisal of the nation's labor requirements and the supply of workers for purposes of national defense. All agencies of the government shall cooperate with the Secretary in furnishing information necessary for this purpose, to the extent permitted by law;

(b) In response to requests from the head of a Federal department or agency engaged in the procurement for national defense, consult with and advise that department or agency with respect to (1) the effect of contemplated actions on labor supply and utilization, (2) the relation of labor supply to materials and facilities requirements, and (3) such other matters as will assist in making the exercise of priority and allocations functions consistent with effective utilization and distribution of labor;

(c) Formulate plans, programs, and policies for meeting defense and essential civilian labor requirements;

(d) Project skill shortages to facilitate meeting defense and essential civilian needs and establish training programs;

(e) Determine the occupations and skills critical to meeting the labor requirements of defense and essential civilian activities and, with the assistance of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Selective Service, and such other persons as the Director, FEMA, may designate, develop policies regulating the induction and deferment of personnel for the armed services, except for civilian personnel in the reserves; and

(f) Administer an effective labor-management relations policy to support the activities and programs under this order with the cooperation of other Federal agencies, including the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.

PART VIII - DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE INFORMATION AND REPORTS

Sec. 801. Foreign Acquisition of Companies. The Secretary of the Treasury, in cooperation with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of Agriculture, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, shall complete and furnish a report to the President and then to Congress in accordance with the requirements of section 721(k) of the Act concerning foreign efforts to acquire United States companies involved in research, development, or production of critical technologies and industrial espionage activities directed by foreign governments against private U.S. companies.

Sec. 802. Defense Industrial Base Information System.

(a) The Secretary of Defense and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, shall establish an information system on the domestic defense industrial base in accordance with the requirements of section 722 of the Act.

(b) In establishing the information system required by subsection (a) of this order, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, as determined by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, shall consult with each other for the purposes of performing the duties listed in section 722(d)(1) of the Act.

(c) The Secretary of Defense shall convene a task force consisting of the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of each military department and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, as determined by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, to carry out the duties under section 722(d)(2) of the Act.

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall report to Congress on a strategic plan for developing a cost-effective, comprehensive information system capable of identifying on a timely, ongoing basis vulnerability in critical components and critical technology items. The plans shall include an assessment of the performance and cost-effectiveness of procedures specified in section 722(b) of the Act.

(e) The Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Bureau of the Census, shall consult with the Secretary of Defense and the Director, FEMA, to improve the usefulness of information derived from the Census of Manufacturers in carrying out section 722 of the Act.

(f) The Secretary of Defense shall perform an analysis of the production base for not more than two major weapons systems of each military department in establishing the information system under section 722 of the Act. Each analysis shall identify the critical components of each system.

(g) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall issue a biennial report on critical components and technology in accordance with section 722(e) of the Act.

PART IX - GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 901. Definitions. In addition to the definitions in section 702 of the Act, the following definitions apply throughout this order:

(a) "Civil transportation" includes movement of persons and property by all modes of transportation in interstate, intrastate, or foreign commerce within the United States, its territories and possessions, and the District of Columbia, and, without limitation, related public storage and warehousing, ports, services, equipment and facilities, such as transportation carrier shop and repair facilities. However, "civil transportation" shall not include transportation owned or controlled by the Department of Defense, use of petroleum and gas pipelines, and coal slurry pipelines used only to supply energy production facilities directly. As applied herein, "civil transportation" shall include direction, control, and coordination of civil transportation capacity regardless of ownership.

(b) Energy means all forms of energy including petroleum, gas (both natural and manufactured), electricity, solid fuels (including all forms of coal, coke, coal chemicals, coal liquification, and coal gasification), and atomic energy, and the production, conservation, use, control, and distribution (including pipelines) of all of these forms of energy.

(c) "Farm equipment" means equipment, machinery, and repair parts manufactured for use on farms in connection with the production or preparation for market use of food resources.

(d) "Fertilizer" means any product or combination of products that contain one or more of the elements -- nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium -- for use as a plant nutrient.

(e) "Food resources" means all commodities and products, simple, mixed, or compound, or complements to such commodities or products, that are capable of being ingested by either human beings or animals, irrespective of other uses to which such commodities or products may be put, at all stages of processing from the raw commodity to the products thereof in vendible form for human or animal consumption. "Food resources" also means all starches, sugars, vegetable and animal or marine fats and oils, cotton, tobacco, wool, mohair, hemp, flax fiber, and naval stores, but does not mean any such material after it loses its identity as an agricultural commodity or agricultural product.

(f) "Food resource facilities" means plants, machinery, vehicles (including on-farm), and other facilities required for the production, processing, distribution, and storage (including cold storage) of food resources, livestock and poultry feed and seed, and for the domestic distribution of farm equipment and fertilizer (excluding transportation thereof).

(g) "Functions" include powers, duties, authority, responsibilities, and discretion.

(h) "Head of each Federal department or agency engaged in procurement for the national defense" means the heads of the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Commerce, as well as those departments and agencies listed in Executive Order No. 10789.

(i) "Heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies" as used in part VIII of this order means the heads of such other Federal agencies and departments that acquire information or need information with respect to making any determination to exercise any authority under the Act.

(j) "Health resources" means materials, facilities, health supplies, and equipment (including pharmaceutical, blood collecting and dispensing supplies, biological, surgical textiles, and emergency surgical instruments and supplies) required to prevent the impairment of, improve, or restore the physical and mental health conditions of the population.

(k) "Metals and minerals" means all raw materials of mineral origin (excluding energy) including their refining, smelting, or processing, but excluding their fabrication.

(l) "Strategic and Critical Materials" means materials (including energy) that (1) would be needed to supply the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs of the United States during a national security emergency, and (2) are not found or produced in the United States in sufficient quantities to meet such need and are vulnerable to the termination or reduction of the availability of the material.

(m) "Water resources" means all usable water, from all sources, within the jurisdiction of the United States, which can be managed, controlled, and allocated to meet emergency requirements.

Sec. 902. General.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 902(c) of this order, the authorities vested in the President by title VII of the Act may be exercised and performed by the head of each department and agency in carrying out the delegated authorities under the Act and this order.

(b) The authorities which may be exercised and performed pursuant to subsection 902(a) of this order shall include (1) the power to redelegate authorities, and to authorize the successive re-delegation of authorities, to departments and agencies, officers, and employees of the government, and (2) the power of subpoena with respect to authorities delegated in parts II, III, and IV of this order, provided that the subpoena power shall be utilized only after the scope and purpose of the investigation, inspection, or inquiry to which the subpoena relates have been defined either by the appropriate officer identified in subsection 902(a) of this order or by such other person or persons as the officer shall designate.

(c) Excluded from the authorities delegated by subsection 902(a) of this order are authorities delegated by parts V, VI, and VIII of this order and the authority with respect to fixing compensation under section 703(a) of the Act.

Sec. 903. Authority. All previously issued orders, regulations, rulings, certificates, directives, and other actions relating to any function affected by this order shall remain in effect except as they are inconsistent with this order or are subsequently amended or revoked under proper authority. Nothing in this order shall affect the validity or force of anything done under previous delegations or other assignment of authority under the Act.

Sec. 904. Effect on other Orders.

(a) The following are superseded or revoked:
(1) Section 3, Executive Order No. 8248 of September 8, 1939, (4 FR 3864).
(2) Executive Order No. 10222 of March 8, 1951 (16 FR 2247).
(3) Executive Order No. 10480 of August 14, 1953 (18 FR 4939).
(4) Executive Order No. 10647 of November 28, 1955 (20 FR 8769).
(5) Executive Order No. 11179 of September 22, 1964 (29 FR 13239).
(6) Executive Order No. 11355 of May 26, 1967 (32 FR 7803).
(7) Sections 7 and 8, Executive Order No. 11912 of April 13, 1976 (41 FR 15825, 15826-27).
(8) Section 3, Executive Order No. 12148 of July 20, 1979 (44 FR 43239, 43241).
(9) Executive Order No. 12521 of June 24, 1985 (50 FR 26335).
(10) Executive Order No. 12649 of August 11, 1988 (53 FR 30639).
(11) Executive Order No. 12773 of September 26, 1991 (56 FR 49387), except that part of the order that amends section 604 of Executive Order 10480.
(b) Executive Order No. 10789 of November 14, 1958, is amended by deleting "and in view of the existing national emergency declared by Proclamation No. 2914 of December 16, 1950,î as it appears in the first sentence.
(c) Executive Order No. 11790, as amended, relating to the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, is amended by deleting "Executive Order No. 10480" where it appears in section 4 and substituting this order's number.
(d) Subject to subsection 904(c) of this order, to the extent that any provision of any prior Executive order is inconsistent with the provisions of this order, this order shall control and such prior provision is amended accordingly.
Sec. 905. Judicial Review. This order is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.