A Perspective on the JFK Case
Appeasement and Anti-Neo-Colonialism
It is inherently speculative to discuss what foreign
policies JFK might have pursued had he lived longer. However, such
prognostication is not unusual for historians. For example, the different
course that events might have taken had an earlier Johnson not succeeded to the
presidency has prompted substantial discussion of Lincoln ’s
approach to the Reconstruction Era based on his record of statements and his
conduct of political affairs and philosophy prior to his assassination. (See NY
Times book review by Schlesinger of john Newman’s Kennedy and Vietnam .)
In his HSCA hearings, the “Umbrella Man” maintained that his
use of the umbrella at Dealey Plaza
was intended as a political protest. The umbrella was described as a reference
to Nevelle Chamberlain and what was considered a policy of appeasement in the
face of Nazi aggression prior to Churchill’s election as Prime Minister.
Assuming for a moment, that this was the Umbrella Man’s intent, the protest was
remarkably discreet. By comparison, previous Dallas
protesters had simply bashed Adlai Stevenson over the head with a placard.
The “policy of appeasement” argument has been a prominent
part of the political discussion in America
since WWII and has been raised in conjunction not only with Vietnam ,
but previously in relation to Korea
and recently relating to Iraq
and beyone. (See, e.g. The Wages of Appeasement: Ancient Athens, Munich ,
and Obama’s America
by Bruce S. Thornton.)
Indeed, the post-World War II argument about “appeasement”
can be said to have initiated at least as early as Churchill’s Iron Curtain
speech in 1946, which specifically stated:
Our difficulties and
dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be
removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a
policy of appeasement.
In May 2008, former president George W. Bush stated to
Israeli Knesset:
Some seem to believe we should negotiate with terrorists and
radicals, as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong
all along. We have heard this foolish delusion before as Nazi tanks crossed
into Poland in
1939, an American senator declared: “Lord, if only I could have talked to
Hitler, all of this might have been avoided.” We have an obligation to call
this what it is: the false comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly
discredited by history.
If the Umbrella Man’s protest was indeed a reference to
Chamberlain, it was a remarkably subtle gesture that made direct reference to
JFK’s father’s stance in the period before England ’s
entry into World War II, a posture which led to Joseph P. Kennedy’s dismissal
as ambassador to Britain
by FDR in October 1940. (See, e.g., Citizens of London by Lynn Olson. 2011 for
scathing assessment of Kennedy, Sr.’s position.)
This record of Joseph P. Kennedy’s historic reluctance to
enjoin with arms the enemies of democracy was no doubt well known to Chief of
Staff of the US Air Force General Curtis LeMay, as well as other Joint Chiefs.
Did LeMay simply consider JFK a coward, unfit to lead
the nation as commander-in-chief? Ro LeMay, JFK may well have been considered
an unqualified former lieutenant who had disgracefully lost his ship when it
was rammed by a Japanese destroyer. The fact that Kennedy’s administration was
succeeding that of the former five star general who led the allied forces
against the Nazis would not have been lost on the Pentagon following the Bay
of Pigs disaster and the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as the
political settlement brokered in Laos .
In considering this perspective, Kennedy’s record on the
issue of Algerian independence is relevant. Issues relating to the post-WWII
armistice bore a direct relationship to the question of tensions among factions
denouncing what was referred to as neo-colonialism, the perceived need to
combat the spread of Communism, and the policy of containment.
During the period of the late-1950s, JFK prominently spoke for Algerian independence. (NY Times, July 3, 1957.) He was labeled a leader of the anti-neocolonialist forces in the Senate, (J.F.K.: the Man and the Myth, Victor Lasky, 1963.)
Of interest to researchers would be documentation of General
LeMay’s reaction to the political solution of the Kennedy administration in Laos
preceding the emerging crisis in Vietnam .
Generally, he considered the approach of succeeding presidents Johnson and
Nixon insufficiently aggressive, which contributed to his decision to run on
the Wallace ticket.
JFK’s approach to the aftermath of the Bay of
Pigs , and the reaction of the hawkish elements in the Pentagon to
the Cuban Missile Crisis, provide additional context to the political
atmosphere prior to November 1963. None of this puts a smoking gun into the
hands of the Pentagon, the “intelligence community,” or rogue elements of
various factions, including organized crime and Big Oil interests. (See Robert
Caro, Master of the Senate, pp. 232-303, for an illuminating account of LBJ’s
treatment of Leland Olds.)
Nevertheless, as the 50th anniversary approaches,
the political context of the transition from the Eisenhower administration to
the Kennedy administration, and the attempted passage of the torch to a new
generation that was belayed, are fertile areas for fresh research by a new
generation of scholars who should have all the documents made available for a
frank elucidation of the facts and circumstances leading up to the debacle in
Dallas, as well as of the dubious legacy of the Warren Commission Report.
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