Information Operations (United States)
Information Operations is a category of direct
and indirect support operations for the United States Military. By definition
in Joint Publication 3-13, "IO are described as the integrated employment
of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert
with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt,
corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while
protecting our own."[1]Information
Operations (IO) are actions taken to affect adversary information and
information systems while defending one's own information and information
systems.[1]
Soldiers from the U.S. Army's 350th Tactical
Psychological Operations, 10th Mountain Division, droped leaflets over a
village near Hawijah in Kirkuk province, Iraq, on March 6, 2008.
U.S. Army PSYOP Force structure
NATO leaflet in Libya
PSYOP as an IO Core Capability. PSYOP has a
central role in the achievement of IO objectives in support of the JFC.
In
today’s information environment even PSYOP conducted at the tactical level can
have strategic effects. Therefore, PSYOP has an approval process that must be
understood and the necessity for timely decisions is fundamental to effective
PSYOP and IO. This is particularly important in the early stages of an
operation given the time it takes to develop, design, produce, distribute,
disseminate, and evaluate PSYOP products and actions.
All PSYOP are conducted
under the authority of interagency-coordinated and OSD approved PSYOP programs.
The PSYOP program approval process at the national level requires time for
sufficient coordination and resolution of issues; hence, JFCs should begin
PSYOP planning as early as possible to ensure the execution of PSYOP in support
of operations. A JFC must have an approved PSYOP program, execution authority,
and delegation of product approval authority before PSYOP execution can begin.
JFCs should request PSYOP planners immediately during the initial crisis stages
to ensure the JFC has plenty of lead time to obtain the proper authority to
execute PSYOP. PSYOP assets may be of particular value to the JFC in
pre-/post-combat operations when other means of influence are restrained or not
authorized. PSYOP must be coordinated with CI, MILDEC, and OPSEC to ensure
deconfliction and control, CI operations are not compromised, and that all
capabilities within IO are coordinated to achieve the objectives established in
planning.
There must be close cooperation and coordination between PSYOP and PA
staffs in order to maintain credibility with their respective audiences, which
is the purpose of the IO cell. PSYOP efforts are most effective when personnel
with a thorough understanding of the language and culture of the TA are
included in the review of PSYOP materials and messages. As the information
environment evolves, the dissemination of PSYOP products is expanding from
traditional print and broadcast to more sophisticated use of the Internet,
facsimile messaging, text messaging, and other emerging media. The
effectiveness of PSYOP is enhanced by the synchronization and coordination of
the core, supporting, and related capabilities of IO; particularly public affairs (PA), MILDEC,
CNO, civil-military operations (CMO), and
EW.[3]
Psychological operations are planned operations to
convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of
foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.
Military Deception (MILDEC)
Main article: Military deception
Simulated OH-58C Kiowa helicopter and simulated fuel
blivets during a deception operation on 10 November 1990 carried out by the
XVIII Airborne Corps Deception Cell. This simulated forward arming and
refueling point (FARP) at TL 139512 in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia was
approximately 45 kilometers northwest of An Nuariya.
MILDEC is described as being those actions executed
to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military
capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take
specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of
the friendly forces’ mission. MILDEC and OPSEC are complementary activities —
MILDEC seeks to encourage incorrect analysis, causing the adversary to arrive
at specific false deductions, while OPSEC seeks to deny real information to an
adversary, and prevent correct deduction of friendly plans. To be effective, a
MILDEC operation must be susceptible to adversary collection systems and
"seen" as credible to the enemy commander and staff.
A plausible
approach to MILDEC planning is to employ a friendly course of action (COA) that
can be executed by friendly forces and that adversary intelligence can verify.
However, MILDEC planners must not fall into the trap of ascribing to the
adversary particular attitudes, values, and reactions that "mirror
image" likely friendly actions in the same situation, i.e., assuming that
the adversary will respond or act in a particular manner based on how we would
respond.
There are always competing priorities for the resources required for
deception and the resources required for the real operation. For this reason,
the deception plan should be developed concurrently with the real plan,
starting with the commander’s and staff’s initial estimate, to ensure proper
resourcing of both. To encourage incorrect analysis by the adversary, it is
usually more efficient and effective to provide a false purpose for real
activity than to create false activity. OPSEC of the deception plan is at least
as important as OPSEC of the real plan, since compromise of the deception may
expose the real plan.
This requirement for close hold planning while ensuring
detailed coordination is the greatest challenge to MILDEC planners. On joint
staffs, MILDEC planning and oversight responsibility is normally organized as a
staff deception element in the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3).[4]
MILDEC as an IO Core Capability. MILDEC is
fundamental to successful IO. It exploits the adversary’s information systems,
processes, and capabilities. MILDEC relies upon understanding how the adversary
commander and supporting staff think and plan and how both use information
management to support their efforts. This requires a high degree of
coordination with all elements of friendly forces’ activities in the
information environment as well as with physical activities. Each of the core,
supporting, and related capabilities has a part to play in the development of
successful MILDEC and in maintaining its credibility over time. While PA should
not be involved in the provision of false information, it must be aware of the
intent and purpose of MILDEC in order not to inadvertently compromise it.[4]
A message targeted to exploit a fissure between a
key member of the adversary’s leadership who has a contentious relationship
with another key decision maker is an example. That message could cause
internal strife resulting in the adversary foregoing an intended course of
action and adopting a position more favorable to our interests.[5]
Operations Security (OPSEC)
See also: Operations security
OPSEC as an IO Core Capability. OPSEC denies the
adversary the information needed to correctly assess friendly capabilities and
intentions. In particular, OPSEC complements MILDEC by denying an adversary
information required to both assess a real plan and to disprove a deception
plan. For those IO capabilities that exploit new opportunities and
vulnerabilities, such as EW and CNO, OPSEC is essential to ensure friendly
capabilities are not compromised. The process of identifying essential elements
of friendly information and taking measures to mask them from disclosure to
adversaries is only one part of a defense-in-depth approach to securing
friendly information. To be effective, other types of security must complement
OPSEC. Examples of other types of security include physical security, IA
programs, computer network defense (CND), and personnel programs that screen
personnel and limit authorized access.[6]
What occurs, often, is that data is either leaked,
stolen, or hacked online and the enemy has access to and can decipher what that
information may say. This is especially true for defensive operational
security. US servicemen and servicewomen may have Facebook,
multiple blogs,
or upload photos, which can lead to the enemy knowing troop movements and
locations. With this information, setting up ambush and wreaking havoc on US
and support personnel becomes much easier. Geo-tagging features of cellular
phones especially, may cause this type of breach in OPSEC.[7][8][9]
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