Monday, March 18, 2019

Jeff Morley's What Jane Roman Said

WHAT JANE ROMAN SAID


A Retired CIA Officer Speaks Candidly About Lee Harvey Oswald
By Jefferson Morley

Long-secret CIA records show that operations officer George Joannides paid for the first JFK conspiracy theory, designed to link Lee Harvey Oswald to the government of Fidel Castro.


Dick Helms’ Man in Miami

Still more vindication came in November 1998. Without fanfare, the CIA declassified the personnel file of a previously unknown operations officer on the Special Affairs Staff named George Joannides. Jane Roman had said that in late 1963 certain people in the CIA’s anti-Castro operation were showing “a keen interest in Oswald held very closely on the need to know basis.”  Skeptics of my story could rightly ask, “Like who?”

The new records suggested George Joannides was one such SAS operative. The reason for his interest? The bulk of the available evidence indicates that Joannides in late 1963 was running a psychological warfare operation designed to link Lee Harvey Oswald to the Castro government without disclosing the CIA’s hand.
George E. Joannides (pronounced “Joe-uh-NEE-deez”) is a new and important character in the Kennedy assassination story. The son of a well-known Greek-American newspaper columnist in New York City, he went to law school and joined the CIA in 1951. Joannides, fluent in Greek and French, was sent to the Athens station. By 1963, he was 40 years old, a rising protégé of Tom Karamessines. He was highly regarded for his skills in political action, propaganda and psychological warfare operations. A dapper, witty man, Joannides presented himself publicly as a Defense Department lawyer. In fact, in 1963 he was Dick Helms’ man in Miami.

His personnel file showed that he served in 1963 as the chief of the Psychological Warfare branch of the CIA’s station in Miami. He had a staff of 24 and a budget of $1.5 million. He also was in charge of handling the anti-Castro student group that Oswald had tried to infiltrate in August 1963. They called themselves the Cuban Student Directorate and it was Joannides’s job to guide and monitor them. Under a CIA program code named AMSPELL, he was giving $25,000 a month to Luis Fernandez Rocha and Juan Salvat, the Directorate’s leaders in Miami. That funding supported the Directorate’s chapters in New Orleans and other cities.

Fernandez Rocha and Salvat, who still live in Miami, confirm the story. Fenandez Rocha is a doctor. Salvat owns a publishing house. Both recall a close but stormy relationship with George Joannides whom they knew only as “Howard.” The records of the Directorate, now in the University of Miami archives, support their memories. The group’s archives show that “Howard” worked closely with the Directorate on a wide variety of issues. He bought them an air conditioner and reviewed their military plans. He was aware of their efforts to buy guns. He briefed them on how to answer questions from the press and paid for their travels. Joannides was certainly responsible for knowing if a Castro supporter was trying to infiltrate their ranks.
Then came November 22, 1963. On a political trip to Dallas, Kennedy died in a hail of gunfire. Ninety minutes later, a suspect, Lee Oswald, was arrested. Not long after that Joannides received a call from the Cuban students saying they knew all about the accused assassin. He told them not to go public until he could check with Washington. They went public anyway. As the American nation reeled from the shock of Kennedy’s violent death, Salvat and Fernandez Rocha and other Cuban students embarked on a wide-ranging and effective media blitz to link Fidel Castro to Kennedy’s death.

https://www.history-matters.com/essays/frameup/WhatJaneRomanSaid/images/GeorgeJoannidesHOWARD_icon.jpg
DRE propaganda work for the CIA:In this memo, Cuban exile students in the Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil tell CIA contact "Howard,"-the cover name used by George Joannides-- how they want to reorganize their propaganda efforts. The DRE was keeping the CIA apprised of its work in the propaganda field in the summer of 1963.

In the span of a couple of hours in the evening of November 22, one leader of the Cuban Student Directorate called Paul Bethel, an influential former State Department official active in efforts to liberate Cuba. Another Cuban student called conservative spokeswoman Clare Booth Luce and told her the Directorate knew for a fact that Oswald was part of a Cuban government hit team operating out of Mexico City. A third told a New York Times reporter that the accused assassin was a Castro supporter.
The next day, November 23, 1963, the Cuban students put their suspicions in writing. They wrote up a seven-page brief on Oswald’s pro-Castro ways. They also published a special edition of the Directorate’s monthly publication. It was a four-page broadsheet with photos of Oswald and Castro together under the banner headline “The Presumed Assassins.” This was probably the very first conspiratorial explanation of Kennedy’s death to reach public print--and the mysterious George Joannides of the CIA paid it for.
The goal of this operation, say Fernandez Rocha and Salvat, was to destabilize the Cuban government and create public pressure for a U.S. attack on the island. They say they acted on their own.

Fidel Castro feared the gambit might work. He put his armed forces on high alert. In a long, brooding speech on Cuban TV on the night of November 23, 1963, the Cuban leader denounced the exiled students’ effort to link him to the assassination, charging it was a CIA provocation.

Until now, historians and journalists have had little reason to credit Castro’s charge. The revelation of Joannides’ mission to Miami lends credence to—but does not prove--the longstanding view of Fidel Castro and his intelligence service who have long believed that the effort of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil to link Oswald to Castro was part of a deliberate plan by rogue CIA operatives to exploit the assassination and provoke a U.S. invasion of Cuba.  That allegation, it now seems, has some merit. George Joannides was a CIA officer who helped perpetrate the post-assassination propaganda. 

Not surprisingly, George Joannides took his secrets to the grave. According to his Washington Post obituary, Joannides died in a Houston hospital in March 1990.

When I asked the CIA for comment on his career, I was told that the agency has no knowledge of his actions in 1963. The chief of the CIA’s Historic Review Program, James R. Oliver, wrote me a letter denying that Joannides had worked with the Cuban Student Directorate in 1963. He acknowledged that Joannides’s cover name “Howard” appears on CIA records about the Directorate but said “there is no other evidence to suggest that ‘Howard’ was an identity for Joannides.”

This is the CIA’s official position on George Joannides. It is untrue.

https://www.history-matters.com/essays/frameup/WhatJaneRomanSaid/images/WCBRING2_icon.jpg
DRE press release on Oswald: In August 1963, as George Joannides took over as chief of Psychological Warfare branch in Miami, the DRE delegation in New Orleans had a series of encounters with a pro-Castro, ex-Marine named Lee Harvey Oswald. The New Orleans delegation, supported by CIA funds, put out this press release calling for an investigation of Oswald.


The CIA’s own records are proof that Joannides was ‘Howard.’ Luis Fernandez Rocha, Juan Salvat and other veterans of the Cuban Student Directorate, now well-established professional men in Miami, told me of their frequent meetings with a CIA man named “Howard” in 1963.  The records of the Directorate at the University of Miami library document the group’s almost daily dealings with “Howard” in 1963. The former leaders of the Directorate described the CIA man’s New York accent, his well-tailored suits, his Mediterranean features, his legal training, and other characteristics of George Joannides. The 1963 Miami phone book and members of the Joannides family confirm that Joannides lived in Miami at the time. And his CIA personnel file specifies that he had responsibility for the largest anti-Castro student group in Miami, which was the Cuban Student Directorate.

Yet the CIA’s position is that George Joannides a.k.a “Howard” was not in Miami in 1963, did not handle the agency’s contacts with Cuban Student Directorate, and may not have even been an actual person.

Whatever the reason for such odd obfuscations, the revelation of George Joannides’s existence and activities in 1963 gives empirical substance to Jane Roman’s analysis: that certain operatives on the Special Affairs Staff were interested in Lee Harvey Oswald before the assassination.

Roman had said, “There had to be a reason” for SAS to withhold information about Oswald. she said. The simplest and most plausible explanation is that George Joannides was one of those operatives and that he and his superiors sought to protect the “sources and methods” of a covert operation involving Lee Harvey Oswald in the fall of 1963.

Such a conclusion is not indisputable. There is no direct documentary evidence stating that Joannides ran such an operation. But the lack of such evidence is not dispositive.

First, it was Joannides’s job to make sure that his actions could not be traced to the U.S. government. He was, judging from his job evaluations in 1963, very good at his job.

Second, Joannides was well-known for his attention to paperwork. Very little of that paperwork has ever come to light. Running a group like the Cuban Student Directorate required monthly reports to CIA headquarters. The CIA has declassified these reports for the years 1960 to 1966.  Only in the 17 months that Joannides worked with the group, December 1962 to April 1964, are the monthly reports missing from CIA archives.

Third, and most importantly, CIA officials called Joannides was called out of retirement in 1978 to serve as the agency’s liaison to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Fifteen years after the fact, he could have shared what he knew about Oswald’s Cuban activities with investigators. He did not. G. Robert Blakey, a former federal prosecutor who served as the HSCA’s general counsel and worked closely with Joannides says the CIA man never let on that the anti-Castro Cubans who tangled with Oswald had been his assets. Why refrain from stating such a pertinent fact if not to protect a sensitive operation? Blakey told me that if he had known Joannides’ role in 1963, he would have required him to testify under oath.

“He was a material witness to events related to the assassination,” Blakey says.

While the details of Joannides’s motivations remain concealed, the results of his actions in 1963 are well documented. According to a Kennedy White House memo, the CIA “guided and monitored” the Cuban Student Directorate in mid-1963. Declassified CIA cables show that “Howard” demanded that the group clear their public statements with him. In his job evaluation from the summer of 1963, Joannides was credited having established control over the group. He dispensed funds from the AMSPELL budget, which the Directorate’s leaders in Miami and New Orleans used to publicly identify Oswald as a supporter of the Castro government in August 1963. AMSPELL funds were also used within hours of the Kennedy’s death to link Oswald to Castro.

The results of his expenditures, it must be said, were consistent with U.S. policy. The former Directorate leaders say their purpose in launching a propaganda blitz against Oswald was to discredit the Castro regime and create public pressure for a U.S. attack on Cuba.

At the time, the group was funded and authorized to carry out the agency’s desires. Indeed, the group’s propaganda chief, Juan Manual Salvat had operational approval as a CIA agent, according to the agency’s records.

Joannides kept his hand in all of this secret. Joannides certainly knew of the Directorate’s contacts with Oswald within hours of Kennedy’s death, if not earlier, yet did not report his knowledge in written documents. Such records might have been turned over to law enforcement and thus exposed the agency’s operations to public view.  His actions were consistent with his duty to protect “sources and methods” and with Jane Roman’s observation that SAS was keeping information about Oswald “under their tight control.”

To be sure, other interpretations are possible. Perhaps the Cuban students, while funded by the CIA for the purposes of political action, intelligence collection and propaganda, engaged in all of these activities against Lee Harvey Oswald but did so independently, without knowledge of or prompting from George Joannides or anyone else at agency.

https://www.history-matters.com/essays/frameup/WhatJaneRomanSaid/images/GeorgeJoannidesLABEL_icon.jpg
Joannides receives a tape of Oswald:On November 22, 1963, Joannides learned that his assets in the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE) had collected intelligence on Lee Harvey Oswald, accused killer of Kennedy. The DRE leaders sent Joannides (a.k.a. "Howard") a tape of remarks Oswald had made on a New Orleans radio station.

The former leaders of the Directorate tend to this point of view. They stress that memories are hazy after 40 years and their allies at the CIA certainly did not keep them fully informed about anything. They were, they admit, impetuous and inexperienced young men while “Howard” was an older man of considerable experience and clout sent by the highest levels of the U.S. government. Of course, they worked with him while reserving the right to act on their own. Idealistic, if sometimes immature, they acted as Cuban patriots. 

They did not have to be told to dislike Lee Harvey Oswald’s pro-Castro politics or to resent his attempted infiltration of their group. After Oswald was arrested for killing Kennedy, they had every reason to use his politics to discredit Castro and create pressure on him.

One of the Directorate’s former leaders, Tony Lanusa, a Miami businessman, says he called “Howard” within minutes of the news of Oswald’s arrest on November 22, 1963. He recalls telling the CIA man that the group wanted to go public with what they knew about the accused assassin.  “Howard” told them to hold off until he could contact Washington for guidance. They went ahead anyway. Citing Lanusa’s very credible account, one could argue that the Cuban Student Directorate’s propaganda linking Oswald and Castro was not the agency’s responsibility.

https://www.history-matters.com/essays/frameup/WhatJaneRomanSaid/images/VERSO1_icon.jpg
https://www.history-matters.com/essays/frameup/WhatJaneRomanSaid/images/VERSO2_icon.jpg
The First JFK Conspiracy. On November 23, 1963, the leaders of the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE) published a special four page edition of their newspaper suggesting that Lee Harvey Oswald had shot President Kennedy at the behest of Cuban leader Fidel Castro. This is the very first JFK conspiracy to reach public prints-and it was paid for by CIA man George Joannides.


On a practical level though, the agency’s responsibility for the first JFK conspiracy theory is beyond dispute. By the admission of its own former leaders, the Cuban Student Directorate was totally dependent on CIA funding in 1963. Without the money provided by Joannides there would have been no delegation of Cuban students in New Orleans with the time to confront Oswald. There would have been no money for their press release to the local papers calling for an investigation of his pro-Castro ways. There would have been no tape recording of his remarks on a local radio station. There would have been no money for the Directorate’s phone calls to Clare Booth Luce and the New York Times on the night of November 22, 1963. There would have been no money for the broadsheet with photos of Oswald and Castro, and perhaps no post-assassination war scare. The fact that the Directorate’s leaders felt obliged to call Joannides on November 22, 1963 is mostly evidence of how seriously they took his guidance.

In any case, George Joannides was not displeased with the Directorate’s conspiracy mongering. The FBI checked out the Directorate’s claims about Oswald. The CIA apparently did not. None of the Cuban student leaders say they heard from Joannides after November 22, 1963, except for Luis Fernandez Rocha who says the CIA man offered some friendly advice: go back to school; The anti-Castro cause was doomed.

That sounds more like a spook shutting down an operation, than a clueless suit surprised to learn that his paid agents had been talking to Lee Harvey Oswald behind his back.

Nor is there any evidence that Helms and Karamessines were unhappy that Joannides’s boys in Miami had linked the accused assassin to Castro. The agency continued to fund the Directorate after the Kennedy assassination. Joannides received the highest possible job evaluation for his work in 1963.
Nonetheless, one might still concoct a scenario in which the independent-minded Cuban students had a series of encounters with the obscure Lee Harvey Oswald that somehow escaped the notice of the usually vigilant George Joannides (but not the FBI or CIA headquarters). One could further hypothesize that, when President Kennedy was killed and the overzealous Cuban students attempted to link the accused presidential assassin to Castro, Joannides and his superiors chose to bury the whole affair --and not investigate the claims of a Castro-Oswald connection--out of sheer embarrassment about the ridiculousness of the charge. In this view, the Cuban students were out of control, George Joannides was out of his league, Fidel Castro was above suspicion, and the CIA was honestly surprised by the exiles’s conspiracy mongering. 

Perhaps the biggest problem with such a scenario is that the CIA flatly rejects it. In the official story, George Joannides had no contact at all with Cuban Student Directorate in 1963. He wasn’t there, and that CIA personnel have no knowledge of or connection to the first JFK conspiracy theory.  This denial of reality is, 40 years after the fact,  bizarre. It lends credibility to the Cuban communist interpretation of 1963—that a rogue faction killed JFK and the CIA still has something to hide. Yet the agency stands by it.

In fact, all of he evidence suggests that George Joannides did his job in 1963 as his CIA bosses wanted. He was paid to mount covert operations--and he did. In the fall of 1963, he was, in all likelihood, working on an authorized psychological warfare operation involving the Cuban Student Directorate and Lee Harvey Oswald. The purpose of this operation seems to have been to expose Oswald’s pro-Castro ways, the better to advance the U.S. policy of overthrowing Castro’s government. Joannides and his bosses did what they conceived of as their professional duty by protecting the agency’s “sources and methods” both before and after Oswald was arrested for killing Kennedy.  Joannides’s stonewalling of the HSCA in the late 1970s was part of the same effort.

There is no evidence that George Joannides or the Cuban students whom he supported had anything to do with the gunfire in Dealey Plaza.

No one can insinuate that George Joannides was a co-conspirator in a plot to kill President Kennedy. His friends and family recall him as an ethical, funny, warm, and patriotic person, and I have no reason to doubt them. But his emergence, thirty five years after the fact, as a material witness to the JFK assassination story is remarkable, especially considering that his name appeared nowhere in the findings of five official investigations or in hundreds of books about the JFK assassination.  Whatever George Joannides did in 1963 it certainly had the approval of his boss, the late Dick Helms. Because the CIA denies knowing anything about Joannides’ actions in 1963, the exact nature of his professional activities awaits decisive clarification.

In any case, his actions emerge as the most likely explanation for what Jane Roman saw in the Oswald paper trail (and what John Whitten wasn’t allowed to see after Kennedy was killed.) George Joannides was, in all probability, part of a faction in the Special Affairs Staff that was holding information about Lee Harvey Oswald tightly under their control.

To my mind, the revelation of his existence and activities corroborated Jane Roman’s analysis and confirmed the importance that I attached to it. But the CIA’s evasions make definitive conclusions premature.
I felt vindicated. But I’d been stonewalled.

https://www.history-matters.com/essays/frameup/WhatJaneRomanSaid/images/JoannidesGRAVE.jpg

And that’s where my story ends. I have no “smoking gun” about who killed Kennedy. I have no JFK conspiracy theory. If you insist that Lee Harvey Oswald fired the fatal shot on November 22, 1963, I would say you are probably right. If you insist there was a plot by a faction in the Special Affairs Staff to provoke an invasion of Cuba in late 1963, I would say you might well be right. With the CIA still withholding evidence, the issue is hard to judge.

Certainly, the records of George Joannides’ activities in late 1963 meet the legal definition of “assassination related” records, as defined in the 1992 JFK Assassination Records Act. In August 1963 Joannides’ paid assets in the Cuban Student Directorate had knowledge of and contact with Oswald; in November 1963 these assets attempted to use their knowledge to exploit the president’s death to advance the anti-Castro cause. Yet virtually nothing is known about his actions in those months.

What everybody from Oliver Stone to Ben Bradlee to Arlen Specter can agree on is that the CIA should account for the actions of George Joannides in 1963. As long as it does not, the agency is violating of the spirit and the letter of the JFK Assassination Records Act and  the JFK conspiracy question remains open.
As for Jane Roman, I am certain that she did not know what the men from SAS were doing with Oswald in the fall of 1963 nor the nature of George Joannides’s peculiar mission to Miami.  She knew a lot but she did not know the complex depths of the story of the CIA and Oswald. Like many in the nation’s capital, she did not want to know. That is why I can understand and sympathize with her feelings of vexation about my article and her desire to repudiate its implications.

The CIA’s own records, even the very incomplete paper trail that John Newman and I possessed in 1994, forced conclusions that she, a loyal, blameless insider preferred not to contemplate: That certain CIA officers in the anti-Castro operation hid the nature of their interest in Lee Harvey Oswald before and after President Kennedy was killed. Their actions may well have had the effect of insulating Oswald from scrutiny on his way to Dealey Plaza. They certainly prevented a real investigation into the causes of Kennedy’s death. Theirs was the intelligence failure at the heart of the November 22 tragedy, and Jane Roman was an honest, if unwilling, witness to it.

There lay the story that I pursued in the spirit of Ben Bradlee’s challenge, the story for which I was willing to sacrifice the family jewels. Of course, I failed. I didn’t get a big front page story. But I did get a nice little yarn that nobody outside (and few inside) the CIA ever knew: the story of the CIA man who paid for the first JFK conspiracy theory. It may not be a blockbuster, hold the presses type scoop, but, as we say in the journalism trade, it “incrementally” advances the story of the Kennedy assassination. And I didn’t lose any gonads along the way.

Thank you, Ben Bradlee.

--Washington, DC
January 15, 2002


Thursday, March 14, 2019

Joannides and the DRE - By Jefferson Morley


Miami New Times
Revelation 19.63
JEFFERSON MORLEY | APRIL 12, 2001 | 4:00AM



When Fidel Castro's Revolutionary Armed Forces routed the U.S.-backed Cuban exiles in the Bay of Pigs fiasco 40 years ago this week, President John F. Kennedy took full responsibility for the defeat. But the contrition of the young commander in chief, while popular with the American people, played poorly among the tens of thousands of Cubans living here in Miami. Many believed the liberal chief executive's refusal to send planes to support the men scrambling for cover at Playa Girón was a failure of nerve, if not a betrayal. And to this day a certain embittered distrust of Washington, born four decades ago, runs deep in Cuban Miami, erupting whenever the federal government (in the person of Janet Reno or farm-belt Republicans in Congress) pursues policies contrary to the agenda of the first generation of el exilio

INFO
Related Links:
Based on documents found in 
Foreign Relations of the United States of America, Vol. XI, "Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath." President Kennedy comments on the DRE's story about Soviet missiles in cave in Documents 154 and 170.
The best online chat group on the JFK assassination is alt.assassination.jfk
The JFK Collection and database at the National Archives


But the truth is that whatever the disappointment of the Bay of Pigs, Miami's Cuban exiles have never lacked for support at the highest levels of the U.S. government. From the beginning their anti-Castro cause was taken up by senior leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency, who encouraged their ambitions to destroy the Cuban regime. For 38 years one of the most powerful of those leaders has guarded a secret about the events leading up to Kennedy's violent death, a secret potentially damaging to the exile cause as well as to the agency itself.

The man is Richard Helms, former director of the CIA. Now retired and living in the swank Foxhall section of Washington, D.C., the 89-year-old Helms declined interview requests for this story, the basic facts of which have emerged from recently declassified JFK files.

Through four intensive investigations of the Kennedy assassination, Helms withheld information about a loyal CIA officer in Miami -- a dapper, multilingual lawyer and father of three -- who guided and monitored the Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil (the Revolutionary Student Directorate, or DRE). His name was George Joannides, and his charges in the DRE were among the most notoriously outspoken and militant anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the early Sixties. For several weeks in the summer of 1963, those same exiles tailed, came to blows with, and harassed Lee Harvey Oswald, who just a few months later changed the course of U.S. history.

Helms never told the Warren Commission -- the presidential panel set up after Kennedy's death to investigate the assassination -- about his officer's relationship with the exile group. He never disclosed that the CIA was funding the DRE when it had contact with Oswald, who was agitating on Castro's behalf in New Orleans in August 1963. A skillful bureaucrat, Helms withheld files on Oswald's pro-Castro activities from an in-house investigation of the accused assassin (and when the veteran officer in charge of that probe protested, Helms relieved him of his duties).

Helms stonewalled again in 1978, when Congress created the House Select Committee on Assassinations to re-examine Kennedy's murder. Once more the CIA kept every detail of Joannides's mission in Miami under wraps. Worse still, in veiled contempt of that inquiry, the CIA assigned to Joannides himself the job of deflecting sensitive inquiries from the committee's investigators.

As recently as 1998, the agency still disavowed any knowledge of Joannides's actions in Miami. John Tunheim, now a federal judge in Minneapolis, chaired the federal Assassination Records Review Board, which between 1994 and 1998 opened more than four million pages of long-secret documents -- including a thin file on Joannides. Yet even then the CIA was claiming that no one in the agency had had any contact with the DRE throughout 1963. The Joannides story, Tunheim says today, "shows that the CIA wasn't interested in the truth about the assassination."

Journalist and author Gerald Posner, whose 1993 best seller Case Close dargued that the DRE's harassment of Oswald was a "humiliation" that propelled him on his way to shoot the president, says he finds the Joannides piece of the JFK puzzle to be "obviously important" and suggests that the CIA is "covering up its own incompetence." In his view the agency's "intransigence, lying, and dissembling are once again contributing to suspicions of conspiracy."

G. Robert Blakey, who served as general counsel for the House Select Committee on Assassinations, says the agency's silence compromised that investigation. "If I had known then what Joannides was doing in 1963, I would have demanded that the agency take him off the job [of responding to committee inquiries]," he asserts. "I would have sat him down and interviewed him. Under oath."

The story begins on November 6, 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis had just come to an end the week before, when Kennedy accepted the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw all its missiles from the island. The fear of nuclear war that had lasted for thirteen anxious days was easing.

That afternoon the Evening Star in Washington hit the newsstands with a disturbing front-page headline: "Exiles Tell of Missiles Hidden in Cuba Caves." The Star's scoop, which alleged the existence of seven previously unidentified and camouflaged missile sites around the island, was based on information provided by the Revolutionary Student Directorate.

At the time the DRE was the single most popular exile group in Miami, according to a CIA survey, with a hard-core following of 2200 supporters. Since the group's founding on the University of Havana campus in early 1960, it had been receiving funding, training, and logistical support for its leaders, thanks to a CIA officer named David Atlee Phillips, known for his role in the 1954 overthrow of a leftist government in Guatemala. By the time of the missile crisis, the agency was giving the group's young leaders in Miami $25,000 each month.

The CIA wanted the DRE "for one simple reason," recalls Luis Fernandez-Rocha, the Directorate's secretary-general at the time and a 23-year-old who had been expelled from medical school at the University of Havana. "We had the best organization in Latin America they had ever seen."

Fernandez-Rocha's boast is not idle. In the early Sixties, the DRE was at the cutting edge of the Cuban resistance movement. Founded by Alberto Muller, Ernesto Travieso, and Juan Manuel Salvat, the Directorate was born during a march protesting the visit to Havana of Soviet envoy Anastas Mikoyan in February 1960. When pro-Castro forces greeted the young Cuban democrats with lead pipes and flying fists, Muller and Co. decided to take up arms against Castro's proletarian dictatorship. They went to Miami, where it was safer to plan their activities and stockpile the equipment necessary for military action. In the fall of 1960 the group returned to the island and organized boycotts at colleges and high schools in the capital. When Castro spoke at the University of Havana, DRE members set off more than 100 bombs at the fringes of the crowd.

While the CIA trained an exile army in Guatemala for an island invasion in the spring of 1961, agency officials informed the DRE and other groups inside Cuba that something big would soon take place, but, citing security concerns, the officials refused to announce when and where the attack would occur. Salvat organized a network of active supporters among Catholic and middle-class students throughout Cuba. Muller built a nucleus of guajiro allies in the Escambray Mountains. Then without warning came the April 17 invasion at the Bay of Pigs. Before the DRE could mobilize, the invaders were trounced and Castro cracked down on his foes. Salvat eluded capture, but scores of DRE sympathizers wound up in prison. In a blow to the DRE, cofounder Muller was among those caught and imprisoned. Others took refuge in the packed embassies of sympathetic Latin-American nations.

As the Directorate's leaders straggled back to Miami, they embodied the bitter mood that enveloped the city in 1961. But with assistance from David Atlee Phillips and the CIA, Salvat, Fernandez-Rocha, and engineer Isidro "Chilo" Borja revived the DRE.

In the summer of 1962, Fernandez-Rocha sneaked back into Cuba and spent several dangerous months trying to shore up the group's clandestine network. With continuous funding from the U.S. government, the DRE headquarters in Miami was able to send delegates to international conferences in Vienna and Helsinki. The group published a newspaper, Trinchera (Trenches), and an English-language newsletter, the Cuban Report, which often was cited by New York Sen. Kenneth Keating, a leading Republican critic of JFK's Cuba policy. Additional DRE chapters sprang up in cities throughout North and South America.

To announce the revival of the Directorate, the group's military section launched its most spectacular deed on the evening of August 24, 1962. Under the leadership of Salvat and Borja, two boats of DRE militants carried out a midnight fusillade attack on the Rosita Hornedo hotel in suburban Miramar, where Castro's Soviet-bloc advisors were gathering. (The man who fired the 20mm cannon was José Basulto, now famous as founder of Brothers to the Rescue.)

Meanwhile the Cuban Report was publishing information provided by Luis Fernandez-Rocha from inside Cuba that the Soviet Union was installing large ballistic missiles on the island. The Kennedy White House dismissed such claims as exile exaggeration, but within weeks aerial-reconnaissance photos confirmed the reports. The missile crisis ensued.

When that confrontation ended peacefully that fall -- but with Castro still in power -- the DRE again sought to force the United States to confront Cuba. On November 12, just six days after the Star story broke, Fernandez-Rocha appeared on The Today Show and repeated the details, claiming that nuclear missiles had been stashed in caves in the Yumuri valley in Matanzas, in the hills of Camagüey, and in Hershey in Havana province -- and that he had seen the sites with his own eyes.

Kennedy was incensed at Fernandez-Rocha's brashness so soon after the near-nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union had been defused. "The refugees," the president told his advisors, "are naturally trying to build up the story in an effort to get us to invade [Cuba]." He ordered the CIA to rein in the young exiles, and within 24 hours Richard Helms summoned Fernandez-Rocha to Washington.

The 49-year-old deputy director spent the better part of a day grilling Fernandez-Rocha and, according to the CIA's minutes of that meeting, concluded that the new missile allegations were not altogether reliable. Helms rebuked the Directorate for going public -- on national television no less -- but softened the reprimand by adding that he wanted to forge a "reasonable collaboration" with the DRE. He understood their disappointment with U.S. policy, he said. He confided that he was promoting a new agent in Miami who would be "personally responsible to me" for the success of the relationship.

For this sensitive task Helms selected an up-and-coming political-action officer, George Efythron Joannides, who had been transferred to Miami earlier that year and was working as deputy chief of psychological warfare operations against the Castro government. With a staff of 24 and a budget of $2.4 million, he ran his clandestine activities out of a ramshackle office building in then-rural South Dade that was known to CIA hands by its aquatic code name: JM/WAVE station. Joannides reported to station chief Theodore G. Shackley, who was overseeing one of the CIA's largest operations in the world, with an annual budget of more than $50 million, more than 100 leased vehicles, several thousand Cuban agents, and 300-plus American employees.

Joannides was 40 years old then, a native New Yorker who had attended City College and St. John's University School of Law in Queens. Recruited for the CIA in 1951, he'd spent eleven years in Greece and Libya, confounding communists and influencing local politicians. He was a cosmopolitan man, fluent in French and Greek, competent in Spanish. He wore tailored suits, spun bilingual puns, and enjoyed Greek pastries. He and his wife, Violet, and their three children lived in suburban anonymity on SW 65th Avenue in what is now the Village of Pinecrest.

Luis Fernandez-Rocha, now a doctor at Mercy Hospital, recalls his initial meeting with "Howard," as the CIA man called himself. Howard spoke confidently, with a New York accent, and wore an ornate pinky ring. In Fernandez-Rocha's view he compared favorably with the DRE's previous handler, Ross Crozier. "[He] was a great human being, but he was a sergeant," Fernandez-Rocha says. "When I was dealing with this guy Howard, I was talking to a colonel."

Howard was always available, Fernandez-Rocha adds. The agent would meet him anywhere from "three times a week to once every two weeks. We used to have a cup of coffee at a Howard Johnson's on U.S. 1."
The relationship was complicated. While the DRE was financially dependent on the CIA, its leaders publicly vilified Kennedy for his actions regarding Cuba: the Bay of Pigs defeat followed by a missed opportunity to topple Castro during the missile crisis. When the president came to Miami on December 29, 1962, to welcome returning Bay of Pigs prisoners at the Orange Bowl, DRE leaders stayed away in disgust.

In the spring of 1963, the Directorate's military section continued to plan raids on island targets, drawing up an elaborate scheme to destroy the Nazabal sugar mill in central Cuba. They sent word of the operation through Joannides to Richard Helms, according to a declassified CIA cable, but Joannides emphasized the CIA's opposition, and the raid never took place. The Kennedy White House, wanting no return to the tensions of the missile crisis, then cracked down hard on Cuban Miami. In April 1963 the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an administrative order forbidding 25 of the most militant exile leaders from leaving Dade County without permission. On the list were DRE secretary-general Fernandez-Rocha, military-section leader Chilo Borja, and propaganda chief Juan Manuel Salvat, the group's corpulent, hot-tempered mastermind.

The exiles didn't obey the order. "We worked with the CIA," recalls Salvat. "We never subordinated ourselves to them." Nor did the Directorate's members try to hide their anger. Joannides walked a fine line -- trying to discourage the group's military ambitions while encouraging their propaganda campaigns and intelligence-collection efforts. But by the summer of 1963, the DRE harbored an "extremely bitter animosity" toward Kennedy, according to Ross Crozier, Joannides's predecessor. In fact they were scarcely less hostile to the president than to Castro.

On July 31 Joannides was promoted to chief of psychological warfare operations at the JM/WAVE station in South Dade. Among his most notable accomplishments, his supervisor wrote, was his "excellent job in the handling of a significant student exile group, which hitherto had successfully resisted any important degree of control."

Chilo Borja has a clear recollection of the summer of 1963. Now the owner of a Miami air-conditioning business, he was 28 years old at the time. Skilled with guns and familiar with boats, he became the chief of the group's military section in Miami in 1961. In the summer of 1963, the Directorate was desperate and divided. "At this point there's a big wedge between the international faction and the military faction of the DRE," Borja remembers. "The CIA is pumping money to do anything in Latin America, but it's not giving anything for anything in Cuba. We have a lot of our good friends that are killed or in jail. Alberto [Muller] is in jail. We've got to tell these people that we are still doing something."

Along with his good friend Salvat, Borja was undeterred by the Kennedy administration's crackdown on the exiles, and their antagonism didn't go unnoticed. The Miami station chief, Ted Shackley, had long since warned CIA headquarters that the DRE's attitude toward U.S. policymakers "was one of contempt repeat contempt."

Shackley's assessment was on target. In a strategy memo to the Directorate in May 1963, Salvat proposed that the DRE continue to take CIA funding while the military section, under Borja's leadership, would act covertly to evade Washington's control. The DRE's goal, Salvat wrote in the memo (preserved in the University of Miami's Cuban Heritage Collection), was "to strike a surprise blow so strong as to bring about the fulfillment of [the military section's] plan" to overthrow Castro.

As Borja safeguarded the group's boats and guns on Catalina Island, just off the southern coast of the Dominican Republic, he heard from a close friend, Carlos Bringuier, with whom he had grown up on the beaches of Tarara, just east of Havana. "Carlitos," Borja reminisces. "We called him Vistilla [nearsighted], because he was a little bit blind, and his glasses were this thick. He was our delegate in New Orleans. He notified us that this guy was putting in propaganda all throughout New Orleans, and he wanted our directions."

The guy was Lee Harvey Oswald.

At age 23 Oswald had lived an itinerant life. He grew up in New Orleans and New York City, and enlisted in the Marines when he was seventeen years old. After a series of tours in the Far East, he asked for a discharge in 1959. Sympathetic to communism, he moved to the Soviet Union and lived for two years in Minsk. He married a Russian girl but became disillusioned with socialism and brought his wife back to the United States. They settled in New Orleans, where, by the spring of 1963, he began to call attention to himself as a supporter of Fidel Castro.

Carlos Bringuier told Borja that Oswald had tried to infiltrate the group on August 5 by walking into the local headquarters of the Directorate and offering to train commandos to fight Castro. Four days later a DRE supporter reported to Bringuier that he'd seen Oswald on a street corner handing out pamphlets for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC), the best-known pro-Castro group in the United States. Bringuier and his friends went to find the double-dealing leftist. As they angrily denounced him, a crowd gathered and police broke up the altercation.

Bringuier called Borja to ask what he should do next. "Our answer to him was just “face him down,'" the former military-section chief recalls. "Go out there and contest him. Talk to the press, uncover this guy." And Bringuier did just that. On August 16 another friend of Bringuier in the Directorate reported that Oswald was again handing out FPCC pamphlets. Bringuier sent the friend to Oswald's house posing as a Castro supporter to find out who was backing his work.

Meanwhile Oswald's support for the Cuban revolution had caught the attention of a local radio host named Bill Stuckey, also a friend of Bringuier. Stuckey invited Oswald to speak on his weekly program and asked Bringuier to participate. Before the planned debate, Bringuier wrote to Miami, to José Antonio Lanuza, who was in charge of the DRE's North American chapters, requesting background on the FPCC. Lanuza sent back information from the Directorate's files.

On Saturday evening, August 21, 1963, Bringuier and Oswald debated the Cuban revolution over radio station WDSU. In the middle of the discussion, in which Oswald defended Castro's policies, Stuckey suddenly shifted gears. Was it true, the moderator asked, that Oswald had lived in Russia?

"That is correct, and I think those -- the fact that I did live for a time in the Soviet Union -- gives me excellent qualifications to repudiate charges that Cuba and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee is communist controlled," Oswald replied, obviously taken aback.

"I would like to know," Bringuier chimed in, "if it is the Fair Play for Cuba Committee or Fair Play for Russia Committee."

Bringuier was pleased with the program. When it was over, he drafted a press release that called on the U.S. Congress to investigate Lee Harvey Oswald and denounce the FPCC. A rewritten and slightly toned-down version of the press release was issued in the name of the Directorate, as well as Alpha 66 and five other hard-line exile groups. Bringuier also sent a note to Lanuza three days after the debate, stating, "You can rest assured that the traitor Lee H. Oswald (the same one who tried to infiltrate the DRE here) came off looking so bad that it is possible that he will have to be transferred by his organization to another city."

(Although Fernandez-Rocha says he has "no specific recollection" of telling George Joannides about the Directorate's actions against Oswald, Borja recalls that the CIA officer was "definitely" informed. "That's the kind of thing we took a lot of merits and credits for," he says. "That's what the money [given to the DRE] was for.")

Perhaps humiliated in the radio debate, Oswald did indeed cease all public activities in support of Castro. According to his wife, he spent his time reading books and cleaning his rifle on their back porch. The Directorate, Bringuier now says, soon forgot about the FPCC adventurer. A few weeks later, Bringuier says he ran into an FBI agent who told him Oswald had left New Orleans. That was true. In late September Oswald took a bus to Mexico City, where he tried to obtain a visa for travel to Cuba and the Soviet Union. (Coincidentally David Atlee Phillips, the DRE's first CIA handler, was monitoring the Cuban embassy at the time.) Oswald's request was denied. Returning to the States, he went to Dallas, where he moved into a boardinghouse under an assumed name. Seven weeks later Kennedy was dead.

George Joannides's name is unknown to JFK historians. Unlike the countless scoundrels and spies who haunt the vast literature of the assassination, his cameo role in the tragedy has been neither documented nor debated. His name does not appear in the 26 volumes of evidence collected by the Warren Commission in 1964. His relationship to the DRE was unknown to New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, whose JFK conspiracy case failed to persuade a New Orleans jury in 1969. Joannides's actions do not figure in the twelve volumes of evidence and analysis that accompanied the report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1979. He does not appear in any of the hundreds of books about the assassination. There is no character based on him in Oliver Stone's 1991 film JFK.

Joannides's career was only forced into the public record by the immense popularity of Stone's movie. In response to renewed interest in the JFK murder, open-government advocate Rep. Lee Hamilton, an Indiana Democrat, secured unanimous passage of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, intended to clarify public confusion about the Dealey Plaza tragedy. The law created an independent civilian panel with unique powers to declassify JFK files, even over the objections of federal agencies. Between 1994 and 1998, when its funding ran out, the panel, known as the Assassination Records Review Board, dislodged four million pages of classified documents. Among the new records were portions of George Joannides's personnel file. They confirmed he was the DRE's case officer.

During its existence the review board and its staff solicited help from the public in locating JFK records. In December 1997 I suggested that the board ask the CIA to review its files on the Revolutionary Student Directorate. An official in the CIA's Office of Historic Review, J. Barry Harrelson, responded with a memo stating that no agency employee had been in contact with the DRE in 1963. "Major policy differences between the agency and DRE developed ... because the DRE would not take directions or instructions about a number of operational matters, insisting on engaging in activities the agency did not sanction," Harrelson wrote. It was a mystifying response, especially since the CIA had already allowed publication of the name of Joannides's predecessor, Ross Crozier.

Then who, I asked, was Howard? Former members of the DRE had described him in detail to me. The Directorate's records corroborate their accounts of working closely with him in 1963.

Harrelson professed ignorance. "Knowledgeable case officers" had been consulted, he wrote, and no one knew of any officer using the name Howard who had dealt with the Cuban students. The CIA, he claimed, had no evidence that Howard was an "actual person."

At this the review board staff grew skeptical. Empowered by the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, the board was able to conduct its own check of agency files, and in March 1998 Michelle Combs, an investigator who had once worked at the CIA, uncovered Joannides's personnel file. The board ruled that the file was an assassination-related record and ordered that it be made public.

The file seems unexceptional. It contains just four performance reviews, three of them written during Joannides's tenure at the South Dade JM/WAVE station and one from 1978. The reviews describe his day-to-day responsibilities, grade his performance, and include written comments from his supervisor. That much was fairly routine.

More intriguing was what the files did not contain. The CIA's archives contained no reports, receipts, memoranda, notes, or cables that accounted for how the Directorate spent U.S. funds in August 1963 (when Joannides's Cuban charges were in contact with Oswald) or for November 1963, when Kennedy was slain. In fact there are no reports in the file for the entire seventeen-month period he handled the DRE, from December 1962 to April 1964. Although Joannides's personnel file stated he was paying the Directorate for "intelligence collection" and "propaganda," the CIA's Office of Historic Review maintained that it had no reports from Joannides about the group's intelligence and propaganda activities.

Why is the absence of those documents significant? Because such reporting almost always was mandatory. Contrary to Hollywood images of espionage, operations officers spend a lot of time at their desks doing paperwork. As a bureaucracy that collects information systematically and processes it efficiently, the CIA expects and requires its employees to account for their efforts. Such written reports were filed monthly by Joannides's predecessor, Ross Crozier, and are found in declassified CIA files. Reports were filed monthly by Joannides's successor as well. (And Joannides himself received praise in a July 1963 performance evaluation for his "adherence to valid reporting techniques.")

From the public record, we know how the JM/WAVE station, located adjacent to what is now Metrozoo in South Miami-Dade, operated during Joannides's tenure in Miami. Case officers such as he were required to file reports with their "reporting officers." These rewrite men synthesized the information for station chief Ted Shackley, who reviewed the reports, edited them, added his own comments, and sent them on to Washington. In a brief telephone conversation in December 1998, Shackley confirmed that Joannides did report regularly on the DRE, if not monthly then at least quarterly. But when pressed to explain why no reports could be found in the files, he replied that he wouldn't want to speculate, then canceled a previously scheduled interview.

Six retired CIA operations officers interviewed for this article agree that after November 22, 1963, Joannides had a duty to report, in writing, whatever he knew about the relationship between the Directorate and Oswald. "He would have been completely remiss if he didn't," says Justin Gleichauf, a retired CIA official who worked in Miami in the early Sixties. "[The Directorate's members] were up to their eyes with this guy [Oswald], and they hadn't told him? He must've been hot about that. He undoubtedly reported it, and in writing."

John Pereira, retired chief of the CIA's Office of Historic Review, concurs. "On anything that important," he says, "the normal reporting would have gone in writing."

"There may not be a report in the file," adds Peter Jessup, a CIA officer assigned to the National Security Council in 1963, "but you can be sure there was a report."

If there were such a report, someone at the CIA either destroyed it without authorization or is still keeping it secret. The former would be a violation of Title 18 of the U.S. Criminal Code, the latter a violation of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act.

If DRE members were "up to their eyes" with Oswald in August 1963, the modest propaganda victory provided by the WDSU radio debate was just the impetus they needed for ratcheting up their anti-Castro schemes. In early September the JM/WAVE station received a copy of a national tabloid called See, in which the DRE had taken out an advertisement offering ten million dollars to persons willing to help the group assassinate Fidel Castro.

On September 15, the DRE's records show, Salvat and his cohorts used $660 provided by the CIA to travel to New York City to challenge pro-Castro students speaking at a conference in midtown Manhattan. 

The resulting brawl made page one of the New York Times.

And on October 9, DRE propaganda chief Salvat made a six-day trip to Dallas, though he remembers he didn't inform Joannides of the mission. The purpose, he recalls during an interview at his family's Calle Ocho bookstore, Libreria & Distribuidora Universal, was to bolster the DRE chapter there, raise funds among local exile supporters, and buy weapons. As first revealed in Oswald Talked, a 1996 book by Dallas journalists Ray and Mary La Fontaine, Salvat's trip later came to the attention of the FBI. According to FBI interviews with two of his friends in the DRE military section, Salvat arranged a series of meetings in Dallas with a gun dealer of fervent right-wing views named John Thomas Masen. That name would be of interest to the FBI after the assassination, when the bureau learned that Masen was one of only two people in the Dallas area who sold the type of Mannlicher-Carcano bullets that had killed Kennedy. Salvat says he has no recollection of Masen's name but reports that he relied on the CIA for the names of weapons suppliers. His own notes show he returned to Miami on October 15, 1963.

A little more than a week later, on October 24, the Directorate presented the CIA with a plan for an ambitious attack on Cuba. The group proposed to insert fourteen commando teams, totaling 200 men, inside the island. The fighting force would instigate an uprising against Castro's 25,000-man army while being resupplied by the CIA.

Joannides's reaction to the scheme is unknown, but JM/WAVE station chief Shackley's was scathing. In a cable to headquarters, Shackley scorned the DRE leaders for imagining themselves "the equals of generals and ambassadors." He recommended that all funds to the Directorate's military section be cut off. A week later Richard Helms agreed. Joannides, who had been paying maintenance expenses for the group's boats and guns, had to deliver the message. On November 19, 1963, while President Kennedy was in Miami speaking to Latin-American newspaper publishers under tight security, Luis Fernandez-Rocha was called in to receive the news that the agency was cutting off its support.

Three days later Kennedy traveled to Dallas. As the presidential motorcade passed by a friendly crowd in Dealey Plaza, Kennedy was struck by gunfire in the back and head and died instantly in his wife's arms. Ninety minutes later Dallas police arrested a suspect in the shooting: Lee Harvey Oswald.

What exactly did George Joannides do on November 22, 1963, when news of Oswald's arrest spread? Few records exist to provide an answer.

In 1978 José Antonio Lanuza told Gaeton Fonzi, an investigator for the House Select Committee on Assassinations, how the DRE reacted to Kennedy's murder. On November 22, 1963, Lanuza was coordinator of the DRE's North American chapters. When he heard the news stories linking Oswald to the shooting, he remembered delegate Carlos Bringuier's reports from New Orleans and went to DRE headquarters to check his files. There he found Bringuier's letters about the confrontations with Oswald, along with tapes of the WDSU radio debate. The group's leaders gathered, he said, and one of them -- Salvat, Fernandez-Rocha, or Borja -- "made the first outside call about the discovered material." That call, he said, went to the DRE's case officer at the CIA's JM/WAVE station in Miami.

The Directorate "was told by the CIA not to do anything or contact anyone else about the discovery for at least one hour, time enough for the agency to contact Washington and get back to them with instructions," Lanuza told Fonzi. Later that night the case officer called back to say the FBI would come by to collect their evidence.

By then, however, the DRE had already gone public. The group "was so anxious to get word out about Oswald's association with a pro-Castro group, that [we] waited only about 50 minutes," Lanuza related to Fonzi. Other members of the DRE then spread a variety of stories -- some true, some false -- about Oswald: He had attempted to infiltrate the Directorate in New Orleans (true), he had once lived in the home of the Soviet foreign minister (false), he had recently been in Mexico City (true).

The details of Oswald's pro-Castro activism, as they hit the American airwaves on the evening of November 22, 1963, had an added benefit for the Directorate: They advanced the long-standing goal of the DRE's military section. "We wanted to put pressure on Castro," Salvat explains today. The ploy worked. Castro responded by putting his Revolutionary Armed Forces on high alert along Cuba's northern coast.

Meanwhile Oswald was in jail in Dallas, denying he had shot Kennedy. "I'm a patsy," he told reporters.
Joannides had only to read the next morning's newspaper to know his assets in the DRE were exerting a powerful influence on the coverage of the president's murder. Carlos Bringuier's story appeared in the Miami Herald: "Oswald Tried to Spy on Anti-Castro Exile Group." The story also made the Washington Post: "Castro Foe Details Infiltration Effort."

Castro continued to play defense. In a radio speech to the Cuban people the day after the shooting, he portrayed the assassination as a provocation aimed at destroying the revolution. He derided Bringuier's statements to the New York Times that Oswald was a supporter. "How curious!" Castro said. "They say that he is a Castroite, a communist, an admirer of Fidel Castro. And it appears that he tried to enter [the DRE in New Orleans] and was not admitted because they thought he belonged to the FBI or CIA.... They must know pretty well the kinds of agents the FBI and CIA have, since they deal with them a lot." George Joannides was one of the few people on the planet in a position to know the accuracy of those words.

"Oswald could be guilty or innocent; we can't tell," Castro continued. "Or he could be a CIA or FBI agent, as those people [the DRE] suspected, or an instrument of the most reactionary sectors that may have been planning a sinister plot.... [He] may be innocent, a cat's paw in a plan very well prepared by people who knew how to prepare such plans. Or he may be a sick man, and if so, the only honest thing is to hand him over for a medical examination and not to be starting a campaign extremely dangerous to world peace."

As Castro spoke Salvat put the finishing touches on a special edition of Trinchera, the Directorate's newspaper. It featured an English-language banner headline, "The Presumed Assassins," over photos of Oswald and Castro. The text consisted of reprints of Bringuier's letters to the Miami DRE about Oswald and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Trinchera also quoted from a telegram the group had sent to the newly sworn-in president, Lyndon B. Johnson: "May God enlighten the government of this country at such difficult moments."

Copies of Trinchera were being distributed outside a church on Key Biscayne on Sunday morning, November 24, when nightclub owner Jack Ruby shot Oswald in the basement of the Dallas jail. Nothing would contribute so powerfully to the popular belief in a conspiracy as Ruby's execution of Oswald. Within days pollsters found that 60 percent of the American public was convinced that Oswald had accomplices.

On November 25, three days after Kennedy's murder, FBI agent Jim O'Connor interviewed José Antonio Lanuza and collected the Directorate's file on Oswald, including an eight-page memo arguing that Fidel Castro was the "intellectual author" of the assassination.

But FBI director J. Edgar Hoover squelched investigations into a Cuban or exilio connection. Within days of the assassination, for example, the Secret Service, which had launched its own investigation, received an urgent report from its Chicago office about a Cuban exile who had been seeking to buy guns in Chicago since September. He was traveling in the company of one Juan Francisco Blanco Fernandez, a friend of Salvat and a member of the DRE's military section. On the day before the assassination, the exile told a Secret Service informant that the group had "plenty of money" and would buy weapons "as soon as we take care of Kennedy." But Hoover, whose bureau took over the investigation with the support of President Johnson, forced the Secret Service to drop further inquiries. The FBI preferred to pursue the theory that Oswald had acted alone.

Over at the CIA, Richard Helms withheld files on Oswald's pro-Castro activities from the agency's in-house investigation of the accused assassin within weeks of the shooting, according to a sworn deposition by John Whitten, the CIA veteran in charge of the probe. When Whitten protested, Helms reassigned him.

Not long after Oswald was killed, the DRE laid off its efforts to link him and Castro. George Joannides continued to assist the group in ways large and small. He paid expenses, accepted intelligence reports, and helped "exfiltrate" Jorge Medina Bringuier, Carlos's cousin and the Directorate's last remaining leader inside Cuba who wasn't in prison.

Fernandez-Rocha recalls only one conversation with the CIA man after November 22, 1963. They met for coffee, he says, around Christmas that year. The nation was still in mourning. With the Cuba dilemma receding from national attention -- and with the FBI pursuing a lone-gunman theory over a Castro conspiracy -- Joannides, in his forthright way, told Fernandez-Rocha the game was over for the Directorate. As the two sipped their cafecitos, the CIA man offered some advice: Get out of politics, go back to school, and get on with your life. Fernandez-Rocha was touched by Joannides's thoughtfulness.

Several months later, in April 1964, Joannides left Miami. He was transferred to Athens with a job evaluation that praised his performance as "exemplary." Fernandez-Rocha quit the anti-Castro cause and enrolled in the University of Miami's School of Medicine the following September. In October 1964 the Warren Commission issued its final report, concluding that Oswald "alone and unaided" had killed Kennedy. The commission, of course, knew nothing about Joannides.

If George Joannides's activities in 1963 were the whole of the story, it would be possible, though difficult, to dismiss Oswald's encounters with the DRE as a freakish twist of fate, an awkward convergence of agendas and individuals in New Orleans that was best laid to rest for fear of unleashing myriad conspiracy theories.

But fifteen years after the tragedy, Joannides resurfaced in the Kennedy assassination story. During the intervening time, he had enjoyed continued success in the CIA. When Ted Shackley became CIA station chief in Saigon, Joannides followed him there and ran covert operations against the Vietcong in 1970 and 1971. He next returned to CIA headquarters to work in the general counsel's office until he left the agency in 1976 to start an immigration-law practice in Washington, D.C.

The CIA called him out of retirement two years later. In 1978 Congress created the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) in response to a revival of JFK assassination-conspiracy speculation, and the committee's aggressive young investigators began to request sensitive files from the CIA. Officials at the agency grew concerned. How could they filter the questions? Deputy Counsel Scott Breckinridge thought Joannides would be just the man to handle requests for records. Breckinridge, who is now retired, said in a 1999 interview that he couldn't recall if he knew about Joannides's 1963 mission in Miami when he made the offer. "He was a man who had a good reputation," Breckinridge recalled. "He knew his way around and knew the [Operations Directorate, the division in charge of mounting covert actions]." Breckinridge remembered that Joannides was especially adept at tracking down information. "He could find things in a hurry," he said.

In June 1978 Joannides began his new assignment back at the office of the CIA's general counsel. Although he'd suffered health problems, his wit remained intact. He even joked with colleagues about the noise made by a mechanical valve doctors had installed in his heart a few years earlier. As he worked with congressional investigators, he betrayed nothing about his own participation in or knowledge of the events of 1963 -- nothing about the Directorate's well-documented hostility toward Kennedy, nothing to suggest he knew of the DRE's contacts with Oswald.

"I worked closely with Joannides," says G. Robert Blakey, former general counsel for the HSCA who is now a law professor at the University of Notre Dame. "None of us knew that he had been a contact agent for the DRE in 1963. That was one of the groups we had targeted for investigation."

Gaeton Fonzi, the investigator who'd questioned former DRE members in Miami for the committee, recalls his own efforts to get answers from the CIA. When he had asked who'd handled contacts with the Directorate in 1963, the committee was informed -- via the CIA general counsel's office -- that the agency did not know. "We got the runaround from day one on the DRE," says Fonzi, who now lives in North Bay Village and who eventually wrote a book blaming the assassination on the DRE's original patron, David Atlee Phillips, and assorted Cuban exiles. (Phillips denied the charge until his death in 1987.) The Joannides revelation, Fonzi adds, just reconfirms that the CIA deceived the American people about who really was responsible for Kennedy's death.

The HSCA issued its final report in February 1979, chillingly concluding that "in all probability" there had been a conspiracy perpetrated by Oswald and persons whom the committee could not identify. Blakey believed the CIA had cooperated fully with the committee, a claim he no longer cares to defend. Joannides fooled him, Blakey admits. "He was a witness," he marvels. "The assassination happened on his watch."
In November 1978 George Joannides retired permanently. He was not a man to talk about his work. He once told one of his children he was skeptical of JFK conspiracy theories but did not explain why. His heart problems worsened in his later years, and he moved to Houston to receive treatment from renowned surgeon Michael DeBakey. He died on March 9, 1990, at the age of 67.

Family and friends mourned him as a loving husband, thoughtful father, and delightful and ethical friend. His obituary in the Washington Post on March 14, 1990, made no mention of his 28 years of CIA service, stating only that he had been a lawyer for the Defense Department.

Fidel Castro and the majority of the American people don't often agree, but on the JFK conspiracy question they are like-minded. In December 1995 Fabian Escalante, retired chief of counterintelligence for Castro's security services, offered new details of the Cuban interpretation of Kennedy's assassination. As Castro had insinuated from the beginning, Cuban communists believed that certain exiles, working in league with CIA officials who loathed Kennedy's Cuba policy, were likely responsible for the crime. Speaking at a conference of JFK historians in the Bahamas, Escalante said he had conducted the Cuban government's first full-scale inquiry into the assassination in 1991 and 1992. He claimed he and a colleague had interviewed 150 people in Cuba and said he had reviewed all relevant files.

"I think that the people that had to do with [the assassination] are people in the DRE," he told the conference. But Escalante was another investigator who knew nothing of Joannides. He emphasized that he didn't think Juan Manuel Salvat or other military section leaders were the organizers of the plot. "When you are going to carry out an operation as complex as this one, you cannot put all your money on one single horse. You have to use different ways in order not to have any mistakes." He added, "Obviously the DRE was in on the whole plot against Cuba."

Salvat shrugs at the suggestion that the Directorate had a hand in Kennedy's death. His response is self-deprecating, not defensive. "If there was a conspiracy," he offers, "it was at a much higher level than the DRE."

The Joannides story doesn't prove the existence of an assassination conspiracy, but it does demonstrate that a U.S. government intelligence officer was far better positioned to know about Kennedy's accused killer than the CIA has ever admitted. Still the agency prefers to bluff rather than to disclose. 

When I asked the CIA in 1999 to explain why J. Barry Harrelson of the agency's Office of Historic Review had, a year earlier, denied that the CIA had had any contact with the Directorate in 1963, as well as any knowledge of Joannides's activities that year, a spokesman said the agency could not help me. "We think the records speak for themselves," he replied.

Principal Players:
Basulto, José DRE gunner
Blakey, G. Robert General counsel to the House Select Committee on Assassinations
Borja, Isidro "Chilo" DRE military-section leader
Bringuier, Carlos DRE representative in New Orleans
Crozier, Ross CIA agent based in Miami
Escalante, Fabian Chief of counterintelligence for Cuba's security services
Fernandez-Rocha, Luis DRE secretary-general
Fonzi, Gaeton Investigator for the House Select Committee on Assassinations
Helms, Richard CIA director
Hoover, J. Edgar FBI director
Joannides, George CIA agent based in Miami; agency liaison to the DRE
Lanuza, José Antonio DRE's director of North American chapters
Muller, Alberto DRE cofounder
Phillips, David Atlee CIA agent
IF YOU LIKE THIS STORY, CONSIDER SIGNING UP FOR OUR EMAIL NEWSLETTERS.
SHOW ME HOW
Salvat, Juan Manuel DRE propaganda chief
Shackley, Theodore CIA Miami station chief
Travieso, Ernesto DRE cofounder
Whitten, John CIA agent who headed probe of Lee Harvey Oswald