ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL – The Briefer &
The Center (NPIC)
Dino Brugioni dedicates his book
“Eyeball to Eyeball” The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile
Crisis (Random House, 1991) to “Arthur C. Lundahl. His vision and
leadership made photo interpretation the guardian of the national
security.”
Before reviewing what transpired when
the Zapruder film was at the National Photographic Interpretation
Center (NPIC), the following excerpts from Brugioni’s book reflects
who worked at NPIC and how they operated during the October 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis.
After two of his Navy Photographic
Interpretation Center photoanalysists brief ARTHUR C. LUNDAH – The Briefer &
The Center (NPIC)
Dino Brugioni dedicates his book
“Eyeball to Eyeball” The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile
Crisis (Random House, 1991) to “Arthur C. Lundahl. His vision and
leadership made photo interpretation the guardian of the national
security.”
Before reviewing what transpired when
the Zapruder film was at the National Photographic Interpretation
Center (NPIC), the following excerpts from Brugioni’s book reflects
who worked at NPIC and how they operated during the October 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis.
After two of his Navy Photographic
Interpretation Center photoanalysists briefed the Robertson
Commission in 1953, the had of that center, Captain Arthur Lundahl,
was transferred to the CIA to start the National Photographic
Interpretation Center.
Brugioni writes:
…Concomitant with (Kelly) Johnson’s
development of the U2, [ and special Kodak film, and camera] (Arthur
C.) Lundahl began to structure the intelligence organization within
the CIA required to exploit the imagery acquired by the U2. Lundahl
was given a free hand in recruiting and selecting personnel. Early in
1955, Hans “Dutch” Scheufele, William F. Banfield,
and I were told by Dr. James M. Andrews, the director of the Office
of Central Reference, and Dr. Joseph Becker, his executive officer,
that we had new jobs and that we were not to discuss our new
assignments with anyone.
I had been recruited by the CIA in
March 1948 and was a member of a unit responsible for creating
the Agency’s industrial register of detailed information on
foreign-production facilities worldwide…Lundahl, aware of the
difficulties encountered by the photo interpreters during World War
II, conceived of his organization as a wagon wheel. The photo
interpreters would be the hub of that wheel and the radiating spokes
of specialists would make the wheel turn….in Q Building and,
later, Quarters I – an abandoned barracks that housed a WAVE
contingent during World War II…Photo-interpretation had
traditionally been the private preserve of the military, especially
the Air Force, which was extremely sensitive to the Agency’s
encroachment on its territory.
…During this period, Lundahl and his
executive officer, Chick Camp were also involved in
negotiating a permanent home for the center. The nondescript Steuart
Motor Car Co. Building was selected in a crime-ridden area of the
Washington ghetto at Fifth and K Streets, NW. the four upper floors
of the building would become the division’s home, while the three
lower floors would still be occupied by the motor car company, along
with the Steuart Real Estate Office. The building was not air
conditioned, and there were heating problems in winter….
Lundahl met with the Agency’s deputy
director for intelligence, Robert Amory, about reorganizing
the organization to accommodate the service elements. Amory agreed
and Lundahl chose the title National Photographic Interpretation
Center for his new organization.
Air Force Colonel Osmond “Ozzie”
J. Ritland had been working with Bissel, and he and lower-ranking
Air Force officers were doing everything possible to aid the CIA in
its photo-collection and interpretation efforts.
Meanwhile, at the Pentagon, there was
an angry undercurrent as to how the Air Force could allow a task
properly assigned to them slip away to the CIA. Air Force
photo-interpretation units were directed not to cooperate with Agency
personnel in their attempt to establish a photo-interpretation
center. At Omaha, General Curtis LeMay regarded SAC as the
free world’s primary deterrent to the Soviet Union and assumed that
it should have the dominant role I acquiring strategic intelligence.
While General LeMay cooperated with the Agency in providing
logistical support, he too, to paraphrase one of his senior officers,
was ‘bent out of shape’ because the Agency was becoming involved
with photo-interpretation. In one of his staff meetings, LeMay said
about the U2, “We’ll let them develop it and then we’ll take it
away from them.”
The first U2 mission over the Soviet
Union took place on July 4, 1956…Photo interpreters at the
center looked at the photographs with abject fascination. A number of
briefing boards were produced….Lundahl showed the intelligence
significance of each board as the president listened intently.
Lundahl remembered that the president “asked questions about very
specific targets that were of great national interest. He was
impressed with the quality of the photography and asked questions
about the resolution and the altitude the pictures were made from. He
also asked questions about intercept attempts and questions about any
Soviet reaction.” Lundahl described the president as being “warm
with satisfaction” after seeing the results from the first mission.
A warm and friendly relationship developed. Eisenhower admiring
Lundahl for his articulate presentations and Lundahl enjoying the
president’s support for the reconnaissance programs.
It was an exciting era – a new age of
discovery, and, for the first time, we had the capability to derive
precise, irrefutable data on the vast land mass and physical
installations of our principal adversary – and the data was only a
few days old. It was also a learning and collaborative experience
between the policymakers, intelligence analysts and photo
interpreters. The analyst literally stood at the photo interpreter’s
shoulder and was made acutely aware of the exploitation process and
of the photo interpreter’s nuances and jargon. The policymakers
began comparing the information derived from the U2 with other
sources of information. Often when presented with information from
other sources, the president would ask, “How does this compare with
the U2 information?”
These missions were generating
accurate, current information in greater quantities than had ever
been contemplated. Much to our surprise, the Russians had not
employed any camouflage and concealment efforts. Time and again, we
knew we were reporting information that was dispelling existing
notions and intelligence estimates, and we took a certain vicarious
pleasure in proving the value of aerial photography over other
intelligence sources. Analysts began reevaluating assumptions
regarding Soviet strategic capabilities. Within a few weeks, analysis
of the U2 photography had dispelled the bomber-gap myth.
Lundahl’s combination of energy,
memory, intelligence, knowledge, and articulateness was making quite
a name for him and the art of photo interpretation. After the
president was briefed on the takes from each mission, Lundahl would
proceed to the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, congressional leaders, and the chiefs of the
various intelligence directorates. Lundahl quickly became the most
respected and honored intelligence officer in the intelligence
community. He was a superb photo interpreter and photogrammetrist
and could articulate the characteristics and technical specifications
of the new collection system. This ability, combined with a warm
enthusiasm and a strong empathy with his audiences, was daily proving
the value of photo intelligence in the estimate process. After each
mission, Kelly Johnson would come to the Center and we would
brief him on the results of the mission. Such other distinguished
visitors as General Jimmy Doolittle, Dr. Edwin Land, and Dr. George
Kistiakowsky also came to our nondescript but vital facility in the
Steuart Building.
GARY POWERS
On May 1, 1960, just fifteen
days before a scheduled four-power summit conference was to convene
in Paris, Gary Power’s U2 air-plane was brought down by an indirect
hit from a near-miss SA-2 missile near Sverdlovsk, in the USSR…A
furious debate ensued in the Senate, …To quell the debate, Allen
Dulles decided to brief the entire Senate on the benefits that were
derived from the U2 program.
Mr. Lundahl was told that he would be
allowed precisely thirty minutes and that this should be the briefing
of his lifetime. Lundahl gave us the task of organizing the effort,
and I carefully reviewed all the contributions that the U2 missions
had made to the national estimate process, along with the many crises
wherein the intelligence derived had been employed to resolve policy
issues worldwide. A number of spectacular briefing boards were
created, and Lundahl rehearsed himself intently on the substantive
content of the boards, to assure that he could effectively deliver
the information within the prescribed thirty minutes.
Lundahl remembers the chamber he and
Dulles entered as being “filled with senators, many in angry or
combative moods.” Mr. Dulles, wearing one of his usual English
tweed suits, introduced Lundahl. He then lit his curved tobacco pipe
and settled back to enjoy Lundahl’s startling presentation, which
upon completion provoked a standing ovation from the senators
present. Mr. Dulles was so surprised by the reaction that when he
rose to his feet, his lit pipe tumbled onto his lap, setting his
tweed coat afire. Lundahl, taken aback, did not know whether to
simply stand there and accept the senators’ acclaim or to seek a
glass of water to throw on his inflamed director.
In Paris,…Lundahl, Cunningham, and a
translator were driven to the Elysee Palace and escorted to de
Gaull’s office. De Gaulle was alone. Lundahl opened the package of
briefing materials and moved toward de Gaulle in order to brief him
at his desk. De Gaulle rose, walked toward Lundahl, and asked him to
place the graphics on a large conference table, where he stood
looking down at them....Lundahl handed him a lage magnifying glass.
De Gaulle asked a number of questions…His initial response to what
he saw was expressed, cryptically, in French, “Formidable!
Formidable!”
When the briefing was completed, de Gaulle thanked Lundahl, paused, reflected for a moment, and then said, “This is one of the most important programs the West is currently involved in and it is something that must continue.” ….Upon his return from the aborted conference, Eisenhower decided to speak to the nation and to reassure the public that he knew what was going on in his government…
When the briefing was completed, de Gaulle thanked Lundahl, paused, reflected for a moment, and then said, “This is one of the most important programs the West is currently involved in and it is something that must continue.” ….Upon his return from the aborted conference, Eisenhower decided to speak to the nation and to reassure the public that he knew what was going on in his government…
James C. Hagerty, the
president’s press secretary, selected a number of the boards and
left to show them to the president. He returned after a few minutes,
saying Eisenhower had rejected the idea of showing all the briefing
boards…Rather than releasing photography of Soviet installations
for public display, the president had selected the single briefing
board I had prepared of the San Diego Naval Air Station,
showing the airfield, aircraft, hangers, and runway markers….
[Kelly notes: J.C. Hagerty later
worked as News director of ABC News in New York and hired the
reporter who became the intermediary in the backchannel negotiations
between JFK, William Atwood and Fidel Castro.]
In his televised address, Eisenhower,…
added, “Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have
used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet
military developments. The usefulness of this work has been well
established through four years of effort…”
There are a number of references in
books on Powers U2 flight and the Kennedy assassination to the effect
that Lee Harvey Oswald provided the Russians with data on the U2 that
was subsequently used by the Soviets in downing Gary Power’s U2.
Most of these accounts focus on the fact that in 1957, Oswald, then a
seventeen year old US Marine Corps private, was assigned to the 1
Marine Aiercraft Wing, based at Atsugi Naval Air Station, about
twenty miles west of Tokyo, as a trained radar operator. During the
period Oswald was assigned at Atsugi, U2s used the naval air station
as a staging base for missions over the Soviet Union. Oswald returned
to the US, and on October 31, 1959, renounced his US
citizenship. At the US embassy in Moscow, he indicated that he would
tell the Russians everything he knew about US radar operations and
something else that he termed “of special interest.” 19 The
knowledge derived from radar intercepts – i.e., course, altitude,
and speed – is the same whether learned from US or Russian radar
operations. The Soviets had an accurate record of U2 performance
beginning with the first mission over the USSR on July 4, 1956. On
subsequent missions the data was refined so that in a relatively
short period the Soviets had an accurate record of U2
characteristics. The Russians had publicly confirmed the fact that
they had been tracking and were knowledgeable about U2 operations….so
the Russians were well aware of the U2s altitude, course, and speed….
On August 18, at 12:57 P.M., the US
Discoverer XIV space satellite was launched from Vandenberg
Air Force Base in California….The reentry vehicle was ejected
over Alaska on its seventeenth pass. In the recovery area, which
encompassed a 200 by 60 mile rectangle, six C-119s and one C-130 flew
within the area called the ball park. Three other C-119s patrolled an
“outfield” area, embracing an additional 400 miles. All aircraft
flew an assigned search pattern. At 3:46 PM on August 19, one of the
C-119 Flying Boxcars, piloted by Captain Harrold E. Mitchell and
his nine man crew, searching in the “outfield” area, hooked
the parachute and the 84 pound capsule in midair at an altitude of
8,500 feet and hauled them aboard. 21 A new era of reconnaissance had
begun. On this first successful photographic satellite mission,
carrying a twenty-pound roll of film, we gained more than 1 million
square miles of coverage of the Soviet Union – more coverage in one
capsule than the combined four years of U2 coverage….
[Kelly notes: This film was flown to
the Kodak HQ in Rochester NY for processing]
The front page of the New York Times on
August 20, 1960 headlined the first successful midair recovery of the
reentry capsule and on the opposite side of the front page announced
the end of the U2 trial and conviction and sentencing of Gary Powers.
One photographic-collection period of the Soviet Union was ending
while another was just beginning….
LUNDAHL THE BRIEFER AND JFK
The task of educating President
Kennedy on photo interpretation devolved upon Arthur Lundahl. Lundahl
was a key official who established a close working relationship with
both President Kennedy and the assistant to the president for
national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy. Lundahl’s
articulate, erudite, and succinct explanations of what was seen on
aerial photography were always welcome at the White House. The
president wanted technical information presented in a straightforward
manner, free of military jargon, so it would be comprehensible not
only to him but also the average person. In one of his early
briefings of the president, Lundahl explained that the U2 camera
could photograph a swath about 125 nautical miles wide and about
3,000 nautical miles long on over 10,000 feet of film. Lundahl drew
the analogy that each foot of film was scanned under magnification in
much the same manner that Sherlock Holmes would scan evidence or look
for clues with a large magnifying glass. “Imagine,” Lundahl would
suggest, “a group of photo interpreters on their hands and knees
scanning a roll of film that extended from the White House to the
Capitol and back.” Kennedy never forgot that analogy. When other
high officials were briefed on the U2 at the White House, the
president would call on Lundahl to repeat the story.
Lundahl and President Kennedy hit it
off famously. Periodically, Lundahl would update the president in
private briefings on the latest finds from both the U2 and satellite
photography. The president’s discomfort from a chronic back
ailment, the usual cluttered condition of the presidential desk, with
its many mementos and reams of reading material, and the very nature
of the photographic briefing materials to be presented required that
a certain special physical arrangement be made. Lundahl would enter
the Oval Office and the president would leave his cluttered desk and
be seated in the famous rocking chair that had been custom designed
to alleviate his back problem. The rocking chair was positioned in
front of a round coffee table. Lundahl would be seated on the sofa to
the right of the president, and the director of the CIA would
frequently be seated on the president’s left. Removing the silver
cigar humidor and ashtray that were usually on the table, Lundahl
would arrange his briefing materials and provide the president with a
large magnifying glass. The president then drew up his rocking chair
close to the table and, using the magnifying glass, began to study
the latest photography as Lundahl briefed.
According to Lundahl, the president was
a good listener. He liked good lead-in statements. Lundahl knew this
and carefully selected and arranged his words so he could gauge the
president’s reaction as he spoke. Once he asked Lundahl to remain
after a briefing. He was eager to know more about the
photo-interpretation process. “Where do you get photo interpreters?
How much do you pay them? How do you train them? Are they satisfied
with their work? He indicted that he would like to visit the center
and observe the high technology of interpretation at work. Lundahl
was afforded a unique opportunity because of his position. He admired
the president’s intellect and courage, and in turn, the president
came to admire Lundahl for his intelligence and grace in making a
difficult task look exceptionally easy. He came to know the president
as a friend and was privy to share the laughter, heartaches, secrets,
moods, defeats and triumphs that occurred during the Kennedy years.
…Colonel – later General Andrew
Goodpasture became powerful during the Eisenhower administration
performing important national-security-affairs function. McGeorge
Bundy – who had been appointed assistant to the president for
national security affairs after the Bay of Pigs invasion and also had
an instinct for power – assumed the intelligence watchdog role in
President Kennedy’s administration. Intense, articulate, and
intelligence, Bundy kept close track of the satellite, U2 and other
aircraft missions being flown – and their results. Any photography
shown to the president had to be passed through Bundy’s office in
the White House basement….
[Kelly notes: Gen. Goodpasture is
the husband of Mrs. Goodpasture, the secretary.]
….Suspecting that General Cabell
had leaked the information, he asked for his resignation….On
January 31, 1962 he resigned…from the Air Force…He was replaced
by Major General Marshall “Pat” Carter…(Murphy) revealed
that Admiral Arleigh Burke had been the source of his
Bay of Pigs information…and his “bagman” at the
Department of Defense, McNamara…
CUBA
On August 29, 1962, a U2 was
dispatched to photograph the entire island of Cuba….As one analyst
stated after viewing the results of the mission, “The sirens were
on and the red lights were flashing.”
Within minutes after the film was
placed on the light table, a Center photo interpreter assigned to the
mission scan team shouted, “I’ve got a SAM site.” Excitement
spread, and other photo interpreters gathered around him to look at
his find…
When Mr. (John) McCone was
briefed on the finds of the mission, he admonished contemptuously,
“They’re not putting them [the SA-2 sites] in to protect the cane
cutters. They’re putting them in to blind our reconnaissance eye.”
When (Ray) Cline was briefed on
the mission finds, he asked that Bill Harvey, chief of Task Force
W, also be informed so that covert personnel would be aware of
and could concentrate on collecting confirmation on the newly found
sites. Harvey was briefed by Lundahl and William Tidwell, an
assistant to Cline. He responded quickly that McGeorge Bundy and
the president should also be briefed as soon as possible.
Bundy said the president would not be
available that afternoon because he was preparing to fly to the
Quonset Naval Air Station to meet his wife and children, who
had returned from a month-long vacation in Italy. Recuperating from
the death of their newborn son, Patrick, Jackie had visited her
sister, Lee, and Lee’s husband Stanislas Radziwill, at Villa
Episcopin in Ravello.
Bundy told Cline that Attorney
General Bobby Kennedy was available, however, and might like to
hear the briefing, since he would be seeing the president later that
evening in Rhode Island.
On August 31, at 4 PM, Lundahl,
Tidwell, and Harvey waited outside the attorney general’s office.
After the group was ushered into Kennedy’s office, Harvey made a
brief introductory statement and turned the briefing over to Lundahl.
Lundahl laid out the photographs and maps on Kennedy’s desk and
summarized the developments in Cuba. He pointed to the deployment
patterns of the SA-2 sites and indicated that we would probably be
seeing more. He then showed Kennedy the photo of the port of Mariel
with seven KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats, explaining their
function and mission in a sketch included on the briefing board.
Photography was an ideal medium for
conveying information to someone with Bobby’s forceful views and
convictions. He was extremely interested, asked many questions, said
he wanted to be kept up-to-date, and promised that the intelligence
would be conveyed to the president that evening…..The briefing had
lasted about an hour, and Lundahl noticed that there was a chill
between Kennedy and Harvey – that Kennedy avoided speaking to
Harvey directly and that Harvey avoided eye contact with Kennedy.
This was Lundahl’s first briefing of
the attorney general, and he remembered him as being “a very sharp
fellow, very perceptive, full of good questions. He didn’t like
long, involved answers. He cut through any wandering conversations
and got right up to the things he wanted to know….
Then on August 31, 1962, the day
Bobby Kennedy was briefed on the SA-2 sites in Cuba, Senator
Kenneth Keating of New York made the following startling
announcement from the floor of the Senate: “I am reliably informed
that…Soviet ships unloaded 1,200 troops, I call these men troops,
not technicians. They were wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms.”
A meeting with the president was set
for September 7 at 3:30 PM. Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of
Defense McNamara, General Carter, Cline, Lundahl, and John
McLauchlin, representing the Defense Intelligence Agency, were
ushered into the Oval Office. The secretary of defense had asked John
Hughes, a special assistant to the director of DIA, to attend,
but Hughes was unavailable. John McLauchlin, Hughes’s deputy,
laughs when he recalls how a GS-12 represented the DOD at such a
critical White House meeting. He felt ill at ease when he saw the
nation’s leaders’ inquiring glances directed at him. He is sure
they were wondering, Who in the hell is he. But no one asked.
The president was seated in his famous
rocking chair, with McGeorge Bundy standing immediately to his left.
General Carter told the president that detailed analysis of the
August 29 U2 photography over Cuba – in addition to providing data
on the SA-2 sites and the KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats – had
revealed a surface-to-surface missile site. He said that Cline and
Lundahl would provide the details. Cline read a short prepared
statement…He then asked Lundahl to describe the site. Lundahl
removed the briefing board from a leather carrying case and handed it
to the president. Lundahl looked over the top of the briefing board
wile explaining it to the president….
The president obviously was concerned
primarily with whether the newly identified site was defensive or
offensive in nature.... “How far will this thing shoot?” the
president asked….The president was not satisfied with technical
explanations….The president paused for a moment and reflected,…He
asked, “Do we have something like that?”
McNamara replied, “No, we don’t.”
The president snapped, “Why in the
hell don’t we? How long have we know about this weapon?”
…The president’s face froze. He
began to drum his fingers nervously and impatiently on the arms of
the rocker. Lundahl knew that the quick, annoyed tapping betrayed his
impatience and anxiety. “Damnit,” the president said, “If that
damn thing is in Cuba, we should know something about it.”
General Carter, sensing that the
president’s questions and concerns about the missile system would
not be satisfied that day, stated that he hoped the president
understood that he was only following the president’s orders to
report any new developments in Cuba to him personally…
The president stood up and glared fiercely at General Carter and then muttered, almost to himself, “I do, but I don’t want half-assed information….Go back and do your homework….I want no further reporting until the missile site has been completely evaluated and you can report back to me.”
…The president asked how widely the
information would be disseminated… “We have to be very careful
about any evidence of offensive weapons in Cuba. If such evidence is
found, It must be kept very restricted and I want to be the first to
know about it.”
…The president began a chopping
motion with his right arm,… “If this information is in the
Washington Post tomorrow, I’ll fire both of you.”
…Carter tarried and said, “…you
do want us to know exactly what these things are so that we can
report to you accurately?”
The president considerably toned down,
said, “By all means.”
Carter continued, “Then in order to
arrive at these conclusions, it wouldn’t be contrary to your
wishes, or your order, that we, the analysts, talk back and forth
with each other to compare our knowledge and winnow out our
conclusions and to reject that which is inconsistent.
The president replied, “Most
certainly not: that’s exactly what I want to happen.”
“I thought that’s what you wanted,”
Carter said, “but others might have felt that each of us was to
stay in isolation and try independently to arrive at a collectively
agreed upon conclusion, which would have been hard to do.”
The president then said, “No. Those
people who need to know – those specialists, those experts who can
talk to the photo interpreters and with whom those photo interpreters
can talk – can collective arrive at a decision. That’s what I
want to happen”
…Everyone had gotten the president’s
message. When Carter returned to his Langley office, he was asked by
an aide how the presidential briefing had gone. He answered, “The
president was pissed!”
Carter called Huntington Sheldon,
the CIA assistant deputy director for intelligence into his
office. Carter told him that as a result of a presidential directive,
a security system had to be established that would absolutely
safeguard the dissemination of highly sensitive information derived
from the Cuban overflights should offensive missiles be found…Sheldon
summoned security specialist Henry Thomas to his office and
asked him to bring with him a list of available code names..
Sheldon chose the code word PSALM.
At the Center, Lundahl appointed Jack
Gardner and me to work with Office of Scientific Intelligence
offensive missile specialist Sidney Graybeal and defensive
missile specialist Norman Smith on the Barnes site….
General Carter called Lundahl early on
September 10 and said that the president would like a current
briefing on aerial photographic systems for himself and General
Eisenhower…Carter was informed that the president would be lunching
with General Eisenhower and that Carter, Lundahl, and his deputy,
Col. David S. Parker, should have lunch at the White House dining
room. Afterward, Lundahl set up his briefing materials on an easel in
the Oval Office. Just before 2 P.M. President Kennedy and General
Eisenhower came in. The president said to General Eisenhower, “You
must certainly know these gentlemen?” General Eisenhower said that
he did, shook hands with the briefers, and sat down at the
president’s right.
Carter made a few introductory remarks
and then turned to Lundahl, who presented fifteen briefing boards on
Soviet strategic industries and test centers. Lundahl had briefed
President Kennedy numerous times and knew he liked opening remarks
that gave him an immediate option on the presentation. The president
reached into the humidor and took out a big black cigar and lit it.
Senator Smathers had given him several boxes of Havanas and the
president promptly had the bands removed and the cigars placed in the
handsome silver humidor. Although he appeared to enjoy a good cigar,
the president was not an adept smoker, often toying with and chewing
on the cigar. He tried, however, not to be photographed with a cigar.
Part of Lindahl’s presentation showed
the improvements that had been made in the various photographic
systems. General Eisenhower listened intently ad asked questions
about the systems in the research and development stages….President
Kennedy, too, asked numerous questions. During the briefing, Lundahl
was pleased to see the president smiling, delighted with the
general’s questions and the answers given by the participants. The
briefing lasted approximately forty minutes and all agreed that the
briefing was a success. General Carter, especially, felt relieved and
jokingly remarked, “At last, I can report some good news from the
White House to Mr. McCone.” But Carter’s elation would not last
long.
A Special Group meeting had been
scheduled for September 10 in Bundy’s office regarding aerial
reconnaissance over Cuba…James Reber, the chairman of COMOR
(Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance), unfolded a large map
of Cuba on the conference table with various flight plans on it.
Bobby strongly advocated the overflights…The president was
confronted with a nagging dilemma – caught between Soviet and Cuban
charges that the U.S. was planning to invade the island and mounting
congressional demands from both the Republicans and Democrats that he
had to do precisely that…Direct military intervention against Cuba,
of course, had to be considered. On October 1, McNamara had met with
the Joint Chiefs of staff. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss
circumstances in which military action against Cuba might be
necessary and toward which planning should be actively pursued….These
were operational plans: 312, 314, and 316.
Meanwhile Senator Kenneth Keating of
New York…On October 10, on the floor of the Senate, the senator
made the most serious charge to date….Keating then attacked the
president and Undersecretary Ball for not telling the whole
truth….Keating’s speech hit like a bombshell at the White House.
Keating’s implication that the U.S. government possessed
information on offensive missiles in Cuba and was doing nothing about
it infuriated President Kennedy. Kennedy initially suspected that
information had been withheld from him and angrily called McCone,
demanding to know if such information existed. McCone responded in
the negative and then called Lundahl to see if anything had been
discovered in the aerial photos. Lundahl said he had no such
information….
It was considered possible that
Keating’s information had been a deliberate attempt by a dissident
refugee source to embarrass ad discredit the Kennedy administration
before the November elections or to push the United States into
taking action against the Castro government. In the past the
Agency had received a number of such outright false reports, and all
of them had been discredited….
McCone did not like the criticism that
President Kennedy was receiving from Congress. He was a
Republican…and he felt he was the logical man to approach Senator
Keating….But Keating did not appear at the appointed time. The NPIC
couriers exchanged banter with McCone’s secretaries….Then the
senator was ushered into McCone’s office. Presumably, McCone showed
the senator all of the briefing materials and then probably asked
Keating for the source of his information. Keating refused. 46
The couriers reported that voices began
to rise, McCone said that he had his cards on the table and had been
honest but that the senator was doing his country incalculable
damage….McCone retorted, “Tell me where they are and I’ll prove
to you they are not there.” …McCone did not give up. On another
occasion, he asked Lundahl to report to the Senate Office Building
and wait for him. The purpose he said, was to brief Senator
Keating....Senator Keating’s secretary (said) that he was busy and
did not have time for McCone…Although a concerted effort was
undertaken by the Kennedy administration to determine Senator
Keating’s source of information, all their efforts failed…In
later years, Clare Booth Luce would state that some of her sources
had furnished information on missiles being in Cuba and that the
information had found its way to Senator Keating. 48
…On October 12, General Thomas S.
Power, commander of the Strategic Air Command, was called to
Washington. Ushered into the office of the secretary of the Air
Force, he was asked if the Strategic Air Command was prepared to take
over all the duties of flying the U2 reconnaissance of Cuba…General
Power replied in the affirmative…The motto of the 55 Strategic
Reconnaissance Wing of the Strategic Air Command was Videmus –Omnia
– “We see all.” …The wing was based at Forbes Air Force
Base, outside Topeka, Kansas, but had detachments…at Yokota, Japan,
Incirlik, Turkey,…
October 15 would be a routine day for
the heads of state of two of the most powerful nations in the world.
President Kennedy had been campaigning in upstate New York and had
appeared in the Pulaski Day parade at Buffalo on October 14….He
stopped off in New York City and had a late night dinner with Adlai
E. Stevenson…the president arrived late at the White House at 1:40
A.M. on the fifteenth. He slept late that morning and went to his
office at 11:00 A.M., just in time to greet Ahmed Ben Bella, the
prime minister of Algeria….Two days later Ben Bella arrived in
Havana…
At the new CIA headquarters building in
Langley, Virginia, the day also began with meetings for some of the
principles who would later be involved in the crisis….At 9:10 Ray
Cline opened the Second Conference on Intelligence Methods.
Participants were foreign-intelligence chiefs, along with senior
officers from the CIA, DOD and State.
Paul J. Pigot, Mrs. McCone’s son, who
had been injured in an auto race…had died at the March Air Force
Base hospital. McCone had left Washington to accompany the body to
Seattle….McCone had planned to open the conference…The first
speaker was McGeorge Bundy,….the second Roger Hilsman….As
the week’s program continued, the Commonwealth intelligence chiefs
were to become more and more suspicious that a crisis was brewing as
their U.S. hosts mysteriously excused themselves from the business
and the social functions of the conference… [See: Poem sidebar]
THE STEUART BUILDING – Fifth &
K Streets NW aka “The Center.”
Monday, October 15, began as a
beautiful fall day in Washington. Because of the poor parking
facilities around the Steuart Building at 5 and K streets in
northwest Washington, car pools were encouraged....Broken bottles,
abandoned autos, and trash littered the area…The Steuart Building
was a nondescript seven-story structure built during World War II.
The Center occupied a total of fifty thousand square feet on the
fourth through seventh floors. There were no restaurants or cafeteria
facilities in the building and the food service was a particular
problem, especially for persons working at night. When there was
time, sandwiches and coffee could be bought at a nearby all-night
diner. Most employees brought bag lunches and diners from home.
Before entering the Steuart Building each morning, others stopped at
the Center City Market. The market was a conglamoration of small
shops selling everything from the cheapest cuts of meats to imported
delicacies, from patent medicines to freshly cut flowers. But every
morning, freshly baked breakfast rolls and freshly brewed coffee and
tea were available. Properly fortified, employees passed through the
security turnstiles of the Steuart Building en route to their
offices. They were always greeted cordially by guard George
Bailey, who knew everyone by their first name. Eunice
Stallings, the elevator operator, a cigar-smoking women who did
the New York Times crossword puzzle in record time, took the
employees to their appointed floor.
A mere physical description of the
squalid building amid its squalid surroundings in Washington’s 2
Police Precinct reveals little as to what NPIC was all about. It was
a unique multidepartmental national-level organization. The formal
structure was controlled, staffed, and funded by the CIA, but the
informal organizational structure also comprised special detachments
from the Army, Air Force and Navy. They were under the administrative
control of “service chiefs,” who contributed personnel for
photo-interpretation projects of national interest such as the
exploitation of photography acquired over Cuba.
The National Photographic
Interpretation Center, however, was synonymous with its director,
Arthur C. Lundahl. Lundahl was responsible for the conception and
evolution of photographic interpretation as it was performed at the
Center. His ingenuity was reflected not only in Center activity, but
also at all the military intelligence agencies involved in
photo-interpretation activities. From the inception of NPIC and its
predecessor organizations, beginning in 1955, Lundahl’s visionary
approach and methods of deriving intelligence from photography and
collateral sources were dismissed by many as too revolutionary to
last. Basically, he aimed at fusing ideas and experience that
previously had been considered unrelated or incompatible.
Drawing on World War II experiences, he
juxtaposed and fused the skills of seven different disciplines: photo
interpretation, collateral information and data processing,
photogrammetry, graphics and publication support, technical analysis,
and distribution and courier support. The result was a team of
experienced personnel that inspired great confidence from other
intelligence and government officials. The Center’s organization
and skill represented the first modern technological approach to
intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination. NPIC
supervisory personnel recognized their unique opportunity and worked
hard at making the Center a model of organization and production.
Lundahl’s leadership was reinforced
by an unusual level of talent throughout the organization. Allen
Dulles, the director of the CIA, and his deputy, Lieutenant General
Charles F. Cabell, extended Lundahl a free-hand in selecting
personnel to staff the Center. Although the Steuart Building left
much to be desired in physical amenities, Lundahl would frequently
remark: “Where a choice be necessary, give me good men in poor
ships than the converse.” A particularly distinguishing feature of
Lundahl’s managerial genius was his ability to find gifted people
and to establish the atmosphere of creativity in which they could
work. Many new organizations are burdened with a percentage of
castoffs. But Lundahl’s most unique and significant contribution
was his ability to lead and inspire others. He was unparalleled in
winning he complete respect, admiration, and devotion of all those
with whom he came into contact – presidents, the Congress, the
military services, the intelligence community, the scientists,
contractor and, of course, the personnel of the Center. The
imagination and dedication of the people selected by Lundahl for
managerial responsibilities can never be overestimated. These
managers, in turn, supervised young, talented, and dedicated
personnel. Although Lundahl set high standards for his employees, he
permitted his staff an extraordinary degree of independence. He laid
down few guidelines or specific rules. He believed that his staff
would function better if given wide latitude. In return, he received
an exceptional sense of commitment from his employees and a great
response of new ideas. The employees of the Center had in Art Lundahl
an ardent believer in, and a prophet of, photographic interpretation.
He could articulate with great feeling the meaning of the
photo-interpretation methods and the value of information obtained
from the photography. Lundahl, in his words, didn’t believe in a
droning presentation but rather in an exploding one. Aerial
photography was his ammunition.
Even the security system at the Center
reflected the singularity and uniqueness of the organization. The
security accorded the U2 program and the photo intelligence derived
from it was never breached. Great effort had been expended to place
the program in a separate security system and give it a set of
special code words. Some maintain this system gave Lundahl
extraordinary freedom to move information directly from the Center to
the president. Others maintained that the novelty of aerial
photography made it a new toy for the intelligence service chiefs and
other government leaders.
It was also the knot that tied together
the many bits and pieces of information gathered from other
collection sources. Analysts now had the means to confirm or deny
their suspicions or hypotheses. NPIC was uniquely qualified, staffed,
and ready on October 15.
At the Naval Photographic
Intelligence Center, the film from mission 3101 was processed
under stringent quality and security controls. The film was carefully
edited and titled, and the duplicate positives from the processors
were spooled and packaged in film cans.
NPIC’s operations officer, Hans
F. Scheufele, maintained constant contact with the
collection and processing sites so that scheduling information would
be available to Center components and the exploitation teams could be
appraised of the delivery time of the film. He kept this information
posted on a large blackboard on his office wall. He also
issued daily bulletins on “Proposed Staffing and Time
Completion Estimates,” which listed specific personnel
assigned to exploit a given mission and the arrival time of the film.
This particular day had all the
appearances of being routine. Lundahl had scheduled a 9:30 A.M.
meeting with his division chiefs to discuss training….As he
prepared for the meeting Lundahl glanced out his office window
overlooking Fifth Street. With some annoyance, he noted that a U.S.
Navy truck parked in front of the building entrance was blocking
traffic. Two armed Marines had dismounted and taken positions
immediately behind the truck. An armed Navy officer and an enlisted
man entered the truck from the rear, lifted a box off the truck, and
carried it into the Steuart Building.
Lundahl smiled, shook his head, and
noted how good intentions often become counter-productive. Every
effort had been made to keep the Steuart Building looking as
innocuous as possible. Yet the regulations for transporting U2 film
by the military services specified that movement of the film be made
under armed guard. But in doing so, it was revealing that personnel
in the Steuart Building were undoubtedly engaged in some extremely
classified and sensitive work.
Robert Kithcart of the NPIC
registry, a businesslike reserve paratroop captain who was in
charge of all the film and files retained in the Steuart Building,
received the box….He then placed the film in a wire basket to be
delivered to Earl Shoemaker, the exploitation coordinator for
this mission.
After being notified that mission 3101
had been successfully flown over Cuba, personnel at the Steuart
Building prepared to exploit the photography and, when the
exploitation was completed, to report their findings in a SITSUM
(situation summary) for the mission. The usual procedure was
to cable the SITSUM immediately to watch officers throughout the
intelligence community. Some days later, it would be disseminated by
courier in hard-copy form to a broader distribution of intelligence
analysts in the Washington area and throughout the JCS unified and
specified commands.
Marvin Michell, the
collateral-support information specialist for the mission had
performed preparatory tasks for many of the U2 missions over Cuba. He
had plotted the mission flight track…Marvin wheeled a library cart
full of the target packets and reference materials to the area where
the photo interpreters were waiting.
Earl Shoemaker had his
photo-interpretation teams ready….The interpreters began
cranking the reels of duplicate positives onto the light tables.
Normally, six photo-interpretation stations were employed in
scanning…there stations were manned by six photo interpreters –
three teams of two interpreters each – representing the CIA, Army,
Air Force and Navy….As they examined the film, the interpreters
wrote their observations on the worksheets provided and passed them
to their team leaders for review….
The two cans of film covering the San
Cristobol and the trapezoidal area of concern were given to the scan
team of Gene Lydon, a CIA photo interpreter, and Jim Holmes,
an Air Force interpreter, for exploitation….Then they spotted
six long canvas-covered objects. Lydon and Holmes made rough
estimates of the measurements of the objects several times. Each
time, their measurements showed the objects to be more than sixty
feet long. It was about noon, and both men paused for lunch. After
lunch, they resumed their efforts but still could not positively
identify the canvas-covered objects….Jim Holmes, a civilan Air
Force employee, was a soft spoken, yet tough-minded and intense,
photo interpreter. A native of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, he was only
twenty-nine but a veteran of twelve years of government service. He
began his government career at seventeen as a GS-2 cartographic
technician at the Army Map Service, where his aunt was a training
officer….Twenty-two year old Second Lieutenant Ricahrd Reninger
was the Army member of the team. Born in Laramie, Wyoming, he had
a B.A. in history from the University of Wyoming. He had graduated
from the U.S. Army Photo Interpretation School at Fort Holabird in
June 1961 and was assigned to the missile backup team at the Center….
A native of Maine, Joe Sullivan, a
civilian Navy employee, was a puckish, attractive Irishman. At
fifty, he was the senior member of the team…Vince DiRenzo was the
CIA representative on the team, from Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, he was
thirty-two and former Marine…(Clark University)…He and his branch
chief Bob Boyd had performed detailed support studies for covert
operations…
DiRenzo called me and said he
needed some support regarding the missiles. I called Jay
Quantrill, who worked for me and who was the Center’s
collateral specialist on missiles…DiRenzo was assured and
straightforward when he contacted his chief, Bob Boyd, and announced,
“We’ve got MRBMs in Cuba.” …
After reviewing the evidence on the
size and shape of the missile transporters with Reninger at about 4
P.M., Shoemaker said, “We’ve got to let Mr. Lundahl know before
he goes home.” Shoemaker and Boyd went to their division chief,
Jack Gardner, and his intelligence production officer, Gordon
Duvall….Holmes was unable to contact Air Force lieutenant
colonel Robert Saxon, so he sought out Ted Tate, Saxon’s
civilian deputy….Reninger informed Army colonel George C.
Eckert, his commanding officer. Joe Sullivan however, had
problems. His chief, Lieutenant Commander Pete Brunette,…had
a dinner engagement that evening…Joe said he was working on a
project and that Lundahl was about to be briefed….Sullivan called
Brunette’s deputy, Clay Dalryple,…and posted Brunette on the
details.
Lundahl was called by Gardener, and
Duvall escorted him into the room where the backup team was working.
Lundahl had a distinctive list to his walk as a result of an old
football injury. He was immediately recognized by us in the
semidarkened enclosed room. “I understand you fellows have found a
beauty,” he said as he approached.
…Lundahl turned from the table and
looked at us and then said, “I think I know what you guys think
they are, and if I think they are the same thing and we both are
right, we are sitting on the biggest story of our time.”
…Lundahl rose and walked a short
distance. His hands were clasped behind his back. We remained
silent. The strange stillness suggested the extreme seriousness of
the moment. Lundahl looked at us and said, “If there was ever a
time I want to be right in my life, this is it.”
He asked if anything had been
committed to paper. He was shown a few notes…Lundahl pointed to
each of us by name and asked if we agreed the missiles in question
were MRBMs. Each reply was affirmative. He then asked if there were
any other possibilities. Di Renzo mentioned what is always considered
at such a time – the possibility that these missiles were dummies.
All signs however, pointed to their being real…He did not doubt or
delay reacting to the situation. The ruddy-complexioned ,
silver-haired director looked at each of us again. “Gentlemen. I am
convinced. Because of the grave responsibility of this find, I want
to personally sign the cable.”
All of those present knew these images
represented a grave moment in history. All knew that the future turn
of events would surely involve the president personally. Lundahl
asked who knew about the find. Jack Gardner said that the “service
chiefs” had been informed but had been told not to divulge the
information to their superiors until the analysis had been completed.
Lundahl asked Gardner to invoke the code word PSALM on all the
information. I was the custodian of this closely held directive for
the Center and said that I would furnish it to Gardner.
…Lundahl asked that all those present
to remain and work through the night if necessary to glean all the
information possible from the images….I ran downstairs and told my
superiors, Hans Scheufele and Bill Banfield, that photographic
laboratory support would be needed that night…I ran downstairs and
told my superiors, Hans Scheufele and Bill Banfield, that
photographic-laboratory support would be needed that night and that
they should keep essential personnel at work...It was always
difficult to get through to CIA headquarters on the secure phone line
at that time of the evening. On his way downstairs to his fifth floor
office, Lundahl was thinking how he could clearly and unmistakably
get his message across to Cline if he had to use open phone lines.
(Ray) Cline was one of the founding fathers of the Agency, held a
doctorate from Harvard in history and international relations, was a
Phi Beta Kappa, and had earned his Agency reputation as a China
expert. He had replaced Robert Amory in March 1962 as the deputy
director of intelligence. Cline had full confidence in Lundahl and
the abilities of his people….
Cline was incredulous. He paused and
asked, “Are you fellows sure?”
Lundahl replied, “Yes, I am sorry to
have to maintain it, but we are sure.”
Cline said, “Well, we’ve got to get
on this right away. I’ll get hold of Carter….I want you to plan
on being in my office with the evidence b seven-thirty tomorrow
morning.”
Lundahl agreed. The call had been
made…One of my duties was to prepare all of the briefing notes for
Lundahl, and he called me down to his office and explained that the
note on all of the materials that were to be produced that night
should be as complete as possible…Lundahl checked his calendar for
any appointments that would conflict with the next day’s briefings.
He wrote crash and MRBM on the page for October 15. He looked back at
the page for October 14 on which he had jotted mission 3101. Printed
on the right side of the calender’s date was DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
BORN 1890….
The evening of October 15 was a night
of parties, not atypical for Washington during the month of
October....The secretary of defense was attending a Hickory Hill
seminar at Bobby Kennedy’s home in McClean, Virginia. General and
Mrs. Maxwell Taylor were giving a formal dinner party at their Fort
McNair residence in Southwest Washington…Bundy was hosting a dinner
party for Charles “Chip” Bohlen, the newly appointed Ambassador
to France…Cline next called Roger Hilsman at his home. He had
difficulty indicating over the insecure phone that he meant
MRBMs…..Meanwhile Norman Smith, the SAM specialist,…called Sidney
Graybeal, his division chief….Greaybeal…was shown the imagery
under the stereoscope and given a description of the find. He agreed
that these had to be offensive missiles….Graybeal told the missile
backup team that he did not want to disturb them in their work but
would like to remain, listen to their converstations, and jot down
all pertinent details….
Col. David Parker, the deputy director
of NPIC, called John Hughes, a special assistant to the director of
he Defense Intelligence Agency, and asked him to come over to the
Center…and John McLauchlin, a photo interpreter
specialist….McLauchlin proceeded to General Carroll’s Bolling Air
Force Base home…Carroll called Roswell Gilpatrick…and said that
Hughes and McClauchlin were coming over to fill him in on some new
and very important intelligence on Cuba.
Hughes and McLauchlin got in Hughes’
old yellow DeSoto,…experiencing transmission problems and painfully
growled…McLauchlin kidded Hughes, “We have the secret of the
century…If this thing breaks down, you’ll run the rest of the way
on foot.” They arrived at Gilpatrick’s apartment at 4201
Cathedera Avenue in northwest….
Lundahl asked me to provide him with a
map showing Cuba and the United States. He asked me to swing a 1,100
mile arc on the map, the range of the MRBM from the area where the
missile was found.…NPIC photo laboratory personnel had waited since
5 P.M. that evening for the photo interpreters to relinquish the
duplicate positives so they might make the necessary prints,
enlargements, and additional duplicate positives for study. Jimmy
Allen, a photo-laboratory section chief, had much experience waiting
or imagery from the photo interpreters. He contentedly puffed on a
large cigar. Jack Davis, the new chief of the photo laboratory,
waited nervously.
At 8:30 P.M. Earl Shoemaker brought a
duplicate positive from the laboratory.
...Normally a control code word was
given to priority or special laboratory processing work. When
Allen asked what code word should he apply to the Cuban Material,
Davis replied, “This is all so confused, a good term might be mass
confusion” All the photo-laboratory work that night and throughout
the missile crisis received priority treatment if it bore the title
“Mass Confusion.”
…Leon Coggin was listed as the
off-duty photogammetrist….Dick Reninger…Eugene Ricci…An
around-the-clock atmosphere soon pertained at NPIC – one of
sleeplessness and anxiety….Most stepped out of the Steuart Building
onto Fifth Street. It was a warm fall night and most crossed over New
York Avenue and 6 th Street to Havran’s Restaurant, a
favorite after-hours eating place for Steuart Building people and
policemen from the 2 Precinct. Hambergers, french fries, pies and
coffee were popular menu selections – in fact, the only food
available.
Joe Sullivan…..tried to located
prominent landmarks in the vicinity of Los Palacios…as he scanned
the photography…Leon Coggin…began measuring the missiles…John
Wyman, the senior NPIC computer operator…Dean Frazier,…the
Center’s graphics duty officer…graphic analysis officer Dan
McDevitt, illustrator Glenn Farmer, and headliner (typesetting)
operator Loretta Huggins, arrived at the Steuart Building about 4:30
A.M….The first three sites at San Cristobal were numbered MR-1,
MR-2, MR-3, and the Sagua la Grande sites MR-4 and MR-5, The Guanajay
IRBM sites were numbered IR-1, …and the Remedies site IR-3…
LUNDAHL ARRIVED at the Steuart Building
at 6 A.M. on October 16 and carefully reviewed the briefing boards
and notes that Shoemaker and I had assembled. They seemed to impart
an extraordinary, almost surrealistic, feeling. In stark stillness
they depicted a moment in time that had been frozen as visual
history. It was as if the world was holding its breath for a moment.
And the effect was total, devastating loneliness…
Frank Beck, the courier, was waiting.
Lundahl closed the large, black briefing board case and said, “Let’s
go.” He paused and asked Shoemaker and me to thank all the people
who had worked through the night and to send them home to get some
sleep. It was 7 A.M.
About the same time, Walter Elder, a
special assistant to the DCI, called McCone in Seattle and
cryptically reported, “That which you always expected has
occurred.”
Lundahl and Beck arrived at Ray Cline’s
office at 7:30 A.M….Lundahl placed the briefing boards on Cline’s
desk and everyone in the room listened, almost in awe, as Lundahl
pointed out each salient featue…After Lundahl finished briefing
Cline, he stepped back so that those gathered could review the
photography for themselves. …Cline, Lundahl and the courier, Beck,
left the CIA headquarters for the White House shortly before 8 A.M.
Conference delegates…being intelligence officers, wondered why they
were obviously in such a hurry with the courier and large bag of
briefing boards. Later, Walter Pforzheimer, longtime agency
legislative counsel, would write a poem about the departing members
of the intelligence methods conference.
At the White Hous, Cline, Lundahl, and
Beck went directly to McGeorge Bundy’s office in the
basement….Cline summarized the photo-intelligence findings and
asked Lundahl to explain what had been found…Bundy made a telephone
call…and took the elevator to the president’s private
quarters…The president, sitting on his bed and still in his
pajamas, was looking at the morning newspapers…Bundy told the
president about the missiles being in Cuba and together they reviewed
the president’s appointments for that morning. The only free time
was at 11:45. The president asked that a meeting of all principals be
scheduled for that time….A number of military exercises were
underway … PHIBRIGLEX-62 (Amphibious Brigade Landing)…
It was obvious that the president had
called Bobby Kennedy concerning the missiles in Cuba because at about
9 A.M. on the morning of October 16, he came storming into Bundy’s
office asking to see the photography. Cline repeated his assessment
and Lundahl took Kennedy over the briefing boards, pointing out the
fourteen missiles. Kennedy looked at the photos and moaned, “Oh
shit! Oh shit! Those sons of bitches Russians.”
Lundahl described Bobby’s movements
as being like those of a prizefighter. He walked several times about
the room, snorting like a prizefighter, smacking the palm of one hand
with his fist….Bobby Kennedy came back to Lundahl and Cline. The
seriousness of the moment was broken when Kennedy pointed to the map
NPIC had prepared showing the range of the SS-4. He pointed to the
map and asked, “Will those goddamn things reach Oxford,
Mississippi?” Before Lundahl could stop himself, he replied, “Sir,
well beyond Oxford.” He then looked up to catch a slight gleam in
Kennedy’s eyes and a wry smile on his face. Oxford, Mississippi, of
course, was where the Kennedys were having trouble attempting to
register James Meredith into the University of Mississippi. Bobby
thanked Ludahl and Cline and said he was going up to talk to the
president. When Lundahl returned to the Steuart Building and told
about Bobby’s Oxford remarks, it was decided all subsequent maps
showing the ranges of missiles deployed in Cuba would also show as
reference points such principal cities of the United States as St.
Louis, New York, Atlanta, and in the same bold type, Oxford,
Mississippi.
…C.Douglas Dillon, the secretary
of the treasury, came to Bundy’s office and asked to see the
photographs. An urbane, scholarly New York Republican, Dilllon was a
popular figure in the Kennedy cabinet. Tall, bald, outgoing,
studious, and unpretentious, he was listened to when he spoke. Suave
and courteous, he was one of Kennedy’s favorite cabinet members.
Possessed of a quick grasp for complex detail, his penetrating
intellect enabled him to contribute precise logic to resolving
problems not only in the Treasury Department but in other departments
as well.
Lundahl repeated his briefing….At
9:30 A.M. General Carter arrived at Bundy’s office. Cline felt that
Carter, as acting DCI, should handle the scheduled 11:45 meeting.
Carter agreed, and Cline advised him that Lundahl would perform the
briefing but that he would be sending over Sydney Graybeal, the
Agency’s offensive missile specialist, to provide analytical
backup to Lundahl if needed.
General Taylor had asked that
the JCS members be briefed on the Cuban photography as soon as
possible…When the office door closed, Colonel Eckert
abruptly stated his mission. “Sir, last evening the National
Photographic Interpretation Center discovered MRBM missile sites on
photography flown over Cuba on October 14.” General Wheeler
reeled back in is chair,…stunned, as if he had been hit by a
baseball bat….
The Center also prepared additional
copies of the briefing boards and notes for the Navy and Air
Force. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Saxon took the briefing boards
from the Steuart Building to General LeMay’s office and Lieutenant
Commander Pete Brunette took copies to Admiral Anderson’s
office….
…After all the participants were
seated in the Cabinet Room, General Carter read a prepared statement
that MRBM missiles had been discovered on U2 photography of October
14 at two locations and that Lundahl would brief the group using
enlargements of that photography. The president was seated, as usual,
at the center of the long conference table in the Cabinet Room, with
his back to the windows. Lundahl had placed the briefing boards on an
easel at the far end of the room near the fireplace. He gave a brief
description of the MRBM sites and then asked permission of the
president to come to the table and show him the evidence at close
range. The president replied, “By all means.” Lundahl approached
the conference table and stood between the president and Secretary
Rusk. Handing the president a large magnifying glass, so he had on
numerous occasions, he placed the briefing boards on the table in
front of the president and proceeded to point out details of the
three sites.
Lundahl was acutely aware that photo
interpreters can recognize and point out things that the
unsophisticated and untrained eye would easily miss. He therefore
dwelt on the enlargements of the missiles….After asking a few
questions he turned to his right and, looking Lundahl straight in the
eye and carefully spacing out his words, asked, “Are you sure?”
Lundahl was anxious to be measured in his response but at the same
time leave no doubt in the president’s mind that the evidence was
conclusive. Lundahl replied, “Mr. President, I am as sure of this
as a photo interpreter can be sure of anything. And I think, sir, you
might agree that we have not misled you on anything we have reported
to you. Yes, I am convinced they are missiles.”
…The president’s eyes rose again
from the photos. He looked at Lundahl again and asked, “How long
will it be before they can fire those missiles?” Lundahl stated
that Sydney Graybeal, the Agency’s expert on offensive missiles,
would comment on that question. Graybeal moved into position next to
Lundahl. He discussed the SS-4 missile system…Lundahl and Graybeal
tried very carefully to differentiate what was known and what was
unknown…The question and answer period lasted for over ten minutes.
The briefing left a particularly somber
mood in the room. The worst fears had come to pass and the worse of
conjectures were on many minds. Dramatic reaction was uppermost in
many minds – war, with all its new, devastating consequences – a
nuclear confrontation.
Lundahl would relate: “In an era
which demanded immediate response and rebuttal, the president
listened to all remarks and weighed all positions without surprise.
He had the curiosity, sensitivity, and intellect to assimilate any
proposition. With that grace and charm, he stimulated the best in all
those with whom he came in contact and that day was no exception.”
According to Lundahl, “The president
never panicked, never shuddered, his hands never shook. He was crisp
and businesslike and speedy in his remarks and he issued them with
clarity and dispatch, as though he were dispatching a train or a set
of instructions in an office group.” General Taylor would confirm
the president’s attitude: “Kennedy gave no evidence of shock or
trepidation resulting from the threat to the nation implicit in the
discovery of the missile sites, but rather a deep but controlled
anger at the duplicity of the Soviet officials who had tried to
deceive him.” 9
Lundahl removed the boards from the
table. The president turned to the group and said he wanted the whole
island covered – he didn’t care how many missions it too. “I
want the photography interpreted and the finds from the readouts as
soon as possible.” The discussion then turned to how many U2
missions could be flown and the possibility of using low-altitude
aircraft…
At the conclusion of the meeting, the
president turned to General Carter and Lundahl and said he wanted to
express the nation’s gratitude to the men who had collected these
remarkable photographs and to the photo interpreters for finding and
analyzing the missile sites. Carter graciously accepted the
compliment and motioned to Lundahl and Graybeal to remove the
briefing boards and prepare to leave the room.
The Cuban missile crisis was on!
When Lundahl returned from the meeting
at the White House, he held a meeting in his office and warned us
that “all hell was going to break loose” and for us to be
prepared to receive a lot of photography in the coming days. He
outlined specific duties and responsibilities in getting ready for
the influx of photography…Questions arose about the number of Air
Force pilots qualified to fly the Agency’s U2s…A decision was
reached to use both SAC and CIA U2 pilots to cover all of Cuba. The
CIA pilots were to be used only in “extreme circumstances” and
they would be recommissioned into the Air Force and given Air Force
credentials…
The Navy had devoted considerable time
and effort to develop an effective low-altitude jet reconnaissance
capability. Commander (later Captain) Willard D. Dietz had
perceived and pushed for the development of small-format aerial
cameras….Chicago Aerial Industries, Inc.’s KA-45 and KA-46, six
inch focal length framing cameras with a film width of five
inches and a capacity of 250 feet of film…installed in the F-8U-1P
Crusader….Lundahal recommended that the Navy’s Light
Photographic Squadron No. 62 (VFP-62) be selected…based at the
U.S. Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, just outside Jacksonville,
Florida…Joe Sullivan, the Navy photo interpreter on the NPIC
“discovery” team, had gone home about 4:30 A.M. on October 16,
having been told by his supervisors to take the day off but to be
available…his supevisor Clay Dalrymple, …told in no
uncertain terms to, “get his tail over to the Pentagon as fast as
possible” because there was going to be a special meeting of the
GMAIC (Guided Missile Astronautics Intelligence Committee).
Sullivan had a difficult time finding a parking place at the
Pentagon…
Dr. Albert “Bud” Wheelon, CIA
Chairman of the committee…He realized too that this
photographic lode had to be incorporated with other sources and
succinct and definitive reports created for policymakers…..was also
director of the Agency’s Office of Scientific
Intelligence...thirty-three at the time, was an MIT
physicist…Ramo-Woolridge Corportation….met with McCone and
sketched out procedures for handling and reporting information
concerning this crisis…He recommended that selected representatives
of all the standing United States Intelligence Boards’s
scientific committees transfer their activities on an ad hoc baiss to
NPIC in order to expediate their considerations of the findings from
the photography. McCone approved, and the next day, representatives
of the GMAIC, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC),
and members of the Agency’s Guided Missile Task Force began moving
certain of their files to NPIC.
[p.238]
The president formulated a group of
special advisors to advise and assist him in decisions affecting the
missile crisis. It became known as the Executive Committee (EXCOM)
of the National Security Council and would be formally
established by National Security Action Memorandum 196, signed by
the president on October 22, 1962. 15 …
The first meeting of the EXCOM opened
with a briefing on the photographs by Lundahl and intelligence
estimates….the president specifically asked that Robert Lovett
be included…Dean Rusk recommended…Dean Acheson…The
president approved.
Lundahl held a prolonged staff meeting
at the Center on the morning of October 17 to structure operational
changes for the duration of the crisis. Center personnel were equally
divided into two twelve-hour shifts, with the shift change at 8 A.M.
each morning. Robert Boyd was put in charge of one shift of the photo
interpreters and Gordon Duvall the other. Photo interpreters would
brief Lundahl on photo intelligence derived the previous day at a
morning meeting that would take place at 6:30 to 7 AM. Duvall and
Boyd and I would be at that meeting. My staff would have prepared
notes for Lundahl on each photographic briefing board, along with
other pertinent collateral information. Notes on operational matters,
such as the number of missions to be flown, the weather, etc., would
have been prepared by Dutch Scheufele.
Various film processing sites also
worked around the clock during the crisis. Navy and Air Force jet
transports shuttled exposed film from the U2 missions to the
airfields nearest to the processing sites, and the processed film was
expected, similarly, to Washington and the Center for exploitation.
Eastman Kodak also went into shift operations to meet the increased
demand for aerial photographic film. Camera manufacturers were
alerted, and their best technicians, along with truckloads of spare
parts, were sent to Orlando, MacDill and Boca Chica to make sure that
cameras were maintained and functioned properly. Additional Lockheed
U2 technicians and maintenance personnel were dispatched to Orlando
to keep the U2s flying.
The EXCOM met several times in
George Ball’s State Department conference room on October
17…President Kennedy brought General Maxwell Taylor to the White
House as a military consultant to the president after the Bay of
Pigs…It was in Taylor’s office, room 303 in the Executive
Office Building that the powerful 303 Committee met and reviewed all
covert CIA operations. On the 303 Committee were McNamara, Rusk,
Taylor, and McCone…
Admiral George W. Anderson,
fifty-five, the chief of naval operations,…had been picked by
Kennedy’s first Navy secretary, John Connally, to replace…Arleigh
Burke…
And so a pattern developed.
Photography acquired by U2 missions flown in the morning would be
processed in the afternoon, then analyzed in the late afternoon and
nightly at the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Teams of
photo interpreters working with missile and nuclear experts from
other components of the intelligence community produced situation
summaries that were then disseminated the following morning. To
keep track of information other than photography, a special
situation room was established in the Agency’s Office of Current
Intelligence, at Langley, Virginia. John Hicks, who had
recently returned from a tour of duty in Australia, was placed in
charge and had the responsibility of issuing the CIA daily bulletin.
After being briefed each morning at the Center on the information
generated the previous evening, Lundahl would depart for a briefing
of the United States Intelligence Board, which met each morning at
8 A.M. in the East Building of the Agency, located in the Foggy
Bottom section of Washington.
The USIB was the highest level of all
national intelligence committees, acting as a board of review for all
strategic estimates and current intelligence assessments. The Board
was also cognizant of all clandestine collection efforts…
After Lundahl’s daily briefing of the
USIB, he would proceed to brief the EXCOM. The EXCOM met several
times daily, usually at 10 A.M. and 2 P.M. in the Cabinet Room of the
White House during the early days of the crisis and thereafter in
George Ball’s Conference Room at the State Department…
Whenever McCone thought the president should be informed about items of special significance or whenever the president expressed an interest, Lundahl, usually accompanied by McCone, would proceed to the White House. The president was briefed at least once a day with the aerial photos. At one meeting with the president, McCone raised the question of how and when the photographic evidence should be shown to congressional leaders. The president asked that the full PSALM security directive be sustained….
The Air Defense Command had directed
the large ballistic detection radar at Morristown, New Jersey, and
the space-tracking radar at Laredo, Texas, and Thomasville, Georgia,
be aligned for missile warning from Cuba…
A relatively new and large
air-conditioned classroom at Homestead Air Force Base was selected
to be the Command Center…At the U.S. Army Pictorial Center,
in New York City, Major Robert Vaughn received an order from
headquarters of the U.S. Continental Army Command, at Fort Monroe,
Virginia, to install a closed-circuit television system at the
Florida command site. Vaughn knew such a system was at Fort
Gordon, Georgia, but unfortunately it had been dismantled and
placed in a convoy and was on its way to the Brooke Army Medical
Center, in San Antonio, Texas, for demonstration purposes….Maps
and charts were hung on the wall panels and the latest information on
the Cuban situation was posted. The panels were used to conduct
briefings several times daily. The closed-circuit television system
permitted this data to be transmitted simultaneously to the offices
and conference rooms of admirals and generals newly assigned to the
task group coordinating the response….
President Kennedy once warned McCone,
“If you have a secret, do me a favor - don’t tell Salinger.” …
Salinger had not been told of the missiles being in Cuba by the
president….
A new phase of analysis of the U2
imagery began on October 19 at the Center to determine whether (or
when) the MRBM missile sites in Cuba would become operational.
Criteria were developed by the GMAIC, and the Center applied that
criteria in the analysis of all the imagery being received…
At about one o’clock on that Saturday
afternoon, October 20, word was received at the Center that Robert
Kennedy and Robert McNamara would pay a visit. Some fifteen minutes
later a black limousine rolled up to the entrance of the Center, and
Kennedy, McNamara, Gilpatrick, and McCone stepped out. They were
quickly ushered to the seventh floor of the Center, where photo
interpreters were exploiting the latest U2 photography.
The first concern of the four important
visitors appeared to be the certainty of our identification of the
newly discovered IRBM sites…Lundahl invited the visitors to view
the missile sites at light tables fitted with stereoscopic viewers.
The four visitors took turns at the light tables, while photo
interpreters pointed out details of what they were seeing…At this
point, Air Force brigadier general Robert N. Smith arrived at
the Center. General Smith, director of intelligence of the Strategic
Air Command, was an old friend of Lundahl,. He brought with him the
latest U2 photography that had been processed by the Strategic Air
Command’s 544 Reconnaissance Tactical Wing at Omaha. It was not
unusual for high ranking officers to accompany such film shipments
inasmuch as the photography was extremely sensitive from a security
standpoint. Escorting mission film to the Center also afforded
field-command officers an opportunity to view the latest photography
firsthand, with immediate access to the most recent intelligence
derived in Washington….
…Finally McCone asked Bobby and
McNamara if they were satisfied with what they had seen. Both replied
in the affirmative. Bobby then asked the interpreters if they were
getting enough sleep. Lundahl interrupted, stating that the Center
was working on a two-shift basis and would continue to operate that
way. Bobby then moved around the room shaking the hands and
encouraging everyone to keep up the good work.
The unannounced purpose of the visit to
the Center was to confirm details of the findings to help draft a
televised address to the nation by the president and for an important
meeting to be held at the White House…in the Yellow Oval room….The
president walked into the room and said with a wry smile, “Gentlemen,
today we’re going to earn our pay.” He then waved to McCone to
begin the meeting. McCone gave Cline the task of summarizing…When
Lundahl took over, he first made sure the president in particular,
had a clear view of the easel….When Lundahl finished he turned to
the president and said, “Mr. President, gentlemen, this summarizes
the totality of the missile and other threats as we’ve bee able to
determine it form aerial photography…”
The president was on his feet the
moment Lundahl finished. He crossed the room directly towards Lundahl
and said, “I want you to extend to your organization my gratitude
for a job very well done.” Lundahl, rather embarrassed, hesitantly
thanked the president. The president then extended his hand and
smiled. Lundahl was again surprised.
At 4 P.M. the president was scheduled
to meet with his cabinet. When McCone asked if the president would
like to have the cabinet briefed by him and Lundahl, the president
said no. Mr. McCone also wondered if the president would like to show
the cabinet members some of the aerial photos of Cuba. The president
replied, “No, it just might confuse the issues.”….
The president had summoned
congressional leaders to Washington from various parts of the country
to apraise them of the Cuban situation…Hale Boggs, the Democratic
whip, was deep-sea fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. An Air Force plane,
after making several warning passes over the boat, dropped a plastic
message bottle. The message: “Call Washington – urgent message
from the president.” …Boggs was helicoptered to an airfield,
where a two-seat jet trainer was waiting…He was flown to Andrews
Air Force Base, near Washington and was helicoptered from their to
the White House lawn, “still smelling of fish…”
At 5 P.M. that Monday afternoon,
President Kennedy waited for the congressional leaders in the Cabinet
Room…All chairs were occupied and people were standing several deep
along the walls. The doors were closed. The president apologized for
the inconvenience he had caused the legislators by interrupting their
campaigns. He said, however, that the nation was facing an
international emergency – offensive missiles…in Cuba. Mr. McCone
and his briefer would provide the details….He then turned the
meeting over to McCone. Mr. McCone made a short statement summarizing
the finds that had been presented to the National Security Council
earlier in the afternoon, and asked Lundahl to show the telltale
photographs.
As Lundahl began to unfold the pictures
of MRBM and IRBM launch sites and their targets, an incredible hush
settled over the room….When Lundahl finished his presentation, he
felt as if everyone was looking at him “as though I were holding a
cobra rather than a pointer n my right hand.” The enormity of the
threat was being seen and heard for the first time by the congressmen
and senators and they were obviously surprised and angered. Attention
then shifted to the president. A great buzzing arose among the
group….
At 7 P.M. Washington time on October
23, the Pentagon placed the entire U.S. military establishment on
Defcon 3 (defense condition), an increased state of alert. The
greatest mobilization since World War II was underway. SAC B-47
bombers were dispursed according to plan…The first Crusader, No.
923, landed at the naval air station at Jacksonville and taxied to
the front line. When the aircraft stopped, there was an immediate
flurry of activity as photographer mates unloaded the film magazines
and rushed to the nearby Fleet Air Photo Laboratory. The activity
inside the lab was just as intense as that on the flight line. The
film was placed in the processors and within minutes the first
negatives were finished… “Run the duplicate positives and let’s
get them to Washington.”
…As the flight crews were busy
fueling and preparing the aircraft for another mission and
photographer mates were reloading the cameras, a young enlisted man
on the flight line decided that each mission should be recorded on
the side of the aircraft. He made a stencil depicting a dead hanging
chicken, the chicken an obvious reference to Castro’s chicken
episode at the UN and Washington. (Castro and his entourage cooked
chicken in their hotel rooms, much to the consternation and disgust
of hotel managers.) He began stenciling them on the side of each
aircraft. It became a ritual for the pilot when he opened the canopy
after each mission to call out, “Chalk up another chicken.”
[Kelly notes: There is also a logo
patch for one of the photo recon outfits that has a role of film
wrapped around the head of a chicken].
The Joint Chiefs wanted a firsthand
report of the mission and Commander Ecker was ordered to fly to
Washington. He landed at Andrews Air Force Base and, still in his
flying suit, was rushed to the Pentagon….The Joint Chiefs queried
the commander about the mission and asked if any anti-aircraft fire
had been seen. Ecker proudly reported that the mission was, “a
piece of cake.” The low-altitude photography added a new dimension
to NPIC reporting….
On the afternoon of October 26, the FBI
reported that the Soviets were burning their archives not only at the
Washington embassy, tub also at the Soviet UN enclave at Glen Cove,
Long Island. The burning of sensitive files is normally the last
diplomatic act in preparation for war…If nuclear war became a
distinct possibility, the Office of Emergency Management had
formulated plans for the evacuation of the president from Washington.
The coordinater within the White House staff for preparing such a
move was General Chester V. “Ted” Clifton, the president’s
military advisor. However, there appeared to be some conflict in
responsibilities, because Secret Service chief Jim Rowley also
was checking out details of his own plan for the evacuation of the
president…
Luncahl arrived at the Steuart Building
early on the morning of October 27. There was much work to be done.
At the usual morning staff briefing he was shocked when told that all
twenty-four MRBM sites in Cuba were now considered fully
operational….
As the governors were assembling at the
Pentagopn on the morning of October 27, Lundahl spent a few minutes
with us before he went into his office and rehearsed in his mind what
photography he was going to show them and what he was going to say.
This would be the first time that most of these distinguished men
would be exposed to serial reconnaissance, and Lundahl felt the
briefing should be a “tutorial.” McCone called for Lundahl at the
Center in his personal car. One the way to the Pentagon, McCone
informed Lundahl that he would personally conduct the briefing. He
wanted to impress the governors with both his and the president’s
creditilblty…At 8:40 A.M. McCone began his briefing…Following
McCone’s presentation, Roswell Gilpatrick briefed the governors n
the state of U.S. military prepardness…Following the Pentagon
briefings, the governors were driven to the White House to meet with
the president…Lundahal and McCone had hurried from the governors’
meeting to the EXCOM, which met, as usual, at 10 A.M….
…U Thant…saying his military
advisor, Indian brigadier Indar JiT Rikhye, would supply the
details. William Tidwell, a CIA expert in aerial reconnaissance
and a military reserve officer, was sent to New York to seek
carification from Brigadier Rikhye. But if U Thant was confused,
Rikhye was completely out of touch with reality. A short, stocky
Punjabi with a deceptive smile, Rikhye’s first service with the UN
was as a colonel commanding an Indian unit in the Gaza Strip during
the Middle East cease fire of 1957. He had helped organize the UN
force sent to the Congo in 1960-61 and, in 1962, had worked to
supervise the peacekeeping force in Neartherlands New Guinea. During
World War II, as a major, he commanded an armor unit of the famed
Bengal lancers in General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army. Tidwell soon
determined Rikhye…knew absolutely nothing about Soviet MRBM and
IRBM sites. He had no plans…
[BK notes: Ruth Forbes Paine Young
(Michael Paine’s mother), and other World Federalists worked
closely with Gen. Rikhye at the UN on a number of projects.]
…Throughout the crisis, Lundahl had
alerted his staff to post him of any evidence of comic relief
observed on the photography. President Eisenhower had appreciated a
number of humorous briefing boards prepared during critical
situations. Lundahl felt President Kennedy would also welcome a
litter humor in this situation. President Kennedy, himself adept at
clear, concise usage of the English language, particularly disliked
anything smacking of military jargon. On several occasions during the
crisis he had shown a certain displeasure with daily intelligence
reports referring to the number of missile launch positions
“occupied” and “unoccupied.” He felt that, somehow, there
must be a better way to describe how many of the four launch
positions at each of the missile sites had missile launchers on them.
McCone had struggled unsuccessfully to find appropriate terms of
clarification throughout the crisis…At that point, a U.S.
reconnaissance plane flying very low over a military camp happened to
photograph a soldier using an open “three hole” latrine. We
produced a briefing board from the photograph, and Lundahl showed it
to McCone and included it in the White House briefing package.
Lundahl finished his routine briefing of the president and McCone
asked if the president would like to see a new three position
military site discovered in Cuba, with one position occupied. The
president’s face froze momentarily, since he was aware that each of
the missile sties in Cuba had four positions rather than three. As
the president studied the photo, there came first a smile and then a
booming laugh. When he finally stopped, he asked, “Why didn’t I
have this earlier? Now I understand the occupied and unoccupied
problem perfectly.
The president was generous with his
thanks and praise….McCone was the first to recognize the work of
the National Photographic Interpretation Center with a formal memo of
commendation on November 2, 1962….On November 8, 1962, the
president sent the following letter to Lundahl: “While I would like
to make public the truly outstanding accomplishments of the National
Photographic Interpretation Center, I realize that the anonymity of
an organization of your high professional competence in the
intelligence field must be maintained.
“I do want you and your people to
know of my very deep appreciation for the tremendous task you are
performing under most trying circumstances. The analysis and
interpretation of the Cuban photography and the reporting of your
findings promptly and succinctly to me and to my principal policy
advisors, most particularly the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense, has been exemplary.You have my thanks and the thanks of
your government for a very remarkable performance of duty and my
personal commendation goes to all of you.”
John F. Kennedy
John F. Kennedy
…President Kennedy decided the
American people should be briefed on the photographic evidence…The
president preferred that Lundahl handle the report to the nation, but
McCone was reluctant to surface Lundahl and the National Photographic
Interpretation Center. Lundahl recommended that John Hughes,
who had been outstanding in his service at the National Photographic
Interpretation Center as an Army lieutenant and became special
assistant to General Joseph Carroll, director of the Defense
Intelligence Agnecy, conduct the public briefing. NPIC supported
Hughes in preparing the briefing…on nationwide TV. The presentation
did much to allay the fears of the American public, but some
intelligence specialists questioned whether too much had been
revealed…
…The president would be dead
before the 1964 election and Bobby before that of 1968… McCone
found Lyndon Johnson colorless and crude in intelligence matters and,
as president, clumsy and heavy-handed in international affairs.
Instead of personally carefully considering prepared intelligence
memorandums on intelligence matters, he preferred to be briefed by
trusted advisors. Increasingly, the president sought intelligence
information almost exclusively from Secretary McNamara and the
Defense Department. McCone’s advice simply was no longer
actively sought by the president. His role diminished, his
influence faded, and the ready access he had enjoyed during the
Kennedy administration became very limited…President Johnson
replaced McCone with a fellow Texan, retired U.S. Navy vice-admiral
William F. Raborn, Jr. The admiral had played an important role
in development of the Polaris missile system, but had no experience
in intelligence, which soon became apparent to CIA veterans….
Of all the awards and honors Lundahl
achieved, one he seldom displays reflects most appropriately his
contributions to this nation. It is an autographed photograph of
Allen Dulles and himself, which reads: “Art Lundahl has done as
much to protect the security of this nation as any man I know. Allen
W. Dulles.”
ed the Robertson
Commission in 1953, the had of that center, Captain Arthur Lundahl,
was transferred to the CIA to start the National Photographic
Interpretation Center.
Brugioni writes:
…Concomitant with (Kelly) Johnson’s
development of the U2, [ and special Kodak film, and camera] (Arthur
C.) Lundahl began to structure the intelligence organization within
the CIA required to exploit the imagery acquired by the U2. Lundahl
was given a free hand in recruiting and selecting personnel. Early in
1955, Hans “Dutch” Scheufele, William F. Banfield,
and I were told by Dr. James M. Andrews, the director of the Office
of Central Reference, and Dr. Joseph Becker, his executive officer,
that we had new jobs and that we were not to discuss our new
assignments with anyone.
I had been recruited by the CIA in
March 1948 and was a member of a unit responsible for creating
the Agency’s industrial register of detailed information on
foreign-production facilities worldwide…Lundahl, aware of the
difficulties encountered by the photo interpreters during World War
II, conceived of his organization as a wagon wheel. The photo
interpreters would be the hub of that wheel and the radiating spokes
of specialists would make the wheel turn….in Q Building and,
later, Quarters I – an abandoned barracks that housed a WAVE
contingent during World War II…Photo-interpretation had
traditionally been the private preserve of the military, especially
the Air Force, which was extremely sensitive to the Agency’s
encroachment on its territory.
…During this period, Lundahl and his
executive officer, Chick Camp were also involved in
negotiating a permanent home for the center. The nondescript Steuart
Motor Car Co. Building was selected in a crime-ridden area of the
Washington ghetto at Fifth and K Streets, NW. the four upper floors
of the building would become the division’s home, while the three
lower floors would still be occupied by the motor car company, along
with the Steuart Real Estate Office. The building was not air
conditioned, and there were heating problems in winter….
Lundahl met with the Agency’s deputy
director for intelligence, Robert Amory, about reorganizing
the organization to accommodate the service elements. Amory agreed
and Lundahl chose the title National Photographic Interpretation
Center for his new organization.
Air Force Colonel Osmond “Ozzie”
J. Ritland had been working with Bissel, and he and lower-ranking
Air Force officers were doing everything possible to aid the CIA in
its photo-collection and interpretation efforts.
Meanwhile, at the Pentagon, there was
an angry undercurrent as to how the Air Force could allow a task
properly assigned to them slip away to the CIA. Air Force
photo-interpretation units were directed not to cooperate with Agency
personnel in their attempt to establish a photo-interpretation
center. At Omaha, General Curtis LeMay regarded SAC as the
free world’s primary deterrent to the Soviet Union and assumed that
it should have the dominant role I acquiring strategic intelligence.
While General LeMay cooperated with the Agency in providing
logistical support, he too, to paraphrase one of his senior officers,
was ‘bent out of shape’ because the Agency was becoming involved
with photo-interpretation. In one of his staff meetings, LeMay said
about the U2, “We’ll let them develop it and then we’ll take it
away from them.”
The first U2 mission over the Soviet
Union took place on July 4, 1956…Photo interpreters at the
center looked at the photographs with abject fascination. A number of
briefing boards were produced….Lundahl showed the intelligence
significance of each board as the president listened intently.
Lundahl remembered that the president “asked questions about very
specific targets that were of great national interest. He was
impressed with the quality of the photography and asked questions
about the resolution and the altitude the pictures were made from. He
also asked questions about intercept attempts and questions about any
Soviet reaction.” Lundahl described the president as being “warm
with satisfaction” after seeing the results from the first mission.
A warm and friendly relationship developed. Eisenhower admiring
Lundahl for his articulate presentations and Lundahl enjoying the
president’s support for the reconnaissance programs.
It was an exciting era – a new age of
discovery, and, for the first time, we had the capability to derive
precise, irrefutable data on the vast land mass and physical
installations of our principal adversary – and the data was only a
few days old. It was also a learning and collaborative experience
between the policymakers, intelligence analysts and photo
interpreters. The analyst literally stood at the photo interpreter’s
shoulder and was made acutely aware of the exploitation process and
of the photo interpreter’s nuances and jargon. The policymakers
began comparing the information derived from the U2 with other
sources of information. Often when presented with information from
other sources, the president would ask, “How does this compare with
the U2 information?”
These missions were generating
accurate, current information in greater quantities than had ever
been contemplated. Much to our surprise, the Russians had not
employed any camouflage and concealment efforts. Time and again, we
knew we were reporting information that was dispelling existing
notions and intelligence estimates, and we took a certain vicarious
pleasure in proving the value of aerial photography over other
intelligence sources. Analysts began reevaluating assumptions
regarding Soviet strategic capabilities. Within a few weeks, analysis
of the U2 photography had dispelled the bomber-gap myth.
Lundahl’s combination of energy,
memory, intelligence, knowledge, and articulateness was making quite
a name for him and the art of photo interpretation. After the
president was briefed on the takes from each mission, Lundahl would
proceed to the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, congressional leaders, and the chiefs of the
various intelligence directorates. Lundahl quickly became the most
respected and honored intelligence officer in the intelligence
community. He was a superb photo interpreter and photogrammetrist
and could articulate the characteristics and technical specifications
of the new collection system. This ability, combined with a warm
enthusiasm and a strong empathy with his audiences, was daily proving
the value of photo intelligence in the estimate process. After each
mission, Kelly Johnson would come to the Center and we would
brief him on the results of the mission. Such other distinguished
visitors as General Jimmy Doolittle, Dr. Edwin Land, and Dr. George
Kistiakowsky also came to our nondescript but vital facility in the
Steuart Building.
GARY POWERS
On May 1, 1960, just fifteen
days before a scheduled four-power summit conference was to convene
in Paris, Gary Power’s U2 air-plane was brought down by an indirect
hit from a near-miss SA-2 missile near Sverdlovsk, in the USSR…A
furious debate ensued in the Senate, …To quell the debate, Allen
Dulles decided to brief the entire Senate on the benefits that were
derived from the U2 program.
Mr. Lundahl was told that he would be
allowed precisely thirty minutes and that this should be the briefing
of his lifetime. Lundahl gave us the task of organizing the effort,
and I carefully reviewed all the contributions that the U2 missions
had made to the national estimate process, along with the many crises
wherein the intelligence derived had been employed to resolve policy
issues worldwide. A number of spectacular briefing boards were
created, and Lundahl rehearsed himself intently on the substantive
content of the boards, to assure that he could effectively deliver
the information within the prescribed thirty minutes.
Lundahl remembers the chamber he and
Dulles entered as being “filled with senators, many in angry or
combative moods.” Mr. Dulles, wearing one of his usual English
tweed suits, introduced Lundahl. He then lit his curved tobacco pipe
and settled back to enjoy Lundahl’s startling presentation, which
upon completion provoked a standing ovation from the senators
present. Mr. Dulles was so surprised by the reaction that when he
rose to his feet, his lit pipe tumbled onto his lap, setting his
tweed coat afire. Lundahl, taken aback, did not know whether to
simply stand there and accept the senators’ acclaim or to seek a
glass of water to throw on his inflamed director.
In Paris,…Lundahl, Cunningham, and a
translator were driven to the Elysee Palace and escorted to de
Gaull’s office. De Gaulle was alone. Lundahl opened the package of
briefing materials and moved toward de Gaulle in order to brief him
at his desk. De Gaulle rose, walked toward Lundahl, and asked him to
place the graphics on a large conference table, where he stood
looking down at them....Lundahl handed him a lage magnifying glass.
De Gaulle asked a number of questions…His initial response to what
he saw was expressed, cryptically, in French, “Formidable!
Formidable!”
When the briefing was completed, de Gaulle thanked Lundahl, paused, reflected for a moment, and then said, “This is one of the most important programs the West is currently involved in and it is something that must continue.” ….Upon his return from the aborted conference, Eisenhower decided to speak to the nation and to reassure the public that he knew what was going on in his government…
When the briefing was completed, de Gaulle thanked Lundahl, paused, reflected for a moment, and then said, “This is one of the most important programs the West is currently involved in and it is something that must continue.” ….Upon his return from the aborted conference, Eisenhower decided to speak to the nation and to reassure the public that he knew what was going on in his government…
James C. Hagerty, the
president’s press secretary, selected a number of the boards and
left to show them to the president. He returned after a few minutes,
saying Eisenhower had rejected the idea of showing all the briefing
boards…Rather than releasing photography of Soviet installations
for public display, the president had selected the single briefing
board I had prepared of the San Diego Naval Air Station,
showing the airfield, aircraft, hangers, and runway markers….
[Kelly notes: J.C. Hagerty later
worked as News director of ABC News in New York and hired the
reporter who became the intermediary in the backchannel negotiations
between JFK, William Atwood and Fidel Castro.]
In his televised address, Eisenhower,…
added, “Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have
used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet
military developments. The usefulness of this work has been well
established through four years of effort…”
There are a number of references in
books on Powers U2 flight and the Kennedy assassination to the effect
that Lee Harvey Oswald provided the Russians with data on the U2 that
was subsequently used by the Soviets in downing Gary Power’s U2.
Most of these accounts focus on the fact that in 1957, Oswald, then a
seventeen year old US Marine Corps private, was assigned to the 1
Marine Aiercraft Wing, based at Atsugi Naval Air Station, about
twenty miles west of Tokyo, as a trained radar operator. During the
period Oswald was assigned at Atsugi, U2s used the naval air station
as a staging base for missions over the Soviet Union. Oswald returned
to the US, and on October 31, 1959, renounced his US
citizenship. At the US embassy in Moscow, he indicated that he would
tell the Russians everything he knew about US radar operations and
something else that he termed “of special interest.” 19 The
knowledge derived from radar intercepts – i.e., course, altitude,
and speed – is the same whether learned from US or Russian radar
operations. The Soviets had an accurate record of U2 performance
beginning with the first mission over the USSR on July 4, 1956. On
subsequent missions the data was refined so that in a relatively
short period the Soviets had an accurate record of U2
characteristics. The Russians had publicly confirmed the fact that
they had been tracking and were knowledgeable about U2 operations….so
the Russians were well aware of the U2s altitude, course, and speed….
On August 18, at 12:57 P.M., the US
Discoverer XIV space satellite was launched from Vandenberg
Air Force Base in California….The reentry vehicle was ejected
over Alaska on its seventeenth pass. In the recovery area, which
encompassed a 200 by 60 mile rectangle, six C-119s and one C-130 flew
within the area called the ball park. Three other C-119s patrolled an
“outfield” area, embracing an additional 400 miles. All aircraft
flew an assigned search pattern. At 3:46 PM on August 19, one of the
C-119 Flying Boxcars, piloted by Captain Harrold E. Mitchell and
his nine man crew, searching in the “outfield” area, hooked
the parachute and the 84 pound capsule in midair at an altitude of
8,500 feet and hauled them aboard. 21 A new era of reconnaissance had
begun. On this first successful photographic satellite mission,
carrying a twenty-pound roll of film, we gained more than 1 million
square miles of coverage of the Soviet Union – more coverage in one
capsule than the combined four years of U2 coverage….
[Kelly notes: This film was flown to
the Kodak HQ in Rochester NY for processing]
The front page of the New York Times on
August 20, 1960 headlined the first successful midair recovery of the
reentry capsule and on the opposite side of the front page announced
the end of the U2 trial and conviction and sentencing of Gary Powers.
One photographic-collection period of the Soviet Union was ending
while another was just beginning….
LUNDAHL THE BRIEFER AND JFK
The task of educating President
Kennedy on photo interpretation devolved upon Arthur Lundahl. Lundahl
was a key official who established a close working relationship with
both President Kennedy and the assistant to the president for
national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy. Lundahl’s
articulate, erudite, and succinct explanations of what was seen on
aerial photography were always welcome at the White House. The
president wanted technical information presented in a straightforward
manner, free of military jargon, so it would be comprehensible not
only to him but also the average person. In one of his early
briefings of the president, Lundahl explained that the U2 camera
could photograph a swath about 125 nautical miles wide and about
3,000 nautical miles long on over 10,000 feet of film. Lundahl drew
the analogy that each foot of film was scanned under magnification in
much the same manner that Sherlock Holmes would scan evidence or look
for clues with a large magnifying glass. “Imagine,” Lundahl would
suggest, “a group of photo interpreters on their hands and knees
scanning a roll of film that extended from the White House to the
Capitol and back.” Kennedy never forgot that analogy. When other
high officials were briefed on the U2 at the White House, the
president would call on Lundahl to repeat the story.
Lundahl and President Kennedy hit it
off famously. Periodically, Lundahl would update the president in
private briefings on the latest finds from both the U2 and satellite
photography. The president’s discomfort from a chronic back
ailment, the usual cluttered condition of the presidential desk, with
its many mementos and reams of reading material, and the very nature
of the photographic briefing materials to be presented required that
a certain special physical arrangement be made. Lundahl would enter
the Oval Office and the president would leave his cluttered desk and
be seated in the famous rocking chair that had been custom designed
to alleviate his back problem. The rocking chair was positioned in
front of a round coffee table. Lundahl would be seated on the sofa to
the right of the president, and the director of the CIA would
frequently be seated on the president’s left. Removing the silver
cigar humidor and ashtray that were usually on the table, Lundahl
would arrange his briefing materials and provide the president with a
large magnifying glass. The president then drew up his rocking chair
close to the table and, using the magnifying glass, began to study
the latest photography as Lundahl briefed.
According to Lundahl, the president was
a good listener. He liked good lead-in statements. Lundahl knew this
and carefully selected and arranged his words so he could gauge the
president’s reaction as he spoke. Once he asked Lundahl to remain
after a briefing. He was eager to know more about the
photo-interpretation process. “Where do you get photo interpreters?
How much do you pay them? How do you train them? Are they satisfied
with their work? He indicted that he would like to visit the center
and observe the high technology of interpretation at work. Lundahl
was afforded a unique opportunity because of his position. He admired
the president’s intellect and courage, and in turn, the president
came to admire Lundahl for his intelligence and grace in making a
difficult task look exceptionally easy. He came to know the president
as a friend and was privy to share the laughter, heartaches, secrets,
moods, defeats and triumphs that occurred during the Kennedy years.
…Colonel – later General Andrew
Goodpasture became powerful during the Eisenhower administration
performing important national-security-affairs function. McGeorge
Bundy – who had been appointed assistant to the president for
national security affairs after the Bay of Pigs invasion and also had
an instinct for power – assumed the intelligence watchdog role in
President Kennedy’s administration. Intense, articulate, and
intelligence, Bundy kept close track of the satellite, U2 and other
aircraft missions being flown – and their results. Any photography
shown to the president had to be passed through Bundy’s office in
the White House basement….
[Kelly notes: Gen. Goodpasture is
the husband of Mrs. Goodpasture, the secretary.]
….Suspecting that General Cabell
had leaked the information, he asked for his resignation….On
January 31, 1962 he resigned…from the Air Force…He was replaced
by Major General Marshall “Pat” Carter…(Murphy) revealed
that Admiral Arleigh Burke had been the source of his
Bay of Pigs information…and his “bagman” at the
Department of Defense, McNamara…
CUBA
On August 29, 1962, a U2 was
dispatched to photograph the entire island of Cuba….As one analyst
stated after viewing the results of the mission, “The sirens were
on and the red lights were flashing.”
Within minutes after the film was
placed on the light table, a Center photo interpreter assigned to the
mission scan team shouted, “I’ve got a SAM site.” Excitement
spread, and other photo interpreters gathered around him to look at
his find…
When Mr. (John) McCone was
briefed on the finds of the mission, he admonished contemptuously,
“They’re not putting them [the SA-2 sites] in to protect the cane
cutters. They’re putting them in to blind our reconnaissance eye.”
When (Ray) Cline was briefed on
the mission finds, he asked that Bill Harvey, chief of Task Force
W, also be informed so that covert personnel would be aware of
and could concentrate on collecting confirmation on the newly found
sites. Harvey was briefed by Lundahl and William Tidwell, an
assistant to Cline. He responded quickly that McGeorge Bundy and
the president should also be briefed as soon as possible.
Bundy said the president would not be
available that afternoon because he was preparing to fly to the
Quonset Naval Air Station to meet his wife and children, who
had returned from a month-long vacation in Italy. Recuperating from
the death of their newborn son, Patrick, Jackie had visited her
sister, Lee, and Lee’s husband Stanislas Radziwill, at Villa
Episcopin in Ravello.
Bundy told Cline that Attorney
General Bobby Kennedy was available, however, and might like to
hear the briefing, since he would be seeing the president later that
evening in Rhode Island.
On August 31, at 4 PM, Lundahl,
Tidwell, and Harvey waited outside the attorney general’s office.
After the group was ushered into Kennedy’s office, Harvey made a
brief introductory statement and turned the briefing over to Lundahl.
Lundahl laid out the photographs and maps on Kennedy’s desk and
summarized the developments in Cuba. He pointed to the deployment
patterns of the SA-2 sites and indicated that we would probably be
seeing more. He then showed Kennedy the photo of the port of Mariel
with seven KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats, explaining their
function and mission in a sketch included on the briefing board.
Photography was an ideal medium for
conveying information to someone with Bobby’s forceful views and
convictions. He was extremely interested, asked many questions, said
he wanted to be kept up-to-date, and promised that the intelligence
would be conveyed to the president that evening…..The briefing had
lasted about an hour, and Lundahl noticed that there was a chill
between Kennedy and Harvey – that Kennedy avoided speaking to
Harvey directly and that Harvey avoided eye contact with Kennedy.
This was Lundahl’s first briefing of
the attorney general, and he remembered him as being “a very sharp
fellow, very perceptive, full of good questions. He didn’t like
long, involved answers. He cut through any wandering conversations
and got right up to the things he wanted to know….
Then on August 31, 1962, the day
Bobby Kennedy was briefed on the SA-2 sites in Cuba, Senator
Kenneth Keating of New York made the following startling
announcement from the floor of the Senate: “I am reliably informed
that…Soviet ships unloaded 1,200 troops, I call these men troops,
not technicians. They were wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms.”
A meeting with the president was set
for September 7 at 3:30 PM. Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of
Defense McNamara, General Carter, Cline, Lundahl, and John
McLauchlin, representing the Defense Intelligence Agency, were
ushered into the Oval Office. The secretary of defense had asked John
Hughes, a special assistant to the director of DIA, to attend,
but Hughes was unavailable. John McLauchlin, Hughes’s deputy,
laughs when he recalls how a GS-12 represented the DOD at such a
critical White House meeting. He felt ill at ease when he saw the
nation’s leaders’ inquiring glances directed at him. He is sure
they were wondering, Who in the hell is he. But no one asked.
The president was seated in his famous
rocking chair, with McGeorge Bundy standing immediately to his left.
General Carter told the president that detailed analysis of the
August 29 U2 photography over Cuba – in addition to providing data
on the SA-2 sites and the KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats – had
revealed a surface-to-surface missile site. He said that Cline and
Lundahl would provide the details. Cline read a short prepared
statement…He then asked Lundahl to describe the site. Lundahl
removed the briefing board from a leather carrying case and handed it
to the president. Lundahl looked over the top of the briefing board
wile explaining it to the president….
The president obviously was concerned
primarily with whether the newly identified site was defensive or
offensive in nature.... “How far will this thing shoot?” the
president asked….The president was not satisfied with technical
explanations….The president paused for a moment and reflected,…He
asked, “Do we have something like that?”
McNamara replied, “No, we don’t.”
The president snapped, “Why in the
hell don’t we? How long have we know about this weapon?”
…The president’s face froze. He
began to drum his fingers nervously and impatiently on the arms of
the rocker. Lundahl knew that the quick, annoyed tapping betrayed his
impatience and anxiety. “Damnit,” the president said, “If that
damn thing is in Cuba, we should know something about it.”
General Carter, sensing that the
president’s questions and concerns about the missile system would
not be satisfied that day, stated that he hoped the president
understood that he was only following the president’s orders to
report any new developments in Cuba to him personally…
The president stood up and glared fiercely at General Carter and then muttered, almost to himself, “I do, but I don’t want half-assed information….Go back and do your homework….I want no further reporting until the missile site has been completely evaluated and you can report back to me.”
…The president asked how widely the
information would be disseminated… “We have to be very careful
about any evidence of offensive weapons in Cuba. If such evidence is
found, It must be kept very restricted and I want to be the first to
know about it.”
…The president began a chopping
motion with his right arm,… “If this information is in the
Washington Post tomorrow, I’ll fire both of you.”
…Carter tarried and said, “…you
do want us to know exactly what these things are so that we can
report to you accurately?”
The president considerably toned down,
said, “By all means.”
Carter continued, “Then in order to
arrive at these conclusions, it wouldn’t be contrary to your
wishes, or your order, that we, the analysts, talk back and forth
with each other to compare our knowledge and winnow out our
conclusions and to reject that which is inconsistent.
The president replied, “Most
certainly not: that’s exactly what I want to happen.”
“I thought that’s what you wanted,”
Carter said, “but others might have felt that each of us was to
stay in isolation and try independently to arrive at a collectively
agreed upon conclusion, which would have been hard to do.”
The president then said, “No. Those
people who need to know – those specialists, those experts who can
talk to the photo interpreters and with whom those photo interpreters
can talk – can collective arrive at a decision. That’s what I
want to happen”
…Everyone had gotten the president’s
message. When Carter returned to his Langley office, he was asked by
an aide how the presidential briefing had gone. He answered, “The
president was pissed!”
Carter called Huntington Sheldon,
the CIA assistant deputy director for intelligence into his
office. Carter told him that as a result of a presidential directive,
a security system had to be established that would absolutely
safeguard the dissemination of highly sensitive information derived
from the Cuban overflights should offensive missiles be found…Sheldon
summoned security specialist Henry Thomas to his office and
asked him to bring with him a list of available code names..
Sheldon chose the code word PSALM.
At the Center, Lundahl appointed Jack
Gardner and me to work with Office of Scientific Intelligence
offensive missile specialist Sidney Graybeal and defensive
missile specialist Norman Smith on the Barnes site….
General Carter called Lundahl early on
September 10 and said that the president would like a current
briefing on aerial photographic systems for himself and General
Eisenhower…Carter was informed that the president would be lunching
with General Eisenhower and that Carter, Lundahl, and his deputy,
Col. David S. Parker, should have lunch at the White House dining
room. Afterward, Lundahl set up his briefing materials on an easel in
the Oval Office. Just before 2 P.M. President Kennedy and General
Eisenhower came in. The president said to General Eisenhower, “You
must certainly know these gentlemen?” General Eisenhower said that
he did, shook hands with the briefers, and sat down at the
president’s right.
Carter made a few introductory remarks
and then turned to Lundahl, who presented fifteen briefing boards on
Soviet strategic industries and test centers. Lundahl had briefed
President Kennedy numerous times and knew he liked opening remarks
that gave him an immediate option on the presentation. The president
reached into the humidor and took out a big black cigar and lit it.
Senator Smathers had given him several boxes of Havanas and the
president promptly had the bands removed and the cigars placed in the
handsome silver humidor. Although he appeared to enjoy a good cigar,
the president was not an adept smoker, often toying with and chewing
on the cigar. He tried, however, not to be photographed with a cigar.
Part of Lindahl’s presentation showed
the improvements that had been made in the various photographic
systems. General Eisenhower listened intently ad asked questions
about the systems in the research and development stages….President
Kennedy, too, asked numerous questions. During the briefing, Lundahl
was pleased to see the president smiling, delighted with the
general’s questions and the answers given by the participants. The
briefing lasted approximately forty minutes and all agreed that the
briefing was a success. General Carter, especially, felt relieved and
jokingly remarked, “At last, I can report some good news from the
White House to Mr. McCone.” But Carter’s elation would not last
long.
A Special Group meeting had been
scheduled for September 10 in Bundy’s office regarding aerial
reconnaissance over Cuba…James Reber, the chairman of COMOR
(Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance), unfolded a large map
of Cuba on the conference table with various flight plans on it.
Bobby strongly advocated the overflights…The president was
confronted with a nagging dilemma – caught between Soviet and Cuban
charges that the U.S. was planning to invade the island and mounting
congressional demands from both the Republicans and Democrats that he
had to do precisely that…Direct military intervention against Cuba,
of course, had to be considered. On October 1, McNamara had met with
the Joint Chiefs of staff. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss
circumstances in which military action against Cuba might be
necessary and toward which planning should be actively pursued….These
were operational plans: 312, 314, and 316.
Meanwhile Senator Kenneth Keating of
New York…On October 10, on the floor of the Senate, the senator
made the most serious charge to date….Keating then attacked the
president and Undersecretary Ball for not telling the whole
truth….Keating’s speech hit like a bombshell at the White House.
Keating’s implication that the U.S. government possessed
information on offensive missiles in Cuba and was doing nothing about
it infuriated President Kennedy. Kennedy initially suspected that
information had been withheld from him and angrily called McCone,
demanding to know if such information existed. McCone responded in
the negative and then called Lundahl to see if anything had been
discovered in the aerial photos. Lundahl said he had no such
information….
It was considered possible that
Keating’s information had been a deliberate attempt by a dissident
refugee source to embarrass ad discredit the Kennedy administration
before the November elections or to push the United States into
taking action against the Castro government. In the past the
Agency had received a number of such outright false reports, and all
of them had been discredited….
McCone did not like the criticism that
President Kennedy was receiving from Congress. He was a
Republican…and he felt he was the logical man to approach Senator
Keating….But Keating did not appear at the appointed time. The NPIC
couriers exchanged banter with McCone’s secretaries….Then the
senator was ushered into McCone’s office. Presumably, McCone showed
the senator all of the briefing materials and then probably asked
Keating for the source of his information. Keating refused. 46
The couriers reported that voices began
to rise, McCone said that he had his cards on the table and had been
honest but that the senator was doing his country incalculable
damage….McCone retorted, “Tell me where they are and I’ll prove
to you they are not there.” …McCone did not give up. On another
occasion, he asked Lundahl to report to the Senate Office Building
and wait for him. The purpose he said, was to brief Senator
Keating....Senator Keating’s secretary (said) that he was busy and
did not have time for McCone…Although a concerted effort was
undertaken by the Kennedy administration to determine Senator
Keating’s source of information, all their efforts failed…In
later years, Clare Booth Luce would state that some of her sources
had furnished information on missiles being in Cuba and that the
information had found its way to Senator Keating. 48
…On October 12, General Thomas S.
Power, commander of the Strategic Air Command, was called to
Washington. Ushered into the office of the secretary of the Air
Force, he was asked if the Strategic Air Command was prepared to take
over all the duties of flying the U2 reconnaissance of Cuba…General
Power replied in the affirmative…The motto of the 55 Strategic
Reconnaissance Wing of the Strategic Air Command was Videmus –Omnia
– “We see all.” …The wing was based at Forbes Air Force
Base, outside Topeka, Kansas, but had detachments…at Yokota, Japan,
Incirlik, Turkey,…
October 15 would be a routine day for
the heads of state of two of the most powerful nations in the world.
President Kennedy had been campaigning in upstate New York and had
appeared in the Pulaski Day parade at Buffalo on October 14….He
stopped off in New York City and had a late night dinner with Adlai
E. Stevenson…the president arrived late at the White House at 1:40
A.M. on the fifteenth. He slept late that morning and went to his
office at 11:00 A.M., just in time to greet Ahmed Ben Bella, the
prime minister of Algeria….Two days later Ben Bella arrived in
Havana…
At the new CIA headquarters building in
Langley, Virginia, the day also began with meetings for some of the
principles who would later be involved in the crisis….At 9:10 Ray
Cline opened the Second Conference on Intelligence Methods.
Participants were foreign-intelligence chiefs, along with senior
officers from the CIA, DOD and State.
Paul J. Pigot, Mrs. McCone’s son, who
had been injured in an auto race…had died at the March Air Force
Base hospital. McCone had left Washington to accompany the body to
Seattle….McCone had planned to open the conference…The first
speaker was McGeorge Bundy,….the second Roger Hilsman….As
the week’s program continued, the Commonwealth intelligence chiefs
were to become more and more suspicious that a crisis was brewing as
their U.S. hosts mysteriously excused themselves from the business
and the social functions of the conference… [See: Poem sidebar]
THE STEUART BUILDING – Fifth &
K Streets NW aka “The Center.”
Monday, October 15, began as a
beautiful fall day in Washington. Because of the poor parking
facilities around the Steuart Building at 5 and K streets in
northwest Washington, car pools were encouraged....Broken bottles,
abandoned autos, and trash littered the area…The Steuart Building
was a nondescript seven-story structure built during World War II.
The Center occupied a total of fifty thousand square feet on the
fourth through seventh floors. There were no restaurants or cafeteria
facilities in the building and the food service was a particular
problem, especially for persons working at night. When there was
time, sandwiches and coffee could be bought at a nearby all-night
diner. Most employees brought bag lunches and diners from home.
Before entering the Steuart Building each morning, others stopped at
the Center City Market. The market was a conglamoration of small
shops selling everything from the cheapest cuts of meats to imported
delicacies, from patent medicines to freshly cut flowers. But every
morning, freshly baked breakfast rolls and freshly brewed coffee and
tea were available. Properly fortified, employees passed through the
security turnstiles of the Steuart Building en route to their
offices. They were always greeted cordially by guard George
Bailey, who knew everyone by their first name. Eunice
Stallings, the elevator operator, a cigar-smoking women who did
the New York Times crossword puzzle in record time, took the
employees to their appointed floor.
A mere physical description of the
squalid building amid its squalid surroundings in Washington’s 2
Police Precinct reveals little as to what NPIC was all about. It was
a unique multidepartmental national-level organization. The formal
structure was controlled, staffed, and funded by the CIA, but the
informal organizational structure also comprised special detachments
from the Army, Air Force and Navy. They were under the administrative
control of “service chiefs,” who contributed personnel for
photo-interpretation projects of national interest such as the
exploitation of photography acquired over Cuba.
The National Photographic
Interpretation Center, however, was synonymous with its director,
Arthur C. Lundahl. Lundahl was responsible for the conception and
evolution of photographic interpretation as it was performed at the
Center. His ingenuity was reflected not only in Center activity, but
also at all the military intelligence agencies involved in
photo-interpretation activities. From the inception of NPIC and its
predecessor organizations, beginning in 1955, Lundahl’s visionary
approach and methods of deriving intelligence from photography and
collateral sources were dismissed by many as too revolutionary to
last. Basically, he aimed at fusing ideas and experience that
previously had been considered unrelated or incompatible.
Drawing on World War II experiences, he
juxtaposed and fused the skills of seven different disciplines: photo
interpretation, collateral information and data processing,
photogrammetry, graphics and publication support, technical analysis,
and distribution and courier support. The result was a team of
experienced personnel that inspired great confidence from other
intelligence and government officials. The Center’s organization
and skill represented the first modern technological approach to
intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination. NPIC
supervisory personnel recognized their unique opportunity and worked
hard at making the Center a model of organization and production.
Lundahl’s leadership was reinforced
by an unusual level of talent throughout the organization. Allen
Dulles, the director of the CIA, and his deputy, Lieutenant General
Charles F. Cabell, extended Lundahl a free-hand in selecting
personnel to staff the Center. Although the Steuart Building left
much to be desired in physical amenities, Lundahl would frequently
remark: “Where a choice be necessary, give me good men in poor
ships than the converse.” A particularly distinguishing feature of
Lundahl’s managerial genius was his ability to find gifted people
and to establish the atmosphere of creativity in which they could
work. Many new organizations are burdened with a percentage of
castoffs. But Lundahl’s most unique and significant contribution
was his ability to lead and inspire others. He was unparalleled in
winning he complete respect, admiration, and devotion of all those
with whom he came into contact – presidents, the Congress, the
military services, the intelligence community, the scientists,
contractor and, of course, the personnel of the Center. The
imagination and dedication of the people selected by Lundahl for
managerial responsibilities can never be overestimated. These
managers, in turn, supervised young, talented, and dedicated
personnel. Although Lundahl set high standards for his employees, he
permitted his staff an extraordinary degree of independence. He laid
down few guidelines or specific rules. He believed that his staff
would function better if given wide latitude. In return, he received
an exceptional sense of commitment from his employees and a great
response of new ideas. The employees of the Center had in Art Lundahl
an ardent believer in, and a prophet of, photographic interpretation.
He could articulate with great feeling the meaning of the
photo-interpretation methods and the value of information obtained
from the photography. Lundahl, in his words, didn’t believe in a
droning presentation but rather in an exploding one. Aerial
photography was his ammunition.
Even the security system at the Center
reflected the singularity and uniqueness of the organization. The
security accorded the U2 program and the photo intelligence derived
from it was never breached. Great effort had been expended to place
the program in a separate security system and give it a set of
special code words. Some maintain this system gave Lundahl
extraordinary freedom to move information directly from the Center to
the president. Others maintained that the novelty of aerial
photography made it a new toy for the intelligence service chiefs and
other government leaders.
It was also the knot that tied together
the many bits and pieces of information gathered from other
collection sources. Analysts now had the means to confirm or deny
their suspicions or hypotheses. NPIC was uniquely qualified, staffed,
and ready on October 15.
At the Naval Photographic
Intelligence Center, the film from mission 3101 was processed
under stringent quality and security controls. The film was carefully
edited and titled, and the duplicate positives from the processors
were spooled and packaged in film cans.
NPIC’s operations officer, Hans
F. Scheufele, maintained constant contact with the
collection and processing sites so that scheduling information would
be available to Center components and the exploitation teams could be
appraised of the delivery time of the film. He kept this information
posted on a large blackboard on his office wall. He also
issued daily bulletins on “Proposed Staffing and Time
Completion Estimates,” which listed specific personnel
assigned to exploit a given mission and the arrival time of the film.
This particular day had all the
appearances of being routine. Lundahl had scheduled a 9:30 A.M.
meeting with his division chiefs to discuss training….As he
prepared for the meeting Lundahl glanced out his office window
overlooking Fifth Street. With some annoyance, he noted that a U.S.
Navy truck parked in front of the building entrance was blocking
traffic. Two armed Marines had dismounted and taken positions
immediately behind the truck. An armed Navy officer and an enlisted
man entered the truck from the rear, lifted a box off the truck, and
carried it into the Steuart Building.
Lundahl smiled, shook his head, and
noted how good intentions often become counter-productive. Every
effort had been made to keep the Steuart Building looking as
innocuous as possible. Yet the regulations for transporting U2 film
by the military services specified that movement of the film be made
under armed guard. But in doing so, it was revealing that personnel
in the Steuart Building were undoubtedly engaged in some extremely
classified and sensitive work.
Robert Kithcart of the NPIC
registry, a businesslike reserve paratroop captain who was in
charge of all the film and files retained in the Steuart Building,
received the box….He then placed the film in a wire basket to be
delivered to Earl Shoemaker, the exploitation coordinator for
this mission.
After being notified that mission 3101
had been successfully flown over Cuba, personnel at the Steuart
Building prepared to exploit the photography and, when the
exploitation was completed, to report their findings in a SITSUM
(situation summary) for the mission. The usual procedure was
to cable the SITSUM immediately to watch officers throughout the
intelligence community. Some days later, it would be disseminated by
courier in hard-copy form to a broader distribution of intelligence
analysts in the Washington area and throughout the JCS unified and
specified commands.
Marvin Michell, the
collateral-support information specialist for the mission had
performed preparatory tasks for many of the U2 missions over Cuba. He
had plotted the mission flight track…Marvin wheeled a library cart
full of the target packets and reference materials to the area where
the photo interpreters were waiting.
Earl Shoemaker had his
photo-interpretation teams ready….The interpreters began
cranking the reels of duplicate positives onto the light tables.
Normally, six photo-interpretation stations were employed in
scanning…there stations were manned by six photo interpreters –
three teams of two interpreters each – representing the CIA, Army,
Air Force and Navy….As they examined the film, the interpreters
wrote their observations on the worksheets provided and passed them
to their team leaders for review….
The two cans of film covering the San
Cristobol and the trapezoidal area of concern were given to the scan
team of Gene Lydon, a CIA photo interpreter, and Jim Holmes,
an Air Force interpreter, for exploitation….Then they spotted
six long canvas-covered objects. Lydon and Holmes made rough
estimates of the measurements of the objects several times. Each
time, their measurements showed the objects to be more than sixty
feet long. It was about noon, and both men paused for lunch. After
lunch, they resumed their efforts but still could not positively
identify the canvas-covered objects….Jim Holmes, a civilan Air
Force employee, was a soft spoken, yet tough-minded and intense,
photo interpreter. A native of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, he was only
twenty-nine but a veteran of twelve years of government service. He
began his government career at seventeen as a GS-2 cartographic
technician at the Army Map Service, where his aunt was a training
officer….Twenty-two year old Second Lieutenant Ricahrd Reninger
was the Army member of the team. Born in Laramie, Wyoming, he had
a B.A. in history from the University of Wyoming. He had graduated
from the U.S. Army Photo Interpretation School at Fort Holabird in
June 1961 and was assigned to the missile backup team at the Center….
A native of Maine, Joe Sullivan, a
civilian Navy employee, was a puckish, attractive Irishman. At
fifty, he was the senior member of the team…Vince DiRenzo was the
CIA representative on the team, from Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, he was
thirty-two and former Marine…(Clark University)…He and his branch
chief Bob Boyd had performed detailed support studies for covert
operations…
DiRenzo called me and said he
needed some support regarding the missiles. I called Jay
Quantrill, who worked for me and who was the Center’s
collateral specialist on missiles…DiRenzo was assured and
straightforward when he contacted his chief, Bob Boyd, and announced,
“We’ve got MRBMs in Cuba.” …
After reviewing the evidence on the
size and shape of the missile transporters with Reninger at about 4
P.M., Shoemaker said, “We’ve got to let Mr. Lundahl know before
he goes home.” Shoemaker and Boyd went to their division chief,
Jack Gardner, and his intelligence production officer, Gordon
Duvall….Holmes was unable to contact Air Force lieutenant
colonel Robert Saxon, so he sought out Ted Tate, Saxon’s
civilian deputy….Reninger informed Army colonel George C.
Eckert, his commanding officer. Joe Sullivan however, had
problems. His chief, Lieutenant Commander Pete Brunette,…had
a dinner engagement that evening…Joe said he was working on a
project and that Lundahl was about to be briefed….Sullivan called
Brunette’s deputy, Clay Dalryple,…and posted Brunette on the
details.
Lundahl was called by Gardener, and
Duvall escorted him into the room where the backup team was working.
Lundahl had a distinctive list to his walk as a result of an old
football injury. He was immediately recognized by us in the
semidarkened enclosed room. “I understand you fellows have found a
beauty,” he said as he approached.
…Lundahl turned from the table and
looked at us and then said, “I think I know what you guys think
they are, and if I think they are the same thing and we both are
right, we are sitting on the biggest story of our time.”
…Lundahl rose and walked a short
distance. His hands were clasped behind his back. We remained
silent. The strange stillness suggested the extreme seriousness of
the moment. Lundahl looked at us and said, “If there was ever a
time I want to be right in my life, this is it.”
He asked if anything had been
committed to paper. He was shown a few notes…Lundahl pointed to
each of us by name and asked if we agreed the missiles in question
were MRBMs. Each reply was affirmative. He then asked if there were
any other possibilities. Di Renzo mentioned what is always considered
at such a time – the possibility that these missiles were dummies.
All signs however, pointed to their being real…He did not doubt or
delay reacting to the situation. The ruddy-complexioned ,
silver-haired director looked at each of us again. “Gentlemen. I am
convinced. Because of the grave responsibility of this find, I want
to personally sign the cable.”
All of those present knew these images
represented a grave moment in history. All knew that the future turn
of events would surely involve the president personally. Lundahl
asked who knew about the find. Jack Gardner said that the “service
chiefs” had been informed but had been told not to divulge the
information to their superiors until the analysis had been completed.
Lundahl asked Gardner to invoke the code word PSALM on all the
information. I was the custodian of this closely held directive for
the Center and said that I would furnish it to Gardner.
…Lundahl asked that all those present
to remain and work through the night if necessary to glean all the
information possible from the images….I ran downstairs and told my
superiors, Hans Scheufele and Bill Banfield, that photographic
laboratory support would be needed that night…I ran downstairs and
told my superiors, Hans Scheufele and Bill Banfield, that
photographic-laboratory support would be needed that night and that
they should keep essential personnel at work...It was always
difficult to get through to CIA headquarters on the secure phone line
at that time of the evening. On his way downstairs to his fifth floor
office, Lundahl was thinking how he could clearly and unmistakably
get his message across to Cline if he had to use open phone lines.
(Ray) Cline was one of the founding fathers of the Agency, held a
doctorate from Harvard in history and international relations, was a
Phi Beta Kappa, and had earned his Agency reputation as a China
expert. He had replaced Robert Amory in March 1962 as the deputy
director of intelligence. Cline had full confidence in Lundahl and
the abilities of his people….
Cline was incredulous. He paused and
asked, “Are you fellows sure?”
Lundahl replied, “Yes, I am sorry to
have to maintain it, but we are sure.”
Cline said, “Well, we’ve got to get
on this right away. I’ll get hold of Carter….I want you to plan
on being in my office with the evidence b seven-thirty tomorrow
morning.”
Lundahl agreed. The call had been
made…One of my duties was to prepare all of the briefing notes for
Lundahl, and he called me down to his office and explained that the
note on all of the materials that were to be produced that night
should be as complete as possible…Lundahl checked his calendar for
any appointments that would conflict with the next day’s briefings.
He wrote crash and MRBM on the page for October 15. He looked back at
the page for October 14 on which he had jotted mission 3101. Printed
on the right side of the calender’s date was DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
BORN 1890….
The evening of October 15 was a night
of parties, not atypical for Washington during the month of
October....The secretary of defense was attending a Hickory Hill
seminar at Bobby Kennedy’s home in McClean, Virginia. General and
Mrs. Maxwell Taylor were giving a formal dinner party at their Fort
McNair residence in Southwest Washington…Bundy was hosting a dinner
party for Charles “Chip” Bohlen, the newly appointed Ambassador
to France…Cline next called Roger Hilsman at his home. He had
difficulty indicating over the insecure phone that he meant
MRBMs…..Meanwhile Norman Smith, the SAM specialist,…called Sidney
Graybeal, his division chief….Greaybeal…was shown the imagery
under the stereoscope and given a description of the find. He agreed
that these had to be offensive missiles….Graybeal told the missile
backup team that he did not want to disturb them in their work but
would like to remain, listen to their converstations, and jot down
all pertinent details….
Col. David Parker, the deputy director
of NPIC, called John Hughes, a special assistant to the director of
he Defense Intelligence Agency, and asked him to come over to the
Center…and John McLauchlin, a photo interpreter
specialist….McLauchlin proceeded to General Carroll’s Bolling Air
Force Base home…Carroll called Roswell Gilpatrick…and said that
Hughes and McClauchlin were coming over to fill him in on some new
and very important intelligence on Cuba.
Hughes and McLauchlin got in Hughes’
old yellow DeSoto,…experiencing transmission problems and painfully
growled…McLauchlin kidded Hughes, “We have the secret of the
century…If this thing breaks down, you’ll run the rest of the way
on foot.” They arrived at Gilpatrick’s apartment at 4201
Cathedera Avenue in northwest….
Lundahl asked me to provide him with a
map showing Cuba and the United States. He asked me to swing a 1,100
mile arc on the map, the range of the MRBM from the area where the
missile was found.…NPIC photo laboratory personnel had waited since
5 P.M. that evening for the photo interpreters to relinquish the
duplicate positives so they might make the necessary prints,
enlargements, and additional duplicate positives for study. Jimmy
Allen, a photo-laboratory section chief, had much experience waiting
or imagery from the photo interpreters. He contentedly puffed on a
large cigar. Jack Davis, the new chief of the photo laboratory,
waited nervously.
At 8:30 P.M. Earl Shoemaker brought a
duplicate positive from the laboratory.
...Normally a control code word was
given to priority or special laboratory processing work. When
Allen asked what code word should he apply to the Cuban Material,
Davis replied, “This is all so confused, a good term might be mass
confusion” All the photo-laboratory work that night and throughout
the missile crisis received priority treatment if it bore the title
“Mass Confusion.”
…Leon Coggin was listed as the
off-duty photogammetrist….Dick Reninger…Eugene Ricci…An
around-the-clock atmosphere soon pertained at NPIC – one of
sleeplessness and anxiety….Most stepped out of the Steuart Building
onto Fifth Street. It was a warm fall night and most crossed over New
York Avenue and 6 th Street to Havran’s Restaurant, a
favorite after-hours eating place for Steuart Building people and
policemen from the 2 Precinct. Hambergers, french fries, pies and
coffee were popular menu selections – in fact, the only food
available.
Joe Sullivan…..tried to located
prominent landmarks in the vicinity of Los Palacios…as he scanned
the photography…Leon Coggin…began measuring the missiles…John
Wyman, the senior NPIC computer operator…Dean Frazier,…the
Center’s graphics duty officer…graphic analysis officer Dan
McDevitt, illustrator Glenn Farmer, and headliner (typesetting)
operator Loretta Huggins, arrived at the Steuart Building about 4:30
A.M….The first three sites at San Cristobal were numbered MR-1,
MR-2, MR-3, and the Sagua la Grande sites MR-4 and MR-5, The Guanajay
IRBM sites were numbered IR-1, …and the Remedies site IR-3…
LUNDAHL ARRIVED at the Steuart Building
at 6 A.M. on October 16 and carefully reviewed the briefing boards
and notes that Shoemaker and I had assembled. They seemed to impart
an extraordinary, almost surrealistic, feeling. In stark stillness
they depicted a moment in time that had been frozen as visual
history. It was as if the world was holding its breath for a moment.
And the effect was total, devastating loneliness…
Frank Beck, the courier, was waiting.
Lundahl closed the large, black briefing board case and said, “Let’s
go.” He paused and asked Shoemaker and me to thank all the people
who had worked through the night and to send them home to get some
sleep. It was 7 A.M.
About the same time, Walter Elder, a
special assistant to the DCI, called McCone in Seattle and
cryptically reported, “That which you always expected has
occurred.”
Lundahl and Beck arrived at Ray Cline’s
office at 7:30 A.M….Lundahl placed the briefing boards on Cline’s
desk and everyone in the room listened, almost in awe, as Lundahl
pointed out each salient featue…After Lundahl finished briefing
Cline, he stepped back so that those gathered could review the
photography for themselves. …Cline, Lundahl and the courier, Beck,
left the CIA headquarters for the White House shortly before 8 A.M.
Conference delegates…being intelligence officers, wondered why they
were obviously in such a hurry with the courier and large bag of
briefing boards. Later, Walter Pforzheimer, longtime agency
legislative counsel, would write a poem about the departing members
of the intelligence methods conference.
At the White Hous, Cline, Lundahl, and
Beck went directly to McGeorge Bundy’s office in the
basement….Cline summarized the photo-intelligence findings and
asked Lundahl to explain what had been found…Bundy made a telephone
call…and took the elevator to the president’s private
quarters…The president, sitting on his bed and still in his
pajamas, was looking at the morning newspapers…Bundy told the
president about the missiles being in Cuba and together they reviewed
the president’s appointments for that morning. The only free time
was at 11:45. The president asked that a meeting of all principals be
scheduled for that time….A number of military exercises were
underway … PHIBRIGLEX-62 (Amphibious Brigade Landing)…
It was obvious that the president had
called Bobby Kennedy concerning the missiles in Cuba because at about
9 A.M. on the morning of October 16, he came storming into Bundy’s
office asking to see the photography. Cline repeated his assessment
and Lundahl took Kennedy over the briefing boards, pointing out the
fourteen missiles. Kennedy looked at the photos and moaned, “Oh
shit! Oh shit! Those sons of bitches Russians.”
Lundahl described Bobby’s movements
as being like those of a prizefighter. He walked several times about
the room, snorting like a prizefighter, smacking the palm of one hand
with his fist….Bobby Kennedy came back to Lundahl and Cline. The
seriousness of the moment was broken when Kennedy pointed to the map
NPIC had prepared showing the range of the SS-4. He pointed to the
map and asked, “Will those goddamn things reach Oxford,
Mississippi?” Before Lundahl could stop himself, he replied, “Sir,
well beyond Oxford.” He then looked up to catch a slight gleam in
Kennedy’s eyes and a wry smile on his face. Oxford, Mississippi, of
course, was where the Kennedys were having trouble attempting to
register James Meredith into the University of Mississippi. Bobby
thanked Ludahl and Cline and said he was going up to talk to the
president. When Lundahl returned to the Steuart Building and told
about Bobby’s Oxford remarks, it was decided all subsequent maps
showing the ranges of missiles deployed in Cuba would also show as
reference points such principal cities of the United States as St.
Louis, New York, Atlanta, and in the same bold type, Oxford,
Mississippi.
…C.Douglas Dillon, the secretary
of the treasury, came to Bundy’s office and asked to see the
photographs. An urbane, scholarly New York Republican, Dilllon was a
popular figure in the Kennedy cabinet. Tall, bald, outgoing,
studious, and unpretentious, he was listened to when he spoke. Suave
and courteous, he was one of Kennedy’s favorite cabinet members.
Possessed of a quick grasp for complex detail, his penetrating
intellect enabled him to contribute precise logic to resolving
problems not only in the Treasury Department but in other departments
as well.
Lundahl repeated his briefing….At
9:30 A.M. General Carter arrived at Bundy’s office. Cline felt that
Carter, as acting DCI, should handle the scheduled 11:45 meeting.
Carter agreed, and Cline advised him that Lundahl would perform the
briefing but that he would be sending over Sydney Graybeal, the
Agency’s offensive missile specialist, to provide analytical
backup to Lundahl if needed.
General Taylor had asked that
the JCS members be briefed on the Cuban photography as soon as
possible…When the office door closed, Colonel Eckert
abruptly stated his mission. “Sir, last evening the National
Photographic Interpretation Center discovered MRBM missile sites on
photography flown over Cuba on October 14.” General Wheeler
reeled back in is chair,…stunned, as if he had been hit by a
baseball bat….
The Center also prepared additional
copies of the briefing boards and notes for the Navy and Air
Force. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Saxon took the briefing boards
from the Steuart Building to General LeMay’s office and Lieutenant
Commander Pete Brunette took copies to Admiral Anderson’s
office….
…After all the participants were
seated in the Cabinet Room, General Carter read a prepared statement
that MRBM missiles had been discovered on U2 photography of October
14 at two locations and that Lundahl would brief the group using
enlargements of that photography. The president was seated, as usual,
at the center of the long conference table in the Cabinet Room, with
his back to the windows. Lundahl had placed the briefing boards on an
easel at the far end of the room near the fireplace. He gave a brief
description of the MRBM sites and then asked permission of the
president to come to the table and show him the evidence at close
range. The president replied, “By all means.” Lundahl approached
the conference table and stood between the president and Secretary
Rusk. Handing the president a large magnifying glass, so he had on
numerous occasions, he placed the briefing boards on the table in
front of the president and proceeded to point out details of the
three sites.
Lundahl was acutely aware that photo
interpreters can recognize and point out things that the
unsophisticated and untrained eye would easily miss. He therefore
dwelt on the enlargements of the missiles….After asking a few
questions he turned to his right and, looking Lundahl straight in the
eye and carefully spacing out his words, asked, “Are you sure?”
Lundahl was anxious to be measured in his response but at the same
time leave no doubt in the president’s mind that the evidence was
conclusive. Lundahl replied, “Mr. President, I am as sure of this
as a photo interpreter can be sure of anything. And I think, sir, you
might agree that we have not misled you on anything we have reported
to you. Yes, I am convinced they are missiles.”
…The president’s eyes rose again
from the photos. He looked at Lundahl again and asked, “How long
will it be before they can fire those missiles?” Lundahl stated
that Sydney Graybeal, the Agency’s expert on offensive missiles,
would comment on that question. Graybeal moved into position next to
Lundahl. He discussed the SS-4 missile system…Lundahl and Graybeal
tried very carefully to differentiate what was known and what was
unknown…The question and answer period lasted for over ten minutes.
The briefing left a particularly somber
mood in the room. The worst fears had come to pass and the worse of
conjectures were on many minds. Dramatic reaction was uppermost in
many minds – war, with all its new, devastating consequences – a
nuclear confrontation.
Lundahl would relate: “In an era
which demanded immediate response and rebuttal, the president
listened to all remarks and weighed all positions without surprise.
He had the curiosity, sensitivity, and intellect to assimilate any
proposition. With that grace and charm, he stimulated the best in all
those with whom he came in contact and that day was no exception.”
According to Lundahl, “The president
never panicked, never shuddered, his hands never shook. He was crisp
and businesslike and speedy in his remarks and he issued them with
clarity and dispatch, as though he were dispatching a train or a set
of instructions in an office group.” General Taylor would confirm
the president’s attitude: “Kennedy gave no evidence of shock or
trepidation resulting from the threat to the nation implicit in the
discovery of the missile sites, but rather a deep but controlled
anger at the duplicity of the Soviet officials who had tried to
deceive him.” 9
Lundahl removed the boards from the
table. The president turned to the group and said he wanted the whole
island covered – he didn’t care how many missions it too. “I
want the photography interpreted and the finds from the readouts as
soon as possible.” The discussion then turned to how many U2
missions could be flown and the possibility of using low-altitude
aircraft…
At the conclusion of the meeting, the
president turned to General Carter and Lundahl and said he wanted to
express the nation’s gratitude to the men who had collected these
remarkable photographs and to the photo interpreters for finding and
analyzing the missile sites. Carter graciously accepted the
compliment and motioned to Lundahl and Graybeal to remove the
briefing boards and prepare to leave the room.
The Cuban missile crisis was on!
When Lundahl returned from the meeting
at the White House, he held a meeting in his office and warned us
that “all hell was going to break loose” and for us to be
prepared to receive a lot of photography in the coming days. He
outlined specific duties and responsibilities in getting ready for
the influx of photography…Questions arose about the number of Air
Force pilots qualified to fly the Agency’s U2s…A decision was
reached to use both SAC and CIA U2 pilots to cover all of Cuba. The
CIA pilots were to be used only in “extreme circumstances” and
they would be recommissioned into the Air Force and given Air Force
credentials…
The Navy had devoted considerable time
and effort to develop an effective low-altitude jet reconnaissance
capability. Commander (later Captain) Willard D. Dietz had
perceived and pushed for the development of small-format aerial
cameras….Chicago Aerial Industries, Inc.’s KA-45 and KA-46, six
inch focal length framing cameras with a film width of five
inches and a capacity of 250 feet of film…installed in the F-8U-1P
Crusader….Lundahal recommended that the Navy’s Light
Photographic Squadron No. 62 (VFP-62) be selected…based at the
U.S. Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, just outside Jacksonville,
Florida…Joe Sullivan, the Navy photo interpreter on the NPIC
“discovery” team, had gone home about 4:30 A.M. on October 16,
having been told by his supervisors to take the day off but to be
available…his supevisor Clay Dalrymple, …told in no
uncertain terms to, “get his tail over to the Pentagon as fast as
possible” because there was going to be a special meeting of the
GMAIC (Guided Missile Astronautics Intelligence Committee).
Sullivan had a difficult time finding a parking place at the
Pentagon…
Dr. Albert “Bud” Wheelon, CIA
Chairman of the committee…He realized too that this
photographic lode had to be incorporated with other sources and
succinct and definitive reports created for policymakers…..was also
director of the Agency’s Office of Scientific
Intelligence...thirty-three at the time, was an MIT
physicist…Ramo-Woolridge Corportation….met with McCone and
sketched out procedures for handling and reporting information
concerning this crisis…He recommended that selected representatives
of all the standing United States Intelligence Boards’s
scientific committees transfer their activities on an ad hoc baiss to
NPIC in order to expediate their considerations of the findings from
the photography. McCone approved, and the next day, representatives
of the GMAIC, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC),
and members of the Agency’s Guided Missile Task Force began moving
certain of their files to NPIC.
[p.238]
The president formulated a group of
special advisors to advise and assist him in decisions affecting the
missile crisis. It became known as the Executive Committee (EXCOM)
of the National Security Council and would be formally
established by National Security Action Memorandum 196, signed by
the president on October 22, 1962. 15 …
The first meeting of the EXCOM opened
with a briefing on the photographs by Lundahl and intelligence
estimates….the president specifically asked that Robert Lovett
be included…Dean Rusk recommended…Dean Acheson…The
president approved.
Lundahl held a prolonged staff meeting
at the Center on the morning of October 17 to structure operational
changes for the duration of the crisis. Center personnel were equally
divided into two twelve-hour shifts, with the shift change at 8 A.M.
each morning. Robert Boyd was put in charge of one shift of the photo
interpreters and Gordon Duvall the other. Photo interpreters would
brief Lundahl on photo intelligence derived the previous day at a
morning meeting that would take place at 6:30 to 7 AM. Duvall and
Boyd and I would be at that meeting. My staff would have prepared
notes for Lundahl on each photographic briefing board, along with
other pertinent collateral information. Notes on operational matters,
such as the number of missions to be flown, the weather, etc., would
have been prepared by Dutch Scheufele.
Various film processing sites also
worked around the clock during the crisis. Navy and Air Force jet
transports shuttled exposed film from the U2 missions to the
airfields nearest to the processing sites, and the processed film was
expected, similarly, to Washington and the Center for exploitation.
Eastman Kodak also went into shift operations to meet the increased
demand for aerial photographic film. Camera manufacturers were
alerted, and their best technicians, along with truckloads of spare
parts, were sent to Orlando, MacDill and Boca Chica to make sure that
cameras were maintained and functioned properly. Additional Lockheed
U2 technicians and maintenance personnel were dispatched to Orlando
to keep the U2s flying.
The EXCOM met several times in
George Ball’s State Department conference room on October
17…President Kennedy brought General Maxwell Taylor to the White
House as a military consultant to the president after the Bay of
Pigs…It was in Taylor’s office, room 303 in the Executive
Office Building that the powerful 303 Committee met and reviewed all
covert CIA operations. On the 303 Committee were McNamara, Rusk,
Taylor, and McCone…
Admiral George W. Anderson,
fifty-five, the chief of naval operations,…had been picked by
Kennedy’s first Navy secretary, John Connally, to replace…Arleigh
Burke…
And so a pattern developed.
Photography acquired by U2 missions flown in the morning would be
processed in the afternoon, then analyzed in the late afternoon and
nightly at the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Teams of
photo interpreters working with missile and nuclear experts from
other components of the intelligence community produced situation
summaries that were then disseminated the following morning. To
keep track of information other than photography, a special
situation room was established in the Agency’s Office of Current
Intelligence, at Langley, Virginia. John Hicks, who had
recently returned from a tour of duty in Australia, was placed in
charge and had the responsibility of issuing the CIA daily bulletin.
After being briefed each morning at the Center on the information
generated the previous evening, Lundahl would depart for a briefing
of the United States Intelligence Board, which met each morning at
8 A.M. in the East Building of the Agency, located in the Foggy
Bottom section of Washington.
The USIB was the highest level of all
national intelligence committees, acting as a board of review for all
strategic estimates and current intelligence assessments. The Board
was also cognizant of all clandestine collection efforts…
After Lundahl’s daily briefing of the
USIB, he would proceed to brief the EXCOM. The EXCOM met several
times daily, usually at 10 A.M. and 2 P.M. in the Cabinet Room of the
White House during the early days of the crisis and thereafter in
George Ball’s Conference Room at the State Department…
Whenever McCone thought the president should be informed about items of special significance or whenever the president expressed an interest, Lundahl, usually accompanied by McCone, would proceed to the White House. The president was briefed at least once a day with the aerial photos. At one meeting with the president, McCone raised the question of how and when the photographic evidence should be shown to congressional leaders. The president asked that the full PSALM security directive be sustained….
The Air Defense Command had directed
the large ballistic detection radar at Morristown, New Jersey, and
the space-tracking radar at Laredo, Texas, and Thomasville, Georgia,
be aligned for missile warning from Cuba…
A relatively new and large
air-conditioned classroom at Homestead Air Force Base was selected
to be the Command Center…At the U.S. Army Pictorial Center,
in New York City, Major Robert Vaughn received an order from
headquarters of the U.S. Continental Army Command, at Fort Monroe,
Virginia, to install a closed-circuit television system at the
Florida command site. Vaughn knew such a system was at Fort
Gordon, Georgia, but unfortunately it had been dismantled and
placed in a convoy and was on its way to the Brooke Army Medical
Center, in San Antonio, Texas, for demonstration purposes….Maps
and charts were hung on the wall panels and the latest information on
the Cuban situation was posted. The panels were used to conduct
briefings several times daily. The closed-circuit television system
permitted this data to be transmitted simultaneously to the offices
and conference rooms of admirals and generals newly assigned to the
task group coordinating the response….
President Kennedy once warned McCone,
“If you have a secret, do me a favor - don’t tell Salinger.” …
Salinger had not been told of the missiles being in Cuba by the
president….
A new phase of analysis of the U2
imagery began on October 19 at the Center to determine whether (or
when) the MRBM missile sites in Cuba would become operational.
Criteria were developed by the GMAIC, and the Center applied that
criteria in the analysis of all the imagery being received…
At about one o’clock on that Saturday
afternoon, October 20, word was received at the Center that Robert
Kennedy and Robert McNamara would pay a visit. Some fifteen minutes
later a black limousine rolled up to the entrance of the Center, and
Kennedy, McNamara, Gilpatrick, and McCone stepped out. They were
quickly ushered to the seventh floor of the Center, where photo
interpreters were exploiting the latest U2 photography.
The first concern of the four important
visitors appeared to be the certainty of our identification of the
newly discovered IRBM sites…Lundahl invited the visitors to view
the missile sites at light tables fitted with stereoscopic viewers.
The four visitors took turns at the light tables, while photo
interpreters pointed out details of what they were seeing…At this
point, Air Force brigadier general Robert N. Smith arrived at
the Center. General Smith, director of intelligence of the Strategic
Air Command, was an old friend of Lundahl,. He brought with him the
latest U2 photography that had been processed by the Strategic Air
Command’s 544 Reconnaissance Tactical Wing at Omaha. It was not
unusual for high ranking officers to accompany such film shipments
inasmuch as the photography was extremely sensitive from a security
standpoint. Escorting mission film to the Center also afforded
field-command officers an opportunity to view the latest photography
firsthand, with immediate access to the most recent intelligence
derived in Washington….
…Finally McCone asked Bobby and
McNamara if they were satisfied with what they had seen. Both replied
in the affirmative. Bobby then asked the interpreters if they were
getting enough sleep. Lundahl interrupted, stating that the Center
was working on a two-shift basis and would continue to operate that
way. Bobby then moved around the room shaking the hands and
encouraging everyone to keep up the good work.
The unannounced purpose of the visit to
the Center was to confirm details of the findings to help draft a
televised address to the nation by the president and for an important
meeting to be held at the White House…in the Yellow Oval room….The
president walked into the room and said with a wry smile, “Gentlemen,
today we’re going to earn our pay.” He then waved to McCone to
begin the meeting. McCone gave Cline the task of summarizing…When
Lundahl took over, he first made sure the president in particular,
had a clear view of the easel….When Lundahl finished he turned to
the president and said, “Mr. President, gentlemen, this summarizes
the totality of the missile and other threats as we’ve bee able to
determine it form aerial photography…”
The president was on his feet the
moment Lundahl finished. He crossed the room directly towards Lundahl
and said, “I want you to extend to your organization my gratitude
for a job very well done.” Lundahl, rather embarrassed, hesitantly
thanked the president. The president then extended his hand and
smiled. Lundahl was again surprised.
At 4 P.M. the president was scheduled
to meet with his cabinet. When McCone asked if the president would
like to have the cabinet briefed by him and Lundahl, the president
said no. Mr. McCone also wondered if the president would like to show
the cabinet members some of the aerial photos of Cuba. The president
replied, “No, it just might confuse the issues.”….
The president had summoned
congressional leaders to Washington from various parts of the country
to apraise them of the Cuban situation…Hale Boggs, the Democratic
whip, was deep-sea fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. An Air Force plane,
after making several warning passes over the boat, dropped a plastic
message bottle. The message: “Call Washington – urgent message
from the president.” …Boggs was helicoptered to an airfield,
where a two-seat jet trainer was waiting…He was flown to Andrews
Air Force Base, near Washington and was helicoptered from their to
the White House lawn, “still smelling of fish…”
At 5 P.M. that Monday afternoon,
President Kennedy waited for the congressional leaders in the Cabinet
Room…All chairs were occupied and people were standing several deep
along the walls. The doors were closed. The president apologized for
the inconvenience he had caused the legislators by interrupting their
campaigns. He said, however, that the nation was facing an
international emergency – offensive missiles…in Cuba. Mr. McCone
and his briefer would provide the details….He then turned the
meeting over to McCone. Mr. McCone made a short statement summarizing
the finds that had been presented to the National Security Council
earlier in the afternoon, and asked Lundahl to show the telltale
photographs.
As Lundahl began to unfold the pictures
of MRBM and IRBM launch sites and their targets, an incredible hush
settled over the room….When Lundahl finished his presentation, he
felt as if everyone was looking at him “as though I were holding a
cobra rather than a pointer n my right hand.” The enormity of the
threat was being seen and heard for the first time by the congressmen
and senators and they were obviously surprised and angered. Attention
then shifted to the president. A great buzzing arose among the
group….
At 7 P.M. Washington time on October
23, the Pentagon placed the entire U.S. military establishment on
Defcon 3 (defense condition), an increased state of alert. The
greatest mobilization since World War II was underway. SAC B-47
bombers were dispursed according to plan…The first Crusader, No.
923, landed at the naval air station at Jacksonville and taxied to
the front line. When the aircraft stopped, there was an immediate
flurry of activity as photographer mates unloaded the film magazines
and rushed to the nearby Fleet Air Photo Laboratory. The activity
inside the lab was just as intense as that on the flight line. The
film was placed in the processors and within minutes the first
negatives were finished… “Run the duplicate positives and let’s
get them to Washington.”
…As the flight crews were busy
fueling and preparing the aircraft for another mission and
photographer mates were reloading the cameras, a young enlisted man
on the flight line decided that each mission should be recorded on
the side of the aircraft. He made a stencil depicting a dead hanging
chicken, the chicken an obvious reference to Castro’s chicken
episode at the UN and Washington. (Castro and his entourage cooked
chicken in their hotel rooms, much to the consternation and disgust
of hotel managers.) He began stenciling them on the side of each
aircraft. It became a ritual for the pilot when he opened the canopy
after each mission to call out, “Chalk up another chicken.”
[Kelly notes: There is also a logo
patch for one of the photo recon outfits that has a role of film
wrapped around the head of a chicken].
The Joint Chiefs wanted a firsthand
report of the mission and Commander Ecker was ordered to fly to
Washington. He landed at Andrews Air Force Base and, still in his
flying suit, was rushed to the Pentagon….The Joint Chiefs queried
the commander about the mission and asked if any anti-aircraft fire
had been seen. Ecker proudly reported that the mission was, “a
piece of cake.” The low-altitude photography added a new dimension
to NPIC reporting….
On the afternoon of October 26, the FBI
reported that the Soviets were burning their archives not only at the
Washington embassy, tub also at the Soviet UN enclave at Glen Cove,
Long Island. The burning of sensitive files is normally the last
diplomatic act in preparation for war…If nuclear war became a
distinct possibility, the Office of Emergency Management had
formulated plans for the evacuation of the president from Washington.
The coordinater within the White House staff for preparing such a
move was General Chester V. “Ted” Clifton, the president’s
military advisor. However, there appeared to be some conflict in
responsibilities, because Secret Service chief Jim Rowley also
was checking out details of his own plan for the evacuation of the
president…
Luncahl arrived at the Steuart Building
early on the morning of October 27. There was much work to be done.
At the usual morning staff briefing he was shocked when told that all
twenty-four MRBM sites in Cuba were now considered fully
operational….
As the governors were assembling at the
Pentagopn on the morning of October 27, Lundahl spent a few minutes
with us before he went into his office and rehearsed in his mind what
photography he was going to show them and what he was going to say.
This would be the first time that most of these distinguished men
would be exposed to serial reconnaissance, and Lundahl felt the
briefing should be a “tutorial.” McCone called for Lundahl at the
Center in his personal car. One the way to the Pentagon, McCone
informed Lundahl that he would personally conduct the briefing. He
wanted to impress the governors with both his and the president’s
creditilblty…At 8:40 A.M. McCone began his briefing…Following
McCone’s presentation, Roswell Gilpatrick briefed the governors n
the state of U.S. military prepardness…Following the Pentagon
briefings, the governors were driven to the White House to meet with
the president…Lundahal and McCone had hurried from the governors’
meeting to the EXCOM, which met, as usual, at 10 A.M….
…U Thant…saying his military
advisor, Indian brigadier Indar JiT Rikhye, would supply the
details. William Tidwell, a CIA expert in aerial reconnaissance
and a military reserve officer, was sent to New York to seek
carification from Brigadier Rikhye. But if U Thant was confused,
Rikhye was completely out of touch with reality. A short, stocky
Punjabi with a deceptive smile, Rikhye’s first service with the UN
was as a colonel commanding an Indian unit in the Gaza Strip during
the Middle East cease fire of 1957. He had helped organize the UN
force sent to the Congo in 1960-61 and, in 1962, had worked to
supervise the peacekeeping force in Neartherlands New Guinea. During
World War II, as a major, he commanded an armor unit of the famed
Bengal lancers in General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army. Tidwell soon
determined Rikhye…knew absolutely nothing about Soviet MRBM and
IRBM sites. He had no plans…
[BK notes: Ruth Forbes Paine Young
(Michael Paine’s mother), and other World Federalists worked
closely with Gen. Rikhye at the UN on a number of projects.]
…Throughout the crisis, Lundahl had
alerted his staff to post him of any evidence of comic relief
observed on the photography. President Eisenhower had appreciated a
number of humorous briefing boards prepared during critical
situations. Lundahl felt President Kennedy would also welcome a
litter humor in this situation. President Kennedy, himself adept at
clear, concise usage of the English language, particularly disliked
anything smacking of military jargon. On several occasions during the
crisis he had shown a certain displeasure with daily intelligence
reports referring to the number of missile launch positions
“occupied” and “unoccupied.” He felt that, somehow, there
must be a better way to describe how many of the four launch
positions at each of the missile sites had missile launchers on them.
McCone had struggled unsuccessfully to find appropriate terms of
clarification throughout the crisis…At that point, a U.S.
reconnaissance plane flying very low over a military camp happened to
photograph a soldier using an open “three hole” latrine. We
produced a briefing board from the photograph, and Lundahl showed it
to McCone and included it in the White House briefing package.
Lundahl finished his routine briefing of the president and McCone
asked if the president would like to see a new three position
military site discovered in Cuba, with one position occupied. The
president’s face froze momentarily, since he was aware that each of
the missile sties in Cuba had four positions rather than three. As
the president studied the photo, there came first a smile and then a
booming laugh. When he finally stopped, he asked, “Why didn’t I
have this earlier? Now I understand the occupied and unoccupied
problem perfectly.
The president was generous with his
thanks and praise….McCone was the first to recognize the work of
the National Photographic Interpretation Center with a formal memo of
commendation on November 2, 1962….On November 8, 1962, the
president sent the following letter to Lundahl: “While I would like
to make public the truly outstanding accomplishments of the National
Photographic Interpretation Center, I realize that the anonymity of
an organization of your high professional competence in the
intelligence field must be maintained.
“I do want you and your people to
know of my very deep appreciation for the tremendous task you are
performing under most trying circumstances. The analysis and
interpretation of the Cuban photography and the reporting of your
findings promptly and succinctly to me and to my principal policy
advisors, most particularly the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense, has been exemplary.You have my thanks and the thanks of
your government for a very remarkable performance of duty and my
personal commendation goes to all of you.”
John F. Kennedy
John F. Kennedy
…President Kennedy decided the
American people should be briefed on the photographic evidence…The
president preferred that Lundahl handle the report to the nation, but
McCone was reluctant to surface Lundahl and the National Photographic
Interpretation Center. Lundahl recommended that John Hughes,
who had been outstanding in his service at the National Photographic
Interpretation Center as an Army lieutenant and became special
assistant to General Joseph Carroll, director of the Defense
Intelligence Agnecy, conduct the public briefing. NPIC supported
Hughes in preparing the briefing…on nationwide TV. The presentation
did much to allay the fears of the American public, but some
intelligence specialists questioned whether too much had been
revealed…
…The president would be dead
before the 1964 election and Bobby before that of 1968… McCone
found Lyndon Johnson colorless and crude in intelligence matters and,
as president, clumsy and heavy-handed in international affairs.
Instead of personally carefully considering prepared intelligence
memorandums on intelligence matters, he preferred to be briefed by
trusted advisors. Increasingly, the president sought intelligence
information almost exclusively from Secretary McNamara and the
Defense Department. McCone’s advice simply was no longer
actively sought by the president. His role diminished, his
influence faded, and the ready access he had enjoyed during the
Kennedy administration became very limited…President Johnson
replaced McCone with a fellow Texan, retired U.S. Navy vice-admiral
William F. Raborn, Jr. The admiral had played an important role
in development of the Polaris missile system, but had no experience
in intelligence, which soon became apparent to CIA veterans….
Of all the awards and honors Lundahl
achieved, one he seldom displays reflects most appropriately his
contributions to this nation. It is an autographed photograph of
Allen Dulles and himself, which reads: “Art Lundahl has done as
much to protect the security of this nation as any man I know. Allen
W. Dulles.”
Sidney
Graybeal
SG:
Well, when the mission flew on the fifteenth of October and provided
the photographs, they came into the National Photo Interpretation
Center at around four, five o'clock in the afternoon. The photo
interpreters started looking at these pictures and one of my branch
chiefs was there and when he looked at 'em, he called me on the phone
and said, we have something very hot, you'd better come down here
immediately. So I went to the Photo Interpretation Center. When I got
there, the photo interpreters laid out the photographs of these
canvas-covered objects. There was no question in my mind that we had
offensive missiles in Cuba. The question was, what type of offensive
missile is this and they could give very precise measurements of the
length of this canvas-covered object. Now if this were a missile
without its nose cone - you see nose cones are normally mated later -
then it would be one type of missile, but if the nose cone was on, it
would be a different one. So essentially, that measurement said if
this is a complete missile with the nose cone, it would be an SS-3, a
relatively short-range missile. If the nose cone is not on, it would
be an SS-4, which is an eleven hundred-mile range missile. Now,
knowing from Penkovsky and others that the nose cone is normally not
mated, it was my judgment that this was an SS-4 and then if you look
at a map, an SS-4 with a thousand, eleven hundred mile range can
reach Washington and so my view was if the Soviets are going to
deploy offensive missiles into Cuba, they would not deploy something
that could only hit the southern part of the US when they had a
missile that could hit Washington and that would be a real deterrent.
So my judgment immediately was that this is an SS-4 missile, even
though we didn't actually see the missile, we saw a canvas-covered
object and we could see the erector that went with it and we could
see all the information that we thought unambiguous, that we had an
offensive missile and working with the PI's and looking at the range
and looking at the data we had from Penkovsky, and looking at the
data from the Moscow parades, where we had pictures of the missiles,
we discerned that this was an SS-4 and that's when I advised my boss
that night.
SG:
Well, you're doing an evaluation of a ballistic missile's
capabilities, specifically the missiles that we saw on photography in
Cuba, it's like putting together a jigsaw puzzle. You have a piece of
information here that comes from human sources that tells you about
it, of which Penkovsky was clearly a critical aspect on the manuals
and how these missiles operate. You had photographic information,
both of missiles in the parade in Moscow, but photographic
information of the test range where these missiles had been tested.
You had telemetry information which told you the characteristics of
the missile, that it was a liquid fuel missile, how you would have to
operate the missile, so these combined, give you a sufficiently clear
picture that when we looked at the missiles in Cuba and when we get
the question about how will they operate, how long will they operate,
all the things that were asked during that first Ex-Comm committee
meeting, it was a combination of intelligence sources put together by
intelligence analysts, including the photo interpreters and the
missile experts, which gave you an understanding to be able to, one,
identify the missile, two, determine its characteristics, it carries
a three thousand pound payload which could be two megaton warhead on
the front end of the missile, so all of these things fit together
which an intelligence officer uses to provide the conclusions.
SG:
There is no question in my mind that finding offensive missiles in
Cuba was an extremely important, startling development here within
the US government, because it put a whole new perspective on the
threat to the continent of the United States when the ICBM program in
the Soviet Union was small, but here you're putting in ballistic
missiles with range sufficient to hit a good part of the United
States, so you have essentially doubled your capabilities of the
Soviet Union to threaten the US. So as soon as we saw these were
ballistic missiles, I knew we had something that was critically
important process, but you don't panic in these type of situations,
because you have to deal with facts and as an intelligence officer
you recognize sometimes you will be wrong. But now you've got hard
facts, so now you have to deal with these. These were provided to the
DDI, which at the time Deputy Director for Intelligence was Ray Cline
and he knew it was extremely important. The word was being passed
that night to various senior officials. The next day when I went to
the White House with Art Lundahl to brief McGeorge Bundy, McGeorge
Bundy knew exactly that this was extremely serious. There was no
laugh, there was no joking about anything to do with this situation.
McGeorge Bundy wanted to know the facts, are you sure these are
missiles? Yes, we're absolutely sure these are missiles. Are you sure
of the type of missile? Yes, we know the type of missile this is,
what we don't know is the operational status of these missiles right
now. Dillon came in, Dillon took it extremely seriously, no joking,
left. Bobby Kennedy clearly knew that this was a major because Bobby
Kennedy had been the person dealing with Dobrynin and others who were
assuring the President there will be no offensive missiles in Cuba.
So Bobby Kennedy's view immediately was they'd been lying to us. I
mean, so immediately he understood the significance and he took off
to go upstairs to speak to the President about the situation….
SG:
Well, after we had identified the missiles in Cuba and reported these
to the senior officials, we met with the Deputy Director of
Intelligence at about seven o'clock in the morning, the next morning,
and we prepared a three paragraph introduction to the subject which
General Carter, who was acting Director of CIA because McCone was on
the West Coast, for him to give at the Ex-Comm committee that meeting
that morning. Art Lundahl, the Director of the Photographic
Interpretation Center, and Sidney Graybeal, myself, were sent to the
White House with our briefing boards of the missiles in Cuba to brief
McGeorge Bundy, the head of the National Security staff, so we went
to the White House, we laid out the pictures, the briefing from
McGeorge Bundy. Dillon came in and we gave the same briefing to
Dillon. Bobby Kennedy came in, we gave the same briefing to Bobby
Kennedy and he took off to go upstairs to the personal quarters of
President Kennedy to tell him. We stayed in the White House all
morning until the first Ex-Comm committee meeting took place at
around eleven o'clock and then we all went into the Cabinet Room and
we waited for the President. The President came in, good morning
gentlemen, sat down and a side light, which is kind of interesting to
me personally, is the door that the President had come through all of
a sudden burst open and Caroline Kennedy came in and essentially
said, Daddy, Daddy, they won't let my friend in. The President got
up, went over, put his arm around her, took her out of the room, came
back within a minute and says, gentlemen, I think we should proceed.
The meeting started. What transpired at the meeting is General Carter
read the three paragraphs, essentially what was the status, suggested
the President should look at the evidence. Art Lundahl, head of the
NPA, had these very large briefing boards which he laid on the table
in front of President Kennedy, McNamara on the right, Rusk on the
other side, so the three of 'em could see them and Lundahl said this
is Cuba, this is San Forego , so forth. Then he mentioned, these are
offensive ballistic missiles and he specifically pointed to them on
the chart. The first question the President asked was, how long
before they can fire those missiles? And Art Lundahl said, well, Mr.
Graybeal is the missile expert. So he turned to me, I stood up behind
the President, McNamara and Rusk and for the next probably five to
ten minutes fired one question after the other. In answer to the
President's question, how long can they fire these missiles, I relied
primarily on the combination of intelligence sources….
The
Ex-Comm committee meeting we had that morning was all business after
the little... well there was all business in the sense that the
President was extremely serious, he wanted to get the facts His first
question clearly was how long before they can fire those missiles,
'cos he knew I've got an extremely serious situation here. These are
offensive missiles threatening the United States. How much time do I
have to act. And of course, as developed later, during those Ex-Comm
meetings, do we go in and take them out? How do we get them out of
there and there's a whole litany of debates within Ex-Comm which
very, very well reported in various other publications. So the
meeting was serious, the people were serious, the President wanted to
know how much time he had, McNamara wanted to know where were the
nuclear warheads. Rusk was worried about the political implications,
what exactly had taken place here, what had they said to us, what did
you say in your last speech Mr. President. So there was a whole
variety of very good exchanges that took place.
Now
Lundahl and I were excused from that first meeting after we had
presented the facts, after we had answered all the questions that
they asked about the operational characteristics of the missiles. So
I was not present during the time where they started debating what do
we do and if you want to get a good record of that get the book The
Kennedy Tapes which has got an excellent description of what
transpired in all of those meetings….
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