Memorandum
from Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy.
On the
day of John Kennedy’s assassination in Dallas, William Attwood records the
developments that had taken place during the final days of the Kennedy
presidency regarding the attempts to hold private discussions with Cuban
officials. What might be called the Attwood initiative raises the question
whether relations between Washington and Havana would have improved had JFK not
been assassinated.
Washington
November
25, 1963
SUBJECT:
Cuba – Bill Attwood
1.
Attached
is an unsolicited chronology from Bill Attwood which describes the activities
of the Cuba-Attwood tie-line from November 11 to the present. Apparently, the
memo was dispatched on November 22, but because of the recent events [1. Namely,
the assassination of JFK in Dallas on November 22] did not reach us until
today.
Attachment
Memorandum
From William Attwood to Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff
New York, November 22, 1963.
Following is an addition to my memorandum to you dated November 8, 1963 [2. See Document 20 of “The Kennedys and Cuba” (p. 342)
On
November 11, Vallejo called Miss Howard again to reiterate their appreciation
of the need for security and to say that Castro would go along with any
arrangements we might want to make. He specifically suggested that a Cuban
plane could come to Key West and pick up the emissary; alternatively they would
agree to have him come in a U.S. plane which could land at one of several
‘secret’ airfields near Havana. He emphasized that only Castro and himself
would be present at the talks and that no one else – he specifically mentioned
Guevara – would be involved. Vallejo also reiterated Castro’s desire for this
talk and hoped to hear our answer soon.
On
November 12, Bundy called me and I reported Vellejo’s message. He said this did
not affect the White House decision that a preliminary talk with Vallejo at the
United Nations should be held in order to find out what Castro wanted to talk
about – particularly if he was seriously interested in discussing the points
cited in Stevenson’s October 7 speech. [“If Castro wanted peaceful relations
with his neighbors, Stevenson had asserted, he needed to cut ties with Moscow,
end his subversive activities in Latin America, and provide basic
Constitutional rights for his people.].
Bundy
suggested I transmit our decision to Vellejo, stressing the fact that, since we
are responding to their invitation and are not soliciting a meeting, we would
like to know more about what is on Castro’s mind before committing ourselves to
further talks in Cuba.
On
November 13, I went to Miss Howard’s apartment and called Vallejo at home.
There was no answer. She then sent a telegram asking that he call her at his
convenience.
On
November 14, Vallejo called her. She gave him my message – that we would want
to talk to him here at the United Nations before accepting an invitation to go
to Cuba. She said that, if he wished to confirm our discussion this further
with the U.S. official, he could call him (Vallejo) at home on the evening of
November 18. Vallejo said he would be there to receive the call. Meanwhile, he
did not exclude the possibility of his coming to the United Nations and said he
would discuss it with Castro.
On
November 18, Miss Howard reached Vallejo at home and passed the phone to me. I
told him Miss Howard had kept me informed of her talks with him and that I
assumed he knew of our interest in hearing what Castro had in mind. Vallejo
said he did, and reiterated the invitation to Cuba, stressing the fact that
security could be guaranteed. I replied that we felt a preliminary meeting was
essential to make sure there was something
useful to talk about, and asked if he was able to come to New York. Vallejo said he could not come “at this
time.” However, if that’s how we felt, he said that ‘we’ would send
instructions to Lechuga to propose and discuss with me ‘an agenda’ for a later
meeting with Castro. I said I would await Lechuga’s call. Vallejo’s manner was
extremely cordial and he called me ‘Sir’ through the conversation.
On November 19, I called Chase, and reported the conversation.
[From
“The Kennedys and Cuba” (Mark J.
White, ed., Ivan Dee Pub., Chicago, 1999, p. 344]
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