Sunday, August 12, 2012

Higgins Memo Re: CIA Briefing of JCS;relPageId=5


25 September 1963


Subject: Briefing by Mr. Desmond FitzGerald on
CIA Cuban Operations and Planning

• 1. At the JCS meeting at 1400 on 25 September, Mr. Desmond FitzGerald briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• 2. Except for General Taylor and Admiral McDonald, the Joint Chiefs were present, as were the Directors and Secretariat. Colonel Higgins from SACSA was the only other officer in attendance.

• 3. General LeMay opened the meeting by referring to papers recently discussed by the Joint Chiefs on policy and actions concerning military support of the CIA for operations against Cuba. General LeMay expressed the JCS position as had been reflected in the memoranda to Mr. Vance which in effect is that the Joint Chiefs do not believe that the operations to date are of a size and importance enough to justify the use of military support for protection.

• 4. Mr. FitzGerald then discussed his personal feelings as to changed conditions in Cuba. Essentially, he believes that Castro's hold in Cuba has been seriously weakened since last July. He believes that the minor raids conducted by the CIA have contributed to this deterioration in Castro's influence and stability. He is firmly convinced that Castro will fall at some future, not too distant, date, and that such actions as the CIA are conducting, as well as those of exiles, are contributing to unrest and unsettlement.

• 5. Mr. FitzGerald, in commenting upon criteria as to when the military support should be provided, offered the following. The greatest danger from his point of view is that the mother ships may be captured rather than be sunk. This will result in the capture of crewmen who have too much information and which could result in dangerous publicity for the United States. The location of these raids contributes to the possibility of capture. Hence, only when the raids are conducted in the more vulnerable areas from that point of view, is it likely that the CIA will request military support. He further stated that CIA has no intention of requesting aid for the coming raid.

• 6. General LeMay questioned the danger of capture in view of the capabilities of Cubans and ridiculed the idea that small motor boats should have the capability of such a ship.

• 7. General LeMay and others gave opinions concerning such technicalities as the capability of radar both on land and in the air, capability of ship radar of the U.S. and Cuba, the speed of the mother ship, which was cited as 10 to 12 knots, and other related items.

• 8. Mr. FitzGerald made much of the Cuban volatile nature. He cited that many Cubans are now walking with their heads up and alert because of the realization that there are possibilities of raids and other outside supports, such as the light aircraft raids. He voiced the opinion that Castro would probably take desperate measures as his situation further deteriorates and would turn to creating revolutions in Latin America. He stated that even though his operations may be considered only minor, he thought they were doing about as much as could be done under the present policies. One of his problems was that he felt there was only a total of 50 logical targets and if he conducted as many as 10 raids a month, he would be unable to sustain the build-up of Cuban hopes. He further stated that there were times when certain types of raids were more favorable than others; for instance, on sugar centrals.

• 9. In responding to the question concerning the non-attributality of U.S. equipment, he stated that all equipment they use could be bought on the open market in many countries, even though it was of American origin. He stated that intelligence was not as good yet as they would like to have; however, they are having greater success in having agents enter and depart Cuba.

• 10. General Wheeler injected that he sympathizes with such planners as Mr. FitzGerald because he realizes that many good ideas are never accepted by the cautious policy makers. However, Mr. FitzGerald reported that he believes he had a clearer go-ahead on these operations than he has ever had in his past experience.

• 11. Mr. FitzGerald said that over the next two or three months his plans include critical targets of three classes: electrical systems, sugar centrals, and oil. He cited that electrical systems, although a top priority and a key to the economy, were very difficult targets. The sugar centrals were only of a seasonal nature because unless hit at the peak season, they could be repaired without difficulty or loss of time. In regard to oil, the refineries are most important but were also toughest to hit.

• 12. In response to a comment by General Shoup regarding the sabotage of mines Mr. FitzGerald said there had been a recent case of internal sabotage in a mine. He then explained how the success of his operations can only be measured when internal sabotage is increased. In response to a question, he admitted that there was not any coordination as yet with the internal sabotage program.

• 13. He commented that there was nothing new in the propaganda field. However, he felt that there had been great success in getting closer to the military personnel who might break with Castro, and stated that there were at least ten high-level military personnel who are talking with CIA but as yet are not talking to each other, since that degree of confidence has not yet developed. He considers it as a parallel in history; i.e., the plot to kill Hitler; and this plot is being studied in detail to develop an approach.

• 14. General LeMay then questioned the advisability of utilizing a communication technique to install a radio capability which would permit break-in on Castro broadcasts. He stated that an Air Force officer named McElroy was available to talk to Mr. FitzGerald on the matter, and Mr. FitzGerald accepted this offer.

• 15. The conference closed with General LeMay directing that Mr. FitzGerald's planners meet with General Krulak's people and work out the details as to how the military can assist in supporting these operations. After Mr. FitzGerald departed, General LeMay gave added directions to Colonel Higgins to initiate necessary steps for planning.

• 16. After the JCS meeting Admiral Riley called Colonel Higgins into his office and read a letter from Mr. McGeorge Bundy which discussed secrecy measures necessary related to Cuba CIA operations. Admiral Riley directed Colonel Higgins to have the nature of this letter put out through SACSA control to SACSA contact points to insure an adequate system for secrecy within the military services. Admiral Riley stated he was returning the letter to Mr. Gilpatric as he did not want written communication by SACSA, but to put this out orally. This was transmitted to Colonel Wyman who will take the action to prepare an appropriate memorandum for the record to be filed with General Ingelido in accordance with further direction by Admiral Riley.

• 17. General Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the Army, called and questioned us concerning SACSA's access for the knowledge of such operations as mentioned in the McGeorge Bundy letter. I advised him that our Pendulum system was in being but that I would look into it in greater detail to determine that it met the letter as well as the spirit of the memorandum. I stated I believed this was so but had not had reason to do it until this date and therefore did not give him a positive answer at that time.

Colonel, USA

 [September 25, 1963 Joint Chiefs of Staff Memo for the Record, Walter Higgins, Briefing by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald on CIA Cuban Operations and Planning, JFK Collection, (JCS Papers, J-3,#29 NARA. Riff202-10001-10028)

[Higgins may have also wrote the Memo for a Aug. 5, 1963 briefing of JCS – Memo by Col. Walter M. Higgins, Jr., Executive Officer, SACSA, briefing of JCS by Fitzgerald, Aug. 5, 1963, box 1, RG 218, JCS Records, JFK Assassination Records Collection (NA);]


Bundy, Security Memo on Covert Cuban Operations; Sept. 24, 1963;relPageId=20



September 23, 1963



SUBJECT: Covert Operations Against Cuba – Security Within the Government

As you know, in August the U.S. Government directed two “exile” raids against targets in Cuba. From the evidence now available, it appears that our security, with respect to U.S. participation in these operations, was excellent.

While there will always be public speculation as to the extent of U.S. involvement in raids of this type, I think we would all agree readily that it is important that there be only speculation and no direct knowledge. Unfortunately, the maintenance of a high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the numbers of people within the Government who have to know a little or much about a U.S. – directed raid against Cuba.

For example, without counting CIA personnel and secretarial and staff personnel of other agencies, there were probably over 20 people in the Executive Branch who knew details of the August raids while many other people were generally acquainted with the U.S. involvement. Among others, the Navy knew where the attack boats were going; the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS knew about the “comings and goings” of the raiders; a few DOD people, who had to procure special equipment for the raids, could presumably surmise that something was going on somewhere and a few intelligence watch officers and press officers were told for their background, that the U.S. Government as aware of the raids.

I think there are two important, if obvious, security lessons we have learned from the August raids - - one, that it is in the nature of the problem that many people probably have to know something about such raids; and two, that these people apparently can maintain adequate security. At the same time, in view of the truth that security leaks were more likely to occur when substantial numbers of persons are involved, it seems essential to me that we constantly convey the high importance of security to others who are privy to information about our covert activities against Cuba. May I ask that members of the Special Group take such steps within their areas of authority as they think appropriate, and may I in particular urge that the Central Intelligence Agency, as executive agent for these enterprises, emphasize the importance of security to all those with whom it has necessary business on these matters, so that we can maintain the high level of security set in these recent operations.

McGeorge Bundy 


DOC 56
1 page


DOD Access List – Cuba Planning

21 October 1963


Chairman's Office
General Taylor
Maj Gen Goodpaster (Husband of Anne Goodpasture of CIA) 
Col Roger
Mr. R. Day
Mr. F. Kearney
Lt. Col Smith

Director's Office
VAdml Riley
Maj Gen Reynolds
Maj Gen Manhart
Col Erwin
Lt Col Hutchins
LCdr Hilton
Maj Dorsey

Secretary's Office
Brig Gen Ingelido
Col Forbes
Capt Law
Miss Ruth Hunter

Maj Gen Krulak
Col Higgins 

Col. Xxxx – Strozier
Capt Eggeman
Col Wyman
Col Hawkins (Wrote Bay of Pigs report) 
Miss Grace Sciacca
Mrs. Carolyn Kercheval
Miss Linda Sadler
Cpl Gould

DOD Executive Agent
For Cuban Affairs
Secretary Vance
Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig 

Miss Myrtle Davis

Adm H. F. Smith
VAdm R.C. Needham
RAdm J.W. Leverton
Capt J.E. Pond
Capt F.E. Hartman
Capt L. A. Kurtz
Lt Col M.A. Foster, USAF
Cmdr F. J. Winkerhieser

Gen. Wheeler
Lt Gen Johnson
Maj Gen Alger
Col Blanchard
Col Bond
Lt Col Baldwin
Lt Col Woolard
Lt Col Garrett
Mrs. Marie Nier
Miss Mary Hnnig

Adm McDonald
VAdm Ward
VAdm Ramidge
RAdm Jackson
RAdm Taylor (Dir. ONI) 
RAdm Stream
Capt Packard
Capt Hatch
LCdr Bublitz
LCdr Saunders
Lt Dahl
Mr. DeMille (CIV)
YNC Hover

Air Force
Gen LeMay 
Lt Gen Burchinal
Maj Gen Carpenter
Maj Gen Worden
Col Van Duyn
Lt Col Christensen
Lt Col Puchrik
Maj Stutzer
Miss Spruill

Marine Corps
Gen Shoup
Lt Gen Hayes
Lt Gen Greene
Maj Gen Buse
Brig Gen xxxx Quilter
Col Simmons
Lt Col Finn

Maj Gen Unger
RAdm Chew
Capt Moody
Capt Turner 

1 comment:

  1. One correction - I don't believe Anne Goodpasture and Andrew Goodpasture were not married. Check obitiuary of Andrew Goodpasture: