SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
![stern[1]](http://www.hillsstern.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/stern1-260x270.jpg)
Name Samuel Stern
Date 8/22/78
Address Wilmer, Cutler, & Pickering
Place his law office DC
Interview:
"I am less certain now that at the time we wrote the Report. Less certain
that Oswald acted alone. Actually, I wasn't all that certain at the time. I
thought the best evidence supported the final findings, and I agreed with them,
but I wasn't tremendously firm or immovable in that, in my own mind. I just
thought there were a lot of straws left.....I have become more skeptical about the Warren Commission findings and everything
else that is a part of official life, I suppose. Everything has become
discredited over the years since 1963. You don’t really believe in things the
way you did back then"
Former Warren Commission counsel Sam
Stern was interviewed in his Washington Law office on Auguest 22, 1978. Mr.
Stern stated that his duties on the Commission involved handling the investigation
into Lee Oswald’s background, specifically, the intelligence agencies awareness
of Oswald prior to the assassination. Secondly, Stern stated that he had been
in charge of evaluating “the efficacy of Presidential protection,” as well as
preparing a history of American political assassinations.
Mr. Stern stated that “at the outset
we realized that there was no possible way to penetrate any official involvement
in a cover-up or conspiracy if there was such complicity.” Stern stated that he
and several of his Commission colleagues discussed what they regarded as “the
fact that the agencies – the FBI and CIA – could formulate and maintain a
cover-up which no one would ever penetrate. We of course did not believe that
was so. And I still don’t. But we realized what we were dealing with, in the
power of these agencies. Fortunately, we believed they were on our side.”
Mr. Stern stated that on one occasion
he believed that the Commission was influenced in its investigation by what he
regarded as “some type of pressure or fear of the FBI.” Stern stated that this
came about when he prepared a detailed letter to be sent to the FBI setting
forth detailed questions about their past investigation and contacts with Lee
Oswald. Stern stated that Earl Warren told him that the letter was too demanding
and that it would cause problems vis a vis the Commission’s relationship with
Hoover. Stern stated that upon being told that the letter was “unacceptable” by
Warren, he (Stern) met with John McCloy and explained the situation to him,
hoping to gain his support. While McCloy did express agreement with Stern that
the letter was necessary, Stern was once again told by Warren that “the letter
went further than was desirable.” Stern thereupon sent a less detailed request.
In connection with this episode,
Stern stated that “one of my problems, a real difficulty, was having such
limited contact with the Members of the Commission. It was all done through
Rankin. And you never really knew if your viewpoint or arguments or whatever
were being communicated as strongly as you felt was necessary. We didn’t have
direct access.”
Stern stated that his evaluation of
the Secret Service showed that “the Secret Service was not a modern,
demonstrably reliable, body at that time. It was, plain and simply, primitive.
Both in operations and structure.” Stern stated however that he could see (and
still does) that “with the Secret Service you quickly get into your basic problems
of civil liberties. How many people or potential threats are you going to put
on your watch list? How many of these people do you round up when the President
comes to that state? How do you determine who’s on the list, and what are the
final criteria?” Stern stated that “very quickly you can get into a very
unmanageable list” of people who should be watched.
Speaking of the friction he observed
between the FBI and SS during his work on the Commission, Stern stated that “the
friction was expressed more by the Secret Service than by the FBI.”
Stern stated that he and various other
staffers had not had a very high regard for James Malley, the FBI’s liaison
with the Commission. “We knew he was there hustling us. That was his job. He
was the big jovial insurance salesman, without any great intelligence.”
Speaking of the FBI in general,
Stern stated that “I had a very limited regard for their ability. They had
almost a crazy impotent system of headquarters control. The Oswald case would
shift to new offices when Oswald traveled. There would then be lapses in the
coverage of him. This was just a very bad system of internal management. I thought
the level of competence in headquarters was very poor.” Stern stated that on
the other hand he regarded the CIA as “very professional compared with the
Bureau. They had great technology. Compared with the CIA, the FBI was like a
bunch of clerks on roller skates.”
Stern stated that he had been told
of FBI Agent Hosty’s allegedly threatening note received from Lee Harvey Oswald
shortly before the assassination, he “would have regarded it as greater
identification of the possibility of potential danger in Oswald – of violence.”
Stern stated that if the staff of the Commission had discovered that the Hosty
note had existed and had been destroyed by the FBI in Dallas, that “if we had
found out that happened, we would have gone to a full Commission meeting
immediately, and would have made the big decision regarding any future
relationship between the Commission and the FBI. It just would have gone to the
heart of the whole relationship and the Bureau’s motivation. The destruction of
that note would have resulted in the ultimate brouhaha.”
Stern stated that had the Commission
learned of the CIA-Mafia conspiracies to assassinate Fidel Castro, “we would
have gone much more into Cuba, the CIA, and the Mafia. We would have had a
whole host of new avenues calling for investigation. And we would have
obviously had to develop some new sources of information – other than the agency.”
Stern stated that he developed close
relationships with other staff members in that they usually had at least two
meals together, shared small cramped offices, and were away from their
families. He stated that some senior counsel did not work as much as the
juniors, and noted that “William Coleman, in particular wasn’t around that
much.” Stern stated that in conducting the investigation and writing the Report
“I didn’t feel rushed, though others did. And I never felt any outside pressure
during that period.”
Stern stated that he “felt that I
knew the Oswald personality. I was comfortable with him acting alone. Oswald
was incompatible with society – I think he was really striking down the king in
his own mind. I also felt comfortable with the assumption that no foreign power
would utilized Oswald; that any group would readily realize that Oswald was
ineffective and unreliable, especially for something like that.”
Speaking of the Dallas Police
Department, Stern stated that “I had no problem believing the Dallas Police
would let someone down in the basement. Not as a conspiracy, but as an
incompetent operation in guarding Oswald. I had a very low opinion of them.
They turned in a horrible performance with the actual motorcade, and then
things like no tapes of Oswald’s interrogation, and on and on.”
Stern stated that “if there was a
conspiracy, that would mean that Oswald was a consummate actor. I felt that one
of the most significant signs that there was in fact no conspiracy was the
absence of any early effort to take him out. Of other conspirators trying to
kill him before he could really be interrogated at length.”
Stern briefly mentioned that he had
been surprised, along with other Commission staffers, to learn that “Marina
Oswald was sleeping with some guy within weeks of the assassination, when we
were questioning her.”
When shown the CIA memorandum of
November 1963 in which a CIA officer wrote that the Agency had once considered
using Oswald for intelligence purposes, Stern stated that “I have never seen
this. I was never given this, and we had asked for and were supposed to be
given anything of relevance like this.” In reading the memo, Stern stated that “that
would have definitely been relevant. If they (the CIA) were taking him that
seriously, then you might think that others could or did also. If we found that
had been withheld, that would have been a major explosion also.”
When shown a copy of the 1960-61
memos regarding “the possibility of an Oswald imposter,” Stern stated that he
had never seen those three memos either, despite the fact that “they would have
certainly been relevant. I was supposed to have been given all relevant Bureau
information and files on Oswald in the pre-assassination period. They said I
had everything.”
Speaking of the possibility of
various Members of the Commission leaking information to the agencies or other
people, Stern stated that “I always assumed Dulles was doing that – to the CIA.
But I had no hard information.” Stern stated that the FBI had a “pretty good
idea” of what the Commission was doing “because Malley was there to ingratiate
himself as much as possible with each of us.”
Stern stated that among his closest colleagues on the staff, they were convinced that Albert Jenner was frequently leaking material to the press. Stern stated that at one point Jenner was more or less "caught" leaking something, and made a "partial confession." Stern stated that he and some of his colleagues made up a song about Jenner leaking information to the press when he would have lunh with various reporters. Stern stated that he can remember that it started out as follows: "Down at the tables of Hogate's where old Jenner dwells."
Stern stated that he had no knowledge that the FBI prepared secret dossiers on the members of the Commission, and stated that "I'll have to put in an FOI request for mine and see what they have on me."
Stern stated that he had been seriously misquoted by Edward Epstein in his book, "Inquest", and that he had complained to Epstein's editor that Epstein had misrepresented his credentials during the preparation of the book."
In response to the question as to how he now feels about the conclusions of the Warren Commission, Stern stated, "I am less certain now that at the time we wrote the Report. Less certain that Oswald acted alone. Actually, I wasn't all that certain at the time. I thought the best evidence supported the final findings, and I agreed with them, but I wasn't tremendously firm or immovable in that, in muy own mind. I just thought there were a lot of straws left."
Stern stated that "I accepted the forensics, the rifle, the bullets, Tippit, and everything, but I hadn't been involved in the hard physical evidence at all." Stern also stated that he would have liked to see "a new head of the Secret Service when the Report came out. I just didn't think Rowley was up to the job at all." Stern further noted that "after the assassination, the coffers really opened up for the Secret Service and they finally got the money they wanted."
Stern concluded by stating that he
has become “more skeptical about the Warren Commission findings and everything
else that is a part of official life, I suppose. Everything has become
discredited over the years since 1963. You don’t really believe in things the
way you did back then. You seen the Vice President of the United States taking
cash bribes in his office and on and on. You couldn’t help but rely on government
officials more than you do now.”
END DOC
Mr. Stern studied economics at the
University of Pennsylvania and law at Harvard Law School, where he was an
officer of the Law Review. He was a law clerk to Chief Justice Earl
Warren.
Samuel Stern is a recognized expert
in the reform of legal infrastructure in countries moving to open-market
economies. He has extensive experience advising governments and
private sector entities in respect of legal infrastructure for oil and gas,
power, mining, and water. Mr. Stern has served as counsel or advisor
to the governments of over 40 countries; and has been a senior legal
participant in surveys of the foreign investment climate in Mexico and
Venezuela; and of the role of law in the development process in South Korea;
and advised a number of countries on the development of their natural resource
laws. Mr. Stern has extensive experience in privatization,
particularly of utilities and power, including in China, the Philippines,
India, Dominican Republic, Malaysia, and Jamaica. He has lectured at
conferences around the world and published in professional journals on
government regulation, foreign investment/finance, project finance and trade
and risk management. Mr. Stern serves as an arbitrator, advocate, or
expert in international commercial arbitrations. Before joining the
firm, Mr. Stern was a senior partner (and member of the management committee of
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering and of Dickstein Shapiro, and counsel to Rogers
& Wells (now Clifford Chance US LLP). He served as a Visiting Professor
from Practice at Harvard Law School, an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown Law
Center, lecturer at Yale, Cambridge, and Sussex Universities, and a board
member of the International Law institute. Mr. Stern is a member of the Bar
Association of the District of Columbia.
