Nestor D. Sanchez, 83; CIA official led Latin
American division
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Nestor D. Sanchez, 83, a retired CIA officer and
Defense Department official whose early intelligence career involved
clandestine operations in Latin America, died of congestive heart failure Jan.
18 at his home in Buckeystown, Md.
Mr. Sanchez retired from the CIA in 1981 after three
decades of service. Most of his time at the agency involved top-secret covert
actions, including bloody 1954 coups in Guatemala and a 1960s plot to
assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Mr. Sanchez was also closely connected
to former Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, a onetime CIA paid informant.
In his later career, Mr. Sanchez was a deputy
assistant secretary of defense for Latin American affairs during the Reagan
administration. He specialized in providing Central American countries with
U.S. military aid and funding.
At the time of his retirement, Mr. Sanchez was said
by federal investigators to have been linked to illegal U.S. arms deals to the
so-called "contras," anti-Sandinista rebels who were fighting the
left-wing government in Nicaragua.
In the ensuing scandal, which came to be known as
the Iran-Contra affair, Mr. Sanchez said that he was aware of the arms
shipments but that he didn't know their origin. He was never accused of wrongdoing.
Mr. Sanchez joined the CIA in 1952. His first
assignment for the agency was as a field intelligence officer during the Korean
War, where he recruited defectors to infiltrate North Korea.
A New Mexico native and fluent Spanish speaker, Mr.
Sanchez was sent to Central America to help engineer the 1954 coup against the
left-leaning Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman.
Beginning in the early 1960s, Mr. Sanchez sharpened
his focus on CIA operations in Cuba.
"It is obvious that the Soviets and Cubans are
attempting to spread the malaise of Marxism to other countries, especially in
Latin America," Mr. Sanchez once said, defending U.S. actions against the
small tropical country. "They would impose dictatorships, economic decline
and human suffering on the people."
Mr. Sanchez worked as the case officer in charge of
Rolando Cubela, a Cuban CIA asset. Cubela was an officer in the Cuban army who
had become disenchanted with Castro's leadership. At one point, Cubela asked
Mr. Sanchez to provide him with a high-powered rifle equipped with a silencer
and zooming scope.
Instead, on Nov. 22, 1963, Mr. Sanchez gave Cubela a
hypodermic syringe filled with poison and camouflaged as a writing pen. But the
assassination attempt never took place, and CIA officials later suspected that
Cubela was a double agent.
Mr. Sanchez later worked in Venezuela, Guatemala,
Colombia and Spain before retiring from the CIA as chief of the Latin American
division.
From 1981 to 1987, Mr. Sanchez served as a senior
official in the Department of Defense. An ardent anti-communist, he advocated
for millions of dollars in Defense funding to aid the development of Latin
American armies, especially in El Salvador.
"We understand the concern of those who
remember the specter of Vietnam that the war in El Salvador is being
'Americanized,' " Mr. Sanchez said in 1983. "But Vietnam was 10,000
miles away. El Salvador is a contiguous region right at our doorstep. San
Salvador is closer to Washington, D.C., than is San Francisco."
Nestor Daniel Sanchez was born July 28, 1927, in
Magdalena, N.M. He grew up on a cattle ranch.
He was 1950 graduate of the New Mexico Military
Institute and later received a master's degree in geopolitics from Georgetown
University.
From 1955 to 1959, Mr. Sanchez was posted to Morocco
under State Department cover, where he oversaw intelligence gathering
operations from a small base in Casablanca. During his time there, Mr. Sanchez
married Joan Russell, a fellow CIA employee working undercover in Casablanca.
She died in 2008.
Survivors include four sons, John Sanchez of
Crofton, Patrick Sanchez of Philadelphia, Tom Sanchez of Williamsburg and James
Sanchez of McLean; two sisters; seven grandchildren; and one great-grandson.
shapirot@washpost.com
POINT MAN SPEAKS OUT ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA
May 2, 1983, Page 00016The New York Times Archives
Nestor D. Sanchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Inter-American Affairs, comes as close as anyone can to being the
soul of the Reagan Administration's policy toward Central America.
Mr. Sanches, a descendant of conquistadors who
arrived in this hemisphere 400 years ago, Mr. Sanchez was born in New Mexico,
is fluent in Spanish and lived in Latin America for eight years while working
for the Central Intelligence Agency.
That background makes him more knowledgeable about
Central America than most of his colleagues. It also makes his interest in the
area more than academic. Mr. Sanchez is fervent about defeating the spread of
Communism that he says is threatening to engulf the region.
''If we didn't nickel-and-dime we could win this
struggle,'' Mr. Sanchez insisted. ''We could stop the Communist advance. Time
is on their side. We can't fight a prolonged war. They can. If we feel we can
live with Marxist-Communist countries in the area, that's fine. But I don't
think we can. It would be a very dangerous thing.'' A Central Strategic Role
Mr. Sanchez is one of half a dozen key Government
officials who are responsible for making and carrying out United States policy
toward Central America. Others, like Thomas O. Enders, the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs, and William J. Casey, the Director of
Central Intelligence, have received more attention.
But Mr. Sanchez, as the Pentagon's point man on
Central America, has played a central role in devising the Administration's
strategy and is directly responsible for one of its key elements, providing
American military assistance to pro-American governments. Unlike the military
officers who have been silent on the issue, he believes the time has come to
speak out in behalf of American intervention.
These days he is campaigning to persuade Congress to
approve the Administration's request for $110 million in emergency military aid
to El Salvador. So far Congressional reaction hasn't been favorable, and the
doubts on Capitol Hill clearly trouble Mr. Sanchez. ''We have to give the
Salvadorans the means of protecting themselves,'' he said in a recent interview.
''Training is the basic element that the Salvadoran military lacks. If Congress
approves our aid request, and gives us a similar amount next year, we could
train most of their army.'' 'Paternalistic Attitude' Cited
Voluble and volatile, Mr. Sanchez puffed on a large
cigar as he spoke and gesticulated with his glasses for emphasis. Describing
himself as an optimist, he said he wasn't angered by Congressional resistance,
just disappointed. ''The American public and Congress are interested in Latin America
only when there is a crisis,'' he said. ''We have a basically paternalistic
attitude, plus a double standard. We're far more demanding of our friends in
Latin America than anywhere else.''
Critics of the Administration's policy in Central
America see Mr. Sanchez as a quintessential cold warrior, a man imbued with
anti-Communism during 30 years of service in the C.I.A. who artificially
imposes an East-West conflict on regional and local problems.
While denying that his views were simplistic, Mr.
Sanchez makes no effort to disguise his concern about Soviet objectives. ''It
is obvious that the Soviets and Cubans are attempting to spread the malaise of
Marxism to other countries, especially in Latin America.'' he told the National
Security Industrial Association last month. ''They would impose dictatorships,
economic decline and human suffering on the people.'' Cool to Covert Activities
Despite his years in the C.I.A. - he served as chief
of station in Venezuela, Colombia and Guatemala - Mr. Sanchez does not appear
to be an enthusiastic advocate of United States covert intelligence operations
in Central America. In fact, his coolness toward an increase in covert
activities is cited by intelligence officials as one reason for his switch from
the C.I.A. to the Defense Department two years ago.
''When Bill Casey and his aides started increasing
covert operations, Nestor wasn't happy,'' an intelligence official recalled.
''He's not cut out for that kind of stuff.''
Mr. Sanchez approaches the subject with caution.
''If you use covert activities,'' he said, ''and I'm not saying we are, you
have to have a consensus among policymakers and Congress that they are
necessary and the operations have to be successful. In theory, I'm not against
covert operations. So long as they are used judiciously, they are consistent
with overt policy and they are very carefully conducted.'' A Grandfather Named
Higgins
Other Pentagon officials, however, said that Mr.
Sanchez's attitude about covert operations did not stop him from approving the
Defense Department's involvement in many of the intelligence agency's secret
activities in Central America, including the training and arming of
anti-Government forces in Nicaragua.
Mr. Sanchez was born 57 years ago to a cattle
rancher's family in Magdalena, N.M., a small town about 100 miles southwest of
Albuquerque. The family, he said, can be traced to the conquistadors, although
he admitted with a grin that the bloodline was broken by his great grandfather,
an Irishman named Patrick Higgins.
Mr. Sanchez did his undergraduate work at the New
Mexico Military Institute and received a master's degree in geopolitics from
Georgetown University. He also did graduate work at the National War College
where he wrote a thesis on the uses of terrorism as a revolutionary tactic.
Whenever public criticism of the Administration's
policy mounts, Mr. Sanchez finds solace in his origins. ''I know the leaders
and the people in Latin America,'' he said. ''Sometimes they get frustrated by
the way the United States acts and they tend to lose faith. But in the end,
they say you have to lead us.''
The
Darkest Day
By Peter Kornbluh
|From Liev Schreiber, November/December 2013
Fifty years later, unsubstantiated conspiracy
theories still swirl around the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
On the morning of November 22, 1963, a CIA operative
named Nestor Sanchez arrived in Paris carrying a Paper Mate pen that contained
a hidden hypodermic needle—a Cold War weapon specifically created by the
agency’s Technical Services Division to kill Fidel Castro. At a meeting in an
undisclosed location later that day, Sanchez provided the converted pen to a
Cuban military officer—codenamed “AMLASH”—who was the CIA’s highest level asset
in Cuba. The two discussed how to fill it with a deadly poison called
“Blackleaf 40.”
But AMLASH considered trying to prick Castro with a
rigged pen to be a suicide mission; instead he requested a high-powered,
long-range, sniper rifle. As the two left their meeting, they received word
that John F. Kennedy had been assassinated in Dallas. “It is very likely,” a
top secret CIA history on plots to kill Castro later emphasized, “that at the
very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban
agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device to use against Castro.”
On that same day and at that very same moment, some
5,000 miles away in Cuba Fidel Castro was meeting with an emissary sent by
President Kennedy to offer a possible rapprochement between Washington and
Havana. The Cuban leader and the president’s “messenger of peace”—a French
journalist named Jean Daniel—had just finished a lunch of freshly caught
fish. They were discussing the potential restoration of normalcy in
U.S.-Cuban relations when Castro received a phone call reporting that Kennedy
had been shot. “This is terrible,” Castro told Daniel, realizing that his
mission of peace had been aborted by an assassin’s bullet. And then Castro
predicted: “They are going to say we did it.”
Fifty years after the death of the president in
Dallas, the confluence of these dramatic, but coincidental, events on November
22, 1963, continues to provide fodder for a range of assassination conspiracy
theorists who place Cuba at the center of their theories. From the right,
conspiracy buffs have postulated that Fidel Castro managed to manipulate a
revolutionary wannabe named Lee Harvey Oswald into killing Kennedy before
Kennedy could kill Castro; from the left, numerous theories speculate that the
CIA and other nefarious national security operatives assassinated the president
because he had become “soft” on Communism—particularly in Cuba—and wanted to end
the Cold War. After five decades of endless investigation and unproven
hypotheses there remains little evidence to challenge the conclusion of the
official investigative commission led by Chief Justice Earl Warren: Oswald,
acting alone and for his own reasons, killed JFK. Nevertheless, Cuba and
Kennedy’s policies toward the Cuban revolution remain a central part of the public fascination
with the “whodunit” of the murder of the president.
“We resist the idea that a nobody could do something as big as this,” one of
John F. Kennedy’s top White House aides, Theodore Sorensen, told a New
York Times reporter 20 years ago. Indeed, the American public has found it
hard to accept that the most notorious crime of the 20th century could have
been generated by an itinerate loner like Oswald. A Gallup poll taken shortly
after the assassination found that 52 percent of the public believed Oswald had
been part of a larger conspiracy; another Gallup poll on the fortieth
anniversary of Kennedy’s death recorded that 75 percent of Americans believed
more than one individual was responsible. “If you put the murdered president of
the United States on one side of the scale and that wretched waif Oswald on the
other side, it doesn’t balance,” as author William Manchester explained the
national sense of incredulity. “You want to add something weightier to Oswald.
It would invest the president’s death with meaning, endowing him with
martyrdom. He would have died for something. A conspiracy would, of course, do
the job nicely.”
Conspiracy theorists have certainly devoted
themselves to that task. As if to feed the widespread wish to find a master
criminal who fit the magnitude of the crime, an entire conspiracy industry has
proliferated over the years. More than 2,000 books and many thousands of
articles have been written. Major organizations such as the Coalition on
Political Assassinations (COPA) and the Mary Ferrell Foundation have pursued
the story of the assassination for decades. As the 50th anniversary of the
assassination arrives, new websites such as JFKFacts.org have been created to
centralize theories, documentation and the always ongoing debate over who, if
not Oswald alone, killed Kennedy and why. That question has generated countless
responses, many of them paranoid and preposterous. Lyndon Johnson killed the
president, a group of gays killed the president, the military-industrial
complex killed the president, the mafia and/or the CIA killed the
president…these are just a few of the dozens of speculative theories still circulating
on the 50th anniversary.
Conspiracy fantasies formed around many elements of
the assassination, among them: the discrepancies between the bullet holes in
the president’s body and in his suit coat, the so-called “magic bullet” that
pierced Kennedy’s neck and then went through the shoulder of Texas Governor
John Connally seated in front of him, the shadows on the famous photo of Oswald
holding the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle used to shoot Kennedy, and the
inaccuracies of the autopsy reports on the president’s injuries. One
best-selling conspiracy book, Best Evidence, by David Lifton, claimed that the
body in the casket that was put aboard Air Force One in Dallas to transport the
dead president home was not the same one that was taken off the plane when it
landed in Washington. “The conspiracy theories are divorced from
reality,” Jeremy Gunn, former staff director of the Kennedy Assassination
Records Review Board (ARRB) told Cigar Aficionado, “and divorced from common
sense.”
The creation of the ARRB by Congress in 1992 owes to
the mass marketing of perhaps the most discredited and disreputable of all
Kennedy assassination conspiracy theories: the witch hunt in New Orleans by
local prosecutor Jim Garrison. Garrison originally claimed that the assassination
of the president was “a homosexual thrill-killing”—and, on trumped up charges,
unsuccessfully prosecuted a local businessman for the crime; he later expanded
the pool of conspirators to include the CIA and FBI. His infamous investigation
became the basis of the popular 1991 Oliver Stone movie, JFK, starring Kevin
Costner.
Like Garrison’s investigation, the movie was utter
fiction. But it galvanized public outrage over the U.S. government secrecy that
continued to surround the Kennedy assassination. “Even the records
created by the investigative commissions and committees were withheld from
public view and sealed,” noted the Executive Summary of the ARRB report.
“The suspicions created by government secrecy eroded confidence in the
truthfulness of federal agencies in general and damaged their credibility.” The
inexplicable lack of transparency, along with the corrosive nature of the
conspiracy theories that filled the void left by the still hidden historical
record, mobilized Congress in 1992 to pass the “JFK Act,” which mandated the
review and opening of all documentation concerned with the death of the
president.
The result was one of the most far-reaching
declassification projects ever undertaken by the U.S. government. Under the
supervision of a five-member board chaired by Judge John Tunheim, the FBI, CIA,
Secret Service, White House and all other relevant government and
law-enforcement agencies spent four years locating, reviewing and releasing an
estimated 5 million pages relating specifically and broadly to all direct and
indirect aspects of the assassination—none of which disproved original findings
of the Warren Commission that Oswald acted alone. On Cuba, the Kennedy
assassination records included detailed CIA operational cables and reports on covert
operations to kill or overthrow Castro in the early 1960s.
“The agency made a genuine and sincere effort to
declassify everything that was mandated by law,” says Brian Latell, who as the
then-director of the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence oversaw the
agency’s work with the Assassination Records Review Board. But there were “lots
of fights with the board” over declassifying specific documents, he recalled.
“In every case it was sources and methods.”
Indeed, as the ARRB prepared to close its doors in
1998, it identified 1,100 additional CIA records as “assassination-related.”
The Agency, however, refused to release them until 2017—the year the JFK Act
states all remaining intelligence records must be declassified. Similarly, the
CIA continues to fight a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by
assassination scholar Jefferson Morley for the papers of the agency’s case
officer for an anti-Castro group of exiles that had several encounters with the
pro-Castro Oswald in New Orleans. By continuing to keep relevant records
secret, the CIA has fanned the flames of speculation on Cuba’s role in the
assassination, as well as the CIA’s role itself.
Castro’s prediction that “they are going to say we
did it,” proved prescient. The very first accusation of a Cuba/Oswald
conspiracy came just six days after the assassination, on November 28, when CIA
Director John McCone briefed President Johnson on Oswald’s visits in late
September to both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City. CIA intercepts
of telephone calls revealed that Oswald was seeking “travel permits to Cuba and
thence to the Soviet Union for himself and his wife,” McCone advised in a top
secret update on the investigation into Kennedy’s assassination. But McCone
also reported that a Nicaraguan intelligence operative named Gilberto Alvarado
had “advised our [Mexico] station in great detail on his alleged knowledge that
he actually saw Oswald given $6,500 in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on
September 18th.” Alvarado claimed the money was to pay for killing the
president of the United States.
Both the CIA and the FBI had concrete evidence,
however, that Oswald had been in New Orleans on September 18—he did not travel
to Mexico City until September 26th. During questioning at a safe-house in
Mexico City, Alvarado failed a polygraph test and retracted his claims. He was
“totally discredited,” recalls the CIA’s Brian Latell.
Nevertheless, with the growing public clamor about
an international Communist conspiracy, President Johnson moved quickly to
appoint a presidential commission on the assassination. “Now these wild people
are charging Khrushchev killed Kennedy and Castro killed Kennedy,” he told
Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, who Johnson appointed to chair the
investigation. “But the American people and the world have got to know who
killed Kennedy and why.”
Although one informant who pointed the finger at
Cuba was dismissed, the CIA also pursued information from a second informant—a
leftist politician from Panama. This high-level “asset” had been personally
recruited by veteran CIA operative Jacob Esterline to penetrate Castro’s inner
circle. Esterline served as station chief in Caracas, and later senior manager
of the Bay of Pigs operation. “They told me they would never do that,” the
asset reported to Esterline after the assassination—a vague remark he and his
agency colleagues interpreted as their informant’s belief in possible Cuban
complicity.
According to Esterline, this comment set off an
internal investigation, codenamed “Black Walnut,” into whether the Cubans had
anything to do with Kennedy’s death. The sensitivity of “sources and
methods,” in this case the identity of one the agency’s most important sources
inside Cuba, has kept this investigation—it presumably cleared the Cubans of
wrongdoing—hidden for half a century.
“Black Walnut” would not be the last of such
internal inquiries; a dozen years later in the wake of the first major public
revelations of CIA efforts to kill Castro using poison pills, toxic cigars,
exploding sea shells and Paper Mate pens rigged with hidden syringes, the
agency was forced to revisit the issue of whether its own assassination plots
might have prompted Castro to retaliate.
At the time of Kennedy’s death, CIA “executive
action” operations to eliminate Castro, codenamed “ZR/RIFLE,” were so secret
that they were deliberately withheld from the Warren Commission. In 1975,
however, an investigative Senate committee led by Senator Frank Church released
a report titled “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,” which
described, in shocking detail, the CIA’s clandestine assassination
efforts—among them the Sanchez/AMLASH meeting in Paris on the day President
Kennedy was killed. The report drew heavily on a top secret, 138-page internal
CIA history, “Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro,” compiled in 1967 by
the CIA’s own inspector general. The public revelations of the Church Committee
report forced another CIA inspector general to assess whether Castro might have
preempted the obviously failed efforts to murder him.
That second inspector general report, titled “What
Could Castro have Known?” examined the “cause-and-effect relationship between
the [CIA’s Castro] plans and President Kennedy’s death.” The agency’s inspector
general detailed three specific plots, including the AMLASH operation, to
determine whether at any point Castro would have known enough to have acted
first. Since the assassination device was only passed to AMLASH on the actual
day Kennedy was killed, the inspector general inferred that Castro would not
have known in advance of that plot.
“One can speculate,” the report concluded, “as to
whether or not Castro actually learned of the plans described above and, if so,
the details that he would have learned. Assuming that he learned
something—which is not all that clear—he would still have had to know enough
detail to have devised that it was a U.S. Government action as the basis for
launching a counterattack in the form of Lee Harvey Oswald, as has been
postulated by some. The basic issue arises from speculation, and speculation
cannot satisfactorily resolve it.”
In his recently published book, Castro’s Secrets:
Cuban Intelligence, the CIA and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Brian
Latell, now a retired CIA analyst teaching at University of Miami, argues that
even if Cuba did not instruct Oswald to kill the president, Castro knew about
his plans to do so in advance. This theory seems unlikely; all indications are
that Oswald decided, impulsively, to seize the opportunity to shoot the
president only the day before his trip to Dallas. Speculation, sheer though it
may be, continues about a shadowy Cuban role in the Kennedy
assassination.
Even more conspiracy writers have speculated that Cuba was not the sponsor of
the violence that shook the nation on November 22, 1963, but rather its
subject—to terminate the president’s effort to pursue a peaceful coexistence
with Cuba, CIA officials conspired with other sinister forces to terminate the
president. In books such as Peter Dale Scott’s Deep Politics II: Essays on
Oswald, Mexico and Cuba, and Gaeton Fonzi’s The Last Investigation, Oswald is
depicted as either a CIA patsy or a cover for additional assassins positioned
on the famous “grassy knoll.” The motivation of Kennedy’s killers was to
eliminate the president before he could end the Cold War—in the Caribbean, and
elsewhere.
At the time of his death, Kennedy was indeed
pursuing secret talks with Castro. The message of possible reconciliation that
the U.S. president sent to Castro through Jean Daniel became public shortly
after the assassination when the French journalist published a detailed account
on his role as an “unofficial envoy” in the New Republic, and in a front-page
New York Times article. His meetings with both Kennedy and Castro, Daniel wrote
in the Times on December 11, 1963, had established “in effect a dialogue
between President Kennedy and Premier Fidel Castro.”
In fact, the White House had been quietly pursuing
talks with Cuba for months—using a series of secret intermediaries and
interlocutors before Daniel. James Donovan, a New York lawyer who Robert
Kennedy had picked to negotiate the release of more than 1,000 exiles captured
by Cuban forces at the CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion, became the first intermediary.
After Castro broached the possibility of expanding talks on the prisoner
releases to improve overall relations to Donovan, the president instructed his
top aides to “start thinking along more flexible lines” in negotiating with
Castro.
In late April, a correspondent for ABC News named
Lisa Howard who had traveled to Havana to do a televised special on the Cuban
revolution replaced Donovan as the central interlocutor. When she returned from
Cuba, Howard debriefed CIA deputy director Richard Helms on Castro’s clear
interest in improved relations. In a top secret memorandum that arrived on the
desk of the president, Helm’s reported that “Howard definitely wants to impress
the U.S. Government with two facts: Castro is ready to discuss rapprochement and
she herself is ready to discuss it with him if asked to do so by the U.S.
Government.”
Predictably, the CIA adamantly opposed any dialogue
with Cuba. The agency was institutionally invested in its ongoing efforts to
covertly roll back the revolution. In a secret memo rushed to the White House
on May 1, 1963, CIA Director John McCone requested that “no active steps be
taken on the rapprochement matter at this time” and urged only the “most
limited Washington discussions” on accommodation with Castro.
But in the fall of 1963, Washington and Havana did
take active steps toward actual negotiations. In September Howard used a
cocktail party at her E. 74th St. Manhattan townhouse as cover for the first
meeting between a Cuban official, UN Ambassador Carlos Lechuga, and a U.S.
official, deputy UN Ambassador William Attwood. Using Howard as a secret back
channel, Castro and Kennedy then began passing messages about arranging an
actual negotiation session between the two nations.
On November 5, Kennedy’s secret taping system
recorded a conversation with his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, on
whether to send Attwood to Havana to meet secretly with Castro. Attwood, Bundy
told the president, “now has an invitation to go down and talk to Fidel about
terms and conditions in which he would be interested in a change of relations
with the U.S.” The president is heard agreeing to the idea but asking if “we
can get Attwood off the payroll before he goes” so as to “sanitize” him as a
private citizen in case word of the secret meeting leaked.
On November 14, Howard arranged for Attwood to come
to her home and talk via telephone to Castro’s top aide, René Vallejo, about
obtaining the Cuban agenda for a secret meeting in Havana with the Cuban
commandante. Vallejo agreed to transmit a proposed agenda to Cuba’s UN
ambassador, Lechuga, to give to the Americans. When Attwood passed this
information on to Bundy at the White House, he was told that when the agenda
was received, “the president wanted to see me at the White House and decide
what to say and whether to go [to Cuba] or what we should do next.”
“That was the 19th of November,” Attwood recalled.
“Three days before the assassination.
As this dramatic history emerged over the past 25
years, it became grist for some of the more popular conspiracy theories, not
only on the how but why Kennedy was killed. Early in the opening scenes of the
movie, JFK, for example, a narrator sets the stage for the assassination by
stating: “more rumors emerge of JFK’s backdoor efforts outside usual State
Department and CIA channels to establish dialogue with Fidel Castro through
contacts at the United Nations in New York. Kennedy is seeking change on all
fronts.” It was JFK’s “turn toward peace” that led to his assassination,
according to James Douglass’s chronicle of these conspiratorial events, JFK and
the Unspeakable, which has gained a popular following.
“JFK pursued a series of actions—right up to the
week of his death—that caused members of his own military intelligence
establishment to regard him as a virtual traitor who had to be eliminated,” the
book argues. In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which almost led to
nuclear war, Kennedy, sought a détente with both Khrushchev and Castro, the
book reports. “For turning to peace with his enemy (and ours) Kennedy was
murdered by a power we cannot describe.”
“The imaginative recreation of the Kennedy assassination has been a way to
explore the twin issues of confidence and conspiracy in U.S. history,”
Jefferson Morley has written. The government secrecy that has accompanied the
Kennedy assassination, while significantly reduced by the JFK Act, has eroded
public confidence in official findings, while enhancing the validity of
conspiracy theories—completely implausible and off-the-wall as some may be. The
credibility of the Warren Commission findings have been severely undercut by
the fact that the CIA withheld from its investigators all information on its
Castro-assassination plots. Yet with the clear corrosive effect of undue secrecy
on the American psyche, after 50 years there are still “sources and methods”
the CIA feels compelled to hide, and records related to Cuba operations in 1963
that it claims still cannot be declassified.
In anticipation of the 50th anniversary of the
Kennedy assassination, last year officials at the National Declassification
Center, the government agency that pushes for prioritizing the release of
still-secret historical records, approached the CIA about releasing all
remaining Kennedy assassination records, as a historical contribution to the
nation. But the “securocrats” at CIA claimed they did not have the time and
resources to meet that deadline. The public would have to wait till 2017 before
the remaining 1,100 records will be reviewed and, perhaps, finally opened.But
what is now known about the CIA, Kennedy’s Cuba policies, the assassination and
Oswald’s actions leaves an extraordinary and bitter irony. As historian Max
Holland pointed out 20 years ago in a little read essay in Reviews in American
History on “Making Sense of the Assassination,”Oswald’s violent acts were
“manifestly political” and based on “a drive to be recognized as a
revolutionary capable of the daring act.” A would-be communist, and one-man
chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, he saw himself as a political
actor who had the opportunity to save Cuba from the policies of U.S. aggression
that he had likely read about in the New Orleans newspapers. The AMLASH mission
and others like it may have come back to haunt the U.S., noted veteran
journalist Daniel Schorr, who broke the story of the CIA’s assassination plots
against Castro. “An arrow launched into the air to kill a foreign leader may
well have fallen back to kill our own.”
What Oswald could not have known was that his act of
assassination would actually terminate a significant secret effort by President
Kennedy to explore détente in the Caribbean, and fundamentally change the
framework of a hostile U.S. policy toward the Castro revolution. “This is an
end to your mission of peace, this is an end to your mission of peace,” Castro
said to Daniel as they listened to a radio report that President Kennedy had
died in Dallas.
Fifty years later, that sad fact remains the
ultimate historical irony of the Kennedy assassination.
Peter Kornbluh is an analyst at the National Security Archive, and is coauthor
of a forthcoming book on the history of dialog between the U.S. and Cuba.
