Inside the NPIC - National Photo Interpretation Center
ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL – The Briefer & The Center
(NPIC)
Dino Brugioni dedicates his book “Eyeball to
Eyeball” The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Random House, 1991) to
“Arthur C. Lundahl. His vision and leadership made photo interpretation the
guardian of the national security.”
Before reviewing what transpired when the Zapruder
film was at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), the
following excerpts from Brugioni’s book reflects who worked at NPIC and how
they operated during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
After two of his Navy Photographic Interpretation
Center photoanalysists briefed the Robertson Commission in 1953, then the head
of that center, Captain Arthur Lundahl, was transferred to the CIA to start the
National Photographic Interpretation Center.
Brugioni writes:
…Concomitant with (Kelly) Johnson’s development of
the U2 [ and special Kodak film, and camera], (Arthur C.) Lundahl began to
structure the intelligence organization within the CIA required to exploit the
imagery acquired by the U2. Lundahl was given a free hand in recruiting and
selecting personnel. Early in 1955, Hans “Dutch” Scheufele, William F.
Banfield, and I were told by Dr. James M. Andrews, the director of the Office
of Central Reference, and Dr. Joseph Becker, his executive officer, that we had
new jobs and that we were not to discuss our new assignments with anyone.
I had been recruited by the CIA in March 1948 and
was a member of a unit responsible for creating the Agency’s industrial
register of detailed information on foreign-production facilities
worldwide…Lundahl, aware of the difficulties encountered by the photo
interpreters during World War II, conceived of his organization as a wagon
wheel. The photo interpreters would be the hub of that wheel and the radiating
spokes of specialists would make the wheel turn….in Q Building and, later,
Quarters I – an abandoned barracks that housed a WAVE contingent during World
War II…Photo-interpretation had traditionally been the private preserve of the
military, especially the Air Force, which was extremely sensitive to the
Agency’s encroachment on its territory.
…During this period, Lundahl and his executive
officer, Chick Camp were also involved in negotiating a permanent home for the
center. The nondescript Steuart Motor Car Co. Building was selected in a
crime-ridden area of the Washington ghetto at Fifth and K Streets, NW. the four
upper floors of the building would become the division’s home, while the three
lower floors would still be occupied by the motor car company, along with the
Steuart Real Estate Office. The building was not air conditioned, and there
were heating problems in winter…
Lundahl met with the Agency’s deputy director for
intelligence, Robert Amory, about reorganizing the organization to accommodate
the service elements. Amory agreed and Lundahl chose the title National
Photographic Interpretation Center for his new organization.
Air Force Colonel Osmond “Ozzie” J. Ritland had been
working with Bissel, and he and lower-ranking Air Force officers were doing
everything possible to aid the CIA in its photo-collection and interpretation
efforts.
Meanwhile, at the Pentagon, there was an angry
undercurrent as to how the Air Force could allow a task properly assigned to
them slip away to the CIA. Air Force photo-interpretation units were directed
not to cooperate with Agency personnel in their attempt to establish a
photo-interpretation center. At Omaha, General Curtis LeMay regarded SAC as the
free world’s primary deterrent to the Soviet Union and assumed that it should
have the dominant role I acquiring strategic intelligence. While General LeMay
cooperated with the Agency in providing logistical support, he too, to
paraphrase one of his senior officers, was ‘bent out of shape’ because the
Agency was becoming involved with photo-interpretation. In one of his staff
meetings, LeMay said about the U2, “We’ll let them develop it and then we’ll
take it away from them.”
The first U2 mission over the Soviet Union took
place on July 4, 1956…Photo interpreters at the center looked at the
photographs with abject fascination. A number of briefing boards were
produced….Lundahl showed the intelligence significance of each board as the
president listened intently. Lundahl remembered that the president “asked
questions about very specific targets that were of great national interest. He
was impressed with the quality of the photography and asked questions about the
resolution and the altitude the pictures were made from. He also asked
questions about intercept attempts and questions about any Soviet reaction.” Lundahl
described the president as being “warm with satisfaction” after seeing the
results from the first mission. A warm and friendly relationship developed.
Eisenhower admiring Lundahl for his articulate presentations and Lundahl
enjoying the president’s support for the reconnaissance programs.
It was an exciting era – a new age of discovery,
and, for the first time, we had the capability to derive precise, irrefutable
data on the vast land mass and physical installations of our principal
adversary – and the data was only a few days old. It was also a learning and
collaborative experience between the policymakers, intelligence analysts and
photo interpreters. The analyst literally stood at the photo interpreter’s
shoulder and was made acutely aware of the exploitation process and of the
photo interpreter’s nuances and jargon. The policymakers began comparing the
information derived from the U2 with other sources of information. Often when
presented with information from other sources, the president would ask, “How
does this compare with the U2 information?”
These missions were generating accurate, current
information in greater quantities than had ever been contemplated. Much to our
surprise, the Russians had not employed any camouflage and concealment efforts.
Time and again, we knew we were reporting information that was dispelling
existing notions and intelligence estimates, and we took a certain vicarious
pleasure in proving the value of aerial photography over other intelligence
sources. Analysts began reevaluating assumptions regarding Soviet strategic
capabilities. Within a few weeks, analysis of the U2 photography had dispelled
the bomber-gap myth.
Lundahl’s combination of energy, memory,
intelligence, knowledge, and articulateness was making quite a name for him and
the art of photo interpretation. After the president was briefed on the takes
from each mission, Lundahl would proceed to the secretary of state, the
secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, congressional leaders, and the
chiefs of the various intelligence directorates. Lundahl quickly became the
most respected and honored intelligence officer in the intelligence community.
He was a superb photo interpreter and photogrammetrist and could articulate the
characteristics and technical specifications of the new collection system. This
ability, combined with a warm enthusiasm and a strong empathy with his
audiences, was daily proving the value of photo intelligence in the estimate
process. After each mission, Kelly Johnson would come to the Center and we
would brief him on the results of the mission. Such other distinguished
visitors as General Jimmy Doolittle, Dr. Edwin Land, and Dr. George
Kistiakowsky also came to our nondescript but vital facility in the Steuart
Building.
GARY POWERS
On May 1, 1960, just fifteen days before a scheduled
four-power summit conference was to convene in Paris, Gary Power’s U2 air-plane
was brought down by an indirect hit from a near-miss SA-2 missile near
Sverdlovsk, in the USSR…A furious debate ensued in the Senate, …To quell the
debate, Allen Dulles decided to brief the entire Senate on the benefits that
were derived from the U2 program.
Mr. Lundahl was told that he would be allowed
precisely thirty minutes and that this should be the briefing of his lifetime.
Lundahl gave us the task of organizing the effort, and I carefully reviewed all
the contributions that the U2 missions had made to the national estimate
process, along with the many crises wherein the intelligence derived had been
employed to resolve policy issues worldwide. A number of spectacular briefing
boards were created, and Lundahl rehearsed himself intently on the substantive
content of the boards, to assure that he could effectively deliver the
information within the prescribed thirty minutes.
Lundahl remembers the chamber he and Dulles entered
as being “filled with senators, many in angry or combative moods.” Mr. Dulles,
wearing one of his usual English tweed suits, introduced Lundahl. He then lit
his curved tobacco pipe and settled back to enjoy Lundahl’s startling
presentation, which upon completion provoked a standing ovation from the
senators present. Mr. Dulles was so surprised by the reaction that when he rose
to his feet, his lit pipe tumbled onto his lap, setting his tweed coat afire. Lundahl,
taken aback, did not know whether to simply stand there and accept the
senators’ acclaim or to seek a glass of water to throw on his inflamed
director.
In Paris,…Lundahl, Cunningham, and a translator were
driven to the Elysee Palace and escorted to de Gaull’s office. De Gaulle was
alone. Lundahl opened the package of briefing materials and moved toward de
Gaulle in order to brief him at his desk. De Gaulle rose, walked toward
Lundahl, and asked him to place the graphics on a large conference table, where
he stood looking down at them….Lundahl handed him a lage magnifying glass. De
Gaulle asked a number of questions…His initial response to what he saw was
expressed, cryptically, in French, “Formidable! Formidable!”
When the briefing was completed, de Gaulle thanked
Lundahl, paused, reflected for a moment, and then said, “This is one of the
most important programs the West is currently involved in and it is something
that must continue.” ….Upon his return from the aborted conference, Eisenhower
decided to speak to the nation and to reassure the public that he knew what was
going on in his government…
James C. Hagerty, the president’s press secretary,
selected a number of the boards and left to show them to the president. He
returned after a few minutes, saying Eisenhower had rejected the idea of
showing all the briefing boards…Rather than releasing photography of Soviet
installations for public display, the president had selected the single
briefing board I had prepared of the San Diego Naval Air Station, showing the
airfield, aircraft, hangers, and runway markers….
[Kelly notes: J.C. Hagerty later worked as News
director of ABC News in New York and hired Lisa Howard, the reporter who became the
intermediary in the backchannel negotiations between JFK, William Atwood and
Fidel Castro.]
In his televised address, Eisenhower,… added,
“Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used to keep ourselves
and the free world abreast of major Soviet military developments. The
usefulness of this work has been well established through four years of
effort…”
There are a number of references in books on Powers
U2 flight and the Kennedy assassination to the effect that Lee Harvey Oswald
provided the Russians with data on the U2 that was subsequently used by the
Soviets in downing Gary Power’s U2. Most of these accounts focus on the fact
that in 1957, Oswald, then a seventeen year old US Marine Corps private, was
assigned to the 1 Marine Aiercraft Wing, based at Atsugi Naval Air Station,
about twenty miles west of Tokyo, as a trained radar operator. During the
period Oswald was assigned at Atsugi, U2s used the naval air station as a
staging base for missions over the Soviet Union.
Oswald returned to the US, and
on October 31, 1959, renounced his US citizenship. At the US embassy in Moscow,
he indicated that he would tell the Russians everything he knew about US radar
operations and something else that he termed “of special interest.” 19 The
knowledge derived from radar intercepts – i.e., course, altitude, and speed –
is the same whether learned from US or Russian radar operations. The Soviets
had an accurate record of U2 performance beginning with the first mission over
the USSR on July 4, 1956.
On subsequent missions the data was refined so that
in a relatively short period the Soviets had an accurate record of U2
characteristics. The Russians had publicly confirmed the fact that they had
been tracking and were knowledgeable about U2 operations….so the Russians were
well aware of the U2s altitude, course, and speed….
On August 18, at 12:57 P.M., the US Discoverer XIV
space satellite was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California….The
reentry vehicle was ejected over Alaska on its seventeenth pass. In the
recovery area, which encompassed a 200 by 60 mile rectangle, six C-119s and one
C-130 flew within the area called the ball park. Three other C-119s patrolled
an “outfield” area, embracing an additional 400 miles. All aircraft flew an
assigned search pattern. At 3:46 PM on August 19, one of the C-119 Flying
Boxcars, piloted by Captain Harrold E. Mitchell and his nine man crew,
searching in the “outfield” area, hooked the parachute and the 84 pound capsule
in midair at an altitude of 8,500 feet and hauled them aboard. 21 A new era of
reconnaissance had begun. On this first successful photographic satellite
mission, carrying a twenty-pound roll of film, we gained more than 1 million
square miles of coverage of the Soviet Union – more coverage in one capsule
than the combined four years of U2 coverage….
[Kelly notes: This film was flown to the Kodak HQ in
Rochester NY for processing]
The front page of the New York Times on August 20,
1960 headlined the first successful midair recovery of the reentry capsule and
on the opposite side of the front page announced the end of the U2 trial and
conviction and sentencing of Gary Powers. One photographic-collection period of
the Soviet Union was ending while another was just beginning….
LUNDAHL THE BRIEFER AND JFK
The task of educating President Kennedy on photo
interpretation devolved upon Arthur Lundahl. Lundahl was a key official who
established a close working relationship with both President Kennedy and the
assistant to the president for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy.
Lundahl’s articulate, erudite, and succinct explanations of what was seen on
aerial photography were always welcome at the White House. The president wanted
technical information presented in a straightforward manner, free of military jargon,
so it would be comprehensible not only to him but also the average person. In
one of his early briefings of the president, Lundahl explained that the U2
camera could photograph a swath about 125 nautical miles wide and about 3,000
nautical miles long on over 10,000 feet of film. Lundahl drew the analogy that
each foot of film was scanned under magnification in much the same manner that
Sherlock Holmes would scan evidence or look for clues with a large magnifying
glass. “Imagine,” Lundahl would suggest, “a group of photo interpreters on
their hands and knees scanning a roll of film that extended from the White
House to the Capitol and back.” Kennedy never forgot that analogy. When other
high officials were briefed on the U2 at the White House, the president would
call on Lundahl to repeat the story.
Lundahl and President Kennedy hit it off famously.
Periodically, Lundahl would update the president in private briefings on the
latest finds from both the U2 and satellite photography. The president’s discomfort
from a chronic back ailment, the usual cluttered condition of the presidential
desk, with its many mementos and reams of reading material, and the very nature
of the photographic briefing materials to be presented required that a certain
special physical arrangement be made. Lundahl would enter the Oval Office and
the president would leave his cluttered desk and be seated in the famous
rocking chair that had been custom designed to alleviate his back problem. The
rocking chair was positioned in front of a round coffee table. Lundahl would be
seated on the sofa to the right of the president, and the director of the CIA
would frequently be seated on the president’s left. Removing the silver cigar
humidor and ashtray that were usually on the table, Lundahl would arrange his
briefing materials and provide the president with a large magnifying glass. The
president then drew up his rocking chair close to the table and, using the
magnifying glass, began to study the latest photography as Lundahl briefed.
According to Lundahl, the president was a good
listener. He liked good lead-in statements. Lundahl knew this and carefully
selected and arranged his words so he could gauge the president’s reaction as
he spoke. Once he asked Lundahl to remain after a briefing. He was eager to
know more about the photo-interpretation process. “Where do you get photo
interpreters? How much do you pay them? How do you train them? Are they
satisfied with their work? He indicted that he would like to visit the center
and observe the high technology of interpretation at work. Lundahl was afforded
a unique opportunity because of his position. He admired the president’s
intellect and courage, and in turn, the president came to admire Lundahl for
his intelligence and grace in making a difficult task look exceptionally easy.
He came to know the president as a friend and was privy to share the laughter,
heartaches, secrets, moods, defeats and triumphs that occurred during the
Kennedy years.
…Colonel – later General Andrew Goodpasture became powerful
during the Eisenhower administration performing important
national-security-affairs function. McGeorge Bundy – who had been appointed
assistant to the president for national security affairs after the Bay of Pigs
invasion and also had an instinct for power – assumed the intelligence watchdog
role in President Kennedy’s administration. Intense, articulate, and
intelligence, Bundy kept close track of the satellite, U2 and other aircraft
missions being flown – and their results. Any photography shown to the
president had to be passed through Bundy’s office in the White House basement….
[Kelly notes: Gen. Goodpasture is the husband of
Mrs. Goodpasture, the secretary.]
….Suspecting that General Cabell had leaked the
information, he asked for his resignation….On January 31, 1962 he resigned…from
the Air Force…He was replaced by Major General Marshall “Pat” Carter…(Murphy)
revealed that Admiral Arleigh Burke had been the source of his Bay of Pigs
information…and his “bagman” at the Department of Defense, McNamara…
CUBA
On August 29, 1962, a U2 was dispatched to
photograph the entire island of Cuba….As one analyst stated after viewing the
results of the mission, “The sirens were on and the red lights were flashing.”
Within minutes after the film was placed on the
light table, a Center photo interpreter assigned to the mission scan team
shouted, “I’ve got a SAM site.” Excitement spread, and other photo interpreters
gathered around him to look at his find…
When Mr. (John) McCone was briefed on the finds of
the mission, he admonished contemptuously, “They’re not putting them [the SA-2
sites] in to protect the cane cutters. They’re putting them in to blind our
reconnaissance eye.”
When (Ray) Cline was briefed on the mission finds,
he asked that Bill Harvey, chief of Task Force W, also be informed so that
covert personnel would be aware of and could concentrate on collecting
confirmation on the newly found sites. Harvey was briefed by Lundahl and
William Tidwell, an assistant to Cline. He responded quickly that McGeorge
Bundy and the president should also be briefed as soon as possible.
Bundy said the president would not be available that
afternoon because he was preparing to fly to the Quonset Naval Air Station to
meet his wife and children, who had returned from a month-long vacation in
Italy. Recuperating from the death of their newborn son, Patrick, Jackie had
visited her sister, Lee, and Lee’s husband Stanislas Radziwill, at Villa
Episcopin in Ravello.
Bundy told Cline that Attorney General Bobby Kennedy
was available, however, and might like to hear the briefing, since he would be
seeing the president later that evening in Rhode Island.
On August 31, at 4 PM, Lundahl, Tidwell, and Harvey
waited outside the attorney general’s office. After the group was ushered into
Kennedy’s office, Harvey made a brief introductory statement and turned the
briefing over to Lundahl. Lundahl laid out the photographs and maps on
Kennedy’s desk and summarized the developments in Cuba. He pointed to the
deployment patterns of the SA-2 sites and indicated that we would probably be
seeing more. He then showed Kennedy the photo of the port of Mariel with seven
KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats, explaining their function and mission in a
sketch included on the briefing board.
Photography was an ideal medium for conveying
information to someone with Bobby’s forceful views and convictions. He was
extremely interested, asked many questions, said he wanted to be kept
up-to-date, and promised that the intelligence would be conveyed to the president
that evening…..The briefing had lasted about an hour, and Lundahl noticed that
there was a chill between Kennedy and Harvey – that Kennedy avoided speaking to
Harvey directly and that Harvey avoided eye contact with Kennedy.
This was Lundahl’s first briefing of the attorney
general, and he remembered him as being “a very sharp fellow, very perceptive,
full of good questions. He didn’t like long, involved answers. He cut through
any wandering conversations and got right up to the things he wanted to know….
Then on August 31, 1962, the day Bobby Kennedy was
briefed on the SA-2 sites in Cuba, Senator Kenneth Keating of New York made the
following startling announcement from the floor of the Senate: “I am reliably
informed that…Soviet ships unloaded 1,200 troops, I call these men troops, not
technicians. They were wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms.”
A meeting with the president was set for September 7
at 3:30 PM. Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, General
Carter, Cline, Lundahl, and John McLauchlin, representing the Defense
Intelligence Agency, were ushered into the Oval Office. The secretary of
defense had asked John Hughes, a special assistant to the director of DIA, to
attend, but Hughes was unavailable. John McLauchlin, Hughes’s deputy, laughs
when he recalls how a GS-12 represented the DOD at such a critical White House
meeting. He felt ill at ease when he saw the nation’s leaders’ inquiring
glances directed at him. He is sure they were wondering, Who in the hell is he.
But no one asked.
The president was seated in his famous rocking
chair, with McGeorge Bundy standing immediately to his left. General Carter
told the president that detailed analysis of the August 29 U2 photography over
Cuba – in addition to providing data on the SA-2 sites and the KOMAR
guided-missile patrol boats – had revealed a surface-to-surface missile site.
He said that Cline and Lundahl would provide the details. Cline read a short
prepared statement…He then asked Lundahl to describe the site. Lundahl removed
the briefing board from a leather carrying case and handed it to the president.
Lundahl looked over the top of the briefing board wile explaining it to the
president….
The president obviously was concerned primarily with
whether the newly identified site was defensive or offensive in nature…. “How
far will this thing shoot?” the president asked….The president was not
satisfied with technical explanations….The president paused for a moment and
reflected,…He asked, “Do we have something like that?”
McNamara replied, “No, we don’t.”
The president snapped, “Why in the hell don’t we?
How long have we know about this weapon?”
…The president’s face froze. He began to drum his
fingers nervously and impatiently on the arms of the rocker. Lundahl knew that
the quick, annoyed tapping betrayed his impatience and anxiety. “Damnit,” the
president said, “If that damn thing is in Cuba, we should know something about
it.”
General Carter, sensing that the president’s
questions and concerns about the missile system would not be satisfied that
day, stated that he hoped the president understood that he was only following
the president’s orders to report any new developments in Cuba to him
personally…
The president stood up and glared fiercely at
General Carter and then muttered, almost to himself, “I do, but I don’t want
half-assed information….Go back and do your homework….I want no further
reporting until the missile site has been completely evaluated and you can
report back to me.”
…The president asked how widely the information
would be disseminated… “We have to be very careful about any evidence of
offensive weapons in Cuba. If such evidence is found, It must be kept very
restricted and I want to be the first to know about it.”
…The president began a chopping motion with his
right arm,… “If this information is in the Washington Post tomorrow, I’ll fire
both of you.”
…Carter tarried and said, “…you do want us to know
exactly what these things are so that we can report to you accurately?”
The president considerably toned down, said, “By all
means.”
Carter continued, “Then in order to arrive at these
conclusions, it wouldn’t be contrary to your wishes, or your order, that we,
the analysts, talk back and forth with each other to compare our knowledge and
winnow out our conclusions and to reject that which is inconsistent.
The president replied, “Most certainly not: that’s
exactly what I want to happen.”
“I thought that’s what you wanted,” Carter said,
“but others might have felt that each of us was to stay in isolation and try
independently to arrive at a collectively agreed upon conclusion, which would
have been hard to do.”
The president then said, “No. Those people who need
to know – those specialists, those experts who can talk to the photo
interpreters and with whom those photo interpreters can talk – can collective
arrive at a decision. That’s what I want to happen”
…Everyone had gotten the president’s message. When
Carter returned to his Langley office, he was asked by an aide how the
presidential briefing had gone. He answered, “The president was pissed!”
Carter called Huntington Sheldon, the CIA assistant
deputy director for intelligence into his office. Carter told him that as a
result of a presidential directive, a security system had to be established
that would absolutely safeguard the dissemination of highly sensitive
information derived from the Cuban overflights should offensive missiles be
found…Sheldon summoned security specialist Henry Thomas to his office and asked
him to bring with him a list of available code names.. Sheldon chose the code
word PSALM.
At the Center, Lundahl appointed Jack Gardner and me
to work with Office of Scientific Intelligence offensive missile specialist
Sidney Graybeal and defensive missile specialist Norman Smith on the Barnes
site….
General Carter called Lundahl early on September 10
and said that the president would like a current briefing on aerial
photographic systems for himself and General Eisenhower…Carter was informed
that the president would be lunching with General Eisenhower and that Carter,
Lundahl, and his deputy, Col. David S. Parker, should have lunch at the White
House dining room. Afterward, Lundahl set up his briefing materials on an easel
in the Oval Office. Just before 2 P.M. President Kennedy and General Eisenhower
came in. The president said to General Eisenhower, “You must certainly know
these gentlemen?” General Eisenhower said that he did, shook hands with the
briefers, and sat down at the president’s right.
Carter made a few introductory remarks and then
turned to Lundahl, who presented fifteen briefing boards on Soviet strategic
industries and test centers. Lundahl had briefed President Kennedy numerous
times and knew he liked opening remarks that gave him an immediate option on
the presentation. The president reached into the humidor and took out a big
black cigar and lit it. Senator Smathers had given him several boxes of Havanas
and the president promptly had the bands removed and the cigars placed in the
handsome silver humidor. Although he appeared to enjoy a good cigar, the
president was not an adept smoker, often toying with and chewing on the cigar.
He tried, however, not to be photographed with a cigar.
Part of Lindahl’s presentation showed the
improvements that had been made in the various photographic systems. General
Eisenhower listened intently ad asked questions about the systems in the
research and development stages….President Kennedy, too, asked numerous
questions. During the briefing, Lundahl was pleased to see the president
smiling, delighted with the general’s questions and the answers given by the
participants. The briefing lasted approximately forty minutes and all agreed
that the briefing was a success. General Carter, especially, felt relieved and
jokingly remarked, “At last, I can report some good news from the White House
to Mr. McCone.” But Carter’s elation would not last long.
A Special Group meeting had been scheduled for
September 10 in Bundy’s office regarding aerial reconnaissance over Cuba…James
Reber, the chairman of COMOR (Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance), unfolded a
large map of Cuba on the conference table with various flight plans on it.
Bobby strongly advocated the overflights…The president was confronted with a
nagging dilemma – caught between Soviet and Cuban charges that the U.S. was
planning to invade the island and mounting congressional demands from both the
Republicans and Democrats that he had to do precisely that…Direct military
intervention against Cuba, of course, had to be considered. On October 1,
McNamara had met with the Joint Chiefs of staff. The purpose of the meeting was
to discuss circumstances in which military action against Cuba might be
necessary and toward which planning should be actively pursued….These were
operational plans: 312, 314, and 316.
Meanwhile Senator Kenneth Keating of New York…On
October 10, on the floor of the Senate, the senator made the most serious
charge to date….Keating then attacked the president and Undersecretary Ball for
not telling the whole truth….Keating’s speech hit like a bombshell at the White
House. Keating’s implication that the U.S. government possessed information on
offensive missiles in Cuba and was doing nothing about it infuriated President
Kennedy. Kennedy initially suspected that information had been withheld from
him and angrily called McCone, demanding to know if such information existed.
McCone responded in the negative and then called Lundahl to see if anything had
been discovered in the aerial photos. Lundahl said he had no such information….
It was considered possible that Keating’s information
had been a deliberate attempt by a dissident refugee source to embarrass ad
discredit the Kennedy administration before the November elections or to push
the United States into taking action against the Castro government. In the past
the Agency had received a number of such outright false reports, and all of
them had been discredited….
McCone did not like the criticism that President
Kennedy was receiving from Congress. He was a Republican…and he felt he was the
logical man to approach Senator Keating….But Keating did not appear at the
appointed time. The NPIC couriers exchanged banter with McCone’s
secretaries….Then the senator was ushered into McCone’s office. Presumably,
McCone showed the senator all of the briefing materials and then probably asked
Keating for the source of his information. Keating refused. 46
The couriers reported that voices began to rise,
McCone said that he had his cards on the table and had been honest but that the
senator was doing his country incalculable damage….McCone retorted, “Tell me
where they are and I’ll prove to you they are not there.” …McCone did not give
up. On another occasion, he asked Lundahl to report to the Senate Office
Building and wait for him. The purpose he said, was to brief Senator
Keating….Senator Keating’s secretary (said) that he was busy and did not have
time for McCone…Although a concerted effort was undertaken by the Kennedy
administration to determine Senator Keating’s source of information, all their
efforts failed…In later years, Clare Booth Luce would state that some of her
sources had furnished information on missiles being in Cuba and that the
information had found its way to Senator Keating. 48
…On October 12, General Thomas S. Power, commander
of the Strategic Air Command, was called to Washington. Ushered into the office
of the secretary of the Air Force, he was asked if the Strategic Air Command
was prepared to take over all the duties of flying the U2 reconnaissance of
Cuba…General Power replied in the affirmative…The motto of the 55 Strategic
Reconnaissance Wing of the Strategic Air Command was Videmus –Omnia – “We see
all.” …The wing was based at Forbes Air Force Base, outside Topeka, Kansas, but
had detachments…at Yokota, Japan, Incirlik, Turkey,…
October 15 would be a routine day for the heads of
state of two of the most powerful nations in the world. President Kennedy had
been campaigning in upstate New York and had appeared in the Pulaski Day parade
at Buffalo on October 14….He stopped off in New York City and had a late night
dinner with Adlai E. Stevenson…the president arrived late at the White House at
1:40 A.M. on the fifteenth. He slept late that morning and went to his office
at 11:00 A.M., just in time to greet Ahmed Ben Bella, the prime minister of
Algeria….Two days later Ben Bella arrived in Havana…
At the new CIA headquarters building in Langley,
Virginia, the day also began with meetings for some of the principles who would
later be involved in the crisis….At 9:10 Ray Cline opened the Second Conference
on Intelligence Methods. Participants were foreign-intelligence chiefs, along
with senior officers from the CIA, DOD and State.
Paul J. Pigot, Mrs. McCone’s son, who had been
injured in an auto race…had died at the March Air Force Base hospital. McCone
had left Washington to accompany the body to Seattle….McCone had planned to
open the conference…The first speaker was McGeorge Bundy,….the second Roger
Hilsman….As the week’s program continued, the Commonwealth intelligence chiefs
were to become more and more suspicious that a crisis was brewing as their U.S.
hosts mysteriously excused themselves from the business and the social
functions of the conference… [See: Poem sidebar]
THE STEUART BUILDING – Fifth & K Streets NW aka
“The Center.”
Monday, October 15, began as a beautiful fall day in
Washington. Because of the poor parking facilities around the Steuart Building
at 5 and K streets in northwest Washington, car pools were encouraged….Broken
bottles, abandoned autos, and trash littered the area…The Steuart Building was
a nondescript seven-story structure built during World War II. The Center
occupied a total of fifty thousand square feet on the fourth through seventh
floors. There were no restaurants or cafeteria facilities in the building and
the food service was a particular problem, especially for persons working at
night. When there was time, sandwiches and coffee could be bought at a nearby
all-night diner. Most employees brought bag lunches and diners from home.
Before entering the Steuart Building each morning, others stopped at the Center
City Market. The market was a conglamoration of small shops selling everything
from the cheapest cuts of meats to imported delicacies, from patent medicines
to freshly cut flowers. But every morning, freshly baked breakfast rolls and
freshly brewed coffee and tea were available. Properly fortified, employees
passed through the security turnstiles of the Steuart Building en route to
their offices. They were always greeted cordially by guard George Bailey, who
knew everyone by their first name. Eunice Stallings, the elevator operator, a
cigar-smoking women who did the New York Times crossword puzzle in record time,
took the employees to their appointed floor.
A mere physical description of the squalid building
amid its squalid surroundings in Washington’s 2 Police Precinct reveals little
as to what NPIC was all about. It was a unique multidepartmental national-level
organization. The formal structure was controlled, staffed, and funded by the
CIA, but the informal organizational structure also comprised special
detachments from the Army, Air Force and Navy. They were under the
administrative control of “service chiefs,” who contributed personnel for
photo-interpretation projects of national interest such as the exploitation of
photography acquired over Cuba.
The National Photographic Interpretation Center,
however, was synonymous with its director, Arthur C. Lundahl. Lundahl was
responsible for the conception and evolution of photographic interpretation as
it was performed at the Center. His ingenuity was reflected not only in Center
activity, but also at all the military intelligence agencies involved in
photo-interpretation activities. From the inception of NPIC and its predecessor
organizations, beginning in 1955, Lundahl’s visionary approach and methods of
deriving intelligence from photography and collateral sources were dismissed by
many as too revolutionary to last. Basically, he aimed at fusing ideas and
experience that previously had been considered unrelated or incompatible.
Drawing on World War II experiences, he juxtaposed
and fused the skills of seven different disciplines: photo interpretation,
collateral information and data processing, photogrammetry, graphics and
publication support, technical analysis, and distribution and courier support.
The result was a team of experienced personnel that inspired great confidence
from other intelligence and government officials. The Center’s organization and
skill represented the first modern technological approach to intelligence
collection, processing, and dissemination. NPIC supervisory personnel
recognized their unique opportunity and worked hard at making the Center a
model of organization and production.
Lundahl’s leadership was reinforced by an unusual
level of talent throughout the organization. Allen Dulles, the director of the
CIA, and his deputy, Lieutenant General Charles F. Cabell, extended Lundahl a
free-hand in selecting personnel to staff the Center. Although the Steuart
Building left much to be desired in physical amenities, Lundahl would
frequently remark: “Where a choice be necessary, give me good men in poor ships
than the converse.” A particularly distinguishing feature of Lundahl’s
managerial genius was his ability to find gifted people and to establish the
atmosphere of creativity in which they could work. Many new organizations are
burdened with a percentage of castoffs. But Lundahl’s most unique and
significant contribution was his ability to lead and inspire others. He was
unparalleled in winning he complete respect, admiration, and devotion of all
those with whom he came into contact – presidents, the Congress, the military
services, the intelligence community, the scientists, contractor and, of
course, the personnel of the Center.
The imagination and dedication of the people
selected by Lundahl for managerial responsibilities can never be overestimated.
These managers, in turn, supervised young, talented, and dedicated personnel.
Although Lundahl set high standards for his employees, he permitted his staff
an extraordinary degree of independence. He laid down few guidelines or
specific rules. He believed that his staff would function better if given wide
latitude. In return, he received an exceptional sense of commitment from his
employees and a great response of new ideas. The employees of the Center had in
Art Lundahl an ardent believer in, and a prophet of, photographic
interpretation. He could articulate with great feeling the meaning of the
photo-interpretation methods and the value of information obtained from the
photography. Lundahl, in his words, didn’t believe in a droning presentation
but rather in an exploding one. Aerial photography was his ammunition.
Even the security system at the Center reflected the
singularity and uniqueness of the organization. The security accorded the U2
program and the photo intelligence derived from it was never breached. Great
effort had been expended to place the program in a separate security system and
give it a set of special code words. Some maintain this system gave Lundahl
extraordinary freedom to move information directly from the Center to the
president. Others maintained that the novelty of aerial photography made it a
new toy for the intelligence service chiefs and other government leaders.
It was also the knot that tied together the many
bits and pieces of information gathered from other collection sources. Analysts
now had the means to confirm or deny their suspicions or hypotheses. NPIC was
uniquely qualified, staffed, and ready on October 15.
At the Naval Photographic Intelligence Center, the
film from mission 3101 was processed under stringent quality and security
controls. The film was carefully edited and titled, and the duplicate positives
from the processors were spooled and packaged in film cans.
NPIC’s operations officer, Hans F. Scheufele,
maintained constant contact with the collection and processing sites so that
scheduling information would be available to Center components and the
exploitation teams could be appraised of the delivery time of the film. He kept
this information posted on a large blackboard on his office wall. He also
issued daily bulletins on “Proposed Staffing and Time Completion Estimates,”
which listed specific personnel assigned to exploit a given mission and the
arrival time of the film.
This particular day had all the appearances of being
routine. Lundahl had scheduled a 9:30 A.M. meeting with his division chiefs to
discuss training….As he prepared for the meeting Lundahl glanced out his office
window overlooking Fifth Street. With some annoyance, he noted that a U.S. Navy
truck parked in front of the building entrance was blocking traffic. Two armed
Marines had dismounted and taken positions immediately behind the truck. An
armed Navy officer and an enlisted man entered the truck from the rear, lifted
a box off the truck, and carried it into the Steuart Building.
Lundahl smiled, shook his head, and noted how good
intentions often become counter-productive. Every effort had been made to keep
the Steuart Building looking as innocuous as possible. Yet the regulations for
transporting U2 film by the military services specified that movement of the
film be made under armed guard. But in doing so, it was revealing that
personnel in the Steuart Building were undoubtedly engaged in some extremely classified
and sensitive work.
Robert Kithcart of the NPIC registry, a businesslike
reserve paratroop captain who was in charge of all the film and files retained
in the Steuart Building, received the box….He then placed the film in a wire
basket to be delivered to Earl Shoemaker, the exploitation coordinator for this
mission.
After being notified that mission 3101 had been
successfully flown over Cuba, personnel at the Steuart Building prepared to
exploit the photography and, when the exploitation was completed, to report
their findings in a SITSUM (situation summary) for the mission. The usual
procedure was to cable the SITSUM immediately to watch officers throughout the
intelligence community. Some days later, it would be disseminated by courier in
hard-copy form to a broader distribution of intelligence analysts in the
Washington area and throughout the JCS unified and specified commands.
Marvin Michell, the collateral-support information
specialist for the mission had performed preparatory tasks for many of the U2
missions over Cuba. He had plotted the mission flight track…Marvin wheeled a
library cart full of the target packets and reference materials to the area
where the photo interpreters were waiting.
Earl Shoemaker had his photo-interpretation teams ready….The
interpreters began cranking the reels of duplicate positives onto the light
tables. Normally, six photo-interpretation stations were employed in
scanning…there stations were manned by six photo interpreters – three teams of
two interpreters each – representing the CIA, Army, Air Force and Navy….As they
examined the film, the interpreters wrote their observations on the worksheets
provided and passed them to their team leaders for review….
The two cans of film covering the San Cristobol and
the trapezoidal area of concern were given to the scan team of Gene Lydon, a
CIA photo interpreter, and Jim Holmes, an Air Force interpreter, for
exploitation….Then they spotted six long canvas-covered objects. Lydon and
Holmes made rough estimates of the measurements of the objects several times.
Each time, their measurements showed the objects to be more than sixty feet
long. It was about noon, and both men paused for lunch. After lunch, they
resumed their efforts but still could not positively identify the canvas-covered
objects….Jim Holmes, a civilan Air Force employee, was a soft spoken, yet
tough-minded and intense, photo interpreter. A native of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, he was only twenty-nine but a veteran of twelve years of
government service. He began his government career at seventeen as a GS-2
cartographic technician at the Army Map Service, where his aunt was a training
officer….Twenty-two year old Second Lieutenant Ricahrd Reninger was the Army
member of the team. Born in Laramie, Wyoming, he had a B.A. in history from the
University of Wyoming. He had graduated from the U.S. Army Photo Interpretation
School at Fort Holabird in June 1961 and was assigned to the missile backup
team at the Center….
A native of Maine, Joe Sullivan, a civilian Navy
employee, was a puckish, attractive Irishman. At fifty, he was the senior
member of the team…Vince DiRenzo was the CIA representative on the team, from
Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, he was thirty-two and former Marine…(Clark
University)…He and his branch chief Bob Boyd had performed detailed support
studies for covert operations…
DiRenzo called me and said he needed some support
regarding the missiles. I called Jay Quantrill, who worked for me and who was
the Center’s collateral specialist on missiles…DiRenzo was assured and
straightforward when he contacted his chief, Bob Boyd, and announced, “We’ve
got MRBMs in Cuba.” …
After reviewing the evidence on the size and shape
of the missile transporters with Reninger at about 4 P.M., Shoemaker said,
“We’ve got to let Mr. Lundahl know before he goes home.” Shoemaker and Boyd
went to their division chief, Jack Gardner, and his intelligence production
officer, Gordon Duvall….Holmes was unable to contact Air Force lieutenant
colonel Robert Saxon, so he sought out Ted Tate, Saxon’s civilian
deputy….Reninger informed Army colonel George C. Eckert, his commanding
officer. Joe Sullivan however, had problems. His chief, Lieutenant Commander
Pete Brunette,…had a dinner engagement that evening…Joe said he was working on
a project and that Lundahl was about to be briefed….Sullivan called Brunette’s
deputy, Clay Dalryple,…and posted Brunette on the details.
Lundahl was called by Gardener, and Duvall escorted
him into the room where the backup team was working. Lundahl had a distinctive
list to his walk as a result of an old football injury. He was immediately
recognized by us in the semidarkened enclosed room. “I understand you fellows
have found a beauty,” he said as he approached.
…Lundahl turned from the table and looked at us and then said, “I think I know what you guys think they are, and if I think they are the same thing and we both are right, we are sitting on the biggest story of our time.”
…Lundahl rose and walked a short distance. His hands
were clasped behind his back. We remained silent. The strange stillness
suggested the extreme seriousness of the moment. Lundahl looked at us and said,
“If there was ever a time I want to be right in my life, this is it.”
He asked if anything had been committed to paper. He
was shown a few notes…Lundahl pointed to each of us by name and asked if we
agreed the missiles in question were MRBMs. Each reply was affirmative. He then
asked if there were any other possibilities. Di Renzo mentioned what is always
considered at such a time – the possibility that these missiles were dummies.
All signs however, pointed to their being real…He did not doubt or delay
reacting to the situation. The ruddy-complexioned , silver-haired director
looked at each of us again. “Gentlemen. I am convinced. Because of the grave
responsibility of this find, I want to personally sign the cable.”
All of those present knew these images represented a
grave moment in history. All knew that the future turn of events would surely
involve the president personally. Lundahl asked who knew about the find. Jack
Gardner said that the “service chiefs” had been informed but had been told not
to divulge the information to their superiors until the analysis had been
completed. Lundahl asked Gardner to invoke the code word PSALM on all the information.
I was the custodian of this closely held directive for the Center and said that
I would furnish it to Gardner.
…Lundahl asked that all those present to remain and
work through the night if necessary to glean all the information possible from
the images….I ran downstairs and told my superiors, Hans Scheufele and Bill
Banfield, that photographic laboratory support would be needed that night…I ran
downstairs and told my superiors, Hans Scheufele and Bill Banfield, that
photographic-laboratory support would be needed that night and that they should
keep essential personnel at work…It was always difficult to get through to CIA
headquarters on the secure phone line at that time of the evening. On his way
downstairs to his fifth floor office, Lundahl was thinking how he could clearly
and unmistakably get his message across to Cline if he had to use open phone
lines. (Ray) Cline was one of the founding fathers of the Agency, held a
doctorate from Harvard in history and international relations, was a Phi Beta
Kappa, and had earned his Agency reputation as a China expert. He had replaced
Robert Amory in March 1962 as the deputy director of intelligence. Cline had
full confidence in Lundahl and the abilities of his people….
Cline was incredulous. He paused and asked, “Are you
fellows sure?”
Lundahl replied, “Yes, I am sorry to have to
maintain it, but we are sure.”
Cline said, “Well, we’ve got to get on this right
away. I’ll get hold of Carter….I want you to plan on being in my office with
the evidence b seven-thirty tomorrow morning.”
Lundahl agreed. The call had been made…One of my
duties was to prepare all of the briefing notes for Lundahl, and he called me
down to his office and explained that the note on all of the materials that
were to be produced that night should be as complete as possible…Lundahl
checked his calendar for any appointments that would conflict with the next
day’s briefings. He wrote crash and MRBM on the page for October 15. He looked
back at the page for October 14 on which he had jotted mission 3101. Printed on
the right side of the calender’s date was DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER BORN 1890….
The evening of October 15 was a night of parties,
not atypical for Washington during the month of October….The secretary of
defense was attending a Hickory Hill seminar at Bobby Kennedy’s home in
McClean, Virginia. General and Mrs. Maxwell Taylor were giving a formal dinner
party at their Fort McNair residence in Southwest Washington…Bundy was hosting
a dinner party for Charles “Chip” Bohlen, the newly appointed Ambassador to
France…Cline next called Roger Hilsman at his home. He had difficulty
indicating over the insecure phone that he meant MRBMs…..Meanwhile Norman
Smith, the SAM specialist,…called Sidney Graybeal, his division
chief….Greaybeal…was shown the imagery under the stereoscope and given a
description of the find. He agreed that these had to be offensive
missiles….Graybeal told the missile backup team that he did not want to disturb
them in their work but would like to remain, listen to their converstations,
and jot down all pertinent details….
Col. David Parker, the deputy director of NPIC,
called John Hughes, a special assistant to the director of he Defense
Intelligence Agency, and asked him to come over to the Center…and John
McLauchlin, a photo interpreter specialist….McLauchlin proceeded to General
Carroll’s Bolling Air Force Base home…Carroll called Roswell Gilpatrick…and
said that Hughes and McClauchlin were coming over to fill him in on some new
and very important intelligence on Cuba.
Hughes and McLauchlin got in Hughes’ old yellow
DeSoto,…experiencing transmission problems and painfully growled…McLauchlin
kidded Hughes, “We have the secret of the century…If this thing breaks down,
you’ll run the rest of the way on foot.” They arrived at Gilpatrick’s apartment
at 4201 Cathedera Avenue in northwest….
Lundahl asked me to provide him with a map showing
Cuba and the United States. He asked me to swing a 1,100 mile arc on the map,
the range of the MRBM from the area where the missile was found.…NPIC photo
laboratory personnel had waited since 5 P.M. that evening for the photo
interpreters to relinquish the duplicate positives so they might make the
necessary prints, enlargements, and additional duplicate positives for study.
Jimmy Allen, a photo-laboratory section chief, had much experience waiting or
imagery from the photo interpreters. He contentedly puffed on a large cigar.
Jack Davis, the new chief of the photo laboratory, waited nervously.
At 8:30 P.M. Earl Shoemaker brought a duplicate
positive from the laboratory.
…Normally a control code word was given to priority or special laboratory processing work. When Allen asked what code word should he apply to the Cuban Material, Davis replied, “This is all so confused, a good term might be mass confusion” All the photo-laboratory work that night and throughout the missile crisis received priority treatment if it bore the title “Mass Confusion.”
…Normally a control code word was given to priority or special laboratory processing work. When Allen asked what code word should he apply to the Cuban Material, Davis replied, “This is all so confused, a good term might be mass confusion” All the photo-laboratory work that night and throughout the missile crisis received priority treatment if it bore the title “Mass Confusion.”
…Leon Coggin was listed as the off-duty
photogammetrist….Dick Reninger…Eugene Ricci…An around-the-clock atmosphere soon
pertained at NPIC – one of sleeplessness and anxiety….Most stepped out of the
Steuart Building onto Fifth Street. It was a warm fall night and most crossed
over New York Avenue and 6 th Street to Havran’s Restaurant, a favorite
after-hours eating place for Steuart Building people and policemen from the 2
Precinct. Hambergers, french fries, pies and coffee were popular menu
selections – in fact, the only food available.
Joe Sullivan…..tried to located prominent landmarks
in the vicinity of Los Palacios…as he scanned the photography…Leon Coggin…began
measuring the missiles…John Wyman, the senior NPIC computer operator…Dean
Frazier,…the Center’s graphics duty officer…graphic analysis officer Dan
McDevitt, illustrator Glenn Farmer, and headliner (typesetting) operator
Loretta Huggins, arrived at the Steuart Building about 4:30 A.M….The first
three sites at San Cristobal were numbered MR-1, MR-2, MR-3, and the Sagua la
Grande sites MR-4 and MR-5, The Guanajay IRBM sites were numbered IR-1, …and
the Remedies site IR-3…
LUNDAHL ARRIVED at the Steuart Building at 6 A.M. on
October 16 and carefully reviewed the briefing boards and notes that Shoemaker
and I had assembled. They seemed to impart an extraordinary, almost
surrealistic, feeling. In stark stillness they depicted a moment in time that
had been frozen as visual history. It was as if the world was holding its
breath for a moment. And the effect was total, devastating loneliness…
Frank Beck, the courier, was waiting. Lundahl closed
the large, black briefing board case and said, “Let’s go.” He paused and asked
Shoemaker and me to thank all the people who had worked through the night and
to send them home to get some sleep. It was 7 A.M.
About the same time, Walter Elder, a special
assistant to the DCI, called McCone in Seattle and cryptically reported, “That
which you always expected has occurred.”
Lundahl and Beck arrived at Ray Cline’s office at
7:30 A.M….Lundahl placed the briefing boards on Cline’s desk and everyone in
the room listened, almost in awe, as Lundahl pointed out each salient
featue…After Lundahl finished briefing Cline, he stepped back so that those
gathered could review the photography for themselves. …Cline, Lundahl and the
courier, Beck, left the CIA headquarters for the White House shortly before 8
A.M. Conference delegates…being intelligence officers, wondered why they were
obviously in such a hurry with the courier and large bag of briefing boards.
Later, Walter Pforzheimer, longtime agency legislative counsel, would write a
poem about the departing members of the intelligence methods conference.
At the White Hous, Cline, Lundahl, and Beck went
directly to McGeorge Bundy’s office in the basement….Cline summarized the
photo-intelligence findings and asked Lundahl to explain what had been
found…Bundy made a telephone call…and took the elevator to the president’s
private quarters…The president, sitting on his bed and still in his pajamas,
was looking at the morning newspapers…Bundy told the president about the
missiles being in Cuba and together they reviewed the president’s appointments
for that morning. The only free time was at 11:45. The president asked that a
meeting of all principals be scheduled for that time….A number of military
exercises were underway … PHIBRIGLEX-62 (Amphibious Brigade Landing)…
It was obvious that the president had called Bobby
Kennedy concerning the missiles in Cuba because at about 9 A.M. on the morning
of October 16, he came storming into Bundy’s office asking to see the
photography. Cline repeated his assessment and Lundahl took Kennedy over the
briefing boards, pointing out the fourteen missiles. Kennedy looked at the
photos and moaned, “Oh shit! Oh shit! Those sons of bitches Russians.”
Lundahl described Bobby’s movements as being like
those of a prizefighter. He walked several times about the room, snorting like
a prizefighter, smacking the palm of one hand with his fist….Bobby Kennedy came
back to Lundahl and Cline. The seriousness of the moment was broken when
Kennedy pointed to the map NPIC had prepared showing the range of the SS-4. He
pointed to the map and asked, “Will those goddamn things reach Oxford,
Mississippi?” Before Lundahl could stop himself, he replied, “Sir, well beyond
Oxford.” He then looked up to catch a slight gleam in Kennedy’s eyes and a wry
smile on his face. Oxford, Mississippi, of course, was where the Kennedys were
having trouble attempting to register James Meredith into the University of
Mississippi. Bobby thanked Ludahl and Cline and said he was going up to talk to
the president. When Lundahl returned to the Steuart Building and told about
Bobby’s Oxford remarks, it was decided all subsequent maps showing the ranges
of missiles deployed in Cuba would also show as reference points such principal
cities of the United States as St. Louis, New York, Atlanta, and in the same
bold type, Oxford, Mississippi.
…C.Douglas Dillon, the secretary of the treasury,
came to Bundy’s office and asked to see the photographs. An urbane, scholarly
New York Republican, Dilllon was a popular figure in the Kennedy cabinet. Tall,
bald, outgoing, studious, and unpretentious, he was listened to when he spoke.
Suave and courteous, he was one of Kennedy’s favorite cabinet members.
Possessed of a quick grasp for complex detail, his penetrating intellect
enabled him to contribute precise logic to resolving problems not only in the
Treasury Department but in other departments as well.
Lundahl repeated his briefing….At 9:30 A.M. General
Carter arrived at Bundy’s office. Cline felt that Carter, as acting DCI, should
handle the scheduled 11:45 meeting. Carter agreed, and Cline advised him that
Lundahl would perform the briefing but that he would be sending over Sydney
Graybeal, the Agency’s offensive missile specialist, to provide analytical
backup to Lundahl if needed.
General Taylor had asked that the JCS members be
briefed on the Cuban photography as soon as possible…When the office door
closed, Colonel Eckert abruptly stated his mission. “Sir, last evening the
National Photographic Interpretation Center discovered MRBM missile sites on
photography flown over Cuba on October 14.” General Wheeler reeled back in is
chair,…stunned, as if he had been hit by a baseball bat….
The Center also prepared additional copies of the
briefing boards and notes for the Navy and Air Force. Lieutenant Colonel Robert
Saxon took the briefing boards from the Steuart Building to General LeMay’s
office and Lieutenant Commander Pete Brunette took copies to Admiral Anderson’s
office….
…After all the participants were seated in the
Cabinet Room, General Carter read a prepared statement that MRBM missiles had
been discovered on U2 photography of October 14 at two locations and that
Lundahl would brief the group using enlargements of that photography. The
president was seated, as usual, at the center of the long conference table in
the Cabinet Room, with his back to the windows. Lundahl had placed the briefing
boards on an easel at the far end of the room near the fireplace. He gave a
brief description of the MRBM sites and then asked permission of the president
to come to the table and show him the evidence at close range. The president
replied, “By all means.” Lundahl approached the conference table and stood
between the president and Secretary Rusk. Handing the president a large
magnifying glass, so he had on numerous occasions, he placed the briefing
boards on the table in front of the president and proceeded to point out
details of the three sites.
Lundahl was acutely aware that photo interpreters
can recognize and point out things that the unsophisticated and untrained eye
would easily miss. He therefore dwelt on the enlargements of the missiles….After
asking a few questions he turned to his right and, looking Lundahl straight in
the eye and carefully spacing out his words, asked, “Are you sure?” Lundahl was
anxious to be measured in his response but at the same time leave no doubt in
the president’s mind that the evidence was conclusive. Lundahl replied, “Mr.
President, I am as sure of this as a photo interpreter can be sure of anything.
And I think, sir, you might agree that we have not misled you on anything we
have reported to you. Yes, I am convinced they are missiles.”
…The president’s eyes rose again from the photos. He
looked at Lundahl again and asked, “How long will it be before they can fire
those missiles?” Lundahl stated that Sydney Graybeal, the Agency’s expert on
offensive missiles, would comment on that question. Graybeal moved into
position next to Lundahl. He discussed the SS-4 missile system…Lundahl and
Graybeal tried very carefully to differentiate what was known and what was
unknown…The question and answer period lasted for over ten minutes.
The briefing left a particularly somber mood in the
room. The worst fears had come to pass and the worse of conjectures were on
many minds. Dramatic reaction was uppermost in many minds – war, with all its
new, devastating consequences – a nuclear confrontation.
Lundahl would relate: “In an era which demanded
immediate response and rebuttal, the president listened to all remarks and
weighed all positions without surprise. He had the curiosity, sensitivity, and
intellect to assimilate any proposition. With that grace and charm, he
stimulated the best in all those with whom he came in contact and that day was
no exception.”
According to Lundahl, “The president never panicked,
never shuddered, his hands never shook. He was crisp and businesslike and
speedy in his remarks and he issued them with clarity and dispatch, as though
he were dispatching a train or a set of instructions in an office group.”
General Taylor would confirm the president’s attitude: “Kennedy gave no
evidence of shock or trepidation resulting from the threat to the nation
implicit in the discovery of the missile sites, but rather a deep but
controlled anger at the duplicity of the Soviet officials who had tried to
deceive him.” 9
Lundahl removed the boards from the table. The president
turned to the group and said he wanted the whole island covered – he didn’t
care how many missions it too. “I want the photography interpreted and the
finds from the readouts as soon as possible.” The discussion then turned to how
many U2 missions could be flown and the possibility of using low-altitude
aircraft…
At the conclusion of the meeting, the president
turned to General Carter and Lundahl and said he wanted to express the nation’s
gratitude to the men who had collected these remarkable photographs and to the
photo interpreters for finding and analyzing the missile sites. Carter
graciously accepted the compliment and motioned to Lundahl and Graybeal to
remove the briefing boards and prepare to leave the room.
The Cuban missile crisis was on!
When Lundahl returned from the meeting at the White
House, he held a meeting in his office and warned us that “all hell was going
to break loose” and for us to be prepared to receive a lot of photography in
the coming days. He outlined specific duties and responsibilities in getting
ready for the influx of photography…Questions arose about the number of Air
Force pilots qualified to fly the Agency’s U2s…A decision was reached to use
both SAC and CIA U2 pilots to cover all of Cuba. The CIA pilots were to be used
only in “extreme circumstances” and they would be recommissioned into the Air
Force and given Air Force credentials…
The Navy had devoted considerable time and effort to
develop an effective low-altitude jet reconnaissance capability. Commander
(later Captain) Willard D. Dietz had perceived and pushed for the development
of small-format aerial cameras….Chicago Aerial Industries, Inc.’s KA-45 and
KA-46, six inch focal length framing cameras with a film width of five inches
and a capacity of 250 feet of film…installed in the F-8U-1P Crusader….Lundahal
recommended that the Navy’s Light Photographic Squadron No. 62 (VFP-62) be
selected…based at the U.S. Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, just outside
Jacksonville, Florida…Joe Sullivan, the Navy photo interpreter on the NPIC
“discovery” team, had gone home about 4:30 A.M. on October 16, having been told
by his supervisors to take the day off but to be available…his supevisor Clay
Dalrymple, …told in no uncertain terms to, “get his tail over to the Pentagon
as fast as possible” because there was going to be a special meeting of the
GMAIC (Guided Missile Astronautics Intelligence Committee). Sullivan had a
difficult time finding a parking place at the Pentagon…
Dr. Albert “Bud” Wheelon, CIA Chairman of the
committee…He realized too that this photographic lode had to be incorporated
with other sources and succinct and definitive reports created for
policymakers…..was also director of the Agency’s Office of Scientific
Intelligence…thirty-three at the time, was an MIT physicist…Ramo-Woolridge
Corportation….met with McCone and sketched out procedures for handling and
reporting information concerning this crisis…He recommended that selected
representatives of all the standing United States Intelligence Boards’s scientific
committees transfer their activities on an ad hoc baiss to NPIC in order to
expediate their considerations of the findings from the photography. McCone
approved, and the next day, representatives of the GMAIC, the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), and members of the Agency’s Guided
Missile Task Force began moving certain of their files to NPIC.
[p.238]
The president formulated a group of special advisors
to advise and assist him in decisions affecting the missile crisis. It became
known as the Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the National Security Council and
would be formally established by National Security Action Memorandum 196,
signed by the president on October 22, 1962. 15 …
The first meeting of the EXCOM opened with a
briefing on the photographs by Lundahl and intelligence estimates….the
president specifically asked that Robert Lovett be included…Dean Rusk
recommended…Dean Acheson…The president approved.
Lundahl held a prolonged staff meeting at the Center
on the morning of October 17 to structure operational changes for the duration
of the crisis. Center personnel were equally divided into two twelve-hour
shifts, with the shift change at 8 A.M. each morning. Robert Boyd was put in
charge of one shift of the photo interpreters and Gordon Duvall the other.
Photo interpreters would brief Lundahl on photo intelligence derived the
previous day at a morning meeting that would take place at 6:30 to 7 AM. Duvall
and Boyd and I would be at that meeting. My staff would have prepared notes for
Lundahl on each photographic briefing board, along with other pertinent
collateral information. Notes on operational matters, such as the number of
missions to be flown, the weather, etc., would have been prepared by Dutch
Scheufele.
Various film processing sites also worked around the
clock during the crisis. Navy and Air Force jet transports shuttled exposed
film from the U2 missions to the airfields nearest to the processing sites, and
the processed film was expected, similarly, to Washington and the Center for
exploitation. Eastman Kodak also went into shift operations to meet the
increased demand for aerial photographic film. Camera manufacturers were
alerted, and their best technicians, along with truckloads of spare parts, were
sent to Orlando, MacDill and Boca Chica to make sure that cameras were
maintained and functioned properly. Additional Lockheed U2 technicians and
maintenance personnel were dispatched to Orlando to keep the U2s flying.
The EXCOM met several times in George Ball’s State
Department conference room on October 17…
President Kennedy brought General
Maxwell Taylor to the White House as a military consultant to the president
after the Bay of Pigs…It was in Taylor’s office, room 303 in the Executive
Office Building that the powerful 303 Committee met and reviewed all covert CIA
operations. On the 303 Committee were McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and McCone…
Admiral George W. Anderson, fifty-five, the chief of
naval operations,…had been picked by Kennedy’s first Navy secretary, John
Connally, to replace…Arleigh Burke…
And so a pattern developed. Photography acquired by
U2 missions flown in the morning would be processed in the afternoon, then
analyzed in the late afternoon and nightly at the National Photographic
Interpretation Center. Teams of photo interpreters working with missile and
nuclear experts from other components of the intelligence community produced
situation summaries that were then disseminated the following morning. To keep
track of information other than photography, a special situation room was
established in the Agency’s Office of Current Intelligence, at Langley,
Virginia. John Hicks, who had recently returned from a tour of duty in
Australia, was placed in charge and had the responsibility of issuing the CIA
daily bulletin. After being briefed each morning at the Center on the
information generated the previous evening, Lundahl would depart for a briefing
of the United States Intelligence Board, which met each morning at 8 A.M. in
the East Building of the Agency, located in the Foggy Bottom section of
Washington.
The USIB was the highest level of all national
intelligence committees, acting as a board of review for all strategic
estimates and current intelligence assessments. The Board was also cognizant of
all clandestine collection efforts…
After Lundahl’s daily briefing of the USIB, he would
proceed to brief the EXCOM. The EXCOM met several times daily, usually at 10
A.M. and 2 P.M. in the Cabinet Room of the White House during the early days of
the crisis and thereafter in George Ball’s Conference Room at the State
Department…
Whenever McCone thought the president should be
informed about items of special significance or whenever the president
expressed an interest, Lundahl, usually accompanied by McCone, would proceed to
the White House. The president was briefed at least once a day with the aerial
photos. At one meeting with the president, McCone raised the question of how
and when the photographic evidence should be shown to congressional leaders.
The president asked that the full PSALM security directive be sustained….
The Air Defense Command had directed the large
ballistic detection radar at Morristown, New Jersey, and the space-tracking
radar at Laredo, Texas, and Thomasville, Georgia, be aligned for missile
warning from Cuba…
A relatively new and large air-conditioned classroom
at Homestead Air Force Base was selected to be the Command Center…At the U.S.
Army Pictorial Center, in New York City, Major Robert Vaughn received an order
from headquarters of the U.S. Continental Army Command, at Fort Monroe,
Virginia, to install a closed-circuit television system at the Florida command
site. Vaughn knew such a system was at Fort Gordon, Georgia, but unfortunately
it had been dismantled and placed in a convoy and was on its way to the Brooke
Army Medical Center, in San Antonio, Texas, for demonstration purposes….Maps
and charts were hung on the wall panels and the latest information on the Cuban
situation was posted. The panels were used to conduct briefings several times
daily. The closed-circuit television system permitted this data to be
transmitted simultaneously to the offices and conference rooms of admirals and
generals newly assigned to the task group coordinating the response….
President Kennedy once warned McCone, “If you have a
secret, do me a favor – don’t tell Salinger.” … Salinger had not been told of
the missiles being in Cuba by the president….
A new phase of analysis of the U2 imagery began on
October 19 at the Center to determine whether (or when) the MRBM missile sites
in Cuba would become operational. Criteria were developed by the GMAIC, and the
Center applied that criteria in the analysis of all the imagery being received…
At about one o’clock on that Saturday afternoon,
October 20, word was received at the Center that Robert Kennedy and Robert
McNamara would pay a visit. Some fifteen minutes later a black limousine rolled
up to the entrance of the Center, and Kennedy, McNamara, Gilpatrick, and McCone
stepped out. They were quickly ushered to the seventh floor of the Center,
where photo interpreters were exploiting the latest U2 photography.
The first concern of the four important visitors
appeared to be the certainty of our identification of the newly discovered IRBM
sites…Lundahl invited the visitors to view the missile sites at light tables
fitted with stereoscopic viewers. The four visitors took turns at the light
tables, while photo interpreters pointed out details of what they were
seeing…At this point, Air Force brigadier general Robert N. Smith arrived at
the Center. General Smith, director of intelligence of the Strategic Air
Command, was an old friend of Lundahl,. He brought with him the latest U2
photography that had been processed by the Strategic Air Command’s 544
Reconnaissance Tactical Wing at Omaha. It was not unusual for high ranking
officers to accompany such film shipments inasmuch as the photography was
extremely sensitive from a security standpoint. Escorting mission film to the
Center also afforded field-command officers an opportunity to view the latest
photography firsthand, with immediate access to the most recent intelligence
derived in Washington…
.
…Finally McCone asked Bobby and McNamara if they
were satisfied with what they had seen. Both replied in the affirmative. Bobby
then asked the interpreters if they were getting enough sleep. Lundahl
interrupted, stating that the Center was working on a two-shift basis and would
continue to operate that way. Bobby then moved around the room shaking the
hands and encouraging everyone to keep up the good work.
The unannounced purpose of the visit to the Center
was to confirm details of the findings to help draft a televised address to the
nation by the president and for an important meeting to be held at the White
House…in the Yellow Oval room….The president walked into the room and said with
a wry smile, “Gentlemen, today we’re going to earn our pay.” He then waved to
McCone to begin the meeting. McCone gave Cline the task of summarizing…When
Lundahl took over, he first made sure the president in particular, had a clear
view of the easel….When Lundahl finished he turned to the president and said,
“Mr. President, gentlemen, this summarizes the totality of the missile and
other threats as we’ve bee able to determine it form aerial photography…”
The president was on his feet the moment Lundahl
finished. He crossed the room directly towards Lundahl and said, “I want you to
extend to your organization my gratitude for a job very well done.” Lundahl,
rather embarrassed, hesitantly thanked the president. The president then
extended his hand and smiled. Lundahl was again surprised.
At 4 P.M. the president was scheduled to meet with
his cabinet. When McCone asked if the president would like to have the cabinet
briefed by him and Lundahl, the president said no. Mr. McCone also wondered if
the president would like to show the cabinet members some of the aerial photos
of Cuba. The president replied, “No, it just might confuse the issues.”….
The president had summoned congressional leaders to
Washington from various parts of the country to apraise them of the Cuban situation…Hale
Boggs, the Democratic whip, was deep-sea fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. An Air
Force plane, after making several warning passes over the boat, dropped a
plastic message bottle. The message: “Call Washington – urgent message from the
president.” …Boggs was helicoptered to an airfield, where a two-seat jet
trainer was waiting…He was flown to Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington and
was helicoptered from their to the White House lawn, “still smelling of fish…”
At 5 P.M. that Monday afternoon, President Kennedy
waited for the congressional leaders in the Cabinet Room…All chairs were
occupied and people were standing several deep along the walls. The doors were
closed. The president apologized for the inconvenience he had caused the
legislators by interrupting their campaigns. He said, however, that the nation
was facing an international emergency – offensive missiles…in Cuba. Mr. McCone
and his briefer would provide the details….He then turned the meeting over to
McCone. Mr. McCone made a short statement summarizing the finds that had been
presented to the National Security Council earlier in the afternoon, and asked
Lundahl to show the telltale photographs.
As Lundahl began to unfold the pictures of MRBM and
IRBM launch sites and their targets, an incredible hush settled over the
room….When Lundahl finished his presentation, he felt as if everyone was
looking at him “as though I were holding a cobra rather than a pointer n my
right hand.” The enormity of the threat was being seen and heard for the first
time by the congressmen and senators and they were obviously surprised and
angered. Attention then shifted to the president. A great buzzing arose among
the group….
At 7 P.M. Washington time on October 23, the
Pentagon placed the entire U.S. military establishment on Defcon 3 (defense
condition), an increased state of alert. The greatest mobilization since World
War II was underway. SAC B-47 bombers were dispursed according to plan…The
first Crusader, No. 923, landed at the naval air station at Jacksonville and
taxied to the front line. When the aircraft stopped, there was an immediate
flurry of activity as photographer mates unloaded the film magazines and rushed
to the nearby Fleet Air Photo Laboratory. The activity inside the lab was just
as intense as that on the flight line. The film was placed in the processors
and within minutes the first negatives were finished… “Run the duplicate
positives and let’s get them to Washington.”
…As the flight crews were busy fueling and preparing
the aircraft for another mission and photographer mates were reloading the
cameras, a young enlisted man on the flight line decided that each mission
should be recorded on the side of the aircraft. He made a stencil depicting a
dead hanging chicken, the chicken an obvious reference to Castro’s chicken
episode at the UN and Washington. (Castro and his entourage cooked chicken in
their hotel rooms, much to the consternation and disgust of hotel managers.) He
began stenciling them on the side of each aircraft. It became a ritual for the
pilot when he opened the canopy after each mission to call out, “Chalk up
another chicken.”
[Kelly notes: There is also a logo patch for one of
the photo recon outfits that has a role of film wrapped around the head of a
chicken].
The Joint Chiefs wanted a firsthand report of the
mission and Commander Ecker was ordered to fly to Washington. He landed at
Andrews Air Force Base and, still in his flying suit, was rushed to the
Pentagon….The Joint Chiefs queried the commander about the mission and asked if
any anti-aircraft fire had been seen. Ecker proudly reported that the mission
was, “a piece of cake.” The low-altitude photography added a new dimension to
NPIC reporting….
On the afternoon of October 26, the FBI reported
that the Soviets were burning their archives not only at the Washington
embassy, tub also at the Soviet UN enclave at Glen Cove, Long Island. The
burning of sensitive files is normally the last diplomatic act in preparation
for war…If nuclear war became a distinct possibility, the Office of Emergency
Management had formulated plans for the evacuation of the president from
Washington. The coordinater within the White House staff for preparing such a
move was General Chester V. “Ted” Clifton, the president’s military advisor.
However, there appeared to be some conflict in responsibilities, because Secret
Service chief Jim Rowley also was checking out details of his own plan for the
evacuation of the president…
Luncahl arrived at the Steuart Building early on the
morning of October 27. There was much work to be done. At the usual morning
staff briefing he was shocked when told that all twenty-four MRBM sites in Cuba
were now considered fully operational….
As the governors were assembling at the Pentagopn on
the morning of October 27, Lundahl spent a few minutes with us before he went
into his office and rehearsed in his mind what photography he was going to show
them and what he was going to say. This would be the first time that most of
these distinguished men would be exposed to serial reconnaissance, and Lundahl
felt the briefing should be a “tutorial.” McCone called for Lundahl at the
Center in his personal car. One the way to the Pentagon, McCone informed
Lundahl that he would personally conduct the briefing. He wanted to impress the
governors with both his and the president’s creditilblty…At 8:40 A.M. McCone
began his briefing…Following McCone’s presentation, Roswell Gilpatrick briefed
the governors n the state of U.S. military prepardness…Following the Pentagon
briefings, the governors were driven to the White House to meet with the
president…Lundahal and McCone had hurried from the governors’ meeting to the
EXCOM, which met, as usual, at 10 A.M….
…U Thant…saying his military advisor, Indian
brigadier Indar JiT Rikhye, would supply the details. William Tidwell, a CIA
expert in aerial reconnaissance and a military reserve officer, was sent to New
York to seek carification from Brigadier Rikhye. But if U Thant was confused,
Rikhye was completely out of touch with reality. A short, stocky Punjabi with a
deceptive smile, Rikhye’s first service with the UN was as a colonel commanding
an Indian unit in the Gaza Strip during the Middle East cease fire of 1957. He
had helped organize the UN force sent to the Congo in 1960-61 and, in 1962, had
worked to supervise the peacekeeping force in Neartherlands New Guinea. During
World War II, as a major, he commanded an armor unit of the famed Bengal
lancers in General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army. Tidwell soon determined Rikhye…knew
absolutely nothing about Soviet MRBM and IRBM sites. He had no plans…
[BK notes: Ruth Forbes Paine Young (Michael Paine’s
mother), and other World Federalists worked closely with Gen. Rikhye at the UN
on a number of projects.]
…Throughout the crisis, Lundahl had alerted his
staff to post him of any evidence of comic relief observed on the photography.
President Eisenhower had appreciated a number of humorous briefing boards
prepared during critical situations. Lundahl felt President Kennedy would also
welcome a litter humor in this situation. President Kennedy, himself adept at
clear, concise usage of the English language, particularly disliked anything
smacking of military jargon. On several occasions during the crisis he had
shown a certain displeasure with daily intelligence reports referring to the
number of missile launch positions “occupied” and “unoccupied.” He felt that,
somehow, there must be a better way to describe how many of the four launch
positions at each of the missile sites had missile launchers on them. McCone
had struggled unsuccessfully to find appropriate terms of clarification
throughout the crisis…At that point, a U.S. reconnaissance plane flying very
low over a military camp happened to photograph a soldier using an open “three
hole” latrine. We produced a briefing board from the photograph, and Lundahl
showed it to McCone and included it in the White House briefing package.
Lundahl finished his routine briefing of the president and McCone asked if the
president would like to see a new three position military site discovered in
Cuba, with one position occupied. The president’s face froze momentarily, since
he was aware that each of the missile sties in Cuba had four positions rather
than three. As the president studied the photo, there came first a smile and
then a booming laugh. When he finally stopped, he asked, “Why didn’t I have
this earlier? Now I understand the occupied and unoccupied problem perfectly.
The president was generous with his thanks and
praise….McCone was the first to recognize the work of the National Photographic
Interpretation Center with a formal memo of commendation on November 2,
1962….On November 8, 1962, the president sent the following letter to Lundahl:
“While I would like to make public the truly outstanding accomplishments of the
National Photographic Interpretation Center, I realize that the anonymity of an
organization of your high professional competence in the intelligence field
must be maintained.
“I do want you and your people to know of my very
deep appreciation for the tremendous task you are performing under most trying
circumstances. The analysis and interpretation of the Cuban photography and the
reporting of your findings promptly and succinctly to me and to my principal
policy advisors, most particularly the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, has been exemplary.You have my thanks and the thanks of your
government for a very remarkable performance of duty and my personal
commendation goes to all of you.”
John F. Kennedy
…President Kennedy decided the American people
should be briefed on the photographic evidence…The president preferred that
Lundahl handle the report to the nation, but McCone was reluctant to surface
Lundahl and the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Lundahl
recommended that John Hughes, who had been outstanding in his service at the
National Photographic Interpretation Center as an Army lieutenant and became
special assistant to General Joseph Carroll, director of the Defense
Intelligence Agnecy, conduct the public briefing. NPIC supported Hughes in
preparing the briefing…on nationwide TV. The presentation did much to allay the
fears of the American public, but some intelligence specialists questioned
whether too much had been revealed…
…The president would be dead before the 1964
election and Bobby before that of 1968… McCone found Lyndon Johnson colorless
and crude in intelligence matters and, as president, clumsy and heavy-handed in
international affairs. Instead of personally carefully considering prepared
intelligence memorandums on intelligence matters, he preferred to be briefed by
trusted advisors. Increasingly, the president sought intelligence information
almost exclusively from Secretary McNamara and the Defense Department. McCone’s
advice simply was no longer actively sought by the president. His role
diminished, his influence faded, and the ready access he had enjoyed during the
Kennedy administration became very limited…President Johnson replaced McCone
with a fellow Texan, retired U.S. Navy vice-admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. The
admiral had played an important role in development of the Polaris missile
system, but had no experience in intelligence, which soon became apparent to
CIA veterans….
Of all the awards and honors Lundahl achieved, one
he seldom displays reflects most appropriately his contributions to this
nation. It is an autographed photograph of Allen Dulles and himself, which
reads: “Art Lundahl has done as much to protect the security of this nation as
any man I know. Allen W. Dulles.”
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