Considering the Application of Able Danger Data Mining techniques to JFK Assassination Research.
Able Danger
Able Danger was a classified military planning
effort led by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It was created as a result of
a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early October 1999
by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton, to develop
an information operations campaign plan against
transnational terrorism.
According to statements by Lt. Col. Anthony
Shaffer and those of four others, Able Danger had identified 2 of 3 al-Qaeda cells
active in the 9/11 attacks; the 'Brooklyn cell' linked to "Blind
Sheik" Omar Abdel-Rahman, including September 11 attacks leader Mohamed
Atta, and three of the 9/11 plot's other 19 hijackers.
In December 2006, a sixteen-month investigation by
the US Senate Intelligence Committee concluded "Able Danger did not
identify Mohamed Atta or any other 9/11 hijacker at any time prior to
September 11, 2001", and dismissed other assertions that have fueled 9/11
conspiracy theories. The Senate Judiciary Committee first attempted to
investigate the matter for the Senate in September, 2005. The Pentagon
"ordered five key witnesses not to testify" according to Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter. "That looks to me as if it may
be obstruction of the committee's activities", Specter, R-Pennsylvania,
said at the start of his committee's hearing into the unit.[1]
Attorney Mark Zaid representing Lt. Colonel
Anthony Shaffer and the other four Able Danger employees at the Senate
Judiciary Committee hearing in September 2005, pointed out to the Committee
that his clients had been forbidden by the Pentagon to testify to the
Committee. He also discussed the Defense Intelligence Agency's decision to
suspend Lt. Colonel Shaffer's security clearance shortly after it became known
that he had provided information to the 9/11 Commission on Able Danger. "Based
on years of experience I can say categorically that the basis for the
revocation was questionable at best."[2] [3]
An investigation by the Defense Department Inspector
General's office (IG) in September 2006 concluded that "the evidence did
not support assertions that Able Danger identified the September 11, 2001,
terrorists nearly a year before the attack, that Able Danger team members were
prohibited from sharing information with law enforcement authorities, or that
DoD officials acted against LTC Shaffer for his disclosures regarding Able
Danger." However, some of the people questioned by the IG claimed their
statements to the IG were distorted by investigators in the final IG's report,
and the report omitted essential information that they had provided. Lt. Col
Tony Shaffer has claimed that the DOD retaliated against him for speaking out
publicly about the IG report's distortions.[4]
The Senate panel of investigators said there was no
evidence DoD lawyers stopped analysts from sharing findings with the FBI before
the attacks. Analysts had created charts that included pictures of then-known
Al Qaeda operatives, but none including Atta. A follow-up chart made after the
attacks did show Atta. The Senate Committee said its findings were consistent
with those of the DoD inspector general, released in September 2006. [5] [6]
Overview
The program used data mining techniques to
associate open source information with classified information in an attempt to
make connections among individual members of terrorist groups as part of its
original "intelligence preparation of the battlespace". The objective
of this particular project was to ascertain whether the data mining techniques
and open source material were effective tools in determining terrorist
activities, and if the resultant data could be used to create operational plans
that could be executed in a timely fashion to interrupt, capture and/or destroy
terrorists or their cells.[7][8]
According to statements by Lt. Col. Anthony
Shaffer and those of four others, Able Danger had identified 2 of 3 Al
Qaeda cells active in the 9/11 attacks; the 'Brooklyn cell' linked to Blind
Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, including September 11 attacks leader Mohamed
Atta, and three of the 9/11 plot's other 19 hijackers, as possible members of
an al Qaeda cell linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.[9]
This theory was heavily investigated and researched
by Republican Representative Curt Weldon, vice chairman of the House
Armed Services and House Homeland Security committees. However, Defense
Intelligence Agency leadership had already ordered the hurried destruction
of mined data, source databases, charts and resultant documents on entirely
spurious legal grounds. DIA also prevented key personnel from testifying to
both the Senate Judiciary and Senate Intelligence Committees, though after
numerous denials did admit the program's existence.[10]
In December 2006, an investigation by the US Senate
Intelligence Committee concluded that assertions could not be confirmed. It
stated that they were unable to find supporting evidence regarding "one of
the most disturbing claims about the Sept. 11 terrorist strikes."[5] This
report released by the Senate Intelligence Committee copied, nearly verbatim,
the United States Department of Defense Inspector General's September 2006
report on Able Danger.
Assertion that Able Danger identified 9/11 hijackers
The existence of Able Danger, and its purported
early identification of the 9/11 terrorists, was first disclosed publicly on
June 19, 2005, in an article[11] by Keith
Phucas, a reporter for The Times Herald, a Norristown, Pennsylvania,
daily newspaper. Eight days later, on June 27, 2005, Representative Curt
Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services and House Homeland
Security committees and the principal source for the Phucas article, gave
a special orders speech on the House floor detailing Able Danger:
Mr. Speaker, I rise because information has come to
my attention over the past several months that is very disturbing. I have
learned that, in fact, one of our Federal agencies had, in fact, identified the
major New York cell of Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11; and I have
learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September 2000, that Federal agency actually was
prepared to bring the FBI in and prepared to work with the FBI to take
down the cell that Mohamed Atta was involved in in New York City, along
with two of the other terrorists. I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that when
that recommendation was discussed within that Federal agency, the lawyers in
the administration at that time said, you cannot pursue contact with the FBI
against that cell. Mohamed Atta is in the U.S. on a green card, and we are
fearful of the fallout from the Waco incident. So we did not allow that
Federal agency to proceed.[12]
Rep. Weldon later reiterated these concerns during
news conferences on February 14, 2006. He believed that Able Danger identified
Mohamed Atta 13 separate times prior to 9/11 and that the unit also identified
a potential situation in Yemen two weeks prior to the October 12,
2000 attack on the USS Cole.[13] The
Pentagon released a statement in response, stating that they wished to address
these issues during a congressional hearing before a House Armed Services
subcommittee scheduled for Wednesday, February 15, 2006.
Able Danger and the 9/11 Commission
Curt Weldon's assertion that Able Danger identified
the 9/11 hijackers was picked up by the national media in August 2005, after it
was reported in the bimonthly Government Security News [14] In
addition to asserting that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers and was
prevented from passing that information onto the FBI, Weldon also alleged the
intelligence concerning Able Danger was provided to the 9/11 Commission and
ignored.[15] Two
9/11 Commission members, Timothy J. Roemer and John F. Lehman,
both claimed not to have received any information on Able Danger.[14]
Following the GSN report, members of the
9/11 Commission began commenting on the information they had on Able Danger and
Atta. Lee H. Hamilton, former Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission, and Al
Felzenberg, a former spokesman for the 9/11 Commission,[16] both
denied that the 9/11 Commission had any information on the identification of
Mohamed Atta prior to the attacks.[17] Hamilton
told the media, "The Sept. 11 commission did not learn of any U.S.
government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohamed Atta or of his
cell.... Had we learned of it obviously it would've been a major focus of our
investigation."[18]
On August 12, 2005, Hamilton and former 9/11
Commission chairman Thomas Kean issued a statement in response to
media inquiries about the Commission's investigation of the Able Danger
program.[19]It
stated the Commission had been aware of the Able Danger program, and requested
and obtained information about it from the Department of Defense, but none of
the information provided had indicated the program had identified Atta or other
9/11 hijackers. They further stated that a claim about Atta having been
identified prior to the attacks had been made to the 9/11 Commission on July
12, 2004 (just days before the Commission's report was released), by a United
States Navy officer employed at DOD, but that
The interviewee had no documentary evidence and said
he had only seen the document briefly some years earlier. He could not describe
what information had led to this supposed Atta identification. Nor could the
interviewee recall, when questioned, any details about how he thought a link to
Atta could have been made by this DOD program in 2000 or any time before 9/11.
The Department of Defense documents had mentioned nothing about Atta, nor had
anyone come forward between September 2001 and July 2004 with any similar
information. Weighing this with the information about Atta's actual activities,
the negligible information available about Atta to other U.S. government
agencies and the German government before 9/11, and the interviewer's
assessment of the interviewee's knowledge and credibility, the Commission staff
concluded that the officer's account was not sufficiently reliable to warrant
revision of the report or further investigation.[19]
Congressman Curt Weldon issued a response
to the 9/11 Commission[20] clarifying
the mission of Able Danger, expressing concern over the statements made by
various members of the 9/11 Commission, and promising to push forward until it
is understood why the DoD was unable to pass the information uncovered by Able
Danger to the FBI, and why the 9/11 Commission failed to follow up on the
information they were given on Able Danger.
The 9/11 Commission has released multiple statements
over the past week, each of which has significantly changed – from initially
denying ever being briefed to acknowledging being briefed on both operation
ABLE DANGER and Mohamed Atta. The information was omitted primarily because
they found it to be suspect despite having been briefed on it two times by two
different military officers on active duty. Additionally, the 9/11 Commission
also received documents from the Department of Defense on ABLE DANGER.[20]
Congressman Weldon reiterated these statements in
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 21,
2005.[21]
Able Danger data destroyed
In his book Countdown to Terror, Weldon
asserted that an Able Danger chart produced in 1999 identifying 9/11 hijackers Mohamed
Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf
al-Hazmi had been presented to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Jim
Steinberg. Weldon went on to claim that he had personally presented the chart
to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley in 2001, days
after the 9/11 attacks.[22]
He later stated that he was no longer sure that
Atta's name appeared on that document.[23]
Congressman Peter Hoekstra, who was then
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, investigated the matter at
Weldon's request, was reported to have cautioned against
"hyperventilating" before the completion of a "thorough"
probe. Pentagon officials said they were unaware that any Able Danger material
named Atta. They declined to comment on the reports as they worked to clarify
the matter.[23]
On August 14, 2005, Mike Kelly, a columnist
for The (Bergen) Record (New Jersey), described a telephone interview,
arranged by the staff of Rep. Curt Weldon, with a man who identified
himself as a member of the Able Danger team, but asked that his name not be
revealed. In the interview, the man claimed his team had identified Mohamed
Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers as likely Al-Qaeda terrorists operating in
the United States, but were prevented from passing this information on to the
FBI by government lawyers. He also claimed he was ignored by the 9/11
Commission's staff when he approached them on two occasions to explain Able
Danger's work.[24]
On September 15, 2005, Weldon asserted that he had
identified an employee who had been ordered to destroy the 2.5 terabytes (TB)
of data collected by Able Danger two years before the 9/11 attack.[25]
Weldon changes his story
A Time magazine article dated August 14,
2005, reports that Weldon admitted he is no longer sure that Atta's name was on
the chart he presented to Hadley and that he was unable to verify whether this
was the case, having handed over his only copy, and that a reconstruction was
used for post-9/11 presentations.
26] Weldon
gave a talk at the Heritage Foundation with a chart he described as
the one handed over on May 23, 2002. However, a week later he referred
reporters to a recently reconstructed version of the chart in his office where,
among dozens of names and photos of terrorists from around the world, there was
a color mug shot of Mohammad Atta, circled in black marker.
Comments by members of the Able Danger team
Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer
After Weldon's assertions were disputed, Lt.
Col. Anthony Shaffer, a member of the Able Danger team, identified himself as
Weldon's source. Shaffer claimed that he alerted the FBI in September 2000
about the information uncovered by the secret military unit "Able
Danger", but he alleges three meetings he set up with bureau officials
were blocked by military lawyers. Shaffer, who at the time worked for the Defense
Intelligence Agency, claims he communicated to members of the 9/11
Commission that Able Danger had identified two of the three cells
responsible for 9/11 prior to the attacks, but the Commission did not include
this information in their final report.[27]
Shaffer specifically states that in January 2000,
Able Danger data-mining revealed the existence of a 'Brooklyn' Al-Qaeda cell
connected to the "Blind Sheik" Omar Abdel-Rahman, as well as two
other cells overseas. Shaffer & Philpott examined this chart of Al Qaeda
suspected operatives, containing names & photos, and Philpott pointed out
one particular sinister and "scary looking dude" -- Mohammed
Atta.[9]
Shaffer's lawyer, Mark Zaid, has revealed that
Shaffer had been placed on paid administrative leave for what he called
"petty and frivolous" reasons and had his security clearance
suspended in March 2004, following a dispute over travel mileage expenses and
personal use of a work cell phone.[28]
Congressman Weldon asked for a new probe into the
activities undertaken to silence Lt. Col. Shaffer from publicly commenting on
Able Danger and Able Danger's identification of the 9/11 hijackers. Weldon
called the activities "a deliberate campaign of character
assassination."[29]
Shaffer has also told the story of Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) opposition to Able Danger, prior to 9/11, based
on the view that Able Danger was encroaching on CIA turf. According to Shaffer,
the CIA representative said, "I clearly understand. We're going after the
leadership. You guys are going after the body. But, it doesn't matter. The
bottom line is, CIA will never give you the best information from "Alex
Base" or anywhere else. CIA will never provide that to you because if you were
successful in your effort to target Al Qaeda, you will steal our thunder.
Therefore, we will not support this."[30]
Navy Captain Scott Phillpott
Capt. Scott Phillpott confirmed Shaffer's
claims. "I will not discuss this outside of my chain of command",
Phillpott said in a statement to Fox News. "I have briefed the Department
of the Army, the Special Operations Command and the office of (Undersecretary
of Defense for Intelligence) Dr. Cambone as well as the 9/11
Commission. My story has remained consistent. Atta was identified by Able
Danger in January/February 2000", he was quoted as saying.[31]
James D. Smith
Shaffer's claims were also confirmed by James D.
Smith, a civilian contractor who worked on Able Danger.
In an interview with
Fox News, Smith reported that the project had involved analysis of data from a
large number of public sources and 20 to 30 individuals.[32]
Smith stated that Atta's name had emerged during an
examination of individuals known to have ties to Omar Abdel Rahman, a
leading figure in the first World Trade Center bombing.
Major Erik Kleinsmith
Major Erik Kleinsmith, who was with the Army and
chief of intelligence for LIWA until February 2001, testified that he was
ordered to destroy Able Danger's information. "I deleted the data",
he said. "There were two sets, classified and unclassified, and also an
'all sorts,'" which contained a blend of the two, "plus charts we'd
produced." Kleinsmith deleted the 2.5 terabytes of data in May
and June, 2000, on orders of Tony Gentry, general counsel of the Army
Intelligence and Security Command.[33]
Other witnesses
The Defense Department announced its findings on
September 1, 2005, after a three-week investigation into Able Danger. The
statement announced the discovery of three other witnesses in addition to
Shaffer and Phillpott who confirm Able Danger had produced a chart that
"either mentioned Atta by name as an al-Qaeda operative [and/or] showed
his photograph." Four of the five witnesses remember the photo on the
chart. The fifth remembers only Atta being cited by name. The Pentagon
describes the witnesses as "credible" but stated that the document
which allegedly mentioned Atta could not be found.[34][35]
The wall
Former chief assistant U.S. attorney Andrew
McCarthy and others have asserted that the Able Danger intelligence was
suppressed as a result of a policy of forbidding the CIA and FBI to share
intelligence known as "the wall."[36] During
the 9/11 Commission hearings, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft testified
the wall was strengthened under the Clinton administration by Jamie
Gorelick to prohibit sharing of terrorist intelligence within the federal
government.[37]
This assertion was disputed by former senator Slade
Gorton (R-WA), a member of the 9-11 Commission, who said,
"nothing Jamie Gorelick wrote had the slightest impact on the Department
of Defense or its willingness or ability to share intelligence information with
other intelligence agencies." Gorton also asserted that "the
wall" was a long-standing policy that had resulted from the Church
Committee in the 1970s, and that the policy only prohibits transfer of
certain information from prosecutors to the intelligence
services and never prohibited information flowing in the opposite direction
Skepticism
Two Attas theory
Mickey Kaus of Slate.com, referring to Tom
Maguire's "Two Attas" theory,[38] speculates
that "the 'Atta' fingered by Able Danger was really the first, 'Abu
Nidal' Atta, and not the second, 9/11 'Al Qaeda' Atta", and that this
may help explain this Able Danger issue.[39]Snopes.com clarified
a widely circulated email that claimed the two Attas were one and the same.[40]
Another variation of the Two Attas theory reported
by Kaus notes that Omar Abdel Rahman also had an associate with the
name Mohamed El-Amir (a name sometimes used by Atta) who was not the Mohamed
Atta involved in the 9/11 hijacking.[41]
However, Shaffer clarified that. He told 9/11
Commission staffers Able Danger identified three of the individuals in
the terrorist cells that conducted the 9/11 attacks, to include Atta
- Shaffer did not mention the names of any other of the 9/11 hijackers in his
disclosure to the 9/11 staff. A fourth 9/11 terrorist came from the second
cell.[42] Eric
Umansky states the problem this way: "In fact, the two-Atta theory only
leaves one major issue unexplained: What about the three other 9/11 hijackers
that Able Danger purportedly fingered?
The Department of Defense released a report
addressing the issue of two possible individuals with the last name of Atta and
explaining that it was basically a clerical error.
When we reviewed INS records, they appeared to
reflect two entries by Atta into the United States on January 10, 2001, which
initially raised a question as to whether Atta had entered twice on the same
day or whether a second person posing as Atta also entered on January 10, 2001.
The NIIS printout for the first entry reflects that Atta entered with an
admission period of January 10, 2001, to September 8, 2001 (admission number
68653985708). The second record reflects a second entry on January 10, 2001,
with an admission period from January 10, 2001, to July 9, 2001 (admission
number 10847166009). However, this occurred because the inspector at the Miami
District Office who changed Atta's admission date failed to follow the proper
procedure to ensure that the previous entry would be corrected, and a new entry
was created in NIIS. The inspector sent the old I-94 and the corrected I-94 to
the contractor which data enters I-94s for the INS. The May 2, 2001,
transaction with Atta was data entered and then uploaded to NIIS as if it were
a new entry by Atta. This happened because the inspector issued a new I-94 with
a new admission number on it. To prevent two entries from occurring in NIIS,
the inspector should have crossed out the admission number on the new I-94,
made a reference to the previous admission number and noted that it was not a
new entry.[43]
It should be noted that IG report is disputed by Lt.
Col. Shaffer and other Able Danger team members, some of whom were never
interviewed by the IG's office nor the 9/11 commission. Congressman Weldon also
claims the report was a hurried, botched up investigation that was intended to
close the books on the subject rather than report on the facts.
For example this lead was never followed:
"Normen Pentolino, operations manager at the Hollywood store, said two
cashiers told FBI agents they might have recognized Atta, but weren't certain.
Sources inside the store said Atta may have held a BJ's membership card for
more than two years."[44]
Timing
Kevin Drum, writing for The Washington Monthly notes
that reports of the precise date at which the information was allegedly passed
to the FBI vary considerably. It is most unlikely that Able Danger would have
identified a terrorist called "Mohamed Atta" before May 2000.
Since 9/11, of course, we have retrieved every scrap
of information ever known about Mohamed Atta, so we know what information would
have been available to the Able Danger data mining operation. And what we know
is that Mohamed Atta sent his first email to friends in the U.S. in March 2000
and received his first U.S. visa on May 18, 2000. Moreover, that was the first
time he had ever gone by the name "Mohamed Atta." His full name is
"Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta", and prior to 2000 he went
by "Mohamed el-Amir".
Congressional hearings
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen
Specter held a hearing on September 21, 2005, looking into the facts about
Able Danger. However, Lt. Col. Shaffer and the other four members of Able
Danger were ordered not to testify by the Department of Defense.[45] Senator
Specter decided to go forward with the hearings anyway.
Senator Specter wondered if the Posse Comitatus
Act may have been the reason Defense Department attorneys would not allow
Able Danger to turn over information to the FBI. The Posse Comitatus Act
prevents the military from being engaged in law enforcement activities,
including gathering information on U.S. persons, despite the aliens were not
specifically United States citizens. Speaking on behalf of Lt. Col. Shaffer,
attorney Mark Zaid testified "Those within Able Danger were confident they
weren't compiling information on US persons. They were potentially people
connected to US persons."[46]
Zaid also strongly asserted on behalf of his
clients, "Let me emphasize two specific items for
clarification purposes because they have been distorted and invited undue
criticism from some.
At no time did Able Danger identify Mohamed Atta as
being physically present in the United States.
No information obtained at the time would have led
anyone to believe criminal activity had taken place or that any specific
terrorist activities were being planned. Again, the identification of the four
9/11 hijackers was simply through associational activities. Those associations
could have been completely innocuous or nefarious. It was impossible to tell
which, and the unclassified work of Able Danger was not designed to address
that question."[45]
He further added that "unfortunately we are not aware of the
continuing existence of any chart containing Mohamed Atta's name or photograph.
The copies that would have been in the possession of the U.S. Army were
apparently destroyed by March 2001. The copies within Lt Col Shaffer's files
were destroyed by the DIA in approximately Spring 2004. The destruction of
these files is an important element to this story and I encourage the Committee
to investigate it further. It would appear, particularly given the Defense
Department's outright refusal to allow those involved with Able Danger to
testify today, that an obstructionist attitude exists. The question for this
Committee is to investigate how far that position extends and why."[47]
Former Army Major Erik Kleinsmith, former head of
the Pentagon's Land Warfare Analysis Department, testified at the hearing that
he had been instructed to destroy data and documents related to Able Danger in
May and June 2000. When asked whether the information could have prevented the
attack on September 11 of 2001, he answered that he would not speculate to
that, but that the information might have been useful.[48]
Subsequent investigations
On February 14, 2006, Congressmen Curt Weldon charged
that contrary to testimony, not all the data on Able Danger had been destroyed.
Weldon claimed to be in contact with people in the government still able to do
data-mining who got 13 hits on Mohamed Atta. Weldon also claimed that Able
Danger information was found in Pentagon files as recently as two weeks prior
to his statement and that a general was present when the files were taken from
the cabinet.[49] The
next day, there was a joint committee meeting with the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities and the Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces, to discuss the Able Danger program.[50]
On September 21, 2006, The Washington Post reported
that a Defense Department investigation into Able Danger found that Able Danger
did not identify Mohamed Atta or any other hijacker before the September
11 attacks, and that a widely discussed chart was "a sample document
passed to the military as an example of how to organize large amounts of data",
and was created after 9/11.
Inspector General's report
On September 18, 2006, the Office of the Deputy
Inspector General for Investigations released a report stating that Shaffer was
put on leave, that the crew responsible for removing any classified documents
from his office to prevent his taking them home with him found that he did not
have any of the Able Danger-related documents trusted to him he claimed he had,[51] and
that despite the fact that the Army cleared him of any wrongdoing in the
allegations "DIA officials would have taken action to revoke LTC Shaffer's
access and clearance regardless of his disclosures to the DIA IG, the 9/11
Commission staff members, Members of Congress, or the media.[52]
The Department of Defense investigation concluded:
The anti-terrorist program, Able Danger, did not
identify Mohamed Atta or any other 9/11 terrorists before the 9/11 attack.
Able Danger members were not prohibited from sharing
intelligence information with law enforcement authorities or other agencies
that could have acted on that information. In fact, Able Danger produced no
actionable intelligence information.
The destruction of Able Danger documentation at LIWA
and Garland was appropriate and complied with applicable DoD regulations.
The Able Danger program was not terminated
prematurely. It concluded after it had achieved its objective and its work products
were used in follow-on intelligence gathering efforts at USSOCOM."[53]
Alleged evidence of IG cover-up
Five witnesses who had worked on Able Danger and had
been questioned by the Defense Department's Inspector General later told
investigative journalists that their statements to the IG were distorted by
investigators in the final IG's report, or the report omitted essential
information that they had provided. The alleged distortions of the IG report
centered around excluding any evidence that Able Danger had identified and tracked
Atta years before 9/11. The witnesses reported to the journalists that the IG
investigators got increasingly hostile in an effort to intimidate the witnesses
into changing their testimony to drop any assertion that they had identified
and tracked Atta, and this suggests a cover-up by the IG of Able Danger's
findings. Witnesses reported telling Philip Zelikow, executive director of
the 9/11 Commission, that Able Danger had identified Atta well before the 9/11
attacks, but Zelikow showed no interest in their testimony. Lt. Col Tony
Shaffer also reported that the DOD has retaliated against him for speaking out
publicly about the IG report's distortions.[4]
Movie
The independent film, Able Danger was
released in 2008. The screenplay written by Paul Krik centers around
a Brooklyn, New York coffee shop owner who receives a disk
proving a tie between the CIA and the 9/11 attacks.[54]
Book
Operation Dark Heart by Anthony A. Shaffer,
released in September 2010,[55] includes
memories of his time reporting to the 9/11 commission about Able Danger's
findings. The 10,000 copies of the books have not been released yet. The DOD's
Defense Intelligence Agency reviewers identified more than 200 passages
suspected of containing classified information.[56] "Specifically,
the DIA wanted references to a meeting between Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer, the
book's author, and the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, Philip
Zelikow, removed".[57] DOD
took the highly unusual step of purchasing all available copies of Shaffer's
book at a cost of $47,000 and destroying them to deny the public the ability to
read the book.[4]
See also
Bin Laden Issue Station (The CIA's bin
Laden tracking unit, 1996–2005)
References
^ "Specter:
Pentagon may be obstructing committee". Washington: cnn.com. 21
September 2005. Retrieved April 26,2010. That looks to me as it may
be obstruction of the committee's activities.
^ zaid,
mark (21 September 2005). "prepared
statement of mark s. zaid, esq., before the committee on judiciary, united
states senate". washington, d.c.: committee on judiciary, united
states senate. Archived from
the original on 11 April 2010. Retrieved April 26, 2010. Based
on years of experience I can say categorically that the basis for the
revocation was questionable at best.
^ Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence (22 December 2006). "ssci
#2006-4735" (PDF). washington, d.c. p. 9. Archived
from the original (PDF) on
7 May 2010. Retrieved April 26, 2010.
^ Jump
up to:a b c Herridge,
Catherine (4 October 2010). "Exclusive:
Witnesses in Defense Dept. Report Suggest Cover-Up of 9/11 Findings". Fox
News. Retrieved 21 November 2015.
^ Jump up to:a b Miller,
Greg (2006-12-25). "Alarming
9/11 Claim Is Baseless, Panel Says". Los
Angeles Times. Retrieved 2010-01-10.
^ Anne
Flaherty (2006-12-26). "Senators
Nix Pre-9/11 Hijacker ID Theory". The Washington Post. Associated
Press. Retrieved 2008-11-21.
^ An
example of a chart produced as output by the project's data mining and
visualization suite is called the 3.21.00
Chart. (DIAC Link Chart declassified 3.21.00, produced on March 21, 2000,
and reproduced on author Peter Lance's website for his book Triple Cross
Another barely readable sample chart was published by the Defense Department's
Inspector General's Office on page 14 of the Able Danger
Investigation Report.
^ Patience
Wait has reported that a follow-on project appears to have been funded and
implemented by the Intelligence Community and was originally named Able
Providence. Data Mining
Offensive in the Works Archived 2006-10-14
at the Wayback Machine. - Patience Wait - GCN Magazine,
10/10/2005
^ Jump
up to:a b Shaffer,
Anthony (2010). Operation Dark Heart. St Martin's Press.
p. 170. ISBN 978-0-312-60369-4.
^ Shaffer,
Anthony (2010). Operation Dark Heart. St Martin's Press.
pp. 274–275. ISBN 978-0-312-60369-4.
^ Phucas, Keith (19 June 2005). "Missed
chance on way to 9/11". The Times Herald. Shelley Meenan.
Retrieved 2006-08-03.[permanent dead link]
^ United States Congress. ""U.S.
Intelligence"." Congressional Record—House. Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 27 June 2005. 109th
Cong., 1st sess. HR H5244.
^ Hefling,
Kimberly (2006-02-14). "Weldon: 'Able Danger' ID'd 9/ll Ringleader".
Associated Press.
^ Jump up to:a b Goodwin,
Jacob (August 2005). "Did
DoD lawyers blow the chance to nab Atta?". GSN: Government
Security News. Edward Tyler. Archived from the original on
2007-09-15. Retrieved 2010-01-10.
^ United States Congress. ""U.S.
Intelligence"." Congressional Record—House. Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 27 June 2005. 109th
Cong., 1st sess. HR H5250. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
^ Andrews,
Wyatt; The Associated Press (9 August
2005). "New
Pre-9/11 Intel Questions". Special Report: War on Terror. CBS News.
Retrieved 2006-08-03.
^ Douglas Jehl; Philip Shenon; Eric Schmitt (8 August 2005). "Four
in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied to Qaeda in '00". New York Times.
Retrieved 2006-08-03. More than a year before the Sept. 11 attacks, a
small, highly classified military intelligence unit identified Mohamed Atta and
three other future hijackers as likely members of a cell of Al Qaeda operating
in the United States, according to a former defense intelligence official and a
Republican member of Congress.
^ Herridge, Catherine; Liza Porteus; The Associated Press (11 August
2005). "Source:
9/11 Panel Staffers Probing Documents on 'Able Danger'". Fox News
Politics. Fox News Channel. Archivedfrom
the original on 5 September 2006. Retrieved 2006-08-03.
^ Jump up to:a b Kean,
Thomas; Hamilton, Lee H. (2005-08-12). "Kean-Hamilton
Statement on Able Danger" (PDF) (Press release). Archived
from the original (PDF) on
2009-03-01. Retrieved 2005-08-14.
^ Jump up to:a b Curt
Weldon (2005-08-12). "Weldon
Responds to Omission of ABLE DANGER From 9/11 Report" (Press
release). 9/11 Citizens Watch. Archived from the original on 2007-10-11.
^ "Honorable
Curt Weldon's testimony at Able Danger and Intelligence Information
Sharing". Federation of American Scientists website.
^ Curt
Weldon (2005-07-25). Countdown to Terror: The Top Secret Information that
Could Prevent the Next Terrorist Attack on America...And How the CIA has
Ignored it. Regnery Publishing. ISBN 978-0-89526-005-5.
^ Jump
up to:a b Bennett,
Brian; Timothy J. Burger; Douglas Waller (2005-08-14). "Was
Mohamed Atta Overlooked?". Time. Time
Warner. Retrieved 2006-08-17.
^ Kelly, Mike (2005-08-14). "Deadly
tale of incompetence". The Record (Bergen Co., NJ). North Jersey Media Group. Archived
from the
original on June 13, 2006. Retrieved 2006-08-17.
^ De,
Donna (2005-09-16). "Weldon:
Atta Papers Destroyed on Orders". Associated Press. Archived
from the
original on 2005-09-22. Retrieved 2010-01-10.
^ Bennett,
Brian; Burger, Timothy J.; Waller, Douglas (2005-08-14). "Was
Mohamed Atta Overlooked?". Time Magazine.
^ "The
Situation Room Transcript". CNN. 2005-08-17.
^ "Pentagon Investigates
Able Danger Work". Fox News. 2005-08-18.
^ "Congressman
wants new Able Danger probe". United Press International. 2005-10-19.
Archived from the
original on 2005-12-28. Retrieved 2010-01-10.
^ Goodwin,
Jacob (September 2005). "Inside
Able Danger – The Secret Birth, Extraordinary Life and Untimely Death of a U.S.
Military Intelligence Program". GSN: Government Security News.
World Business Media, LLC. Archived from the original on
2005-09-24. Retrieved 2010-05-22.
^ "Navy Captain
Backs Able Danger Claims". Fox News. 2005-08-23.
^ "Third Source
Backs 'Able Danger' Claims About Atta". Fox News. 2005-08-28.
^ Patience
Wait (2005-10-07). "Data-mining
offensive in the works". Government Computer News. Retrieved 2010-01-11.
^ Shanker,
Thom (September 2, 2005). "Terrorist
Known Before 9/11, More Say". New York Times. Retrieved 11
June 2015.
^ Wood,
Sgt. Sara (September 1, 2005). "DoD
Discusses Able Danger Findings". American Forces Press Service.
United States Department of Defense. Archived from the original on
August 30, 2010. Retrieved 2010-05-22.
^ McCarthy,
Andrew C. (19 April 2004). "The
Wall Truth". National Review Online. Archived from the
original on 2 May 2004.
^ "Instructions
on Separation of Certain Foreign CounterIntelligence and Criminal
Investigations" (PDF). US Department of Justice website.
Retrieved 2008-12-28.
^ "Able
Danger - Muddying The Waters". Just One Minute Blog. 2005-08-18.[unreliable source?]
^ Kaus,
Mickey (21 August 2005). "The
"Two Atta" Theory". Slate.com. Archived from the original on 11 November
2005.
^ "Atta Boy".
Snopes.com.
^ Kaus,
Mickey (29 August 2005). "Able
Danger Mystery Solved?". Slate.com. Archived from the original on 23 October
2005.
^ Waterman,
Shaun (8 September 2005). "Congressman
doubts accounts of secret projects's destruction". World Peace
Herald. Archived from the
original on 3 January 2006.
^ "The Immigration
and Naturalization Service's Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists: A
Review of the INS's Admissions of Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, its
Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and its Efforts to Track
Foreign Students in the United States". Website of the United States
Office of the Inspector General. 2002-05-20.
^ Babson,
Jennifer; Lebowitz, Larry; Viglucci, Andres (2001-09-18). "Broward
library PCs yield clues". Miami Herald. Archived from the
original on 2001-10-21.
^ Jump up to:a b "Specter:
Pentagon may be obstructing committee". CNN. 2005-09-21.
^ "Transcript
of The Able Danger Senate Hearings". PBS. 2005-09-21.
^ "Prepared
Statement of Mark S. Zaid, Esq. Before the Committee on Judiciary, United
States Senate" (PDF). Federation of American Scientists Website.
2005-09-21. Retrieved 2008-12-28.
^ "'Able Danger'
Will Get Second Hearing". Fox News. 2005-09-24.
^ Gossett,
Sherrie (2006-02-15). "'Able
Danger' Identified 9/11 Hijacker 13 Times". Cybercast News Service.
Archived from the
original on 2006-06-15. Retrieved 2010-01-10.
^ "Joint
Hearing on the Able Danger Program" (PDF) (Press release).
The Federation of American Scientists website. 2006-02-15.
^ Alleged
Misconduct by Senior DOD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, US Army Reserve (PDF) (Report).
p. 10. Retrieved 2008-12-28.
^ Alleged
Misconduct by Senior DOD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, US Army Reserve (PDF) (Report).
p. 11. Retrieved 2008-12-28.
^ Alleged
Misconduct by Senior DOD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant
Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, US Army Reserve (PDF) (Report).
p. 69. Retrieved 2008-12-28.
^ Shane,
Scott (2010-09-10). "Pentagon Plan:
Buying Books to Keep Secrets". New York Times. p. A16. Archived from
the original on 2012-04-19. Retrieved 2012-04-19.
No comments:
Post a Comment