Tuesday, February 28, 2017

Smoking Doc #5 - NPIC Records

Smoking Doc. #5 - NPIC Records 

Velma Reumann (nee Vogler )

Call Report: Public
Document’s Author: Douglas Horne/ARRB
Date Created: 10/02/96

The Players
Who called whom? Douglas Horne called Velma Reumann (nee Vogler) of Witnesses/Consultants

Description of the Call
Subject: ARRB Interview of Velma Reumann

Summary of the Call:

Dave Montague and I telephonically interview Velma Reumann this date.

We asked her to recap her Navy experience up to the time of the assassination. She said she completed OCS in 1956, then served at the following locations: Newport Rhode Island; Naples, Italy; Bainbridge, Maryland; and then the Naval Photographic Center at Anacostia. She said her tour of duty at NPC began in 1963 and ended in 1966.

She began her tour of duty as Personnel Officer, and prior to the end of her tour, also assumed the larger duties of Administrative Officer, as well.

NPC Command Structure: she said that approximately 300 people worked at NPC, and that there were 3 separate photographic departments, or entities, as follows: Still Photo Lab, Motion Picture Lab, and Research and Development.

Names: she remembered that the C.O. had been CAPT McNair, the X.O. had been CDR Kubbe (now deceased), and that there had been the following additional people working at NPC: Tom Atkins (detailed to the White House for the making of both still and motion picture photography; Sandra (Sandy) Spencer, whom she remembered as an E-6 (First Class Petty Officer) “top performer” who had been the senior enlisted technician working in the Still Photo Lab on White House photography; J.J. Jamroga (sp?), a former LDO LT (O-3); and a Chief Petty Officer involved in photography whose name she could not remember who, in spite of being a high school dropout, had obtained both a Baccalaureate Degree and a Master’s Degree while in the Navy; and Vince Madonia, an LDO whose name (but not responsibilities) she remembered when asked. She did not remember anyone named Nolan or Knowlin (phonetic).

She was inspecting a Barracks in Arlington on Friday, November 22, 1963, when she heard of the JFK Assassination; she then went back to NPC in Anacostia before going home on Friday. She does not recall any photography related to the assassination taking place on Friday before she went home, and she did not work on Saturday, Sunday or Monday (the day of the funeral). She does not specifically remember talk immediately after the assassination weekend about work done that weekend.
She vaguely remembers some photography work related to the assassination being done within the 2 or 3 week period following the assassination, but does not know what kind of photography it was, or what the subject matter was.


She has a strong, independent recollection of NPC personnel boxing up all photographic materials (“everything we-the film department-had”) related to the assassination on the orders of Robert Kennedy and sending them to the Smithsonian Museum for permanent storage sometime within 6 months or so after the assassination.

She cannot remember whether the orders from Robert Kennedy were in writing, or oral, but she was guite firmly of the impression in 1996 that the direction had come from Robert Kennedy. In order to test the strength of her Smithsonian recollection, I asked her whether she may have been confusing the Smithsonian with the National Archives or some other government body; she replied emphatically that she knew the difference between the National Archives and the Smithsonian, and reiterated that the boxed material went to the Smithsonian. She said she was certain of this because she, herself, was required to call an official at the Smithsonian to discuss the imminent transfer, and recalls that the individual to whom she spoke was as surprised by the selection of the Smithsonian as she was. Unfortunately, she does not remember the official’s name or job description, nor does she remember the exact date of this transfer.

When I asked her if she was ever aware of the Zapruder film being shown, or present in the building at NPC, and she said no.

She said that there was general awareness during lunchroom conversation at NPC shortly after the assassination that the autopsy doctors had been silenced, i.e. were forbidden to talk about the autopsy. She said she thought NPC probably did so some autopsy photography, but could not remember why she had this impression.

She had no knowledge of disposition of records, other than the material boxed up by the photographic department and sent to the Smithsonian. She had no records of her own relating to contemporaneous events in which she as involved at the time of the assassination. END

Taiwan's Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Taiwan's Truth and Reconciliation Commission 

Transitional Justice – Taiwan’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate White Terror Era – 30,000 believed killed in historically suppressed time known as the Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion – that is to begin on March 1.

All 228 Incident documents declassified

SEEKING TRUTH: The president announced the release of 4,617 documents, along with plans for a three-year probe into materials relating to the massacre and its aftermath resident Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) yesterday announced the declassification of all historical records relating to the 228 Incident, saying that the measure is critical to establishing the truth and expediting transitional justice.

“Pushing for transitional justice is one of the most important missions for Taiwan’s democracy, but we often have to discern the truth from the mists, with the most crucial yet complicated task being uncovering and collecting the relevant documents, which are scattered across various government agencies,” Tsai said on Facebook.

Tsai’s Facebook post came after the government released a press release touting similar moves, in which it said the speedy declassification of confidential files was aimed at meeting the public’s expectation of transitional justice.

Tsai said collecting such material is also fundamental to the government’s efforts to compile a report on transitional justice, “as many traces of history can be found in past government documents, which reveal the names of the people involved, related incidents or other key elements.”

Of the National Achieves Administration’s documents relating to the 228 Incident — which total 1.37 million pages — 4,617 documents were classified, but they have all now been declassified in their entirety, Tsai said.

“In addition, the related political files containing a total of 990,000 pages from 83 different government divisions were listed as pending transfer [to the administration]. The transfer process is expected to be completed by the end of June,” Tsai said.

The Cabinet plans to allocate additional funds to the National Archives Administration to facilitate a three-year-long investigation and collection of political materials relating to the 228 Incident and the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, which is to begin on March 1, Tsai said.

“That will provide the foundation for the writing of our investigative report on transitional justice,” she said.

The 228 Incident refers to a crackdown launched by the then-Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regime against civilian demonstrations following an incident in Taipei on Feb. 27, 1947. The event marked the beginning of the White Terror era, during which thousands of Taiwanese were arrested, imprisoned and executed. Historians estimate as many as 30,000 people were killed.

Presidential Office spokesman Alex Huang (黃重諺) said the latest development, goals and purposes of the government’s transitional justice commitment are expected to be the focal points of Tsai’s first speech on the 228 Incident as president.

“Pushing for transitional justice is a necessary process for any democratic nation undergoing a transition from authoritarian rule… It is the government’s responsibility to deal with illegitimate party assets, uncover the truth about human rights violations and problematic policies enacted during the rule of the authoritarian regime, and to restore people’s rights,” Huang said.

The transitional justice bill and the political archives bill have been listed as the Democratic Progressive Party caucus’ priorities in the current legislative session, Huang said.

After the passage of the bills into law, an investigative report on the White Terror era is to be published and a truth and reconciliation commission established, Huang said.

Coup at Dealey Plaza

                                                            Coup at Dealey Plaza 

Dr. Cyril Wecht, chairman of Citizens Against Political Assassinations (CAPA), has branded the assassination of President Kennedy as a coup d’état - the violent seizure of the powers of government. 

If so then instead of being the act of a deranged loner it was a deep level political conspiracy, an inside job involving all of the security agencies.

If so then the Modus Operandi - MO was that of a covert intelligence operation designed to shield and protect its actual sponsors.

Against that concealment, the suspects are limited to those who seized power, they utilized known and recognizable techniques, and left a paper trail, even though they have tried to conceal it.
The very concealment, destruction of evidence, withholding of records and acts of deception are clues that lead directly to the perpetrators. 

History shows that they used the covert operational techniques before 11/22/63 and continue to do so.
The intelligence network responsible for the Dealey Plaza operation continuess to function today, though manned by different people, they still hold the reins of power.

Once I recognized these facts I came to the regrettable conclusion that the assassination can only be solved by a counter-intelligence operation conducted by an intelligence network that is more powerful and coordinated than the one who killed the president and got away with it.

If a coup and not just a conspiracy, then all of the intelligence agencies of government were compromised, and as with the assassination of the North Korean in Malaysia, the murder of the president at Dealey Plaza set the clear and distinct message that even the president of the United State can be murdered on the street in public without retribution

If a coup and not the act of rogue agents or mafia goons, then all of the official investigations were penetrated, infiltrated, compromised and neutralized, including the FBI, Warren Commission, HSCA and ARRB.

If a coup by a powerful intelligence network then that network still functions today, and will take "active measures," in their words, against anyone or any opposition network that threatens to expose it. 

And they will do it as they dealt with WC, HSCA and ARRB by penetrating, compromising and neutralizing it.

As WC attorney Sam Stern explained it to the HSCA attorney, “at the outset we realized that there was no possible way to penetrate any official involvement in a cover-up or conspiracy if there was such complicity.” Stern stated that he and several of his Commission colleagues discussed what they regarded as “the fact that the agencies – the FBI and CIA – could formulate and maintain a cover-up which no one would ever penetrate. We of course did not believe that was so. And I still don’t. But we realized what we were dealing with, in the power of these agencies. Fortunately, we believed they were on our side.”

If that is the case then any attempt to identify and them by a responsible CI - counter-intelligence investigation will be met by their anticipated response of penetration, compromise and neutralize.
There are two basic types of investigations - Criminal and CI - Counter-intelligence, both having different intentions and purpose.

The purpose of a Criminal investigation by the police, crime scene investigators and official detectives is to identify and secure evidence in a crime that can be introduced in a court of law. 
Such evidence can be used to get a grand jury to indict a suspect in a crime and bring them to trial.
On the other hand the purpose of a CI - Counter-Intelligence investigation is to determine the truth or the true facts of a person, group, situation or event.

In regards to the Kennedy assassination the Dallas police, FBI,   New Orleans District Attorney and the first chairman of the HSCA conducted Criminal investigations, while the Warren Commission, the USMC, ONI, French Intelligence service, the Hunt Oil company and the HSCA under its second chairman conducted Counter-Intelligence investigations of the assassination. 

While the Criminal investigation intends to go to court, the CI investigation avoids court, keeps its information to itself, and sometimes uses extra legal means to obtain its information, including unauthorized wire taps, breaking and entering (black bag job), paid informants, blackmail, entrapment and even torture. 

There are some basic procedures used by all investigators, such as creating a chronology of key events, a name file of persons, subjects and a map of locations of addresses and events. Traditionally the name and subject files are kept on index cards, like the old library book filing system, and that is what the FBI and CIA used at their headquarters and field offices, though computers and the internet have made the digital system much more effective.

Among the legal techniques used by CI investigators is the compilation of all open source information on targeted individuals and subjects, much like the ABLE DANGER CI investigation identified the 9/11 terrorist cell before 9/11, and similar computerized matrix models based on all intelligence gathered. Such a system, applied to the Kennedy Assassination, should be easier to identify the intelligence networks involved.

Intelligence networks utilize compartmented cells, so if one part of the network is exposed the rest of it can still function and be kept intact. The mafia calls such cells “crews,” and each cell-crew is run by a case officer and from among each cell a team leader, much like the JMWAVE commando teams operated.

The Covert Operational policies, practices and procedures are utilized, and require compartmentation, a code name for the operation and each participant, and total control over the participants and the site of the operation, in this case Dealey Plaza, the Texas School Book Depository (TSBD), the Grassy Knoll and the motorcade itself. 

If what happened at Dealey Plaza was a coup then it utilized standard coup techniques - as outlined by Edward Lutwak in "Coup d etat - A Practical Handbook," and their policies, procedures and even deceptions provide us clues that lead us to them if you just connect the dots in the network grid. 

MTC - More to Come 

ACSI - Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAR)


There were approximately 17 federal intelligence agencies in 1963 and even more state and local (county, city) agencies, and many of them were at Dealey Plaza and inside the TSBD within minutes of the shooting, including the FBI, Secret Service, Army Intelligence, ONI, the Dallas Police Special Services Bureau, Dallas Sheriff, the Texas Rangers and even the Texas Fish Game & Wildlife. Each agent on the scene should have written a full and detailed report on where they were and what they did at the time of the crime.

While the intelligence agencies listed above are well known, one lesser known intelligence agency stands out as having its fingerprints all over the place – ACSI – the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the US Army Reserve.

Because the CIA cannot legally function within the United States, during the civil rights riots of the sixties, the US Army Reserves were called out to support overwhelmed local police departments, and their intelligence arm kept close track of the protesters.

As the US Army After Action Report (AAR) summary for Memphis at the time of the assassination of Martin Luther King clearly indicates, he was under very tight surveillance by the Army, who had an infiltrator and informant in the motel room with King and they watched him being murdered.
In Dallas it has been reported that most of the Dallas Police Department officers in the Special Services (Intelligence) bureau were active US Army Reserve officers, including Deputy Chief George Lumpkin, the driver of the Pilot Car in the motorcade that traveled a half mile ahead to look for and report on any possible trouble. They didn’t see any but pulled to the side of the road at the intersection of Houston and Elm to tell the traffic cop on the corner – and the Sixth Floor sniper 60 feet above him, that the motorcade was coming a few minutes away.

Because of his position in both the Dallas PD and the Army Reserves, Lumpkin arranged for his military superior Lt. Col. George L. Whitmeyer to ride in the back seat of the Pilot Car, the only person in the motorcade who is not listed on the Secret Service check list, and was not supposed to be in the motorcade without the Secret Service knowing or doing a basic background check.

If they had they would have learned that the US Army Reserve intelligence officers for Texas reported to Lt. Colonel William B. Rose, the commander of ACSI, who operated his intelligence network out of an office in the Pentagon.

Other US Army Reserve officers in the Dallas PD at the time include Capt. Pat Gannaway, who raided the home of a TSBD employee at midnight on the night of the assassination, believing that his leftist literature and activist background made him a possible co-conspirator of the main suspect when a communist conspiracy was still being actively pursued.

Yet another US Army Reserve officer in the Dallas PD Detective L. Don Stringfellow falsely reported that Oswald was a communist who had defected to Cuba in a cable sent to the US Air Force Strike Force at MacDill AFB in Florida that, as Peter Dale Scott notes was, “poised for a possible retaliatory attack against Cuba.”  

Documents released under the JFK Act indicate that ACSI was also the Army agency involved in MKULTRA mind control experiments, and in early November 1963, informed the rest of the military that an undercover informant in Cuba (falsely) reported that Castro was going to attack the US Navy base at Guantanamo, that was put on alert.

These ACSI associations could just be their basic intrusion into the situation of the day, and not an indicator of any sinister involvement except for the other extensions of their tentacles, including ACSI officer Col. Sam Kail debriefing the accused assassin’s good friend George deMohrenschildt before he traveled to Haiti, and “Our Man in Acapulco,” – Colonel Frank Maryan “Brandy” Brandstetter, the head of the Hilton Hotel in Havana where Castro stayed in the early days of his reign.

Brandy was from Dallas, and reported directly to General Rose at ACSI at the Pentagon. One of Brandy’s employees at the Havana Hilton, Manalo Ray, co-founded an anti-Castro Cuban group JURE with the father of Sylvia Odio, who Oswald and two Cubans visited after Oswald left New Orleans.

Then there’s the mysterious US Army Reserve Colonel who visited Marina and Ruth Paine at their Irving home a week before the assassination, checking out the scene and reporting back to General Rose on what the situation there was.
Jack A. Crichton is the clincher though. Col. Crichton was a 488th Military Intelligence Detachment US Army Reserve intelligence officer who ran the Dallas Emergency Civil Defense Communications center in an underground bunker below the Dallas Health and Science Museum at the Dallas State Fairgrounds, where the Dallas PD Special Services Bureau (Lumpkin, Stringfellow, Gannaway) also had their offices – away from the regular police department at Dallas City Hall.

At his emergency center Crichton could monitor the police and motorcade (Secret Service) and White House Communications Agency (WHCA- AF1) radio transmissions, and communicate with them. And it was Crichton who, after the arrest of Oswald, arranged for the Russian language translation of Marina Oswald’s original interrogation, which led to the false reports to the military issued by Stringfellow.

In any case, of the many intelligence agencies present in the motorcade and at Dealey Plaza, the ACSI is the one that had the most feet on the ground gathering intelligence and passing it all along to one man – General Rose, back at his office in the Pentagon.


Monday, February 27, 2017


NARA Record Number: 1993.08.05.14:42:12:750028


21 March 1975


On 19 March, Dino A. Brugioni, Chief, Western Geographic Division, informed me that three personnel assigned to his division had told him that while serving at JMWAVE, Miami, Florida or in the  Imagery Analysis Service in Washington during the 1960’s, they had heard references to assassination plans on Fidel Castro.

On 20 March, I met with the following NPIC personnel who had either served in the Imagery Analysis Service or at JMWAVE on Cuban related problems: Gordon Duvall, Earl Shoemaker, Tom Helmke, Bruce Barrett, Reyes Ponce, George Arthur, Eugene Lydon, and William Hanlon. The purpose of this meeting was to ascertain whether their participation was related to case officer generated materials or bona fide operations.

There appeared to be two plans involving Fidel Castro and an incident that may have been related to Raul Castro.

The plans involving Fidel, to the knowledge of our people, were: 

A folder, stored in the Photo interpretation area at JMWAVE contained materials relating to a plan to assassinate Castro in the Bay of Pigs resort area where he maintained a yacht and was known to vacation. The plan, possibly with the codeword PATHFINDER, apparently had been disapproved and was not under active consideration at the time. Our people did not participate actively in the plan in any regard. 

While assigned to the Imagery Analysis Service, a number of our photo interpreters supported Carl Jenkins of the DD/P concerning a plan to assassinate Castro at the DuPont Varadero Beach Estate, east of Havana. Castro was known to frequent the estate and the plan was to use a high-powered rifle in the attempt. The photo interpretation support was restricted to providing annotated photographs and line drawings of the estate. To our knowledge, this plan also was never implemented. 

     (Contains "Photo interpretation area" without "section" crossed out.)
     Not known to D/O:


     HSCA request:

     Reply (negative):

Thursday, February 23, 2017

HSCA Sam Stern Interview - Smoking Doc.#2



Name   Samuel Stern
Date 8/22/78 
Address Wilmer, Cutler, & Pickering
Place his law office DC

"I am less certain now that at the time we wrote the Report. Less certain that Oswald acted alone. Actually, I wasn't all that certain at the time. I thought the best evidence supported the final findings, and I agreed with them, but I wasn't tremendously firm or immovable in that, in my own mind. I just thought there were a lot of straws left.....I have become more skeptical about the Warren Commission findings and everything else that is a part of official life, I suppose. Everything has become discredited over the years since 1963. You don’t really believe in things the way you did back then"

Former Warren Commission counsel Sam Stern was interviewed in his Washington Law office on Auguest 22, 1978. Mr. Stern stated that his duties on the Commission involved handling the investigation into Lee Oswald’s background, specifically, the intelligence agencies awareness of Oswald prior to the assassination. Secondly, Stern stated that he had been in charge of evaluating “the efficacy of Presidential protection,” as well as preparing a history of American political assassinations.

Mr. Stern stated that “at the outset we realized that there was no possible way to penetrate any official involvement in a cover-up or conspiracy if there was such complicity.” Stern stated that he and several of his Commission colleagues discussed what they regarded as “the fact that the agencies – the FBI and CIA – could formulate and maintain a cover-up which no one would ever penetrate. We of course did not believe that was so. And I still don’t. But we realized what we were dealing with, in the power of these agencies. Fortunately, we believed they were on our side.”

Mr. Stern stated that on one occasion he believed that the Commission was influenced in its investigation by what he regarded as “some type of pressure or fear of the FBI.” Stern stated that this came about when he prepared a detailed letter to be sent to the FBI setting forth detailed questions about their past investigation and contacts with Lee Oswald. Stern stated that Earl Warren told him that the letter was too demanding and that it would cause problems vis a vis the Commission’s relationship with Hoover. Stern stated that upon being told that the letter was “unacceptable” by Warren, he (Stern) met with John McCloy and explained the situation to him, hoping to gain his support. While McCloy did express agreement with Stern that the letter was necessary, Stern was once again told by Warren that “the letter went further than was desirable.” Stern thereupon sent a less detailed request.

In connection with this episode, Stern stated that “one of my problems, a real difficulty, was having such limited contact with the Members of the Commission. It was all done through Rankin. And you never really knew if your viewpoint or arguments or whatever were being communicated as strongly as you felt was necessary. We didn’t have direct access.”

Stern stated that his evaluation of the Secret Service showed that “the Secret Service was not a modern, demonstrably reliable, body at that time. It was, plain and simply, primitive. Both in operations and structure.” Stern stated however that he could see (and still does) that “with the Secret Service you quickly get into your basic problems of civil liberties. How many people or potential threats are you going to put on your watch list? How many of these people do you round up when the President comes to that state? How do you determine who’s on the list, and what are the final criteria?” Stern stated that “very quickly you can get into a very unmanageable list” of people who should be watched.

Speaking of the friction he observed between the FBI and SS during his work on the Commission, Stern stated that “the friction was expressed more by the Secret Service than by the FBI.”

Stern stated that he and various other staffers had not had a very high regard for James Malley, the FBI’s liaison with the Commission. “We knew he was there hustling us. That was his job. He was the big jovial insurance salesman, without any great intelligence.”

Speaking of the FBI in general, Stern stated that “I had a very limited regard for their ability. They had almost a crazy impotent system of headquarters control. The Oswald case would shift to new offices when Oswald traveled. There would then be lapses in the coverage of him. This was just a very bad system of internal management. I thought the level of competence in headquarters was very poor.” Stern stated that on the other hand he regarded the CIA as “very professional compared with the Bureau. They had great technology. Compared with the CIA, the FBI was like a bunch of clerks on roller skates.”

Stern stated that he had been told of FBI Agent Hosty’s allegedly threatening note received from Lee Harvey Oswald shortly before the assassination, he “would have regarded it as greater identification of the possibility of potential danger in Oswald – of violence.” Stern stated that if the staff of the Commission had discovered that the Hosty note had existed and had been destroyed by the FBI in Dallas, that “if we had found out that happened, we would have gone to a full Commission meeting immediately, and would have made the big decision regarding any future relationship between the Commission and the FBI. It just would have gone to the heart of the whole relationship and the Bureau’s motivation. The destruction of that note would have resulted in the ultimate brouhaha.”

Stern stated that had the Commission learned of the CIA-Mafia conspiracies to assassinate Fidel Castro, “we would have gone much more into Cuba, the CIA, and the Mafia. We would have had a whole host of new avenues calling for investigation. And we would have obviously had to develop some new sources of information – other than the agency.”

Stern stated that he developed close relationships with other staff members in that they usually had at least two meals together, shared small cramped offices, and were away from their families. He stated that some senior counsel did not work as much as the juniors, and noted that “William Coleman, in particular wasn’t around that much.” Stern stated that in conducting the investigation and writing the Report “I didn’t feel rushed, though others did. And I never felt any outside pressure during that period.”

Stern stated that he “felt that I knew the Oswald personality. I was comfortable with him acting alone. Oswald was incompatible with society – I think he was really striking down the king in his own mind. I also felt comfortable with the assumption that no foreign power would utilized Oswald; that any group would readily realize that Oswald was ineffective and unreliable, especially for something like that.”

Speaking of the Dallas Police Department, Stern stated that “I had no problem believing the Dallas Police would let someone down in the basement. Not as a conspiracy, but as an incompetent operation in guarding Oswald. I had a very low opinion of them. They turned in a horrible performance with the actual motorcade, and then things like no tapes of Oswald’s interrogation, and on and on.”

Stern stated that “if there was a conspiracy, that would mean that Oswald was a consummate actor. I felt that one of the most significant signs that there was in fact no conspiracy was the absence of any early effort to take him out. Of other conspirators trying to kill him before he could really be interrogated at length.”

Stern briefly mentioned that he had been surprised, along with other Commission staffers, to learn that “Marina Oswald was sleeping with some guy within weeks of the assassination, when we were questioning her.”

When shown the CIA memorandum of November 1963 in which a CIA officer wrote that the Agency had once considered using Oswald for intelligence purposes, Stern stated that “I have never seen this. I was never given this, and we had asked for and were supposed to be given anything of relevance like this.” In reading the memo, Stern stated that “that would have definitely been relevant. If they (the CIA) were taking him that seriously, then you might think that others could or did also. If we found that had been withheld, that would have been a major explosion also.”

When shown a copy of the 1960-61 memos regarding “the possibility of an Oswald imposter,” Stern stated that he had never seen those three memos either, despite the fact that “they would have certainly been relevant. I was supposed to have been given all relevant Bureau information and files on Oswald in the pre-assassination period. They said I had everything.”

Speaking of the possibility of various Members of the Commission leaking information to the agencies or other people, Stern stated that “I always assumed Dulles was doing that – to the CIA. But I had no hard information.” Stern stated that the FBI had a “pretty good idea” of what the Commission was doing “because Malley was there to ingratiate himself as much as possible with each of us.”

Stern stated that among his closest colleagues on the staff, they were convinced that Albert Jenner was frequently leaking material to the press. Stern stated that at one point Jenner was more or less "caught" leaking something, and made a "partial confession." Stern stated that he and some of his colleagues made up a song about Jenner leaking information to the press when he would have lunh with various reporters. Stern stated that he can remember that it started out as follows: "Down at the tables of Hogate's where old Jenner dwells." 

Stern stated that he had no knowledge that the FBI prepared secret dossiers on the members of the Commission, and stated that "I'll have to put in an FOI request for mine and see what they have on me." 

Stern stated that he had been seriously misquoted by Edward Epstein in his book, "Inquest", and that he had complained to Epstein's editor that Epstein had misrepresented his credentials during the preparation of the book." 

In response to the question as to how he now feels about the conclusions of the Warren Commission, Stern stated, "I am less certain now that at the time we wrote the Report. Less certain that Oswald acted alone. Actually, I wasn't all that certain at the time. I thought the best evidence supported the final findings, and I agreed with them, but I wasn't tremendously firm or immovable in that, in muy own mind. I just thought there were a lot of straws left." 

Stern stated that "I accepted the forensics, the rifle, the bullets, Tippit, and everything, but I hadn't been involved in the hard physical evidence at all." Stern also stated that he would have liked to see "a new head of the Secret Service when the Report came out. I just didn't think Rowley was up to the job at all." Stern further noted that "after the assassination, the coffers really opened up for the Secret Service and they finally got the money they wanted." 

Stern concluded by stating that he has become “more skeptical about the Warren Commission findings and everything else that is a part of official life, I suppose. Everything has become discredited over the years since 1963. You don’t really believe in things the way you did back then. You seen the Vice President of the United States taking cash bribes in his office and on and on. You couldn’t help but rely on government officials more than you do now.”


Mr. Stern studied economics at the University of Pennsylvania and law at Harvard Law School, where he was an officer of the Law Review.  He was a law clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Samuel Stern is a recognized expert in the reform of legal infrastructure in countries moving to open-market economies.  He has extensive experience advising governments and private sector entities in respect of legal infrastructure for oil and gas, power, mining, and water.  Mr. Stern has served as counsel or advisor to the governments of over 40 countries; and has been a senior legal participant in surveys of the foreign investment climate in Mexico and Venezuela; and of the role of law in the development process in South Korea; and advised a number of countries on the development of their natural resource laws.  Mr. Stern has extensive experience in privatization, particularly of utilities and power, including in China, the Philippines, India, Dominican Republic, Malaysia, and Jamaica. He has lectured at conferences around the world and published in professional journals on government regulation, foreign investment/finance, project finance and trade and risk management.  Mr. Stern serves as an arbitrator, advocate, or expert in international commercial arbitrations.  Before joining the firm, Mr. Stern was a senior partner (and member of the management committee of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and of Dickstein Shapiro, and counsel to Rogers & Wells (now Clifford Chance US LLP). He served as a Visiting Professor from Practice at Harvard Law School, an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown Law Center, lecturer at Yale, Cambridge, and Sussex Universities, and a board member of the International Law institute. Mr. Stern is a member of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia.

Smoking Doc. #3 - The Casasin Memo Unredacted

                                                                                                                       25 November 1963
SUBJECT:  Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald  


-          1. It makes little difference now, but REDWOOD had at one time an OI interest in Oswald. As soon as I heard Oswald’s name, I recalled that as Chief of the 6 Branch I had discussed - - sometime in Summer 1960 – with the then Chief and Deputy Chief of the 6 Research Section the laying on of interview(s) through KUJUMP or other suitable channels. At the moment I don’t recall if this was discussed while Oswald and his family were en route to our country or if it was after their arrival.

22. I remember that Oswald’s unusual behavior in the USSR had struck me from the moment I had read the first ODACID dispatch on him, and I told my subordinates something amounting to “Don’t push too hard to get the information we need, because this individual looks odd.” We were particularly interested in the OI Oswald might provide on the Minsk factory in which he had been employed, on certain sections of the city itself, and of course we sought the usual BI that might help develop target personality dossiers.

-          3. I was phasing into my LPOVER cover assignment, and out of KUDOVE, at the time. Thus, I would have left our country shortly after Oswald’s arrival. I do not know what action developed thereafter.

Thomas B. Casasin


4. As an afterthought, I recall also that at the time I was becoming increasingly interested in watching develop a pattern that we had discovered in the course of our bio and research work in -6: the number of Soviet women marrying foreigners, being permitted to leave the USSR, then eventually divorcing their spouses and settling down abroad without returning “home”. The AEOCEAN 3 case was among the first of these, and we eventually turned up something like two dozen similar cases. We established links between some of these women and the KGB. KUDESK became interested in the developing trend we had come across. It was partly out of curiosity to learn if Oswald’s wife would actually accompany him to our country, partly out of interest in Oswald’s own experience in the USSR, that we showed operational intelligence interest in the Harvey story.


REDWOOD – Action indicator for the Soviet/Eastern Division of CIA 

OI - Operational Intelligence 

6 Branch – CIA Soviet Section 

6 Research Section - Soviet "Realities" Support Branch 

KUJUMP – KU - Divisions of the CIA iteslf 

ODACID dispatch –

LPOVER - A business cover - Over is Casasin's assignment in Paris (Newman p. 309) Conover Nast Publications. 

KUDOVE - Clandestine Services 

AEOCEAN 3 - AE - Legal travelers program to USSR - AE/OCEAN 3 is a CIA agent working out of SR10 Philip Nelson - redefectors attached to Russian women. 

KGB - Soviet Intelligence Service 


Operational Intelligence Interest -

Harvey Story - ?

Redacted Version : showDoc.html

Unredacted : showDoc.html

Mary Ferrell: CIA Cryptonyms

[Many thanks to Rex Bradford at Maryferrell.org for posting these records, and to John Newman, Bill Siimpich and Malcolm Blunt for helping to decode them.]