Gangsterismo – The US , Cuba , and the Mafia: 1933 to 1966 by Jack
Colhoun (OR Books, NY, London ,
2013)
[BK Notes: This review is a work in progress, which when finished will be posted at my regular blog JFKCountercoup.blogspot.] Here's excerpts that I found relevant to JFK assassination and may cite in my review.]
Gangsterismo – The US , Cuba , and the Mafia: 1933 to 1966 by Jack
Colhoun (OR Books, NY, London ,
2013)
In the 50th years since the assassination of
President Kennedy a number of books on the subject stand out, and this book is
a sort of prerequisite before reading some of the others that reflect on more
intimate details of the assassination.
This book stands out because, without mentioning what
specifically happened at Dealey Plaza ,
it shows how Cuba
was the crossroads between President Kennedy, his alleged assassin Lee Harvey
Oswald and Oswald’s killer Jack Ruby.
“Gangsterismo” is the Cuban term for the political-social
time period before Fidel Castro came to power, when Cuban politicians and the
military worked closely with American gangsters in the running of Havana vice,
particularly gambling. Shortly after Castro came to power he closed the casinos
and brothels and kicked out the gangsters who had controlled Havana
for the previous fifty years and effectively ended the era of the
“Gangsterismo.”
In the research and writing “Gangsterismo” Jack Colhoun, a
Washington-based reporter and Washington correspondent for
the Guardian (1980 to 1992), effectively utilized the most recently
released records, primarily from the JFK Assassinations Collection (JFKAC) at
the National Archives (NARA ). With them he
accurately summarizes the economic and political relationship between the United
States and Cuba
from 1933-1966, with a particular emphasis on the influence of American
organized crime, the military and the CIA .
As anyone who has studied the assassination of President Kennedy
appreciates, the Cuban connections are the keys to the crime, so any
understanding of what occurred at Dealey
Plaza is contingent upon knowledge
of the Cuban associations, especially those related to the accused assassin Lee
Harvey Oswald and his murderer, Jack Ruby.
Oswald had a keen interest in Cuba ,
founded a one-man Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) in New
Orleans in the summer of ’63 and visited the Cuban and
Soviet embassies in Mexico City in
an attempt to get a visa to Cuba .
Oswald’s killer Jack Ruby had visited Cuba
on a number of occasions, staying with his good friend Louis McWillie, the
manager of the Tropicana casino. As a favor to McWillie Ruby returned to the United
States with a cache of cash that he
deposited in the Pan Am bank of Miami
for McWillie’s bosses, the Fox brothers.
While early speculation considered the “Fox brothers” a
pseudo name for Meyer and Jake Lansky, it turns out the Fox brothers were for
real, as Jack Calhoun’s book takes account. The book also includes many other
similar details that are of interest to JFK assassination researchers,
including the fact that Ruby’s childhood friends Lenny Patrick and Dave Yaras
also had financial interests in mob controlled Havana
casinos, and American ex-patriates Frank Forini and William Morgan really
didn’t work for the CIA , as the CIA
has been claiming all along. It turns out they were working for US military
intelligence, and answering to the US military attaches at the American embassy
in Havana.
Rather than the victim of a deranged madman, if President Kennedy
was killed as a result of a political backlash to his contradictory policies
towards Cuba and the mobsters, as some suspect, then the history of those
policies come into play and a study of their history is a mandatory requirement
for any serious study of the assassination itself.
Colhoun’s “Gangsterismo” provides that basic, deep political
background of Cuban history and gives an understandably historic context for
the political assassination of President Kennedy.
If anything, the accused assassin was a political animal, a
former US Marine Corp radio and radar operator, defector to the Soviet
Union and pro-Castro sympathizer who had been to the Cuban and
Russian embassies in Mexico City ,
so any interpretation of what happened at Dealey
Plaza must consider these facts.
Right off the bat Calhoun gives us some new information that
had previously escaped my general attention, and a new name – Edward K. Moss – who
ran a DC PR firm that was connected with the Mafia and CIA
and represented the mobsters in their bid to reclaim Cuba
from Castro in 1960. But the historical story goes back much further, at least
to 1933, when Meyer Lansky and Cuban military Sgt. Fulgencio Batista made a
deal and Calhoun begins his study.
Going back over the history of Cuba
and the US
involvement there’s a strong US
military presence there from the time of the Spanish-American War (1898), and
the original “Northwoods” type pretext for war – “Remember the Maine !”
But the most important association between the United
States and Cuba
was the business agreement between Cuban Sgt. Fulgencio Batista, who took over Cuba
in a coup in 1933, and Meyer Lansky, the chief accountant and banker of the
national syndicate of organized crime. Lansky represented the loosely
associated group of gangsters who formed the national Syndicate, which was
basically institutionalized at the April 1929 conference of organized crime
leaders in Atlantic City .
That’s also when Santo Trafficante, Sr. was recognized as
the boss of the Tampa , Florida
and Cuba , and
where it was decided the mobsters were to get into casino gambling in a big way
after prohibition ended, a strategic move that the syndicate followed through
on with much success in popular resorts, especially Las
Vegas , Florida and Havana .
In Cuba, Batista was the mobster’s main man, a sergeant in
the military who took over in a coup and reigned from 1933-1943, from when he
lived the high life as Lansky’s Florida neighbor, and then returned to Cuba to
rule again from 1952-1960.
As Calhoun points out, there were others – San Martin and
Carlos Prio Soccaras, but it was basically Batista who carried the water for
the American mobsters who invested heavily in Havana
hotels and were amply rewarded with untaxed profits from the casinos and other
forms of gambling.
The first deal Lansky made with Bastita was over molasas,
which Lanksy, in 1933, needed to make rum in the newly legalized distilleries,
but Lansky quickly moved to opening swanky gambling casinos in the larger
hotels, and made sweetheart deals to build a number of large hotel resorts,
each having their own casino.
One of Lansky’s tenants was to run a clean game of chance,
so the customer knew that Lansky was an honest man, and he ran clean casinos,
and he brought in his team of Americans to run the game – a team that consisted
of a number of individuals who later surface in Dallas including Doc Statcher,
John Martino, Lewis McWillie, the Cillini brothers, John Rosselli and other
similar smooth managers and operators.
They worked for Lansky and his partners – Tampa-Havana Mafia
don Santo Trafficante, Sr. and later Jr., fellow Syndicate Commissioner and
Philadelphia Mafia Don Angelo Bruno, Mike McLaney, Carroll Rosenbloom and
others similar mobster-industrialists.
When Jack Ruby came to Havana, which records indicate
occurred three times, he visited his pal Lewis McWillie, the manager of the
lavish and legendary Tropiana nightclub casino, which was owned by Cuban
brothers Martin and . Fox.
Ruby served as a courier for carrying out large amounts of
cash for the Fox brothers, which he deposited for the Fox brothers in the Pan
Am Bank of Miami .
With Castro in power they knew their days making making
money in the casinos were numbered.
Ruby may have also visited Traficante in Trescora – the
first class prison where a number of high ranking gangsters were held until a
deal was made to free them.
Jack Colhoun writes:
[When the Cubans and the mobsters got together]….. They hired the public relations firm of
Edward K. Moss in Washington , D.C.
Moss was a good choice for the job. Documents in his CIA
file reveal that he had “longstanding connections” to organized crime in the United
States . One report stated, “Moss’s operation
seems to be government contracts for the underworld and probably surfaces Mafia
money in legitimate activities.”
Other CIA
records reported that Moss worked for the Defense Production Administration of
the Department of Commerce in the early 1950s. Julia Cellini, who ran Moss’s
secretarial services, came from a family of Mafia gamblers. Her brothers Edward
and Goffredo were managers of the gaming rooms of the Casino Internacional and
the Tropicana nightclub in the 1950s. Another brother, Dino, a close associate
of Lansky, Santo Trafficante, Jr.,
Gangsterismo is the story of the
squaring of the circle of the politics of gangsterismo, using as sources U.S.
intelligence documents on Cuba
from the John F. Kennedy Assassination Collection (JFKAC) at National Archives II
in College Park , Maryland .
The JFKAC was created by the President Kennedy Act of 1992, which mandated the
declassification of documents with possible relevance to Kennedy’s
assassination in November 1963.
The JFKAC records include CIA ,
FBI, and Army Intelligence records, a unique vantage point from which to assess
the Mafia gambling colony in Havana, as well as reports from the the U.S.
intelligence community on the Cuban exile movement in the United States. Cuban
exile commando operations in Cuba, the political intrigues of Cuban exile
leaders, and their ties to the CIA and Mafia
gamblers are all covered in the more than five million pages of documents.
The JFKAC documents were obtained
by blue-ribbon commissions and special congressional committees in the 1960s
and 1970s: the Warren Commission Inquiry into the assassination of John
Kennedy; the President’s Commission on CIA
Activities within the United States led by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller;
Senator Frank Church’s Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, which investigated CIA -Mafia
plots to assassinate Castro; and the House Select Committee on Assassinations,
which examined Cuban exile groups as part of its investigation of the
assassination of John Kennedy.7
The declassified documents offer
new insights into U.S. policy making: from Eisenhower’s decision to seek the
overthrow of the Cuban revolution in November 1959; to the CIA ’s
ill-starred Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961; to Kennedy’s ineffective but
provocative Operation Mongoose in 1962; to the Cuban missile crisis of October
1962; to Kennedy’s covert funding of “autonomous” Cuban exile commando
operations in 1963; to back-channel discussions between the Kennedy
Administration and Castro in the weeks before President Kennedy’s assassination
in November 1963; and President Lyndon Johnson’s deescalation of U.S.
policy in Cuba .
The Cuban mambises (guerrillas),
who had been fighting off and on since 1868, appeared to be on the road to
victory when the United States
intervened against Spain
in mid-1898. The intervention struck like a bolt from the blue—and left a wound
in the Cuban body politic that would define Cuban politics for decades to come.
With U.S.
intervention, the Guerra de la Independencia de Cuba
(Cuban War of Independence) became the “Spanish-American War.” With the defeat of
Spain , the United
States replaced Spain
as the dominant power on the island. Cuba
went from being a colony of Spain
to a neocolony of the United States .
In August 1933, Machado fled into
exile in the Bahamas
with seven bags of gold and five pistols. With Machado’s exit, Sergeant
Fulgencio Batista, the new commander of the Cuban army, rose to power. From
behind the facade of the Palacio Presidencial, he ruled Cuba
with an iron fist. To the traditional mix of corruption and violence, Batista
added a new form of neocolonial corruption called gangsterismo: Batista would
partner with North American gangsters and share the profits from their colony
of casinos, hotels, and nightclubs.13
Out of this environment of
political decay grew a new Cuban nationalist movement led by Fidel Castro in
the 1950s. Castro did battle with Batista, drawing on the legacy of Cuban
independence leader José Martí. The past would be prologue in neocolonial Cuba .
In August 1933, Machado fled into
exile in the Bahamas
with seven bags of gold and five pistols. With Machado’s exit, Sergeant
Fulgencio Batista, the new commander of the Cuban army, rose to power. From
behind the facade of the Palacio Presidencial, he ruled Cuba
with an iron fist. To the traditional mix of corruption and violence, Batista
added a new form of neocolonial corruption called gangsterismo: Batista would
partner with North American gangsters and share the profits from their colony
of casinos, hotels, and nightclubs.13
Out of this environment of
political decay grew a new Cuban nationalist movement led by Fidel Castro in
the 1950s. Castro did battle with Batista, drawing on the legacy of Cuban
independence leader José Martí. The past would be prologue in neocolonial Cuba .
With a handshake and abrazo, Cuba ’s
strongman Fulgencio Batista closed a deal for the purchase of Cuban molasses
with North American gangster Meyer Lansky in 1933. He also sealed the deal on
gangsterismo in neocolonial Cuba .
Why molasses? President Franklin
D. Roosevelt had just repealed the notorious Volstead Act, ending the era of
Prohibition and prompting the Mafia to invest in the liquor industry. The Mafia
needed a steady source of the thick, dark-colored syrup byproduct of sugar
refining, for use as a sugar substitute in its liquor distilleries. Lansky was
in Havana on behalf of the Molaska
Corporation, a Mafia business front in Ohio .
As Batista and Lansky negotiated
the molasses deal, they also took the measure of each other. They liked what
they saw. Lansky shared with Batista his dream of creating a colony of casinos,
hotels, and nightclubs in Cuba .
He offered to make Batista a partner in the endeavor. Batista would get regular
payments from the gamblers. In return, the Mafia would be allowed to operate their
establishments without interference from the Cuban army or police.
Lansky’s boyhood friend Joseph
“Doc” Stacher recalled, “Meyer was the first one to think about Cuba ,
way back in the early thirties.” Stacher continued, “We knew the island from
our bootlegging business, and what with the great weather and good hotels and
casinos we would build, rich people could easily be persuaded to fly over to an
exotic ‘foreign country’ to enjoy themselves.” Stacher, Lansky’s liaison with
Batista, delivered graft payments to the Cuban dictator.14
Lansky’s Cuban scheme was a
strategic business plan for North American organized crime in the
post-Prohibition era. At a meeting of top Mafia leaders in 1933, Lansky
proposed to invest some of the capital accumulated by Mafia alcohol bootlegging
operations in a new business model based on gambling. As Stacher explained:
“Our biggest problem was always where to invest the money.” He added, “What
Lansky suggested was that each of us put up $500,000 to start the Havana
gambling operation. At the end of the meeting Charlie
[Luciano] said he was in on the deal and ten Seeds……others, including Bugsy
Siegel, Moe Dalitz, Phil Kastel, and Chuck Polizzi, also chipped in a half
million bucks. Lansky and I flew to Havana
with the money in suitcases and spoke to Batista, who hadn’t quite believed we
could raise that kind of money.”15
In 1936, Army Chief of Staff
Batista legalized games of chance in select casinos and nightclubs. Batista
shifted the responsibility for monitoring casinos from civilian authorities to
the Cuban army. He also used Lansky as a consultant to reform the Cuban
government-owned Gran Casino Nacional, where the management was siphoning off
house revenues.16
By the mid-1930s, Lansky was
operating three casinos in Cuba .
One was in the new Hotel Nacional, perched on a limestone bluff overlooking the
Malecón, Havana ’s seaside
boulevard, and the Straits of Florida . Lansky also
managed a casino at Oriental Park ,
a horse racetrack in suburban Marianao, and another gaming room at the nearby
Gran Casino Nacional….
As Batista and Lansky negotiated
the molasses deal, they also took the measure of each other. They liked what
they saw. Lansky shared with Batista his dream of creating a colony of casinos,
hotels, and nightclubs in Cuba .
He offered to make Batista a partner in the endeavor. Batista would get regular
payments from the gamblers. In return, the Mafia would be allowed to operate
their establishments without interference from the Cuban army or police. Lansky’s
boyhood friend Joseph “Doc” Stacher recalled, “Meyer was the first one to think about Cuba ,
way back in the early thirties.” Stacher continued, “We knew the island from
our bootlegging business, and what with the great weather and good hotels and
casinos we would build, rich people could easily be persuaded to fly over to an
exotic ‘foreign country’ to enjoy themselves.” Stacher, Lansky’s liaison with
Batista, delivered graft payments to the Cuban dictator.14 Lansky’s Cuban
scheme was a strategic business plan for North American organized crime in the
post-Prohibition era. At a meeting of top Mafia leaders in 1933, Lansky
proposed to invest some of the capital accumulated by Mafia alcohol bootlegging
operations in a new business model based on gambling. As Stacher explained:
“Our biggest problem was always where to invest the money.” He added, “What
Lansky suggested was that each of us put up $500,000 to start the Havana
gambling operation. At the end of the meeting Charlie [Luciano] said he was in
on the deal and ten Seeds of Gangsterismo 5 others, including Bugsy Siegel, Moe
Dalitz, Phil Kastel, and Chuck Polizzi, also chipped in a half million bucks.
Lansky and I flew to Havana with
the money in suitcases and spoke to Batista, who hadn’t quite believed we could
raise that kind of money.”15
In 1936, Army Chief of Staff
Batista legalized games of chance in select casinos and nightclubs. Batista
shifted the responsibility for monitoring casinos from civilian authorities to
the Cuban army. He also used Lansky as a consultant to reform the Cuban
government-owned Gran Casino Nacional, where the management was siphoning off house
revenues.16
By the mid-1930s, Lansky was
operating three casinos in Cuba .
One was in the new Hotel Nacional, perched on a limestone bluff overlooking the
Malecón, Havana ’s seaside
boulevard, and the Straits of Florida . Lansky also
managed a casino at Oriental Park ,
a horse racetrack in suburban Marianao, and another gaming room at the nearby
Gran Casino Nacional. Batista joined forces with Ramón Grau San Martín, a
popular University of Havana
professor, who led a coalition of liberal reformers, leftists, students, and
Cuban nationalists. Batista and the Grau coalition drove Céspedes from power in
September 1933. Grau’s Provisional Revolutionary Government assumed power.
Batista promoted himself to colonel and army chief of staff.22 Grau’s coalition
undertook a series of long-overdue economic and political reforms, which
impinged on the privileged status of U.S.
interests in Cuba .
Luciano moved to Cuba
after he was deported from the United States
to Italy . He
had been serving a thirty-to-fifty-year prison sentence for running an illegal
prostitution ring in New York . In
January 1946, New York Governor Thomas Dewey granted him clemency in return for
his cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence during World War II.
Early in the war Luciano had provided information for anti-Nazi
counterintelligence operations on the New York
waterfront. Luciano also supplied ONI with intelligence for the Allies’
amphibious landing in Sicily in
1943. Lansky acted as the
go-between for Luciano and U.S.
intelligence.30
Chibás had come in third in the
1948 presidential elections as the candidate of the newly formed Partido del
Pueblo Cubano-Ortodoxo (Cuban People’s Party-Orthodox), known as the
“Ortodoxos.” The Ortodoxos were committed to the politics of the revolution of
1933.
News of General Fulgencio
Batista’s coup d’etat (strike against the state) on March 10, 1952 , was reported almost casually in
the United States .
Time magazine’s coverage was emblematic of the U.
S. reaction. “Batista is back,” Time
reported. “The tough, smiling ex-sergeant who bossed Cuba
for years of ‘disciplined democracy,’ this week toppled President Carlos Prío’s
constitutional regime from power in an almost bloodless army revolution. . . .
In noisy, politically turbulent Havana ,
all was calm and quiet as the Strong Man’s tanks once again brought
‘disciplined democracy’ to the streets.”
The ease with which the Cuban
army drove Carlos Prío Socarrás from power revealed the degree to which
corruption had sapped the vitality of the Partido Revolucionario
Cubano-Auténtico. When Prío first learned that a coup d’etat was underway, he
made no effort to resist. He fled into exile in such a hurry he forgot his
cocaine stash in the Palacio Presidencial. His brother Antonio danced the night
away at the Sans Souci nightclub.65
In 1952, the United
States was not complicit in Batista’s coup
d’etat, as it had been in 1933–1934. From Washington ’s
vantage point, however, Batista’s usefulness as a Cold War ally outweighed the
illegitimate nature of his rule.
Upon his return to power, Batista
made a formal arrangement with Mafia gambling impresario Meyer Lansky to expand
and upgrade the Mafia’s colony of casinos, hotels, and nightclubs in Havana .
By the early 1950s, Havana ’s
attractions had lost their luster. Cuba
was losing tourists to Acapulco , a
new vacation destination on Mexico ’s
Pacific coast, and other resorts in the Caribbean . No
new hotel had been built in Havana
since the mid-1930s. A U.S. Embassy report stated that Cubans were more eager
to invest in “hotels and apartments” in Florida
than they were to put money into real estate in Cuba .
A United Nations mission even recommended that Cuba
build more hotels, beaches, and other tourist attractions. continued to share
ideas about gambling.77
With Batista’s return to power in
Cuba , Lansky
had a unique opportunity to experiment with new concepts of gambling. He would
attract more tourists to Cuba
by building luxurious hotel-casino complexes with good restaurants. He would
also upgrade the Montmartre , Sans Souci, and Tropicana,
the Mafia’s flagship nightclubs. Lansky drew on the experience of the Mafia
gamblers in Las Vegas .
After the initial failure of Bugsy
Siegel’s Flamingo Hotel and Casino, the Mafia built big hotel-casino complexes
in Las Vegas . Within a few years, millions
of visitors a year were streaming in, lured both by gambling and 23 first-rate
entertainment: Abbott and Costello, Harry Belafonte, Rosemary Clooney, Ella
Fitzgerald, and Frank Sinatra and the “Rat Pack” were among the headliners.78
Meanwhile, Batista laid the foundation for Lansky’s new gambling business model
with Hotel Law 2074, which offered financial
incentives, underwritten by the
Cuban treasury, to the Mafia to build new hotels and casinos.
The law made casino licenses
available for $25,000. Nightclubs, with $200,000 worth of upgrades, were
eligible for casino licenses. In return, licensees were required to make a
$2,000 graft payment to the Batistianos. Hotels and casinos were exempted from
paying corporate taxes in Cuba .
Customs duties were eliminated for imported gaming equipment and building
materials. Visa restrictions for pit bosses, stickmen, and dealers were
eased.79 All this spurred a hotel-construction boom in Havana
in the mid-1950s.
Four new hotels with casinos
opened between 1955 and 1958: the Capri , the Hilton, and
the Riviera in Havana ,
and the Comodoro in suburban Miramar .
The number of hotel rooms in Havana
increased from 3,000 in 1952 to 5,500 in 1958. A new casino also opened at the
Sevilla-Biltmore Hotel.80
Lansky set up a headquarters in
the Montmartre Club, where he met with Mafia-linked businessmen and gangsters
from the United States .
His goal was to raise $100 million in cash for new hotel and casino
refurbishing projects. He hired executives to run his hotels and casinos from
among his associates—Clifford A. Jones, Eddie Levine, and Irving Devine. He
selected gamblers with technical expertise like brothers Dino and Eddie Cellini
to manage day-to-day operations of the casinos.
Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts
was a big fan. Senator George Smathers, a Democrat from Florida ,
recalled a memorable evening with 25 Kennedy. “Kennedy wasn’t a great casino
man,” Smathers said. “But the Tropicana nightclub had a floor show that you
wouldn’t believe.”87
The principal owners of the
Tropicana were Cuban gangsters: the Fox brothers Martin and Pedro, Alberto
Adura, and Oscar Echemendia. Martin Fox and Echemendia got their start running
bolita numbers and sponsoring roving casinos in Havana
in the 1930s. Ardura was a close friend of General Roberto Fernandez Miranda,
Batista’s brother-in law. Martin was a good friend of Santiago Rey, Batista’s
defense and interior minister. Batista, his wife Marta, his son Papo, Fernandez
Miranda, and Rey were known to frequent the Tropicana.93
The Tropicana was an epicenter of
gangsterismo. According to CIA and FBI
reports, Santiago Rey granted a “concession” to Martin Fox and Ardura “to bring
slot machines to Cuba .”
Mafia gambler Norman Rothman supervised the transfer of slot machines from the United
States to Cuba .
Ardura managed the slot machine
concession in Cuba ,
while Fernandez Miranda got fifty percent of the “take.”94 Trafficante had
operated in Cuba
since 1946 as an “emissary” for his father, Santo Trafficante, Sr., the
organized crime boss of Tampa , Florida .
When his father died in 1954, Santo Jr. took over the family in Tampa
and inherited his father’s financial interests in Cuba .
The next year Trafficante moved to Cuba ,
where he ingratiated himself with Batista and his security forces. Santo
Trafficante and Meyer Lansky were the top two gamblers in the Mafia gambling
colony in the 1950s. But Lansky, who was not a ‘made man,’ was a junior partner
in the Mafia power structure to Trafficante, who was a godfather.95
According to FBI reports,
Trafficante gained a controlling interest in the Sans Souci nightclub in the
mid-1950s. Trafficante kept a small apartment at the Sans Souci, which was
owned previously by the Gabriel and Sam Mannarino crime family of Kensington ,
Pennsylvania , in the late 1940s and early
1950s. Norman Rothman managed the Sans Souci for the Mannarinos. When the Sans
Souci reopened after renovations on December
31, 1954 , Trafficante put Eddie Cellini in charge of the casino.
Cellini’s brother Dino managed the casino at the Tropicana. An FBI report
stated Dino Cellini was a “longtime associate of Trafficante.”96
The principal owners of the
Tropicana were Cuban gangsters: the Fox brothers Martin and Pedro, Alberto
Adura, and Oscar Echemendia. Martin Fox and Echemendia got their start running
bolita numbers and sponsoring roving casinos in Havana
in the 1930s. Ardura was a close friend of General Roberto Fernandez Miranda,
Batista’s brother-in-law. Martin was a good friend of Santiago Rey, Batista’s
defense and interior minister. Batista, his wife Marta, his son Papo, Fernandez
Miranda, and Rey were known to frequent the Tropicana.93
The Tropicana was an epicenter of
gangsterismo. According to CIA and FBI
reports, Santiago Rey granted a “concession” to Martin Fox and Ardura “to bring
slot machines to Cuba .”
Mafia gambler Norman Rothman supervised the transfer of slot machines from the United
States to Cuba .
Ardura managed the slot machine concession in Cuba ,
while Fernandez Miranda got fifty percent of the “take.”94
Trafficante had operated in Cuba
since 1946 as an “emissary” for his father, Santo Trafficante, Sr., the
organized crime boss of Tampa , Florida .
When his father died in 1954, Santo Jr. took over the family in Tampa
and inherited his father’s financial interests in Cuba .
The next year Trafficante moved to Cuba ,
where he ingratiated himself with Batista and his security forces. Santo
Trafficante and Meyer Lansky were the top two gamblers in the Mafia gambling
colony in the 1950s. But Lansky, who was not a ‘made man,’ was a junior partner
in the Mafia power structure to Trafficante, who was a godfather.95
According to FBI reports,
Trafficante gained a controlling interest in the Sans Souci nightclub in the
mid-1950s. Trafficante kept a small apartment at the Sans Souci, which was
owned previously by the Gabriel and Sam Mannarino crime family of Kensington ,
Pennsylvania , in the late 1940s and early
1950s. Norman Rothman managed the Sans Souci for the Mannarinos.
When the Sans Souci reopened
after renovations on December 31,
1954 , Trafficante put Eddie Cellini in charge of the casino.
Cellini’s brother Dino managed the casino at the Tropicana. An FBI report
stated Dino Cellini was a “longtime associate of Trafficante.”96
Like the Tropicana, the Sans
Souci, with its close ties to Cuba ’s
security forces, was a nexus of gangsterismo.
Like the Tropicana, the Sans
Souci, with its close ties to Cuba ’s
security forces, was a nexus of gangsterismo. The Hilton Hotel was pure gangsterismo. The
Hilton was a joint venture of Batista and the Mafia gamblers. Batista financed
the $32 million hotel by dipping into the Cuban treasury and the Cuban Hotel
and Restaurant Workers Union’s pension fund. The Havana Hilton, with 630 rooms,
was the largest hotel on the island. Roberto “Chiri” Mendoza ,
whose construction company built the hotel, was the principal owner of the
casino at the Havana Hilton. Mendoza
was a business associate of Batista and Trafficante.
A struggle over the ownership of
the Havana Hilton casino may have figured in the murder of gangster Albert
Anastasia. Anastasia’s bullet-riddled body was found lying in a pool of blood
on the floor of the barbershop at the Sheraton Park Hotel in New
York on October
25, 1957 . At the time of his murder, Anastasia was negotiating
aggressively to buy a sizeable share of the Havana Hilton casino from Mendoza
in a move to expand his presence in Havana .
Trafficante and Mendoza traveled to New York
to meet with Anastasia on October 24. According to a police report obtained by
the House Select Committee on Assassinations, “It was rumored that Anastasia
had attempted to move in on Trafficante’s operations in Cuba
and this was one of the reasons that he was killed.”101
As gangsterismo flourished in Cuba ,
Meyer Lansky earned the respect of North American crime families by fairly distributing
the profits from the Mafia casinos in Cuba . Mafioso Johnny Rosselli spent
time in Cuba
representing Chicago Godfather Sam Giancana’s “hidden interests” in the 1950s.
Rosselli worked as a manager at the Sans Souci, where Chicago
gangsters, including Lenny Patrick and Dave Yaras, had financial interests. He
also organized gambling junkets to Cuba
for wealthy North Americans.104
Meanwhile, FBI records indicate
Mafia families from New Jersey , New
York City , and Philadelphia
were also well represented in Cuba .
Charles Tourine “secured a gambling license” for a group of Mafia investors
from New Jersey and Philadelphia .
A group led by Angelo Bruno and Carl “Poppy” Ippolito, bought an interest in
the casino at the Plaza Hotel, a few blocks from the Capitolio.110
An FBI report noted that
Philadelphia-based Bruno “spent a great deal of time in Miami ,
Fla. , and Havana ,
Cuba [in 1957–1958.]”
Bruno was a member of the Mafia Commission.111
Meanwhile, FBI records indicate
Mafia families from New Jersey , New
York City , and Philadelphia
were also well represented in Cuba .
Charles Tourine “secured a gambling license” for a group of Mafia investors
from New Jersey and Philadelphia .
A group led by Angelo Bruno and Carl “Poppy” Ippolito, bought an interest in
the casino at the Plaza Hotel, a few blocks from the Capitolio.110
An FBI report noted that
Philadelphia-based Bruno “spent a great deal of time in Miami ,
Fla. , and Havana ,
Cuba [in 1957–1958.]”
Bruno was a member of the Mafia Commission.111
Meanwhile, FBI records indicate
Mafia families from New Jersey , New
York City , and Philadelphia
were also well represented in Cuba .
Charles Tourine “secured a gambling license” for a group of Mafia investors
from New Jersey and Philadelphia .
A group led by Angelo Bruno and Carl “Poppy” Ippolito, bought an interest in
the casino at the Plaza Hotel, a few blocks from the Capitolio.110
An FBI report noted that
Philadelphia-based Bruno “spent a great deal of time in Miami ,
Fla. , and Havana ,
Cuba [in 1957–1958.]”
Bruno was a member of the Mafia
Commission.111
Meanwhile, FBI records indicate
Mafia families from New Jersey , New
York City , and Philadelphia
were also well represented in Cuba .
Charles Tourine “secured a gambling license” for a group of Mafia investors
from New Jersey and Philadelphia .
A group led by Angelo Bruno and Carl “Poppy” Ippolito, bought an interest in
the casino at the Plaza Hotel, a few blocks from the Capitolio.110 An FBI
report noted that Philadelphia-based Bruno “spent a great deal of time in
Miami, Fla., and Havana , Cuba
[in 1957–1958.]” Bruno was a member of the Mafia Commission.111
According to a study by the U.S.
Army-funded Special Operations Research Office, the Fidelistas “shifted into
full-scale revolutionary warfare” in 1958. They conducted increasingly bold
surprise attacks on the Cuban army. They also lured army patrols into remote
mountain valleys and opened fire on the trapped soldiers. They had become “a formidable
military threat” to Batista.121
According to a study by the U.S.
Army-funded Special Operations Research Office, the Fidelistas “shifted into
full-scale revolutionary warfare” in 1958. They conducted increasingly bold
surprise attacks on the Cuban army. They also lured army patrols into remote
mountain valleys and opened fire on the trapped soldiers. They had become “a
formidable military threat” to Batista.121On December 31, 1958 , General Fulgencio Batista, his
family, and inner circle gathered to celebrate the arrival of the New Year at
the Cuban army headquarters at Camp Columbia
on the outskirts of Havana . Instead
of toasting the New Year at midnight ,
however, Batista informed his guests that the military situation in Cuba
was hopeless. He had been advised that Santa Clara
and Santiago de Cuba would fall
soon to the July 26th Movement.
He told the celebrants to report
to the Camp Columbia
airfield in two hours, ready to go into exile.
In the wee hours of January 1, 1959 , the pilots of three
Cuban air force DC-4s at Camp Columbia
fired up their engines, roared down the runway, and lifted their U.S.-supplied aircraft
into the darkness of the night. Batista wanted to return to his old home in Daytona
Beach , Florida , but President Dwight
D. Eisenhower would not allow him to land in the United
States . Instead, Batista flew to the Dominican
Republic .
The July 26th Movement set up
their headquarters in the Havana Hilton, a luxurious symbol of gangsterismo,
and renamed it Hotel Habana Libre. As the long-haired July 26th Movement
guerrillas, known as barbudos (men with beards), arrived in Havana ,
they took up residence in the hotel built with funds from the hotel- and
restaurant-workers union controlled by Batista.130
Eisenhower searched for a means
by which to prevent Castro from coming to power. He approved former U.S.
diplomat William D. Pawley’s plan to persuade Batista to resign. Pawley, owner
of the Havana Trolley Co. and Havana ’s
bus system, had been U.S.
ambassador to Brazil
and Peru , and knew
Batista personally. Pawley met with Batista at the Palacio Presidencial for
three hours on December 9, 1958 .
According to Pawley, he proposed a quid pro quo designed to isolate Castro:
Batista would hand over power to a “caretaker government,” which would receive U.S.
support; Batista could return to his residence-in-exile in Daytona
Beach . But Batista turned him down. Nine days later,
Allen Dulles informed the NSC that the end
was near for Batista.
Atomic Energy Commission Chairman
John McCone told the NSC that Castro and the
July 26th Movement enjoyed enormous popularity in Cuba .
The memorandum stated, “McCone reported that during his recent trip to Cuba
he was told that 95% of the people supported Castro.”
In a memorandum, Under Secretary
of State C. Douglas Dillon reminded Eisenhower that Batista had been a valued
Cold War ally.
Rufo López-Fresquet, Cuban
treasury minister in 1959, disputed Morse’s claim that the revolutionary
tribunals caused “blood baths” in Cuba .
López- Fresquet asserted that the tribunals, imperfect as they were, prevented
a bloodier “massacre” from taking place. López-Fresquet recalled bitterly the
long silence of the United States
about the murder and torture of innocent Cubans during Batista’s reign of terror.
Nonetheless, he would defect to the United
States in 1960. On May 22, 1959 , Meyer Lansky contacted the FBI in
Fort Lauderdale , Florida .
Lansky told the FBI, “The entire [Cuban] government will soon be communistic.”
He offered to provide the FBI with additional intelligence about communist
activities in Cuba ,
acknowledging the possible loss of his gambling interests in Cuba
had “contributed to his decision to discuss the Cuban situation.”161 The
confrontation between the Cuban revolution and the Mafia gamblers would
culminate with Trafficante’s arrest. On June
6, 1959 , Cuban authorities arrested Santo Trafficante and Henry Saavedra,
who represented Trafficante’s interests at the Hotel Capri. They and other
Mafia gamblers—Jake Lansky, Charles “The Blade” Tourine, Tourine’s son Charles
de Monico, Guiseppe de George, and Lucien Rebard— were held at the Triscornia
immigration prison outside Havana. On August
18, 1959 , Trafficante was released from Triscornia. Cuban officials
later told the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) that Cuba
had no evidence Trafficante had broken Cuban laws.
As the curtain came down on the
Mafia gambling colony, Jack Ruby, a Dallas
stripclub owner, was on a mysterious “vacation” in Cuba .
Jack Ruby was in Cuba
from August 8 until September 11, 1959 ,
according to Cuban tourist cards and U.S.
travel records. Four years later, after Ruby gunned down Lee Harvey Oswald,
witnesses came forward to the FBI to say that they had seen Ruby at the
Tropicana nightclub in September 1959. The Warren Commission questioned Ruby
about his stay in Cuba .
Ruby said he was in Cuba
on vacation in late summer 1959. He spent several nights at the Tropicana,
where his friend Lewis McWillie was manager of the casino. He recalled that
Martin Fox, one of the Cuban owners of the Tropicana, took him out for a night
on the town in Havana . Earlier in
the summer Martin, on business in Texas ,
treated Ruby to dinner in Dallas .
The Warren Commission accepted
Ruby’s explanation, concluding that Ruby’s visit to Cuba
was “purely social.” Ruby’s explanation invites skepticism, however, given the
personalities and circumstances involved. Ruby had ties to organized crime
figures first in Chicago and later
in Dallas . McWillie was a
well-connected gambler. The Tropicana was an epicenter of gangsterismo with
connections to Trafficante, as we have seen. And Ruby knew McWillie from Dallas ,
where McWillie represented the interests of Las Vegas
gambler Benny Binion. When McWillie moved to Havana
in 1958, he worked closely with Meyer and Jake Lansky, Dino Cellini, and Santo
Trafficante.
As manager of the Tropicana’s
casino, McWillie worked closely with Martin Fox to move large amounts of money
out of Cuba, depositing it in U.S. banks in 1959 and 1960, according to Fox’s
widow Ofelia and McWillie’s testimony to the HSCA. G. Robert Blakey, former
general counsel of the HSCA, is among the skeptics. Blakey sees a link between
Ruby and Trafficante’s detention. “Trafficante told us that while he was in
Triscornia, the Foxes were trying ‘their best to get me out,’” Blakey and his
coauthor Richard Billings write.172
They add, “Ruby’s trips to Cuba
were an important, but minor, part of an organized-crime operation, which may
have had to do with Trafficante’s detention.” The HSCA final report suggested
that Ruby was a “courier” for the Mafia gamblers carrying cash between Havana
and banks in Miami . The HSCA report
noted that Ruby made at least two trips to Cuba
in 1959. Cuban tourist cards indicate that Ruby was in Cuba
from August 8 until September 11, when he flew to Miami
and returned to Cuba
the next day. A day later he flew to New Orleans .
FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service records corroborate Ruby’s trips
to Cuba .
Jack Ruby was in Cuba
from August 8 until September 11, 1959 ,
according to Cuban tourist cards and U.S.
travel records. Four years later, after Ruby gunned down Lee Harvey Oswald,
witnesses came forward to the FBI to say that they had seen Ruby at the
Tropicana nightclub in September 1959. The Warren Commission questioned Ruby
about his stay in Cuba .
Ruby said he was in Cuba
on vacation in late summer 1959. He spent several nights at the Tropicana,
where his friend Lewis McWillie was manager of the casino. He recalled that
Martin Fox, one of the Cuban owners of the Tropicana, took him out for a night
on the town in Havana . Earlier in
the summer Martin, on business in Texas ,
treated Ruby to dinner in Dallas . The
Warren Commission accepted Ruby’s explanation, concluding that Ruby’s visit to Cuba
was “purely social.” Ruby’s explanation invites skepticism, however, given the
personalities and circumstances involved.
Ruby had ties to organized crime
figures first in Chicago and later
in Dallas.McWillie was a well-connected gambler. The Tropicana was an epicenter
of gangsterismo with connections to Trafficante, as we have seen.
As manager of the Tropicana’s
casino, McWillie worked closely with Martin Fox to move large amounts of money
out of Cuba, depositing it in U.S. banks in 1959 and 1960, according to Fox’s
widow Ofelia and McWillie’s testimony to the HSCA.
G. Robert Blakey, former general
counsel of the HSCA, is among the skeptics. Blakey sees a link between Ruby and
Trafficante’s detention. “Trafficante told us that while he was in Triscornia,
the Foxes were trying ‘their best to get me out,’” Blakey and his coauthor
Richard Billings write.172
They add, “Ruby’s trips to Cuba
were an important, but minor, part of an organized-crime operation, which may
have had to do with Trafficante’s detention.” The HSCA final report suggested
that Ruby was a “courier” for the Mafia gamblers carrying cash between Havana
and banks in Miami .
The HSCA report noted that Ruby
made at least two trips to Cuba
in 1959. Cuban tourist cards indicate that Ruby was in Cuba
from August 8 until September 11, when he flew to Miami
and returned to Cuba
the next day. A day later he flew to New Orleans .
FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service records corroborate Ruby’s trips
to Cuba .
Triumph of the Cuban Revolution 46
Gangsterismo
Trafficante was released from
Triscornia on August 18. There is also evidence that Ruby may have visited
Trafficante at Triscornia. John Wilson, a British journalist imprisoned at
Triscornia, said that he saw Ruby with Trafficante in 1959. According to a CIA
message to President John Kennedy’s National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Wilson
told the U.S. Embassy in London
that he met a prisoner at Triscornia, “an American gangster gambler named Santos
[sic].” The message continued, “While Santos was in prison Wilson
says, Santos was visited frequently
by an American gangstertype named Ruby.”173
The CIA
also suspected some kind of link between Ruby and Trafficante. S. D.
Breckinridge, CIA liaison with the HSCA,
wrote in a memorandum for the record, “[O]ur
study had a few comments on a possible connection between Ruby and Trafficante
in 1959, but that we could not take it beyond that.”174 Burt W. Griffin ,
the Warren Commission’s expert on Ruby, was another skeptic. Griffin
questioned the commission’s conclusion that Ruby’s trip Cuba
was “purely social.” “Ruby did very few things that were ‘purely social,’ ” Griffin
wrote in an August 1964 memorandum. “In light of the fact that his Cuban visit
is tied closely in time to his own interest in selling jeeps to Cuba . . . I
think we should have considerably more information about Ruby’s visit to Cuba
before we arrive at such a conclusion.”175
McKeown told the FBI that he got
a telephone call from “Mr. Rubenstein of Dallas ”
in January 1959. “Rubenstein” offered him $15,000 to contact Fidel Castro and
help arrange the release of three unnamed people from jail in Cuba .
McKeown said he could obtain the release of the prisoners but wanted $5,000 in
cash before contacting Castro.
Three weeks later, an
unidentified man visited McKeown outside of Houston .
He said he had an option to buy jeeps in Shreveport ,
Louisiana , which he wanted to sell to
Castro. He wanted McKeown to write a letter of introduction to Castro. McKeown
said he would do so for a $25,000 fee. But the visitor did not follow up. 47
When McKeown saw news photographs
of Oswald’s assassin, he realized his visitor was Jack Ruby.178 Ruby
corroborated McKeown’s account in an interview with the FBI. Ruby said he
telephoned a man, who lived near Houston ,
about the sale of jeeps to Cuba .
The man had been involved in “gun running” to Castro. But the jeep deal fell
through.179
The FBI also had evidence linking
Ruby to arms shipments to Cuba
from Florida in 1959. One of the
Bureau’s sources was Blaney Mack Johnson, a Florida
gambler. Johnson was a former owner of the Colonial Inn in Hallandale ,
Florida , one of Meyer Lansky’s “carpet
joints” in the Sunshine State .
An FBI memorandum reported, “He
[Johnson] stated that Jack Ruby, known then as Rubenstein, was active in
arranging illegal flights of weapons from Miami to the Castro organization in
Cuba.” The memorandum added, “T-2 [Johnson] stated that one Donald Edward
Browder was associated with Ruby in the arms smuggling operations.” Browder was
a weapons dealer linked to the Mafia, who sold guns to all sides in Cuba
in the 1950s.180 Had the Warren Commission attempted to connect the dots of
Ruby’s trips to Cuba
and his ties to gangsterismo, it would have opened a Pandora’s box. At a
minimum, a thorough investigation of Ruby would have embarrassed the FBI. Ruby
was a Bureau informant during the period of his Cuba-related activities. FBI
Special Agent Charles Flynn met with Ruby eight times between March and October
1959. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover explained in a memorandum to the Warren
Commission that Ruby “had knowledge of the criminal element in Dallas .”181
The full story of Jack Ruby and Cuba
has yet to be told, according to Blakey and Billings .
“Our belief that there was something to hide in the Ruby-McWillie relationship
was borne out by a remark Ruby made to Wally Weston, a comedian who worked in
his nightclub,” Blakey and Billings write.
“It was after Ruby had been
convicted of murdering Oswald, and they were talking in Ruby’s jail cell.
‘Wally, they’re going to find out about Cuba ,’
Ruby said. ‘They’re going to find out about the guns, find out about New
Orleans , find out about everything.’ ”182 With the end
of the era of gangsterismo in Cuba ,
the Mafia gamblers and the Batistianos would regroup in exile.
A report for the Special Research
Office at the American University
in Washington, D. C., called Masferrer “one of the most hated men in 55
On July 10, 1959 , Pedro Díaz Lanz, the former chief of the
Cuban air force, appeared as the sole witness at a special closed-door session
of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on “The Communist Threat to the United
States through the Caribbean .”Cuba .”
Three days later, Chief of Naval
Operations Arleigh Burke declared that Communists were “using” Castro. Burke
warned that the “danger” of a communist takeover of Cuba
was “great” in a seminar on U.S.
strategy at Fort McNair ,
a mile south of the Capitol on the banks of the Washington Channel.
Three days later, Chief of Naval
Operations Arleigh Burke declared that Communists were “using” Castro. Burke
warned that the “danger” of a communist takeover of Cuba
was “great” in a seminar on U.S.
strategy at Fort McNair ,
a mile south of the Capitol on the banks of the Washington Channel. In October
1959, William Pawley, a businessman with close ties to the CIA ,
began a series of meetings with Cubans plotting against the revolution.
The CIA
installed a covert device in Pawley’s office in Miami
to record his meetings. According to an October 20, 1959 , CIA
memorandum, Pawley met with a representative of wealthy anti-Castro Cubans who
were planning to “sabotage . . . the coming sugar harvest.”
Pawley had met with Batista in
December 1958 in an unsuccessful effort to persuade him to resign, as we have
seen. An October 7, 1959 CIA memorandum noted
Pawley’s past “cooperation with this Agency,” pointing out he was a friend of
Allen Dulles and Western Hemisphere Division Chief J. C. King. Pawley, whose
goal was to organize a unified Cuban armed force to topple the Cuban
revolution, kept the Administration informed about his meetings with Cuban
dissidents. After a meeting with Cubans in Washington ,
he met with Dulles and Vice President Richard Nixon.257
In 1960, the CIA
shifted its focus from providing support for the counterrevolution in Cuba
to organizing a network of Cuban exile action groups in the United
States . Before the end of the year, Cuban
exile action groups would begin launching hit-and-run commando raids on targets
in Cuba from
bases in the United States .
But this tactic created a
political backlash in Cuba
against the counterrevolution. Castro channeled Cubans’ anger at the raids into
popular support for the revolution. When Look magazine editor William Attwood
arrived in Cuba
to interview Castro in July 1959, he was struck by how openly Castro’s
assassination was discussed. “Assassination was in the air,” Attwood recalled.
“I was told quite flatly by Julio Lobo . . . that Castro would not live out the
year, there was a contract on him.” Attwood attended a party, with CIA
officers in attendance, where guests talked “quite openly about assassinating
Castro.” Lobo, one of the richest men in Cuba ,
owned a dozen large sugar mills.272
According to CIA
records, Cain was an informant for the CIA
from 1960 until 1964 on a
variety of matters.323 88
Gangsterismo Cain disclosed that he secretly worked for Giancana when he was employed
by the Chicago Police Department from 1956 until 1960. He was currently the
head of a private detective agency in Chicago ,
but Giancana was one of his clients. A CIA
biographical sketch of Cain noted his ties to the Agency-sponsored Cuban
opposition: “Employment: private detective possibly employed by the Frente
Revolucionario Democrático in 1961.”324 As the CIA
and Mafia conspired to kill Castro, the Cuban middle class began to turn
against the Cuban revolution.
On June 4, 1960 , National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)
85-2-60 reported growing disillusionment with the revolution among Cuban
professionals and middle class…
According to CIA
records, Cain was an informant for the CIA
from 1960 until 1964 on a
variety of matters.323
Cain disclosed that he secretly
worked for Giancana when he was employed by the Chicago Police Department from
1956 until 1960. He was currently the head of a private detective agency in Chicago ,
but Giancana was one of his clients. A CIA
biographical sketch of Cain noted his ties to the Agency-sponsored Cuban
opposition: “Employment: private detective possibly employed by the Frente
Revolucionario Democrático in 1961.”324 As the CIA
and Mafia conspired to kill Castro, the Cuban middle class began to turn
against the Cuban revolution.
On June 4, 1960 , National Intelligence EstiA secret asset
of U.S. Army intelligence, Morgan was charged with smuggling arms to Cuban counterrevolutionaries
in October 1960. Morgan procured arms for Manuel Ray, leader of the Movimiento
Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) (Revolutionary Movement of the People). A CIA
report stated, “Ray said that Major William Morgan, now under arrest, had done
a great deal of work for the MRP and had been responsible for obtaining most of
the weapons the MRP now has.”331 He was executed in March 1961.
According to CIA
records, Cain was an informant for the CIA
from 1960 until 1964 on a
variety of matters.323 Cain
disclosed that he secretly worked for Giancana when he was employed by the
Chicago Police Department from 1956 until 1960. He was currently the head of a
private detective agency in Chicago ,
but Giancana was one of his clients. A CIA
biographical sketch of Cain noted his ties to the Agency-sponsored Cuban
opposition: “Employment: private detective possibly employed by the Frente
Revolucionario Democrático in 1961.”324
As the CIA
and Mafia conspired to kill Castro, the Cuban middle class began to turn
against the Cuban revolution. On June
4, 1960 , National Intelligence EstiA secret asset of U.S. Army
intelligence, Morgan was charged with smuggling arms to Cuban counterrevolutionaries
in October 1960. Morgan procured arms for Manuel Ray, leader of the Movimiento
Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) (Revolutionary Movement of the People). A CIA
report stated, “Ray said that Major William Morgan, now under arrest, had done
a great deal of work for the MRP and had been responsible for obtaining most of
the weapons the MRP now has.”331 He was executed in March 1961.
Alabama Governor John Patterson,
a Democrat, contacted the Kennedy campaign in October 1960. Patterson had been
informed by a CIA official and Major General
Reid Doster of the Alabama Air National Guard that members of the air guard
were being recruited to work with a Cuban exile invasion force. Patterson
recalled Doster’s words: “Any morning now, you are going to pick up the
newspaper and read about a Cuban invasion. It’s going to be a tremendous
success.” Patterson traveled to New York
where he met privately with Kennedy and told him what he had learned about the Cuba
operation.349
On June 4, 1960 , National Intelligence EstiA secret asset
of U.S. Army intelligence, Morgan was charged with smuggling arms to Cuban counterrevolutionaries
in October 1960. Morgan procured arms for Manuel Ray, leader of the Movimiento
Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) (Revolutionary Movement of the People). A CIA
report stated, “Ray said that Major William Morgan, now under arrest, had done
a great deal of work for the MRP and had been responsible for obtaining most of
the weapons the MRP now has.”331 He was executed in March 1961.
Patterson recalled Doster’s
words: “Any morning now, you are going to pick up the newspaper and read about
a Cuban invasion. It’s going to be a tremendous success.” Patterson traveled to
New York where he met privately
with Kennedy and told him what he had learned about the Cuba
operation.349
In October 1960, St. George was
on assignment for Life magazine in Florida
to photograph Frente Revolucionario Democrático activities and Cuban exiles
training to invade Cuba .
Kennedy campaign official William Attwood contacted St. George.
On April 4, Kennedy gathered his
aides together to discuss the Bay of Pigs plan in a
conference room in Foggy Bottom near Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s office.
Kennedy asked, “What do you think?” As the president tapped his fingers on the
table impatiently, his principal deputies—Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara, and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy—had little to
say. Rusk had expressed his doubts about the CIA
plan to Kennedy in private but refused to do so in the meeting. General Lyman
Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not address the Bay of
Pigs plan itself but focused, instead, on the fact it was a CIA —not
a Pentagon—operation.
Nicaraguan
dictator Luis Somoza addressed Brigade 2506 on Nicaragua ’s
Atlantic coast, the staging area for the CIA ’s
amphibious invasion of Cuba .
On the docks of Puerto Cabezas, Somoza told the brigadistas “Bring me a couple
of hairs from Castro’s beard.”
The 1,500
soldiers of Brigade 2506 assembled in Nicaragua
after their military training in CIA camps
in Guatemala , Florida
and Louisiana . 400
According to
Wyden, “He [Burke] had always considered this strike crucial.” He noted, “The
D-Day strike could have temporarily immobilized whatever flying capability
Castro’s men had left.”418 When Cabell returned to CIA
headquarters, he faced the wrath of the Cuba Task Force. Cabell was the senior CIA
official in Washington on the eve
of the Bay of Pigs landing. Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI ) Allen Dulles had arranged
to be out of town at a conference in Puerto Rico as a
featured speaker.
Jacob Esterline
shouted at Cabell, “Goddamn it, this is criminal negligence!” Esterline was
chief of the Cuba Task Force. Esterline, Stanley Beerli, head of Cuba Task
Force air operations, Howard Hunt, David Philips, and other CIA
officers gathered around Cabell’s desk and unloaded their anger on him.
Wyden wrote,
“Jake pounded the general’s desk and told him he was the lowest form of human
being he had ever seen. How could he let the men of the Brigade go to their
death?” Wyden wrote. “All over the room, voices were raised to the bellowing
level. Faces were crimson. Any form of rankconsciousness or civility was gone.
These were emotion-driven men out of control.”419
Secretary of
State Dean Rusk’s opposition to the D-Day air strikes was based on diplomatic
considerations. Rusk later wrote, “Personally I was skeptical about the Bay
of Pigs plan from the beginning.” Rusk stated, “Most simply, the
operation violated international law. There was no way to make a good legal
case for an American-supported landing in Cuba .
Also, I felt that an operation of this scale could not be conducted covertly.
According to
Wyden, “He [Burke] had always considered this strike crucial.” He noted, “The
D-Day strike could have temporarily immobilized whatever flying capability
Castro’s men had left.”418 When Cabell returned to CIA
headquarters, he faced the wrath of the Cuba Task Force. Cabell was the senior CIA
official in Washington on the eve
of the Bay of Pigs landing. Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI ) Allen Dulles had arranged
to be out of town at a conference in Puerto Rico as a
featured speaker.
Secretary of
State Dean Rusk’s opposition to the D-Day air strikes was based on diplomatic
considerations. Rusk later wrote, “Personally I was skeptical about the Bay of Pigs
plan from the beginning.” Rusk stated, “Most simply, the operation violated
international law. There was no way to make a good legal case for an
American-supported landing in Cuba .
Also, I felt that an operation of this scale could not be conducted covertly. Cabell
paid Rusk a second visit, this time at Rusk’s apartment at the
Sheridan-Park Hotel at 4 a.m. on April
17. Cabell wanted Kennedy to authorize the use of combat jets from the aircraft
carrier Essex to provide air support for the beleaguered
Brigade 2506. Cabell knew that control of the air over the Bay of
Pigs was essential for the success of the landing. Once again Rusk
telephoned Kennedy. This time he put Cabell on the line. Cabell suggested a
range of air support operations involving U.S.
jets. Kennedy did not comment. When Rusk got back on the line, Kennedy told
Rusk he would not authorize U.S.
air power to be used in Cuba.420 Rusk later explained, “I was caught by
surprise with the first air strikes.” He said, “I was trying to advise Adlai
Stevenson at the United Nations what was happening and suddenly found out there
were additional
air strikes coming. We didn’t want to have him lie to the United Nations.”421
Ambassador
Adlai Stevenson had been embarrassed in the United Nations when he denied that
the United States
was connected to the bombing of Cuban air fields on April 15. Stevenson had
argued that Cuban air force defectors had carried out the air attacks.422
Bissell’s
deputy Tracy Barnes had misled Stevenson. In an internal CIA
memorandum, Barnes conceded that he did not brief Stevenson about the CIA ’s
role in the April 15 air strikes. Bissell later wrote, “Stevenson was left with
the distinct impression that the United States
had virtually no hand in the events that were unfolding.” Stevenson was furious
when the U.S.
involvement was exposed. He expressed his frustration to Kennedy, Rusk, and
Dulles. Kennedy sent National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy to New
York to make sure Stevenson did not break publicly
with President Kennedy over the Bay of Pigs ….
President
Kennedy summoned General Maxwell Taylor out of retirement to lead a Board of
Inquiry into the failed Bay of Pigs operation. Kennedy was
impressed by Taylor ’s book The
Uncertain Trumpet, a critique of the Eisenhower Administration ’s “massive
retaliation” strategy. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff from 1955 to 1959, took a
leave of absence as president of the Lincoln
Center for the Performing Arts in New
York to assume his new duties in Washington.428
The Taylor
Board included Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles, and Admiral Arleigh Burke. The
Taylor Board, also known as the Cuba Study Group, took testimony from fifty
witnesses over six weeks in April and May 1961.429
Meanwhile,
Felix Rodríguez, a Cuban CIA agent, told his
CIA case officer that Castro’s assassination
was the key to the overthrow of the Cuban revolution, and volunteered to kill
Castro in December 1960. Rodríguez later disclosed that he and a fellow Cuban
counterrevolutionary made three unsuccessful attempts to land at Varadero
Beach east of Havana
to assassinate Castro in early 1961. The first attempt was called off when the yacht
used in the mission developed engine trouble. Two other missions were
terminated when reception groups failed to meet the assassins on shore as
planned.452
Speaking to the Church Committee
investigators, John Henry Stephens, a Special Forces soldier based in Guatemala
from 1959 to 1961, recalled two attempts to parachute men from Guatemala
into Cuba to
kill Castro before before the Bay of Pigs invasion. “He
and/or members of his four-five man training cadre were told to give parachutes
and weapons to individuals who were to be parachuted into Cuba
to attempt to assassinate Castro.”
The memorandum noted, “He
referred to an ‘assassination package.’ Such a ‘package’ would contain a
variety of weapons, grenades, and other armaments, including a special
assassination gun.’”
On the first occasion, one man
was successfully flown into Cuba
on a B-26, but when he reached a hotel room and radioed back to Guatemala ,
“this individual’s radio report was interrupted by gunfire and no more was ever
heard from him.” On the second attempt, they sent two men, “who . . . were
captured or killed in the drop zone where they made their parachute landing in Cuba .”453
On April 20, President Kennedy
requested a detailed plan for U.S.
military intervention in Cuba
from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who passed it on to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, making sure to note: “The request should not be interpreted as an
indication that U.S.
military action against Cuba
is probable.” The Joint Chiefs recommended, “The creation of an incident which
will provide the justification for the overthrow of the Castro government by
the United States .”
The incident, of course, must
be “carefully planned and handled
to insure that it is plausible and that it occurs prior to any indication that
the United States
has decided to take military action against Cuba .”
On April 29, McNamara and Chief
of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke met with President Kennedy to discuss
Operational Plan 312 (OPLAN 312), the Pentagon’s contingency plan for
intervention in Cuba, which called for approximately 60,000 troops, plus naval
and air units….
When [Richard] Goodwin returned
to Washington , he informed
President Kennedy about his meeting with Guevara, and recommended continuing
the dialogue with Cuba .
But Goodwin also interpreted Guevara’s willingness to initiate diplomatic talks
as a sign of Cuba ’s
weakness, a weakness that he advised the administration to exploit. He urged
President Kennedy to step up the CIA ’s
clandestine sabotage operations against economic targets on the island. Goodwin
recalled, “[It] would have been politically difficult, perhaps impossible” to
have negotiated “a deal with Castro, any kind of deal.”492
On November 3, 1961 , President Kennedy approved Operation Mongoose,
a new covert operation to organize a popular uprising on the island, which would
serve as a pretext for U.S.
military intervention in Cuba .
Mongoose would use CIA personnel and
resources but would not be run by the CIA .
President Kennedy chose Brigadier General Edward Lansdale as Mongoose’s chief
of operations; he would work closely with the attorney
general.
Commando raids by CIA -backed
Cuban exile action groups in the United States
would complement Operation Mongoose. “Special support projects will be readied
for use on call.” Lansdale wrote in a December 1961
memorandum, “These projects (such as operations to scuttle shipping and
otherwise hamper the regime) will be timed to support actions by the movement
[inside Cuba ]
and to permit the movement to take credit for them.” In this scenario, local
political actions and sabotage operations would culminate in a popular uprising
in October 1962, just before the congressional elections in the United
States . Action agents would seize territory
and issue an urgent “appeal” for help. Lansdale wrote,
“The United States, if possible in concert with other Western
Hemisphere nations, will hen give open support to the Cuban
people’s revolt.”498
“Guidelines for Operation Mongoose” predicated
success explicitly n U.S.
military intervention in Cuba ….From
the beginning, the new DCI John McCone was
“skeptical” about operation Mongoose, according to a draft CIA
history of the McCone’s tenure at the Agency. McCone thought the Kennedy
brothers were “obsessed with Cuba .”
But he was also committed to working closely with Robert Kennedy n Mongoose,
noting the “CIA had a special responsibility
so far as Cuba as
concerned.”
McCone had good reason to be
cautious. He was sworn in as DCI on November
29, 1961, one day after the publication of Special National intelligence
Estimate (SNIE) 85-61, which cast doubt on the premise that a rebellion could
be organized in Cuba—the very goal of Mongoose.
The Mongoose organization chart
bore a resemblance to the model recommended to President Kennedy by Richard
Goodwin in November 1961. Goodwin proposed a “command operation” run by Robert
Kennedy. The attorney general would become the driving force of Mongoose,
working closely with Lansdale to compensate for his own
inexperience with intelligence operations. Lansdale
would also report to the Special Group (Augmented), new National Security
Council committee created to monitor Mongoose, which included the members of
the Special Group set up by the Eisenhower administration to oversee covert
operations, plus Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor, who was chairman.
On the same day, President
Kennedy ordered the Department of State to take the lead in the development of
an interagency contingency plan for U.S.
action in Cuba
in the event of Castro’s assassination. National Security Adviser McGeorge
Bundy issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 100 on October 5. The
text of NSAM 100 was as simple as it was evasive: “In confirmation of oral
instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State [Robert] Woodward, a plan
is desired for the indicated contingency.”
Thomas Parrott, secretary of the
Special Group, briefed Woodward on NSAM 100. Parrott also informed Woodward
that President Kennedy had a personal interest in the memorandum. Parrott was
an assistant for executive branch matters to the CIA
deputy director for plans. He also served as the special assistant to General
Maxwell Taylor, the president’s military adviser. Interestingly, Parrott noted
Richard Goodwin was “aware” of President Kennedy’s interest in the post-Castro assassination
contingency plan for Cuba .
On October 6, Albert C. Davis,
chief of intelligence of the CIA ’s WH/4,
responded to NSAM 100. “It would be wishful thinking to believe that the Cuban
people would immediately rise up and overthrow the regime, now that Castro
departed the scene,” Davis wrote.
“In order to be effective such a [assassination] program should be coordinated
with a well-organized resistance movement capable of providing a simultaneous internal
uprising.”
In October 1961, there was no
“well-organized resistance movement” in Cuba .
Helms later told the Church
Committee that President Kennedy never directly ordered the CIA
to assassinate Castro. “I remember vividly [the pressure] was very intense,” he
testified. “I believe it was the policy at the time to get rid of Castro and if
killing him was one of the things that was to be done in this connection, that
was within what was
expected.”
Senator Richard Schweicker, a
Republican from Pennsylvania, observed, “[A]s I understand your position on the
assassination of Castro, no one in essence told you to do it, no one in essence
told you not to do it . . . is that correct?”
“Yes, sir,” Helms replied.521
Momentum had carried the CIA ’s plotting to
assassinate Fidel Castro from the Eisenhower Administration to the Kennedy
Administration…..
Which was created by the CIA
for propaganda operations against the Cuban revolution in 1960. A CIA
memorandum on the DRE stated, “Members were used
through 1966 as political action agents, for publishing propaganda which was
sent out throughout the Hemisphere, attending international student meetings at
Agency direction, and producing radio programs and special propaganda
campaigns.”
Operation Mongoose
The CIA
memorandum added, “While the DRE was set up
as a psych warfare outfit, the organization was given a large amount of
paramilitary aid in funds and material. After the Bay of Pigs ,
the DRE engaged in independent military
actions . . .”525Another recipient of CIA
arms and paramilitary training was the DRE ,which
was sent out throughout the Hemisphere, attending international student
meetings at Agency direction, and producing radio programs and special
propaganda campaigns.”
The overweight,
pear-shaped William Harvey wanted to make an impression on Johnny Rosselli when
they met in Miami in April 1962. Harvey
pulled a revolver from inside his rumpled suit jacket and thumped it down on
the table in the cocktail lounge of the Miami
airport. As he knocked back a double Martini, Harvey
explained that he had replaced Jim O’Connell as Rosselli’s CIA
case officer. From now on, Rosselli would work directly with Harvey .
Sam Giancana, Santo Trafficante, and Robert Maheu had been eliminated, to make
the covert operation to assassinate Fidel Castro more secure….
FBI Special
Agent Sam Papich warned Harvey the
Bureau knew about his meetings with Rosselli in Miami .
Papich, the FBI’s liaison with the CIA , said
he would have to report Harvey ’s
contacts with Rosselli to FBI Director Hoover. Harvey
promised to report future meetings with Rosselli to the FBI. But he divulged
little about his business with Rosselli, saying he would continue to maintain
an “open relationship” with Rosselli for operational reasons.539 Hoover ’s
curiosity was aroused by reports linking President Kennedy to Judith Campbell,
who was also a paramour of Giancana and Rosselli. On March 22, 1962 , in a private luncheon, Hoover
informed Kennedy that the FBI knew about his sexual trysts with Judith Campbell
in the White House. A FBI briefing memorandum for Hoover ’s
meeting with Kennedy stated, “Information has been developed that Judith E.
Campbell . . . has been associated with prominent underworld figures Sam
Giancana and John Rosselli of Los Angeles .”
The FBI was monitoring Campbell ,
who was designated an “associate of hoodlums,” as part of its crackdown on
organized crime.
FBI Special
Agent Sam Papich warned Harvey the
Bureau knew about his meetings with Rosselli in Miami .
Papich, the FBI’s liaison with the CIA , said
he would have to report Harvey ’s
contacts with Rosselli to FBI Director Hoover. Harvey
promised to report future meetings with Rosselli to the FBI. But he divulged
little about his business with Rosselli, saying he would continue to maintain
an “open relationship” with Rosselli for
operational
reasons.539 Hoover ’s curiosity was
aroused by reports linking President Kennedy to Judith Campbell, who was also a
paramour of Giancana and Rosselli. On March
22, 1962 , in a private luncheon, Hoover
informed Kennedy that the FBI knew about his sexual trysts with Judith Campbell
in the White House. A FBI briefing memorandum for Hoover ’s
meeting with Kennedy stated, “Information has been developed that Judith E.
Campbell . . . has been associated with prominent underworld figures Sam
Giancana and John Rosselli of Los Angeles .”
The FBI was monitoring Campbell ,
who was designated an “associate of hoodlums,” as part of its crackdown on
organized crime. The FBI discovered John KennFBI Special Agent Sam Papich
warned Harvey the Bureau knew about
his meetings with Rosselli in Miami .
Papich, the FBI’s liaison with the CIA , said
he would have to report Harvey ’s
contacts with Rosselli to FBI Director Hoover. Harvey
promised to report future meetings with Rosselli to the FBI. But he divulged
little about his business with Rosselli, saying he would continue to maintain
an “open relationship” with Rosselli for operational reasons.539 Hoover ’s
curiosity was aroused by reports linking President Kennedy to Judith Campbell,
who was also a paramour of Giancana and Rosselli. On March 22, 1962 , in a private luncheon, Hoover
informed Kennedy that the FBI knew about his sexual trysts with Judith Campbell
in the White House. A FBI briefing memorandum for Hoover ’s
meeting with Kennedy stated, “Information has been developed that Judith E.
Campbell . . . has been associated with prominent underworld figures Sam
Giancana and John Rosselli of Los Angeles .”
The FBI was monitoring Campbell ,
who was designated an “associate of hoodlums,” as part of its crackdown on
organized crime.
The FBI
discovered Kennedy’s secret liaisons with Campbell
when it reviewed her telephone records, which revealed phone calls to the White
House. Campbell made seventy calls
to President Kennedy’s secretary Evelyn Lincoln in 1961 and 1962. Kennedy
family friend Frank Sinatra had introduced Judith Campbell to John Kennedy at
the Sands Hotel in Las Vegas in
February 1960, when the Massachusetts
senator was campaigning for president.
According to an
FBI memorandum, a Bureau informant overheard Sinatra say Campbell
was “shacking up with John Kennedy in the East.”
On August 24, 1962 , the CIA -backed
Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE )
(Revolutionary Student Directorate) carried out a high-publicity 165 commando
attack on beachfront properties in the Havana
suburb of Miramar . The Sierra
Maestra Hotel and nearby Blanquita Theater were shelled by a 20-millimeter
cannon mounted on a small, speedy boat 200 yards offshore. The Associated Press
reported, “Damage was slight, but
near-panic swept
the hotel as sleeping guests were shaken out of bed by the midnight bombardment.” The DRE
boasted the sea-borne raid the was “most dramatic” anti-Castro operation since
the Bay of Pigs .
on August 24.
Lanuza was booked on the show by the Lem Jones public relations agency, the
same agency CIA propaganda specialist David
Atlee Phillips used to issue statements in the name of the Frente
Revolucionario Democrático during the Bay of Pigs
landing. Lem Jones also did public relations work for José Miró Cardona, head
of the Consejo Revolucionario Cubano.
A DRE
press statement declared the purpose of the raid on Miramar
was to “denounce the arrival of increasingly large contingents of Russian troops
to our island.” Soviet military personnel and weapons began to arrive in Cuba
in July 1962. The DRE statement also took
aim at the Kennedy Administration, saying “The presence of Russian ships in Cuba ”
called into question “the promises of President Kennedy that Cuba
would never be abandoned.”
The statement continued, “We will not tolerate peaceful coexistence. . . . We
are not concerned with interested groups or long-range tactics of large powers.
We are concerned only that over the tombs of Martí and Maceo they do not raise
the soiled banners of the hammer and sickle.”
Meanwhile, CIA
officer David Phillips may have had a hand in the DRE ’s
provocative attack in Miramar .
Author Jefferson Morley asserts, “Phillips . . . made the whole incident
possible.” Morley outlines Phillips’s use of the DRE
in highly compartmented propaganda operations against Cuba
in the summer of 1962. From Mexico City ,
Phillips visited Miami , where the DRE
was based, and communicated regularly with Bill Kent and Ross Crozier, CIA
case officers for the DRE .564 p166
In early 1963,
Artime, Pepe San Román, and Enrique Ruiz Williams met frequently with the
attorney general in Washington .
Robert Kennedy biographer Evan Thomas writes, “Kennedy had been meeting
privately with Cuban exiles.” He continues, “RFK was entertaining Cuban exiles at
Hickory Hill and calling them at their apartments at the Ebbitt Hotel downtown,
where they were housed by the Agency.”
In January 1963,
the CIA reorganized its Cuba
operations. Des FitzGerald, appointed chief of the new Special Affairs Staff
(SAS), replaced William Harvey as the Agency’s point man on Cuba.656 Harvey and
Johnny Rosselli tied up the loose ends of their plotting to assassinate Castro.
Dismay turned to
anger when CIA -backed commando operations against
Cuba were
suspended at the end of October 1962. The Cuban exile movement’s anger boiled
over when Attorney General Kennedy announced a crackdown on unauthorized exile
action group raids on 203 Cuba ,
which he worried would jeopardize the continuing negotiations between the United
States and the Soviet Union
to finalize the Kennedy- Khrushchev agreement. Cuban exile
action groups planned to defy the administration’s ban. On October 30, a CIA
memorandum reported that Alpha 66 and the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil
(DRE ) “pledged that they will renew their
armed fight against Castro.”658
On December 4, U.S.
law enforcement officials also prevented a hit-andrun team from the
International Penetration Force (Interpen) from leaving Florida .
In the Florida Keys , federal officers arrested thirteen
Interpen commandos, including ten North Americans. United Press International reported
that Interpen “had been training for a guerrilla attack on Cuba
for the past six months at No Name Key forty miles northeast of Key
West . 660
Veciana, a
former manager of the Banco Financiero in Havana ,
was a past president of the Cuban Association of Public Accountants. The Banco Financiero
was owned by Julio Lobo. Before the revolution Lobo, who owned eleven sugar
mills and had a half-interest in three other mills, was known as Cuba ’s
“Sugar King.” Lobo’s Galban Trading Company was one of the biggest sugar
brokerage houses in the world. His holdings also included other banks,
insurance companies, and real estate.663 Lobo had profited from gangsterismo.
The gangsters turned to the Banco Financiero to finance the expansion of their
gambling colony in the 1950s. Cuban writer Enrique Cirules cites documents from
the Banco Nacional de Cuba and the Archivo Nacional de Cuba that outline the
Banco Financiero’s role in financing the construction of the Mafia-owned Capri
and Riviera hotels.664 Veciana
was Lobo’s protégé. According to CIA
records, Lobo, who left Cuba
for Miami in October 1961, was an
early source of funding for Alpha 66. One CIA
document reported that Veciana received “large sums of money for Alpha 66 from
Lobo in 1962.” Lobo offered to commit $250,000 for future Alpha 66
operations.665
The Department
of Justice considered prosecuting Cuban exiles who participated in raids
unauthorized by the CIA . Cuban exiles
reacted angrily to the crackdown…..
The Department
of Justice considered prosecuting Cuban exiles who participated in raids
unauthorized by the CIA . Cuban exiles
reacted angrily to the crackdown. Robert Kennedy was unrelentingly hawkish on Cuba .
On April 23, Kennedy referred to the possibility of the “death of Castro.” He
called for three studies on covert policy options, including: “A list of
measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro; A
program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in 18 months; A program to
cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next 18 months.” Robert
Kennedy was unrelentingly hawkish on Cuba .
On April 23, Kennedy referred to the possibility of the “death of Castro.” He
called for three studies on covert policy options, including: “A list of
measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro; A
program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in 18 months; A program to
cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next 18 months.”
In the wake of
President Kennedy’s crackdown on unauthorized Cuban exile attacks, Attorney
General Robert Kennedy had second thoughts about prosecuting Alpha 66, Comandos
L, and SFNE commandos. Trials in open courts would reveal U.S.
intelligence agency links to the exile action groups. According to FBI Director
Hoover, Army Intelligence used Alpha 66 raiders as intelligence sources on Cuba .
The CIA also had shadowy associations with
Veciana and Alpha 66. Lt. Col. Grover C. King, of Army Intelligence, wrote in
an October 22, 1962 message,
“There is a working agreement between Alpha 66 and CIA .”
King pointed out that Alpha 66 used CIA
explosives in its hit-and-run sabotage operation in Isabela de Sagua in October
1962. He wrote, “Prior to the raid on La Isabela an Alpha 66 member stole approximately
$600.00 worth of explosives from the CIA .
Explosives were used in La Isabela raid.” In January 1962, the CIA
authorized Veciana for “provisional operational use” in sabotage missions.
Veciana was given the code-name AMSHALE-1.680
An FBI investigation
found that some members of Comandos L were connected to Army Intelligence and
the CIA ….
Meanwhile,
Comandos L’s Antonio Cuesta had multiple connections to U.S.
intelligence. Cuesta was a “small boat operator” in CIA
“maritime operations” in 1961. Notes taken by a House Select Committee on Assassination
(HSCA) investigator from FBI files on Cuesta, reported the “FBI had interest in
January 1961.” A CIA Trace Request in May
1962 disclosed that Cuesta was also being “utilized” by Army Intelligence.683
Meanwhile, CIA
historian Jack Pfeiffer linked Phillips to a previously undisclosed CIA
assassination plot in Cuba
in 1961 involving the DRE . WH/4 Chief of
Operations Richard Drain mentioned the CIA
assassination operation in an oral history interview with Pfeiffer. Drain
recalled that on February 24, 1961 ,
he “asked Ed, Dave Phillips, Hinkle, Moore and Jake ‘why not proceed with
operation AMHINT to set up [a] program of assassinations.’” AMHINT, the CIA
cryptonym for a DRE propaganda team, later
canceled the murder plan.689
When Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor appeared before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, he stated that the Joint Chiefs could support the limited
test ban treaty if it included safeguards. The Chiefs wanted a new series of
underground tests and funding for the continued upgrade of warheads by U.S.
nuclear weapons laboratories.
The Joint Chiefs
also insisted on an assurance that the administration would resume atmospheric
testing if the Soviets violated the treaty. Kennedy gave the Joint Chiefs what
they wanted, and he won their support. On September 24, 1963 , the limited test ban treaty passed the
Senate by a 80 to 19 vote on September
24, 1963 …
The Cuban exile
movement fell into disarray as the Kennedy Administration made the transition
from Operation Mongoose to “autonomous operations.”
There were
several unsuccessful efforts to unify Cuban exile groups. Former
Bay of Pigs prisoner Enrique Ruiz
Williams formed a “unity committee” with the backing of Attorney General Robert
Kennedy. But neither Williams or nor his Ejército Liberación de Cuba (ELC)
(Liberation Army of Cuba) had much of a popular following. According to CIA
documents, Ruiz told other Cuban exiles that there were several unsuccessful
efforts to unify Cuban exile groups.
There were
several unsuccessful efforts to unify Cuban exile groups. Former
Bay of Pigs prisoner Enrique Ruiz
Williams formed a “unity committee” with the backing of Attorney General Robert
Kennedy. But neither Williams or nor his Ejército Liberación de Cuba (ELC)
(Liberation Army of Cuba) had much of a popular following. According to CIA
documents, Ruiz told other Cuban exiles thathe had been chosen by Robert Kennedy
“to lead new Cuban Republic .”
In July and August 1963, former Nicaraguan strongman Luis Somoza was in Miami
to rally the Cuban exile movement. In Miami ,
he met with Cuban exile
leaders and offered them aid and arms and the use of bases in Nicaragua
from which to launch attacks on Cuba .
Among others, he met with Carlos Prío, Manuel Artime, Anotnio
Varona, Antonio Veciana, and Carlos Marquez Sterling.
Meanwhile, Antonio
Varona traveled to Chicago , where
he met with Sam Giancana, Murray
Humphreys, and other leaders of the Chicago Outfit in July 1963. A confidential
CIA informant said that “four underworld
figures made a contribution of $200,000 to him [Varona].”716
Two months later
the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE )
(Revolutionary Student Directorate) also made a trek to Chicago .
According to a CIA report, two DRE
members gave Richard Cain a “purchasing list” of weapons. Cain told the CIA ’s
Domestic Contact office (OO/C) in Chicago that the DRE
wanted two small speedboats, radar, 40-millimeter and 20-millimeter cannons, 50
caliber machine guns, 9-millimeter submachine guns, 45-caliber pistols, and
bazookas. The DRE was willing to pay up to
$25,000 for the
weapons.
According to an
unsigned CIA memorandum, Cain was instructed
to “get out of the picture as soon as possible, and to make no commitment.
Apparently the DRE
is an MOB-controlled organization which, at times, seems to act independently
of its monitor.” A handwritten note in the margin exclaimed “Amen!” The DRE
also cultivated Bacardi Rum as a financial sugar daddy. An FBI report stated,
“MM T-1, who is in regular contact Cuban exiles at Miami ,
Florida , active in revolutionary
activities, advised that Luis Bacardi of the Bacardi Rum manufacturing family,
has been financing some activities of the DRE .”
JMWAVE, the Miami CIA Station, reported…
Apparently the DRE
is an MOB-controlled organization which, at times, seems to act independently
of its monitor.” A handwritten note in the margin exclaimed “Amen!” The DRE
also cultivated Bacardi Rum as a financial sugar daddy. An FBI report stated,
“MM T-1, who is in regular contact Cuban exiles at Miami ,
Florida , active in revolutionary
activities, advised that Luis Bacardi of the Bacardi Rum manufacturing family,
has been financing some activities of the DRE .”
JMWAVE, the Miami CIA Station, reported
José “Pepin”
Bosch, president of Bacardi Rum, financed a committee to select a single leader
to represent Cuban exiles.
Apparently the DRE
is an MOB-controlled organization which, at times, seems to act independently
of its monitor.” A handwritten note in the margin exclaimed “Amen!” The DRE
also cultivated Bacardi Rum as a financial sugar daddy. An FBI report stated,
“MM T-1, who is in regular contact Cuban exiles at Miami ,
Florida , active in revolutionary
activities, advised that Luis Bacardi of the Bacardi Rum manufacturing family,
has been financing some activities of the DRE .”
JMWAVE, the Miami CIA Station, reported José
“Pepin” Bosch, president of Bacardi Rum, financed a committee to select a
single leader to represent Cuban exiles. The Mafia took a special interest in
blowing up oil refineries near Havana .
On June 15, 1963 , U.S.
Customs agents broke up a plan to bomb the Shell Oil refinery, seizing a
twin-engine Beechcraft airplane, explosives, and bombs at an abandoned airport
near Miami . Michael McLaney, who bought
the Hotel Nacional from Lansky’s allies in the Cleveland Syndicate in 1958,
supplied the airplane and the money for the bombing mission…
The Mafia used
Lauchli, a cofounder of the ultra-right Minutemen, to supply On July 31, the
FBI raided a farmhouse in Lacombe , Louisiana ,
near Lake Ponchartrain
connected to another McLaney-sponsored plot to bomb targets in Cuba .
The FBI seized 2,400 pounds of dynamite and twenty bomb casings. The farm
belonged to McLaney’s brother William, a casino worker in Havana
in the 1950s. Rich Lauchli, a Collinsville , Illinois ,
gun dealer, was tied to the explosives found in the farmhouse in Lacombe. The
Mafia used Lauchli, a cofounder of the ultra-right Minutemen, to supply arms
and munitions to Cuban-exile commando groups.
“Nov 63 issue
See magazine . . . contains wanted poster of Fidel Castro on front cover,”
JMWAVE reported. “Wanted poster is part of a story . . . gist of which is DRE
offers 10 million dollars reward ‘to person or persons who with help of the DRE
will assassinate Fidel Castro.’” JMWAVE Chief Theodore Shackley described the CIA ’s
relationship with the DRE to the FBI. A
Bureau report stated, “His agency maintained an interest in the propaganda, political
and intelligence activities of DRE , but did
not sponsor and had no interest in
the paramilitary operations of the DRE and
was interested in preventing the DRE from
executing any paramilitary operations.”717
In June 1963,
President Kennedy pressed the CIA to get its
Cuban exile sabotage campaign up and running as soon as possible. The CIA ’s
new covert action plan, Operation AMLILAC, targeted Cuba ’s
economic infrastructure. A June 19 memorandum for the Standing Group asserted
that the goal was not to foment an uprising but “to nourish a spirit of
resistance and dissatisfaction which could lead to significant defections and
other byproducts of unrest.”720
The first of the
AMLILAC raids took place in the darkness of August 17–18. A nine member team,
using 75-millimeter recoilless rifles and 81-millimeter mortars, attacked oil
storage facilities near the port of Casilda ,
223 not far from Trinidad on Cuba ’s
south coast. Another nine-member team shot up a sulfuric acid plant in Santa
Lucia on Cuba ’s
north coast on the night of August 18–19. The CIA
teams used recoilless rifles and 3.5-inch rocket launchers in the hit-and-run
raid in Santa Lucia.
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor analyzed the CIA
operations. “All were executed by Cubans landing in small craft launched from a
mother ship,” Taylor wrote in a
memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. “[The] operations [were]
conducted in a manner designed to ensure nonattributability to the United
States .” The motherships left from secret
JMWAVE bases in the Florida Keys.721 JMWAVE’s standard operating procedure was
to allow exile action groups like Alpha 66 to take credit for CIA -controlled
operations. But in this case the CIA created
a fictional exile action group Comandos Mambises, named after the
nineteenth-century Cuban independence fighters, to claim responsibility for the
attacks.
Comandos
Mambises’s cover as a front for the CIA was
blown when Clemente Inclán Werner and two other CIA -trained
Cubans were captured off the coast of Pinar del Río . In
an interview broadcast on Cuban television, Inclán said that his group was
trained at a camp near New Orleans
by the CIA . He said the raids wereChairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor analyzed the CIA
operations. “All were executed by Cubans landing in small craft launched from a
mother ship,” Taylor wrote in a
memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. “[The] operations [were]
conducted in a manner designed to ensure nonattributability to the United
States .” The motherships left from secret
JMWAVE bases in the Florida Keys.721 JMWAVE’s standard operating procedure was
to allow exile action groups like Alpha 66 to take credit for CIA -controlled
operations. But in this case the CIA created
a fictional exile action group Comandos Mambises, named after the nineteenth-century
Cuban independence fighters, to claim responsibility for the attacks.
Comandos
Mambises’s cover as a front for the CIA was
blown when Clemente Inclán Werner and two other CIA -trained
Cubans were captured off the coast of Pinar del Río . In
an interview broadcast on Cuban television, Inclán said that his group was
trained at a camp near New Orleans
by the CIA . He said the raids werelaunched
off the coast of Cuba
from a CIA mothership named Rex.722
In Washington,
Attorney General Kennedy moved to gain access to Mafia arms dealer Dominick
Bartone’s contacts to promote “boom and bang” in Cuba. At the request of
Special Assistant to the Attorney General William Kenney, Justine F. Gleichauf,
head of the CIA ’s Domestic Contact office in
Miami , interviewed Bartone.
Gleichauf reported that Bartone was willing to cooperate with U.S.
authorities. Bartone’s lawyers were appealing his conviction for smuggling
airplanes to the Dominican Republic
in August 1959.
Carlos Tepedino
González, a Havana jeweler and friend
of Cubela, set up a meeting between Cubela and the CIA .
Cubela pitched his plan to a CIA 227 officer
in a two-hour meeting at the Hilton Hotel in Mexico City
in March 1961. Tepedino, a CIA asset since
1957, whose cryptonym was AMWHIP, was a financial and political backer of the
Directorio Revolucionario of which Cubela had been a leader. He used his
jewelry business and business travel abroad as cover for his role as a
“cut-out” between Cubela and the Agency.
The CIA
had already made contact with disgruntled Cuban army officers as part of
Operation AMTRUNK, the objective of which was to cause “a split” in the
leadership of the Cuban revolution.733 CIA -trained
Cuban assets were infiltrated into Cuba
to make “initial contacts among select high-level military figures in Havana ,”
according to a CIA memorandum.
On November 22,
Castro and Daniel were having lunch in Castro’s residence at Varadero
Beach when a telephone rang. Castro
excused himself to take the call in another room. When Castro hung up, Daniel
heard him repeat three times, shaken, “Es una mala noticia” (“This is bad
news”).
When Castro
returned, he informed Daniel that President Kennedy had been assassinated. For
a few moments, the two men sat in a stunned silence. Then Castro spoke.
“Everything is going to change,” he said, worried the window of opportunity for
negotiations with the United States
had slammed shut with Kennedy’s passing. “The Cold War, relations with Russia ,
Latin America , Cuba
. . . [A]ll will have to be rethought.” As they listened to radio news updates
from Dallas , Castro became more
apprehensive. Kennedy’s alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, was described as a
member of the “Fair Play for Cuba Committee,” a pro-Castro Marxist whose wife
was Russian. “If they had had proof, they would have said he was an agent, an
accomplice, a hired killer,” Castro said. “In saying simply that he is an
admirer, this is just to try and make an association in people’s minds between
the name of Castro and the emotions awakened by assassination. This is a
publicity method, a propaganda device. It’s terrible.” As they listened to
radio news updates from Dallas ,
Castro became more apprehensive. Kennedy’s alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald,
was described as a member of the “Fair Play for Cuba Committee,” a pro-Castro Marxist
whose wife was Russian. “If they had had proof, they would have said he was an
agent, an accomplice, a hired killer,” Castro said. “In saying simply that he
is an admirer, this is just to try and make an association in people’s minds
between the name of Castro and the emotions awakened by assassination. This is
a publicity method, a propaganda device. It’s terrible.”
In the meantime,
the tide turned against the CIA ’s
hit-and-run raids in Cuba
among Johnson’s foreign-policy advisers. SAS Chief FitzGerald pressed Bundy to
continue to support the CIA ’s covert action
program. He conceded that the effectiveness of the raids was debatable. But he
noted that the original plan, approved by the Standing Group in June 1963,
called for a greater number of raids and more robust operations. Only five
lowkey sabotage actions had actually been authorized between August and December
1963. FitzGerald stressed that the CIA ’s
capability for covert operations against Cuba
would erode unless the commando teams were kept busy…..
Nonetheless,
Johnson terminated the CIA -controlled
sabotage operations on April 7, 1964.742 Adding to the woes of the covert war
against Cuba ,
Cuban exile autonomous operations got off to an inauspicious start.....
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