Charles Ford was described by Sam Halpern as the man who served as a CIA cut-out between Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and former Havana mobsters in regards to the plots to kill Fidel Castro, a false fact engraved in Sy Hersh's "Darkside of Camelot" but refruted by the government's own documents, as John Newman so dramatically demonstrates in his new book "Into the Storm."
Since Ford was from Atlantic City, my old Jersey Shore turf, I took a particular interest in him, especially his attendance at Princeton, his service in the OSS during WWII, his career in the CIA that spanned decades, and his association with a number of key people involved in the JFK assassination - including William Harvey, Desmond FitzGerald, and Sam Halpern.
Aussie analyst James Richards says that Charles Ford knew John Martino – and they may have known each other as they were from the same AC Ducktown neighborhood.
While Martino became a bookie for Angelo Bruno, who was on the Commission, Martino moved to Florida where he worked the illegal Florida casinos for Meyer Lansky and for Santo Traficante in Havana, Charles Ford became a CIA training specialist, but for a little over one year he was pulled out of the Office of Training and assigned to the Operations branch - specifically to Task Force W - the Cuban Operations desk in the basement of the new CIA HQ in Langley.
There, according to Halpern, Ford was ordered to carry out whatever assignment RFK gave him, that according to Halpern, included contacting the Italian mobsters with former interests in Cuba and get them to assassinate Fidel Castro.
But that version of history is totally contradicted by the official records - Ford's TFW reports, transcripts of his testimony before the Church Committee in 1975, called specifically to address this issue, and the contradictions in Halpern's twenty year long branding of RFK as having ordered Castro's assassination.
Since Ford was from Atlantic City, my old Jersey Shore turf, I took a particular interest in him, especially his attendance at Princeton, his service in the OSS during WWII, his career in the CIA that spanned decades, and his association with a number of key people involved in the JFK assassination - including William Harvey, Desmond FitzGerald, and Sam Halpern.
Aussie analyst James Richards says that Charles Ford knew John Martino – and they may have known each other as they were from the same AC Ducktown neighborhood.
While Martino became a bookie for Angelo Bruno, who was on the Commission, Martino moved to Florida where he worked the illegal Florida casinos for Meyer Lansky and for Santo Traficante in Havana, Charles Ford became a CIA training specialist, but for a little over one year he was pulled out of the Office of Training and assigned to the Operations branch - specifically to Task Force W - the Cuban Operations desk in the basement of the new CIA HQ in Langley.
There, according to Halpern, Ford was ordered to carry out whatever assignment RFK gave him, that according to Halpern, included contacting the Italian mobsters with former interests in Cuba and get them to assassinate Fidel Castro.
But that version of history is totally contradicted by the official records - Ford's TFW reports, transcripts of his testimony before the Church Committee in 1975, called specifically to address this issue, and the contradictions in Halpern's twenty year long branding of RFK as having ordered Castro's assassination.
In late 1962, at the behest of Robert
Kennedy, Ford was dispatched to interview a Cuban by the name of
Ernesto Betancourt from the Ejercito Libertadore de Cuba.
Betancourt was planning some sabotage action in Cuba
and even though Betancourt didn't officially have anything to do with the CIA,
in fact he didn't trust them and they didn’t buy his story, but Ford was
told to check it out.
Present in the meeting with Betancourt was one
Eduardo Perez aka Eddie Bayo who indeed was the major spokesman. It was only a
few months later that Bayo led 'Operation Tilt' which was signed off by David
Morales and involved Martino, Richard Billings, and William Paley. A martime
infiltration mission, the story of Operation Tilt is one of a number of covert
intelligence operations that are connected to the Dealey Plaza Operation.
The information regarding Perez and Betancourt was
in a report authored by Ford himself.
Also, one more curiosity, in 1965, the CIA received
a print of the Zapruder Film from Time Inc. This copy was used by the Office of
Training between 1965 and 1969. The man who took possession of the film for the
CIA and who controlled its use was Charles D. Ford, who probably first presented it to his students at Quantaco "the Farm," - for training purposes only.
Besides Ford's possible associations with Martino, questionable association with Halpern, Harvey and FitzGerald, and his secret missions for RFK - that didn't include visiting mobsters to encourage them to kill Castro, OSS records from World War II indicate Ford may have been sent on an OSS mission to China with J. Walton Moore - the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division officer in Dallas at the time of the assassination. Moore was the case officer for George deMohrenschilt, Hugh Aynesworth and Colonel Orlov, the mysterious Colonel who accompanied deMohrenschildt when he first visited Oswald, and regular handball partner with Moore.
While I will let John Newman tell the story of RFK, Charles Ford and Sam Halpern in a much more eloquent style, there are further ramifications to this side of the story than we have come to know so far.
AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10303-10001
RECORDS SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CIA-OP
DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : [No From]
TO : [No To]
TITLE : FILE ON FORD, CHARLES/RFK-MAFIA
DATE : 01/01/0000
PAGES : 10
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER - TEXTUAL
DOCUMENTSUBJECTS :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS : 1BDATE OF LAST REVIEW :
09/18/1998COMMENTS : JFK-M-03 : F6 : 1998.09.18.07:48:32:030120 :
ARRB REQUEST.CIA - IR 13. CORRECTED TO 10 PAGES VICE 20
Date of interview Sept. 18, 1975
Mike Madigan SSC Staff reports that Mr Helms and Mr
Halpern have testified that in response to a request by Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy, the assigned an officer to establish contacts with the underworld
to look for possible contacts for use against Castro. Sam Halpern says the
officer was Charles Ford who used the name Rocky Siscalini.
Madigan wants any information we have on this and
would like to interview the Agency officer.
2...........I told them that I joined in 1949; that
I was and am now a member of the Office of Training; That in 1960 or
thereabouts I had a brief tour of duty with the Economic Group in the DDP, and
I went directly from that assignment to WH-4 in Sept., 1961.
3. I was asked to recall my major activities while
with the Cuban operation and I did so. I reported that my first major
assignment was the handling of a Cuban agent, one we were using to build a
nucleus of an organization for eventual operations into Cuba. I identified this
man as Mr [ 6 ]. (Mr. Rhea having heard my description of this activity at our
earlier session, did not pursue this matter any further.)
4. The investigators were interested in when I was
assigned the code name Fiscalini, the circumstances under which the name was
assigned, and who had assigned it. I told them I had seen a Xerox copy of the
memorandum (I saw this during a meeting with Bill Sturbits last Friday in
Bill's office) which requested that identification in the name of Fiscalini be assigned
to me. I explained the circumstances, which Mr. Postal and Mr Rhea had heard at
our earlier meeting, and said that I thought the date was the end of March,
1962. The circumstances involved a contact by a New York lawyer, thru the
Department of Justice, concerning a client who had access to Cuba and wanted to
visit Castro to put in a special plea on behalf of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. I
identified the individual concerned (I still can't remember his name) as the
manager of the Teresa Hotel in New York. I did not identify the lawyer and was not
asked for his name I identified a man I met at a second meeting in New York as
'Bubbles' Abdallah. I explained that the latter individual proposed to
accompany the manager of the Teresa to Cuba, the manager being an elderly man
with some difficulty in walking. I explained to the investigators that I had no
further contact with these individuals after I discovered that Abdallah was
wanted, or under indictment - I forget which, by Texas authorities for smuggling
drugs from Mexico.
Mr. Robert Kelly was clearly interested in pursuing
the matter further of who assigned my "Code Name." I indicated that
the document I received came from the Office of Security, but that I did not
know whether the Office selected the name or not.
5. We went over again the story of my contact with a
Canadian named "Joe," (I know this man's last name but have not been
asked for it and have not volunteered it.) I described one meeting and a
telephone call involving Joe. In the meeting he claimed that he could travel
back and forth from Canada to Cuba; revealed to me that he was interested in starting
a smuggling activity involving goods on the proscribed list; that he wanted
United States citizenship and a great deal of money in exchange for allowing us
to send materials or tamper with some of the shipments if we could get the
proscribed goods to Canada. I explained to the investigators that my interest
lay in the fact that Joe claimed he could speak with Che Guevera and that I had
attempted to get Joe to serve as a means of communications between us and Che,
which Joe refused to do.
As for the telephone call, I told them that when Joe
returned from his trip to Cuba he called to say that big things were going on in
Cuba and that we should meet right away. Being aware at that point that we in
the Agency were deep in the middle of what would later be called the Cuban
Missile Crisis, I told Joe I could not see him and that we probably already
knew what he had to tell me. That was the last I heard of Joe.
6. We spent a great deal of time going over my
meetings with the Attorney General and his interest in a small group of Cubans
who claimed to have supporters ready to create an uprising in Santiago
Province. This is the case described in paragraph 3 of my earlier memorandum.
The investigators were quite interested in the identity of the man whom I saw
at the request of the Attorney General. I went over this again in as much detail
as I could remember, but without being able to recall who this man was. I was
asked if I could describe the man and I said that I recalled him as a fairly
tall man of average build with black hair, black eyebrows and glasses. Of
considerable interest is the fact that perhaps 15 or 20 minutes later, I was
shown an 8 x 10 glossy photograph of several people walking in front of what
appeared to be a public building and was asked whether I could identify any of
the people in the picture. I could not. Mr. Postal pointed to the central
figure and asked if I could identify him. I said I could not. (The picture was
of a man probably in his mid-sixties with flowing white hair and somewhat on
the order of Sen. Kenneth Keating, a large, down-curving nose, white straight
eyebrows behind dark glasses, a somewhat lined, puffy face and a slightly
receding forehead accentuated by the fact that his hair was combed straight
from front to back. The man was wearing a dark blue, or black suit, and one man
appeared to be accompanying him to his left and slightly ahead and another man slightly
to his right and rear. Without having any reference points by which to judge,
my best guess would be that the subject was about 5'10 inches tall. He appeared
to be rather heavy, perhaps in the range of 220 lbs. There appeared to be a
caption of some sort at the bottom of the picture, but this was hidden from my
view.) Mr. Postal asked whether the main figure in the photograph could have
been the man the Attorney General directed me to see. I replied that, even
allowing for the difference in years, the man in the photograph in no way
resembled the man I saw on behalf of the Attorney General.
7. Messrs. Postal and Rhea again brought up the
topic of assassination and asked whether I had engaged in or had heard mention
of, in Task Force W, or SAS discussions on the subject of assassination either
in general or specifically with regards to Castro. I told the investigators
that the subject name came up repeatedly, when we were speaking with Cubans,
many of whom having bring forced to flee Cuba, sincerely wished for Castrol's immediate
demise. I said that I had never heard of, nor engaged in conversations with
Agency officers about any plan, the direct and only aspect of which was the
assassination of Fidel Castro. I pointed out that on a number of occasions I
dealt with Cubans who wanted to kill Castro, but that my job was simply to
attempt to extract from these contacts the names of people in Cuba who might be
of potential use to us in intelligence operations. I said that I had never engaged
in plotting with Cubans regarding assassinations, but that I had many conversations
with Cubans regarding their desire to conduct paramilitary activities which, as
a by-product might well result in Castro's death.
I pointed out emphatically that the Agency's policy
prohibits political assassination.
8. I was asked if I know [ 3 ] and Nestor Sanchez. I
told them that I knew them both me and that Nestor and I shared an office for a
short period near the end of my attachment with SAS. I was asked if AMLASH
meant anything to me and I replied in the negative. This was followed by
whether [ 3 ] and Nestor had discussed with me or mentioned an operation
involving a high-level officer of the Cuban government, a military man who made
frequent trips out of Cuba. Again I could only reply in the negative. I added
the juxtaposition of [ 3 ] and Nestor in the context of a single operation
surprised me inasmuch as I believed Nestor to have been involved only in
psychological operations and [ 3 ] working at collecting foreign intelligence.
I was then asked if the word "AMOTS" meant
anything to me and I said that it did but that all I could say was that it had
to do with counterintelligence activities. Mr. Rhea asked me whether I could say
that the "AMOTS" activity was concerned with contacting Cuban exiles
in the Miami area and I indicated that this was my understanding. The subject
was not pursued further.
9. I was asked about my visit to New Orleans (which
I had mentioned during the previous session) and I explained that these two
trips were for the purpose of attempting to find ways of establishing lines of communications
between Cuban's in New Orleans and their friends in Cuba.
I indicated that I had been able to come up with a
very fine prospect; a Cuban, and that I had turned him over to one of our FI
Case Officers. I also said that I had several discussions with an American whom
I declined to identify under the general ground rule relating to sources of
information. Messrs Postal and Rhea asked if I would respond affirmatively if
they were to suggest some initials which might correspond to my American
contact. I agreed to do this but the initials they mentioned meant nothing.
(Unfortunately, I cannot recall them!)
I volunteered the initials of my contact
"FJ" and this produced a blank expression on the part of both of the
investigators, and a shrug of Mr. Rhea's shoulders. The final question I was
asked was whether I had any knowledge of the "Ponchartrain
Operation." I told them that I knew where Lake Ponchartrain was and that's
as far as it went.
10. We spent a little time on the subject of General
Lansdale.
I admitted I had attended one meeting in General
Lansdale's office in the Pentagon. I was asked whether anyone else was there,
and said I could recall only one name, Cornelius Roosevelt, but that there were
two other people at that meeting. In response to a series of questions, about
what was discussed at that meeting
I said that General Lansdale was interested
in various paramilitary possibilities and that my role was limited to giving a
quick assessment of whether we had the agent assets to assist in carrying out
the various possible operations that General Lansdale suggested.
11. I was asked whether the term Mongoose meant
anything to me and I indicated that it was a general term to refer to a
composite of planned operational activities. I said that I had no knowledge of
any specific activity being planned under this name and further explained that it
was possible that some of my Cuban contacts may have been taken over by other
case officers for use under "Mongoose," but that I had no direct knowledge
of such having been done.
12. Mr. Robert Kelly expressed considerable interest
in the organization of Task Force W. At one point he asked how many echelons
there were between me and Mr. Helms. I told them that I reported to Bill
Harvey; that my title was Special Assistant; that Mr Harvey reported to Mr
Helms;
That I frequently received assignment and reported
to Sam Halpern; and that I occasionally undertook tasks for Bruce Cheever,
Harvey's deputy, although these tasks were concerned with the workings of Task
Force W and did not involve contacts with the Cubans. I was asked if there were
any Special Assistant other than me in Task Force W and I replied that Mr
Zogby, C/WH/4 prior to Mr Harvey's arrival on the scene had been retained as a
member of Task Force W in an SA status. I said that there may well have been
others because people would show up from time to time for short besides myself
for short tours of duty for several months or so and then depart to carry on
their work elsewhere, but that I could not recall anyone by name at this time
13. I was asked whether I used the name Fiscalini in
circumstances other than those described. I said that I frequently carried
identification in that name and I used it on several occasions. I described one
occasion which was an amusing one-time contact that had no bearing on any item
of interest to the committee. The investigator asked if I ever had contacts among
the Cuban's in Miami, and I replied in the negative.
14. I was asked if I had ever made contact with
people in New York City other than those described. I said that indeed I had;
but that in one case although the man in question lived in New York, the
meeting took place in Newark, New Jersey. In response to a question, I said
that the lead was provided by the FBI. I declined to identify the man involved
on the grounds of the sensitivity of his position at the time.
15. I was asked whether I had any knowledge of a
meeting of the Attornel General and Cuban exile leaders in the summer of 1962.
I said that sucha meeting would not have been unusual in my opinion, but that I
had no knowledge of such a meeting. I pointed out that it was common practice
among many Cuban leaders to acquire the support, or the appearance of support
of U.S. Agencies and prominent U.S. political figures. I further stated that
numerous attempts were made to get the U.S. to support a Cuban
government-in-exile and that I had one meeting in Washington with a Cuban
leader who was constantly trying to get us to support him as head of such an
arrangement. I identified this man as Mario Garcia-Kohly and added that he was
sentenced to prison some years later for counterfeiting Cuban pesos. The name
"Kohly" obviously rang a bell with Mr. Postal as he repeated it in a
surprised tone of voice. However, Mr Postal did not pursue the matter.
16. Some of the other topics which were surfaced in
connection with the above major items: I was asked whether I knew the following
people or recognized the names (My responses are summarized in parentheses and
I can't vouch for all the spellings):
1 Carlos Teppedino (never heard of him)
2 Jose Orta (never heard of him)
3 Sam Giancana (read about him in the newspaper,
never met him)
4 Roselli (read about him in the newspaper, never
met him)
5 Tafficante (read about him in the newspaper, never
met him)
6 Manuel Artime (read about him in the newspaper,
never met him)
7 Big Jim O'Connell (heard about him in the
newspaper, never met him)
I was asked whether "No Name Key" meant
anything to me and I gave no response.
I was asked whether I had gone to Chicago in the
course of my work and I told them I had not.
17. This is probably the appropriate point to
underline my conviction that the main, if not the only point of concern to the
investigators is whether I was directed to sally forth and initiate contact
with members of the underworld in the U.S. and who directed me to do so.
Their interest is even more pointedly focused on
whether I had anything to do with the Rosselli, Giancana, et al,
"operations." Once again, I explained that my job was broader than
this by a longshot and that I was never directed to take the initiative in
establishing contacts with the "underworld." I said that
"several," probably no more than five or six, of the people with whom
I dealt were "somewhat" shady characters in some cases with recorded
"run-ins" with law enforcement agencies.
Charles D. Ford Chief of Training Services Staff,
OTR
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