Sunday, February 17, 2019

Charles Ford - Updated

Charles Ford was described by Sam Halpern as the man who served as a CIA cut-out between Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and former Havana mobsters in regards to the plots to kill Fidel Castro, a false fact engraved in Sy Hersh's "Darkside of Camelot" but refruted by the government's own documents, as John Newman so dramatically demonstrates in his new book "Into the Storm."

Since Ford was from Atlantic City, my old Jersey Shore turf, I took a particular interest in him, especially his attendance at Princeton, his service in the OSS during WWII, his career in the CIA that spanned decades, and his association with a number of key people involved in the JFK assassination - including William Harvey, Desmond FitzGerald, and Sam Halpern.

Aussie analyst James Richards says that Charles Ford knew John Martino – and they may have known each other as they were from the same AC Ducktown neighborhood.

While Martino became a bookie for Angelo Bruno, who was on the Commission, Martino moved to Florida where he worked the illegal Florida casinos for Meyer Lansky and for Santo Traficante in Havana, Charles Ford became a CIA training specialist, but for a little over one year he was pulled out of the Office of Training and assigned to the Operations branch - specifically to Task Force W - the Cuban Operations desk in the basement of the new CIA HQ in Langley.

There, according to Halpern, Ford was ordered to carry out whatever assignment RFK gave him, that according to Halpern, included contacting the Italian mobsters with former interests in Cuba and get them to assassinate Fidel Castro.

But that version of history is totally contradicted by the official records - Ford's TFW reports, transcripts of his testimony before the Church Committee in 1975, called specifically to address this issue, and the contradictions in Halpern's twenty year long branding of RFK as having ordered Castro's assassination.

In late 1962, at the behest of Robert Kennedy, Ford was dispatched to interview a Cuban by the name of Ernesto Betancourt from the Ejercito Libertadore de Cuba.

Betancourt was planning some sabotage action in Cuba and even though Betancourt didn't officially have anything to do with the CIA, in fact he didn't trust them and they didn’t buy his story, but Ford was told to check it out.

Present in the meeting with Betancourt was one Eduardo Perez aka Eddie Bayo who indeed was the major spokesman. It was only a few months later that Bayo led 'Operation Tilt' which was signed off by David Morales and involved Martino, Richard Billings, and William Paley. A martime infiltration mission, the story of Operation Tilt is one of a number of covert intelligence operations that are connected to the Dealey Plaza Operation.

The information regarding Perez and Betancourt was in a report authored by Ford himself.

Also, one more curiosity, in 1965, the CIA received a print of the Zapruder Film from Time Inc. This copy was used by the Office of Training between 1965 and 1969. The man who took possession of the film for the CIA and who controlled its use was Charles D. Ford, who probably first presented it to his students at Quantaco "the Farm," - for training purposes only. 

Besides Ford's possible associations with Martino, questionable association with Halpern, Harvey and FitzGerald, and his secret missions for RFK - that didn't include visiting mobsters to encourage them to kill Castro, OSS records from World War II indicate Ford may have been sent on an OSS mission to China with J. Walton Moore - the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division officer in Dallas at the time of the assassination. Moore was the case officer for George deMohrenschilt, Hugh Aynesworth and Colonel Orlov, the mysterious Colonel who accompanied deMohrenschildt when he first visited Oswald, and regular handball partner with Moore. 

While I will let John Newman tell the story of RFK, Charles Ford and Sam Halpern in a much more eloquent style, there are further ramifications to this side of the story than we have come to know so far. 


AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10303-10001
RECORDS SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CIA-OP
DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : [No From]
TO : [No To]
TITLE : FILE ON FORD, CHARLES/RFK-MAFIA
DATE : 01/01/0000
PAGES : 10
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER - TEXTUAL
DOCUMENTSUBJECTS :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS : 1BDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/18/1998COMMENTS : JFK-M-03 : F6 : 1998.09.18.07:48:32:030120 : ARRB REQUEST.CIA - IR 13. CORRECTED TO 10 PAGES VICE 20

Date of interview Sept. 18, 1975

Mike Madigan SSC Staff reports that Mr Helms and Mr Halpern have testified that in response to a request by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the assigned an officer to establish contacts with the underworld to look for possible contacts for use against Castro. Sam Halpern says the officer was Charles Ford who used the name Rocky Siscalini.

Madigan wants any information we have on this and would like to interview the Agency officer.

2...........I told them that I joined in 1949; that I was and am now a member of the Office of Training; That in 1960 or thereabouts I had a brief tour of duty with the Economic Group in the DDP, and I went directly from that assignment to WH-4 in Sept., 1961.

3. I was asked to recall my major activities while with the Cuban operation and I did so. I reported that my first major assignment was the handling of a Cuban agent, one we were using to build a nucleus of an organization for eventual operations into Cuba. I identified this man as Mr [ 6 ]. (Mr. Rhea having heard my description of this activity at our earlier session, did not pursue this matter any further.)

4. The investigators were interested in when I was assigned the code name Fiscalini, the circumstances under which the name was assigned, and who had assigned it. I told them I had seen a Xerox copy of the memorandum (I saw this during a meeting with Bill Sturbits last Friday in Bill's office) which requested that identification in the name of Fiscalini be assigned to me. I explained the circumstances, which Mr. Postal and Mr Rhea had heard at our earlier meeting, and said that I thought the date was the end of March, 1962. The circumstances involved a contact by a New York lawyer, thru the Department of Justice, concerning a client who had access to Cuba and wanted to visit Castro to put in a special plea on behalf of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. I identified the individual concerned (I still can't remember his name) as the manager of the Teresa Hotel in New York. I did not identify the lawyer and was not asked for his name I identified a man I met at a second meeting in New York as 'Bubbles' Abdallah. I explained that the latter individual proposed to accompany the manager of the Teresa to Cuba, the manager being an elderly man with some difficulty in walking. I explained to the investigators that I had no further contact with these individuals after I discovered that Abdallah was wanted, or under indictment - I forget which, by Texas authorities for smuggling drugs from Mexico.

Mr. Robert Kelly was clearly interested in pursuing the matter further of who assigned my "Code Name." I indicated that the document I received came from the Office of Security, but that I did not know whether the Office selected the name or not.

5. We went over again the story of my contact with a Canadian named "Joe," (I know this man's last name but have not been asked for it and have not volunteered it.) I described one meeting and a telephone call involving Joe. In the meeting he claimed that he could travel back and forth from Canada to Cuba; revealed to me that he was interested in starting a smuggling activity involving goods on the proscribed list; that he wanted United States citizenship and a great deal of money in exchange for allowing us to send materials or tamper with some of the shipments if we could get the proscribed goods to Canada. I explained to the investigators that my interest lay in the fact that Joe claimed he could speak with Che Guevera and that I had attempted to get Joe to serve as a means of communications between us and Che, which Joe refused to do. 

As for the telephone call, I told them that when Joe returned from his trip to Cuba he called to say that big things were going on in Cuba and that we should meet right away. Being aware at that point that we in the Agency were deep in the middle of what would later be called the Cuban Missile Crisis, I told Joe I could not see him and that we probably already knew what he had to tell me. That was the last I heard of Joe.

6. We spent a great deal of time going over my meetings with the Attorney General and his interest in a small group of Cubans who claimed to have supporters ready to create an uprising in Santiago Province. This is the case described in paragraph 3 of my earlier memorandum. The investigators were quite interested in the identity of the man whom I saw at the request of the Attorney General. I went over this again in as much detail as I could remember, but without being able to recall who this man was. I was asked if I could describe the man and I said that I recalled him as a fairly tall man of average build with black hair, black eyebrows and glasses. Of considerable interest is the fact that perhaps 15 or 20 minutes later, I was shown an 8 x 10 glossy photograph of several people walking in front of what appeared to be a public building and was asked whether I could identify any of the people in the picture. I could not. Mr. Postal pointed to the central figure and asked if I could identify him. I said I could not. (The picture was of a man probably in his mid-sixties with flowing white hair and somewhat on the order of Sen. Kenneth Keating, a large, down-curving nose, white straight eyebrows behind dark glasses, a somewhat lined, puffy face and a slightly receding forehead accentuated by the fact that his hair was combed straight from front to back. The man was wearing a dark blue, or black suit, and one man appeared to be accompanying him to his left and slightly ahead and another man slightly to his right and rear. Without having any reference points by which to judge, my best guess would be that the subject was about 5'10 inches tall. He appeared to be rather heavy, perhaps in the range of 220 lbs. There appeared to be a caption of some sort at the bottom of the picture, but this was hidden from my view.) Mr. Postal asked whether the main figure in the photograph could have been the man the Attorney General directed me to see. I replied that, even allowing for the difference in years, the man in the photograph in no way resembled the man I saw on behalf of the Attorney General.

7. Messrs. Postal and Rhea again brought up the topic of assassination and asked whether I had engaged in or had heard mention of, in Task Force W, or SAS discussions on the subject of assassination either in general or specifically with regards to Castro. I told the investigators that the subject name came up repeatedly, when we were speaking with Cubans, many of whom having bring forced to flee Cuba, sincerely wished for Castrol's immediate demise. I said that I had never heard of, nor engaged in conversations with Agency officers about any plan, the direct and only aspect of which was the assassination of Fidel Castro. I pointed out that on a number of occasions I dealt with Cubans who wanted to kill Castro, but that my job was simply to attempt to extract from these contacts the names of people in Cuba who might be of potential use to us in intelligence operations. I said that I had never engaged in plotting with Cubans regarding assassinations, but that I had many conversations with Cubans regarding their desire to conduct paramilitary activities which, as a by-product might well result in Castro's death.

I pointed out emphatically that the Agency's policy prohibits political assassination.

8. I was asked if I know [ 3 ] and Nestor Sanchez. I told them that I knew them both me and that Nestor and I shared an office for a short period near the end of my attachment with SAS. I was asked if AMLASH meant anything to me and I replied in the negative. This was followed by whether [ 3 ] and Nestor had discussed with me or mentioned an operation involving a high-level officer of the Cuban government, a military man who made frequent trips out of Cuba. Again I could only reply in the negative. I added the juxtaposition of [ 3 ] and Nestor in the context of a single operation surprised me inasmuch as I believed Nestor to have been involved only in psychological operations and [ 3 ] working at collecting foreign intelligence.

I was then asked if the word "AMOTS" meant anything to me and I said that it did but that all I could say was that it had to do with counterintelligence activities. Mr. Rhea asked me whether I could say that the "AMOTS" activity was concerned with contacting Cuban exiles in the Miami area and I indicated that this was my understanding. The subject was not pursued further.

9. I was asked about my visit to New Orleans (which I had mentioned during the previous session) and I explained that these two trips were for the purpose of attempting to find ways of establishing lines of communications between Cuban's in New Orleans and their friends in Cuba.

I indicated that I had been able to come up with a very fine prospect; a Cuban, and that I had turned him over to one of our FI Case Officers. I also said that I had several discussions with an American whom I declined to identify under the general ground rule relating to sources of information. Messrs Postal and Rhea asked if I would respond affirmatively if they were to suggest some initials which might correspond to my American contact. I agreed to do this but the initials they mentioned meant nothing. (Unfortunately, I cannot recall them!)

I volunteered the initials of my contact "FJ" and this produced a blank expression on the part of both of the investigators, and a shrug of Mr. Rhea's shoulders. The final question I was asked was whether I had any knowledge of the "Ponchartrain Operation." I told them that I knew where Lake Ponchartrain was and that's as far as it went.

10. We spent a little time on the subject of General Lansdale.

I admitted I had attended one meeting in General Lansdale's office in the Pentagon. I was asked whether anyone else was there, and said I could recall only one name, Cornelius Roosevelt, but that there were two other people at that meeting. In response to a series of questions, about what was discussed at that meeting

 I said that General Lansdale was interested in various paramilitary possibilities and that my role was limited to giving a quick assessment of whether we had the agent assets to assist in carrying out the various possible operations that General Lansdale suggested.

11. I was asked whether the term Mongoose meant anything to me and I indicated that it was a general term to refer to a composite of planned operational activities. I said that I had no knowledge of any specific activity being planned under this name and further explained that it was possible that some of my Cuban contacts may have been taken over by other case officers for use under "Mongoose," but that I had no direct knowledge of such having been done.

12. Mr. Robert Kelly expressed considerable interest in the organization of Task Force W. At one point he asked how many echelons there were between me and Mr. Helms. I told them that I reported to Bill Harvey; that my title was Special Assistant; that Mr Harvey reported to Mr Helms;

That I frequently received assignment and reported to Sam Halpern; and that I occasionally undertook tasks for Bruce Cheever, Harvey's deputy, although these tasks were concerned with the workings of Task Force W and did not involve contacts with the Cubans. I was asked if there were any Special Assistant other than me in Task Force W and I replied that Mr Zogby, C/WH/4 prior to Mr Harvey's arrival on the scene had been retained as a member of Task Force W in an SA status. I said that there may well have been others because people would show up from time to time for short besides myself for short tours of duty for several months or so and then depart to carry on their work elsewhere, but that I could not recall anyone by name at this time

13. I was asked whether I used the name Fiscalini in circumstances other than those described. I said that I frequently carried identification in that name and I used it on several occasions. I described one occasion which was an amusing one-time contact that had no bearing on any item of interest to the committee. The investigator asked if I ever had contacts among the Cuban's in Miami, and I replied in the negative.

14. I was asked if I had ever made contact with people in New York City other than those described. I said that indeed I had; but that in one case although the man in question lived in New York, the meeting took place in Newark, New Jersey. In response to a question, I said that the lead was provided by the FBI. I declined to identify the man involved on the grounds of the sensitivity of his position at the time.

15. I was asked whether I had any knowledge of a meeting of the Attornel General and Cuban exile leaders in the summer of 1962. I said that sucha meeting would not have been unusual in my opinion, but that I had no knowledge of such a meeting. I pointed out that it was common practice among many Cuban leaders to acquire the support, or the appearance of support of U.S. Agencies and prominent U.S. political figures. I further stated that numerous attempts were made to get the U.S. to support a Cuban government-in-exile and that I had one meeting in Washington with a Cuban leader who was constantly trying to get us to support him as head of such an arrangement. I identified this man as Mario Garcia-Kohly and added that he was sentenced to prison some years later for counterfeiting Cuban pesos. The name "Kohly" obviously rang a bell with Mr. Postal as he repeated it in a surprised tone of voice. However, Mr Postal did not pursue the matter.

16. Some of the other topics which were surfaced in connection with the above major items: I was asked whether I knew the following people or recognized the names (My responses are summarized in parentheses and I can't vouch for all the spellings):

1 Carlos Teppedino (never heard of him)
2 Jose Orta (never heard of him)
3 Sam Giancana (read about him in the newspaper, never met him)
4 Roselli (read about him in the newspaper, never met him)
5 Tafficante (read about him in the newspaper, never met him)
6 Manuel Artime (read about him in the newspaper, never met him)
7 Big Jim O'Connell (heard about him in the newspaper, never met him) 

I was asked whether "No Name Key" meant anything to me and I gave no response.

I was asked whether I had gone to Chicago in the course of my work and I told them I had not.

17. This is probably the appropriate point to underline my conviction that the main, if not the only point of concern to the investigators is whether I was directed to sally forth and initiate contact with members of the underworld in the U.S. and who directed me to do so.

Their interest is even more pointedly focused on whether I had anything to do with the Rosselli, Giancana, et al, "operations." Once again, I explained that my job was broader than this by a longshot and that I was never directed to take the initiative in establishing contacts with the "underworld." I said that "several," probably no more than five or six, of the people with whom I dealt were "somewhat" shady characters in some cases with recorded "run-ins" with law enforcement agencies.

Charles D. Ford Chief of Training Services Staff, OTR


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