LeMay and the CIA @ the Bay of Pigs

LEMAY AND CIA at the Bay of Pigs

BILL SIMPICH Asks: In regards to this document:

On the far right of Item #7 - Is "C Le M" - Curtis LeMay? 

Was Curtis LeMay cross-designated with the CIA, working counterintelligence?

During February 1961, Curtis LeMay had considerable time on his hands.  From 1957-1961, LeMay was the Vice Chief of Staff - he wouldn't be elevated until Thomas White retired in June 1961.   Was he cross-designated with the CIA, helping out with Air Force issues?

Look at the man I believe is Curtis Le May (C Le M) as WH/4/CI on both "line 7" and the lower right hand corner of this routing sheet.

As of Feb. 61 - Le May was a deputy - not yet on the Chiefs of Staff - I think he was itching for something to do - based on this signature, I propose that he was "cross-designated" to do Air Force counterintelligence on Cuba, and asked to weigh in on whether this airman from an air force base in Panama was a Cuban spy.

"To (WH/4/PM/REDACTED).  (Note:  We don't know the recipient, due to the redaction. Lou Napoli was a WH/4/PM, it could have been him or someone of similar rank.)

"Please file in Artime's 201.  FYI.  Letter was obtained by illegal entry and was examined by TSD/SAB; evidence of previous surreptitious entry was found.  Original letter was returned by Mr. Droller to Subject for reference while he was in DC 13 Feb 1961.  File card on author of letter in WH/4/FI/Reports. C Le M."

The man handling the letter before LeMay got it was described as "Chief of Base" in late January 1961 - I'm not sure - but it might have been David Morales. Morales signed for "Chief of Base" in May 1961.

Three observations about this letter.

1.  If you play "hangman" on the next page after the signature of "C Le M", at both of the references for the WH/4/CI officer, you have a space for twelve letters - "Curtis LeMay" fits perfectly.

2.  The L is a looped L.  Sometimes Curtis Le May signs with a looped L.   The M also looks similar.

  .  

3.  Whether or not Morales was Chief of Base in January 1961, it is uncontested that Morales was the head of CI at JMWAVE in early 1961.  The chances are high that Morales worked directly with Curtis LeMay.

Note that it appears Curtis LeMay was working WH/4/CI at extension 4448 - that number was used three months earlier by WH/4/CI Jean Pierson while working on June Cobb's file. Pierson was working with the nut from TSD - Herman Kimsey, a dangerous man.   By 2/14/61, TSD/SAB is now inspired to try to fake the letterhead and envelope for Castro himself!  

The airman LeMay was investigating during Feb. 1961 was "Jose Sarria", stationed at Albrook Air Force Base in the Canal Zone.  Can't find the document right now, but I recall that Sarria was trying to penetrate Castro's inner circle.   Sarria wrote this letter directly to Manuel Artime.   

This puts Le May directly in the path of tracking Sarria and Artime, and maybe even guiding Sarria in his penetration efforts.

The Sarria story goes up to at least 3/9/61, when C/WH/4 Jake Esterline says he has more info from Bill Pawley/QDDALE on Sarria, including a memo (possibly from Sarria) and Sarria's bio.  Sarria's bio is here - written in the handwriting of Pawley's aide "the Alligator".

The memo is of much greater import.   The memo discusses the anti-Castro forces trapped in the Escambray, fighting against 60,000 pro-Castro forces, and then has this highly provocative language:

"The situation of the combatants of the Escambray is critical, as never it has been up to now.  They are surrounded by a human wall of about 60,000 militiamen, armed to the teeth, with all kinds of equipment in excessive abundance...

"...Getting supplies by land is almost impossible as there is only one safe route and it does not lend itself to transporting equipment, only men on foot with light arms.  The supplies carried by air are insufficient and parts of the last three or four flights have come into the hands of the Government...

"...The Headquarters and the officers are desperately asking for equipment in massive doses quickly; it is estimated that they can continue to keep fighting some 20 days in the aggressive way they are doing now to great success.  After that it will be on defensive and losing ground and positions until complete annihilation occurs.  Morale is high, combative, and disciplined, for the present, but will change quickly if they cannot maintain the offensive as it is to date.  

"The time has come to carry out a great landing of men and armaments, establishing a beachhead and maintaining it by continuing to land armaments, as close as possible to Escambray.  Some place on the South Coast of the province of Santa Clara, to the south of Trinidad, is suggested, as the ideal point, or almost the only one.  

"In Trinidad there is a good runway for planes.  All that zone is sympathetic with the combatants of Escambray and any movement of this nature would be well received and would have much cooperation.  

A note says "important":  "To the east of Trinidad is a swampy zone and is difficult to maneuver a large military body; toward the west it is dangerous because of the facilities for transporting great military forces.  Places by way of assault at the coast are numerous and relatively lacking of surveillance; there are small rivers and navigable streams for two or three kilometers.  

What is particularly strange about all this is that Trinidad was rejected just days after this letter based on the absurd claim that there was no usable airfield at Trinidad - the person who wrote that was Jack Hawkins:

"We thought of another plan for Trinidad involving landing troops who would go directly into the mountains - but there was no airfield.  

"Finally, through photography, we found what we thought was a usable airfield - this was in the Zapata area - and this is what led us to this area."

The Official History of the Bay of Pigs states:  "At no time was Hawkins questioned as to why the B-26s could not have operated  from the Trinidad airfield.  In fact, there was a 4000 foot, hard surfaced runway at Trinidad from as early as 1957, and in 1960 it was listed as one of the seven major civilian airfields of Cuba.  Even more damning is the fact that both Col. Stanley Beerli and Jake Esterline were present during Hawkins' testimony, but neither remembered that 4000 landings were practiced by the Cuban pilots during their training at Retalhuleu, Guatemala."

JFK did not put major stock on the airfields because he did not believe that the airstrikes were important - because neither the Joint Chiefs or the CIA put the argument to him in a coherent fashion.  Believe it or not, Curtis Le May - the Air Chief of Staff - was reported that he was less than fully convinced that airstrikes were important at the Bay of PIgs!  (Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs, p. 200).

General David Gray told DPD Richard Bissell about "a discussion that had taken place the previous day in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs.  Curtis Le May (who was sitting in for the absent commandant of the Marines) and several of the Chiefs admitted their doubt about the absolute essentiality of air cover.  (Bissell, Reflections of a Cold Warrior, p. 175).

John Newman recounts this episode, adding: "Bissell was shocked - as he should have been.  There was no virtuous explanation for what General Gray heard the chiefs say.  'We all knew only too well." Bissell recalled, "that without air support the project would fail."  (Newman, Countdown to Darkness, p. 401).

And who did both Morales and LeMay work with?  

While serving as JMWAVE/CI, Morales had a close relationship with Clark W. Simmons, the C/WH/4/CI (chief of Western Hemisphere counterintelligence, Cuba) in 1961.   

Similarly, WH/4/CI Curtis Le May's boss would have been C/WH/4/CI Clark SImmons.  

As discussed at length in the last chapter of my book State Secret, I consider Clark Simmons a "person of interest" in the death of JFK.

Simmons worked with CIA security official Joseph Langan in the outrageous attempt to cover up the American origin of the planes that conducted the surprise attack on Castro’s planes right before the Bay of Pigs.[ 38 ] Ambassador Adlai Stevenson publicly claimed that this surprise attack was the work of internal Cuban defectors, and was furious to find out that he had been lied to by his own people.

We also know that Simmons and Harvey’s people had access to highly sensitive information in 1962 – the deficiencies of the Secret Service. Simmons joined Richard Helms, Ghosn Zogby (Bill Harvey’s predecessor at the Cuba desk), and Victor Wallen (Harvey’s CI chief) for a scathing review of the Secret Service by one of its prominent agents, Ernest Ignacio Aragon.[ 39 ] Aragon had a lot of inside knowledge, which can be seen in his reports as an emissary on Cuban affairs for Bobby Kennedy.[ 40 ] 

If LeMay was working with Simmons and Morales during the build-up to the Bay of Pigs, that is cause for concern.  Just a few reasons why, above and beyond his repeated hostile comments to JFK during the Cuban missile crisis.

1.  The claim by autopsy team member Paul O'Connor that LeMay was at the JFK autopsy, as well as background on how LeMay arrived in Washington DC that day...you may have seen this?  (Search for LeMay to find it quickly)

http://www.whokilledjfk.net/LEMAY%20WAS%20AT%20AUTOPSY.htm

2.  Gen. LeMay's aide Colonel Dorman's wife was in White House at the time of assassination.

3.  There is one weapon above all, which can be suspected as that which might have been used, based on wound analysis which points to one rifle may have been the culprit.   David Knight portrays this image of an AR-5 Hornet high powered rifle which belonged to, of all people, General Curtis Lemay!  (The Air Force was very drawn to the AR-5 as early as 1956.)

David analyzed that the size of the hole of entry reported by the Parkland doctors for the bullet wound at JFK's throat was only 3-5mm in diameter. For example:

Dr. Charles Rufus Baxter, general surgeon:

“The wound on the neck was approximately an inch and a haft above the manubrium of the sternum, the sternal notch. This wound was in my estimation, 4 to 5 mm. in widest diameter and was a spherical wound. The edges of it–the size of the wound is measured by the hole plus the damaged skin around the area, so that it was a very small wound.”

David ran a complete inventory of rifles mentioned on 22 November 1963, and determined that all of them were of a greater bore than that which caused this “4-5 mm wound”, with the exception of LeMay's AR-5 Hornet.

The tie between the Bay of PIgs and 11/22/63 has never seemed stronger for me - whether or not this signature pans out as belonging to Curtis LeMay.

Bill Simpich - and see the chrono below - 

1/9/61 - False documentation - Artime:  Memo from Wh/4/PA Lou Napoli to Chief of Base:  "Attached under separate cover is being forwarded the documentation reported by you for use by AMBIDDY-1"

1/9/61 - Memo re "Performance of Surreptitious entry of mail" - from TSD/SAB to WH/4/CI - "To WH/4/CI ATTN:  (REDACTED with room for 11 letters and 1 space - Curtis LeMay would fit) the following item was submitted for surreptitious entry - letter from Jose Sarria to Manuel Artime...this letter bore evidence of a previous surreptitious opening"

It then says:  "the letter and copies of contents are returned herewith to WH/4/CI.  Attn:   (room for 11 letters and one space) x4448."

What is weird is that the routing slip for an event on 2/1/61 that has LeMay's initials on it in two different places is attached to this 1/9/61 memo!!

1/13/64 Letter to C/WH/4/CI re Pedro Diaz Lanz, head of the Cuban Air Force and his concern that Artime may be a Communist

1/24/61 - Droller writes Chief CI/OA re doubts about Artime, young Cuban exile (probably Pedro Diaz Lanz) is claiming both that Artime's parents were Communists and that Artime was a penetration agent for Castro

1/27/61 - letter from Sarria to Artime - read the typed version, Sarria claims to have been in the Air Force for the last three years, and wants to meet with Artime in early Feb in Miami and join him.  A gushing letter, carrying on how "Radio Swan" gets him all fired up.

1/30/61 - On Green List search on Artime's parents, traces came up negative

2/1/61 - Long review on Artime's parents and their history w/communism.  His father was expelled from the party in 1939.

2/1/61 Letter for Artime is ready to be delivered to him - this appears to be the letter referenced by C L M in the routing slip

On 2/14/61, TSD/SAB is now inspired to try to fake the letterhead and envelope for Castro himself!   They send the proposal to June Cobb's handler Jean Pierson.)

3/6/61 QDDALE/Pawley is now providing info on Jose Sarria to Esterline.

Here is some of Pawley's handwritten material on Jose Sarria.

By the way, if this is Pawley's handwriting, he disliked Artime and considered him "a Catholic Fidel".

3/9/61 - Esterline sends to C/WH/4/PM the 3/6/61 unsigned letter to "Dr. Cuervo" and the 3/9/61 bio of Sarria written by Alligator.

Here's the English version of the letter - and the note saying "important"

Here's the Sarria bio

2/2/64 Henrietta Lorie - identified as a "CIA covert", vouched for Sarria as a source of intelligence information from Cuba.  Why is Sarria being vouched for shortly after 11/22/63?

LARRY HANCOCK Responds:

I'm afraid I just can't follow though what you list out here as pointing to LeMay.

First off, the Air Force has its own investigative service which includes CI.  If there was an issue with an airman on a base you would certainly see forwarding and involvement but AFOSI would be the unit involved, and that would bring in commanders within the section of the service involved.

Which might mean SAC if it was a SAC base like say Ramey in Puerto Rico.

The chain of command there would have come though SAC OSI - the toughest and most paranoid group of any air command at Ramey:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramey_Air_Force_Base

SAC was not in the Canal Zone.

That would have been southern command:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Air_Forces_Southern_Command

But there would also be no need to play games with crypts, we frequently see documented copied to various agencies as well as the Air Force and they are spelled out openly.

And in 1961 LeMay moved to a staff positon with the Joint Chiefs, which totally takes him out of line of command for the Air Force.  Chiefs and their staffs serve primarily as advisors and perform a communications role for the CIC, they are not in direct chain of command for any service and
the only folks reporting to them are their personal staff and various staff groups assigned under JCS - like SACSA.

Not that there were not Air Force units detailed for clandestine support for the CIA - primarily for transport, logistics and supply.  I write about the origin and evolution of those units in Shadow Warfare.

As to the Bay of Pigs, all I can do is encourage you to read In Denial when it becomes available - which it will shortly, for a full understanding of the interaction between the Joint Chiefs, the CIA and
both Eisenhower and JFK.

If you want to look for somebody going rogue there, you won't find LeMay, you will find the Navy and Burke on the JCS and Dennison as CINCATLANTIC - both doing things with Bissell that JFK was not told about.

BILL SIMPICH:  The LeMay story is useless without context. For me, the center of it is the possibility that LeMay and friends egged on JFK into the swamps of the Bay of Pigs, hoping it would fail in order to justify a land invasion. My questions boil down to two - don’t you agree that c le m looks like LeMay?

And why in the world would be arguing against air operations at the Bay of Pigs?

Larry basically agrees, he just wants to limit it to the signature because as he said in his initial post he blames it all on Bissell.

LARRY: I do Bill, I just can't think of any good reason to for that to be abbreviated in an official document like that...and I have never seen that used for him anywhere else.

As to the other, he certainly was AF Chief on the Joint Chiefs and it certainly was the JCS who assigned their staff to review what was essentially a verbal description of the Trinidad plan (they got even less
to review for Zapata).  And there was specifically an air staff review which addressed logistics issues - that is where the comments that the effort would be doomed if a single Cuban aircraft was left to operate over the beach since it would likely take out the supply ships and the plans for resupply were minimal at best.

However as far as I can tell LeMay himself did not participate in the process and he does not even show up in the follow up inquires...its the Navy Chief and JCS Chair who represent the JCS.

So...does it refer to LeMay, it certainly might since the JCS staff was involved and the Air staff offered an assessment that was an attachment to their evaluations. But I see no sign that LeMay was personally involved in that, in the discussions etc...the Chiefs made it clear that they were not invited and the most they had done was to do a quick and limited review after JFK asked for it. When you read their remarks you can tell the CIA, in particular Bissell, had wanted it as their turf and deserved what they got...sad, but true.

If anything LeMay had been far more involved with the CIA (and battled them) when he was in charge of SAC and SAC was running U-2 missions and its own air recon missions on top of that.

The problem is that to fully appreciate my assessment you have to spend the months inside the Cuba
Project documents and inquiries I did..or read "In Denial" where I spell it all out.

Checkout Larry’s book SHADOW WARFARE

Larry’s new book IN DENIAL will be out in both Kindle and Print in March:

https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B082MTQS2G/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_hsch_vapi_taft_p1_i7