President Kennedy with Gen. Adams at STRIKE Command, McDill AFB, November 18, 1963
Anywhere, any time
-
Provide mobile, integrated, flexible, readily available
forces
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Furnish highly trained combatant forces under JCS
direction and a single responsible commander
-
Afford a display of force capable for cold-war
operations
-
Reduce reaction time in dealing decisively with any
type of aggression
-
Integrate Army’s CONARC and USAF’s TAC
operations
-
Enhance joint planning and training
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Develop joint doctrine in combined deployment of land
and tactical air forces
These re the jobs of he nation’s newest unified command:
STRIKE
By Allan R. Scholin
Associate editor, Air Force/Space Digest
MAINSTAY of the Saturday-night television gallery is a heroic
character of the old west named Paladin, gifted with a pistol, who responds
with finesse and devastating effect when summoned to content with men of evil
intent.
In modern dress, Paladin would fit right in with the men of
the United States Strike Command, newest of the unified commands, with
headquarters at MacDill AFB, Florida
A primary mission of USSTRICOM – STRIKE for short – is to be
prepared to respond swiftly, and with whatever degree of force may be
necessary, to threats against the peace in any part of the world.
To carry out its mission, STRIK may call upon any or all
combat-ready elements of the Tactical Air Command (TAC )
and the Continental Arm Command (CONARC), together with the airlift required to
deposit the strike force promptly at the scene of trouble.
Commander in Chief of the US Strike Command – CINSRIKE – is
Gen. Paul DeWitt Adams. A World War II Ranger in the Aleutians
and Italy Korea Lebanon
His Deputy Commander in Chief is Lt. Gen. Bruce K. Holloway,
forty-nine, who flew for General Chennault in China TAC ’s Ninth Air Force in the mid-50s, he
contributed to development of a new fighter concepts, and then as Director of
Operations Requirments in the Pentagon guided development of the TFX .
STRIKE came into being on September 19 of last year when
Secretary of Defense McNamara established the command’s mission in response to
President Kennedy’s concern over Communist “nibbling” aggression. General Adams
was named Commander in Chief. Soon thereafter General Adams met in Washington TAC , now
STRIKE’S J-5, Plans, and Maj. Gen. Clifton F. von Kann, then chief of Army
aviation and now J-3, Operations. By mid-December the command headquarters was
fully manned, and General Adams declared it operational on December 28.
As an indication of the speed and urgency with which STRIKE
was set up, none of the personnel assigned to its headquarters took any leave
en route from their former stations. Nor did anyone get leave during their Christmas
holidays.
“Never before,” said General Adams recently, “has a command
with the scope and responsibility of STRIKE been organized and started
functioning in so short a period.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to General Adams listed
two major mission elements – to provide general reserve combat-ready forces to
reinforce other unified commands, and to plan and execute contingency
operations as directed by the Joint Chiefs.
The United States Caribbean ,
Atlantic , and European commands, North American Air
Defense Commmand (NORAD), and now STRIKE.
The Lebanon Lebanon United
States US Europe were hastily moved to Lebanon Lebanon
But a familiar military tactic which has been practiced by
the Communists in the past is to feint aggression in one part of the world,
only to strike elsewhere when we are off balance. The mission of STRIKE, then,
is to provide augmentation forces needed to meet any unexpected threat without
weakening our prepared defenses.
If such a threat were to develop in a part of the world
covered by one of our unified commands, STRIKE would furnish the theater
commander the amount of augmentation forces he asked for, and they would be
deployed as the theater commander thought est.
If, however, the threat were to occur in an area outside the
immediate jurisdiction of a theater commander, CINCSTRIKE might command the
forces himself or through a task-force commander appointed by him.
With the advent of STRIKE, no chief of an individual service
now exercises operational control over any of his combat-ready forces. In every
instance where such forces might be employed, they would do so under control of
one of the unified or special commands.
When you are fighting a fire, it is important to act swiftly before the fire has a chance to spread. The same concept applies to brushfire wars. A small force arriving on the scene within twenty-four hours would be more effective than a much larger forces arriving later.
STRIKE is geared for swift reaction. Not only does the command insist that its contingency forces be air-transportable – “if we can’t fly it in,” says General Adams, “we haven’t got it” – but the force, including its commander, and staff, is prepared to parachute into the trouble zone if necessary. General Adams is an experienced parachutist. General Holloway has just completed jump-school training and now wears the Army’s Parachutist badge. A steady flow of USAF members of STRIKE is now going through the course at
Despite its formidable title and high-ranking leadership,
STRIKE’s headquarters includes only 300 military personnel, half officers, half
enlisted men, split almost fifty-fifty between Army and Air Force. Attached to
STRIKE Headquarters is a communications support element with 311 people,
equipped to provide worldwide communications wherever the CINC may go. The
communications element, too, is manned half by Army, half by Air Force people.
But STRIKE is assigned continuous operational control of all
combat-ready unites of TAC and CONARC, and
calls on them for whatever it needs. In STRIKE’s command post are listed the
strength and location of all TAC and CONARC
elements. If TAC or CONARC wants to shift
the location of any unit in their command, they must check in first with STRIKE
for approval before making the move.
These forces include a dozen TAC
fighter and reconnaissance wings and eight Army divisions, airborne, armored,
and infantry.
But since these combat forces assigned to STRIKE already
existed in TAC and CONARC, what are the
particular contributions of this new unified command? General Adams has set
them forth in the following terms:
First, it provides mobile, integrated, flexible, and readily
available military forces.
Second, it furnishes these forces under JCS direction and a single responsible commander.
Third, it affords a display of force capability for cold-war operations.
Forth, it reduces
Fifth, it facilitates integration of CONARC and TAC
operations.
Seventh, it provides an organization to develop joint
doctrine for the combined employment of land and tactical air forces.
“We feel that the STRIKE Command will substantially increase
the flexibility, readiness, and combat efficiency of the forces available to
it,” General Adams said in an address soon after assuming command. “We also
feel that the STRIKE Command will represent a potent deterrent force and will
add to our military posture the kind of strength needed to give us, in the
President’s words ‘…a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear
action.’”
STRIKE leaders are careful to explain, too, that ‘conventional’ does not necessarily mean “nonnuclear.”
“The choices of action open to STRIKE force range from no
weapons to nuclear weapons,” General Holloway has remarked.
The refinement of our conventional warfare capability is
being undertaken to meet an apparent shift in Soviet military strategy. Having
concluded that global war for the time being (and no one knows how long or
short this may be) involves unacceptable risks, Khrushchev has directed
Communist energies towards what he calls “wars of liberation or popular
uprisings.” But we cannot afford to forget that the wide choice of responses
available to STRIKE in combating such “uprisings” is possible only because
STRIKE forces are covered by our powerful nuclear delivery systems.
Secretary McNamara emphasized this point in a recent speech
when he remarked that America
He said, “The first requirement for such a policy is major
wars. The Soviet decision to concentrate on wars of covert aggression was not
taken in a power vacuum.”
STRIKE is keeping its forces busy to indoctrinate them in
joint operations. From January 1962 to June 1963, STRIKE will be engaged in
twenty-seven joint exercises, plus others which may be laid on without notice.
Even before its headquarters were operational last December, STRIKE took charge
of Exercise Trail Break in the Griffiss AFB Camp Drum area of upstate New
York Alaska Philippines III in the Caribbean .
May exercises include on in the Atlantic theater, another in the Fort
Bragg Western Europe .
Members of STRIKE’s headquarters staff are also “exercised”
at frequent intervals, and on extremely short notice. Alert orders require
designated members of the staff to report in thirty minutes and be prepared to
depart within two hours. Destination may be literally almost anywhere in the
world. Against such contingencies, each headquarters member has three bags
already packed and stored near the flight line, one for the Artic, one for the
tropics, a third for general use. Along with the orders go instructions to
operations to load the appropriate bag on the plane.
Two exercises this spring merit special attention. In Track
Down in April at Fort Hood , Tex Clear Lake Fla.
“STRIKE can bring to these joint exercises a formal degree
of planning and execution that we have never had before,” General Hollaway
explained. “With single control, we can inject more realism and assure a better
approach to evaluating air-ground doctrine.”
The subject of tactical air support of ground forces
occupies considerable attention among STRIKE leaders. “Since we are charged by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff with developing joint doctrine pertaining to the
forces assigned to this command,” General Adams noted, “we maintain a lively
interest in the subject, and when changes appear appropriate we will, after
testing any proposed changes, make appropriate recommendations to the JCS.”
But, for the present at least, STIKE is going along with the
doctrine developed and employed during World War II. “Air superiority,
battlefield isolation, direct support – these are still the main tasks of
tactical air power,” General Holloway said.
“The F-105 was designed to do all these things. The F-110
possesses very useful capabilities. And the TFX
is even further oriented toward that objective.”
General Holloway lists three “freedoms” which he expects to
see achieved in the TFX . Freedom from
specialization. He has little doubt that such a plane can be built.
“Our early jets were limited in capability. But the state of
the art is reaching the point where we can expect to come up with a jet
comparable in versatility to the late piston fighters,” General Holloway said.
General von Kann, who before joining STRIKE had been in
charge of Army aviation, was asked about reports that some Army officers are
still dissatisfied with the degree of close air support the Air Force can
provide, and would like to see the Army acquire its own close-support aircraft.
“Yes, we’ve had some discussion on the subject,” he replied.
“Some infantry officers have mentioned the Marines’ system of close support.
But they forget that Marine ground-air requirements are different. Marines
don’t have the variety of artillery employed in the Army.”
“There are things we can do to improve the system. Part of
the problem is in the Army’s request network. Because our Army people often
call for air strikes on targets that are better suited for their own artillery,
we lose time checking requests through the Army’s fire-support control centers.
The Marines go direct. But it’s the system that causes the lag – not the Air
Force’s readiness to respond.”
He said he thought the Marine pilots were better
ground-oriented because fighter pilots are rotated in forward air-controller
duties. But he added that Tactical Air Command pilots are now being given more
intensive ground orientation.
“It helps to know each other’s problems more intimately,” he
said, “just as we are learning from each other here at STRIKE. I’ve gained a
new perspective on the subject. I think it may have made one or two Army points
with General Holloway.
“But the Army does not intend to get into the Air Force’s
air-support tasks. The purpose of Army aviation is to improve our mobility – to
do things better than we can do them with surface vehicles.”
As this exchange between General Holloway and General von
Kann demonstrates, the men of STRIKE are given renewed attention to the
problems of air-ground operations in conventional war conditions.
Clearly, STRIKE, young though it is, is already prepared to
back up these words of President Kennedy, contained in his defense message a
year ago:
“Any potential aggressor contemplating an attack on any part
of the free world with any kind of weapons, conventional or nuclear, must know
that our response will be suitable, selective, swift, and effective.”
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END
p. 33 - p. 41
STRIKE News Nov. 1963
Gen. Adams Assigned
Additional Commands
The Commander in Chief of the United States Strike Command Gen. Paul D. Adams will in addition to his present assignment become responsible for all U.S. defense activities in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, including India and Pakistan, and
www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/.../nc1-349-79-01_sf115.pdf
File Format: PDF/ Regulations Background Papers of the US
www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/.../nc1-349-79-01_sf115.pdf
File Format: PDF/ Regulations Background Papers of the US
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